Suchergebnisse

The conditions that had facilitated the institutionalization of the Punto Fijo system during the 1960s had changed in the 1990s in the transition from a world society to highly unequal & urbanized society, the new era of globalization & integration, as well as the parallel backlash to the negative consequences of these developments throughout the world. The examination of the failure of the Punto Fijo democracy to structural changes, both nationally & globally identifies vulnerabilities that led to Chavez crosscutting electoral support. The beginning of the decline of Punto Fijo is pegged at the confluence of structural & institutional factors on Black Friday (February 18, 1983) in the Bolivarian Participatory Democracy (1998-2000) & the course of democracy in the Republic (2001-2003). This work confirms that political economy & political culture variables contribute to explaining political change in Venezuela, & institutional variables are even more central to explaining the unraveling of post-1958 representative democracy. A summarization of the institutional hypotheses generated from this analysis supports the conclusion that the Venezuelan case provides important clues of how apparently institutionalized representative democracies can unravel when stressed, & is a very important lesson for leaders seeking to normalize the political regime and the more recent democracies that took root in the 1980s in many countries of the developing world. References. J. Harwell

"Most classical political theorists agree that politics should aim at achieving 'the common good'. They also agree that the content of this common good can be known. This conclusion seems to have potentially undemocratic consequences. A popular response to this perceived problem by theorists of democracy is that the democratic process itself is a means of determining the content of the common good. There are two possible versions of this thesis: either the supposed common good is something which only emerges within the democratic process itself, or the common good exists independently of the process, and the process is the best means of determining its content. The latter version is often supported by de Condorcet's famous Jury Theorem. Both versions have their weaknesses. The constitutive version leads into a pragmatic inconsistency, while the indicative version cannot justify the role of the Opposition. My conclusion is that a plausible defence of democracy cannot be based solely on the epistemic considerations. It has to be based on egalitarian considerations: democratic processes are fair because they treat all citizens as equals. However, the notion of the common good may still play an indirect role in justifying democratic processes. Even though democratic majorities do not possess any specific epistemic virtues, democratic processes may still, in the long run, be more likely to reach the common good than experts or philosopher-kings." (author's abstract).

This historical narrative traces the severing of the unbroken thread of Venezuelan democracy from the Betancourt administration of 1959 through Chavez's coup de grace of the dying Punto Fijo democracy & the disillusionment of the 1970s & 80s to contextualize the hard times described in the remainder of the volume. The eras are periodized as elite settlement & convergence from 1957 to 1959, the policy convergence of the political regime up to 1975, & the results of weaknesses & embedded vulnerabilities. The first phase is characterized as an era of power flowing to political party leaders, codification of points of agreements between elites that flowed into the second phase of convergence in which the Punto Fijo political regime was accepted as normal & legitimate up until 1975. The results of four critical weaknesses embedded in the post-1957-1959 democracy during convergence policy undermined the hard-won consensus, & shattered one of the oldest & most respected representative democracies in Latin America. Support among Venezuelan elites for the 1957-1959 settlements appeared broad and deep as of 1975. Prosperity & political stability legitimated limited pluralist roles of the political game in a country that had almost no experience of democracy, but the optimism was brief. Petroleum prices plummeted during 1982, & in 1983 the massive devaluation exploded the myth that there was enough wealth for all Venezuelans to enjoy the good life. Hard times marked the remainder of the decade. References. J. Harwell

Theories of political legitimacy & elite settlements provide a framework to study the relationship between intellectuals and political change to argue that the role played by Venezuelan intellectuals is one of the keys to explaining the demise of Punto Fijo democracy. The writings of Roman Catholic, Marxists & nationalist intellectuals during the Punto Fijo regime had cumulative effects of hostile currents discrediting the AD/COPEI party domination & the entire post -- 1958 democratic enterprise, but intellectual opposition failed to produce a consensus on a viable alternative to the existing political regime. The expression of citizen frustration at exclusion from meaningful participation in mainstream media stepped up criticism to minor changes implemented by government & response to the second failed coup attempt in 1992. The rise of Chavez's Bolivarian thought -- or Chavismo -- criticized political parties in favor of promises of a "social revolution." The intellectuals who backed Chavez harbored great resentment against the two parties, & attracted a new group of intellectuals who preached direct democracy as a desirable alternative to party control over government, but no consensus about which changes would improve the quality of economic & political life emerged from the 1990s debate. In the end, Chavez cited with the leftist, anti-system intellectuals to view representative institutions as designed to thwart the popular will & protect privilege, & to preach a democracy in which government would respond directly & rapidly to the will of the majority. References. J. Harwell

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) asserts that East & West are not so different that Western political theory could gain but little purchase in Eastern Europe. Taking the example of national minority rights in Romania, it is argued that universal ethical values underpin solutions to minority issues; the necessity of confronting modernity is the basis of key questions facing Western & Eastern European societies; globalization's interconnectedness makes this focus on modernity crucial; & that a society, as a functional system, must identify & resolve member problems. Following a brief look at Romania's ethnic diversity, nationalism as a form of political legitimation in postcommunist societies is touched on. Romanian nationalism, 1992-1996, is next addressed, noting how it effectively undermined pre-1990 legal protections of national minorities. Reconciliation with the Hungarian minority followed after the 1996 elections & in accordance with criteria for NATO & EU integration, & it is noted that the Hungarian minority question in Romania became one of regional stability as Hungary took responsibility for Hungarians outside its borders. In this light, it is contended that, contra Kymlicka, there is no need for any new political theory to account for Romanian diversity as Western thought & ideas were consistently drawn on by minority representatives & activists. Attention turns to principles of cultural autonomy & justice as applied to the Romanian case, delineating three levels of cost: civil/political rights, special measures, & social/economic rights. J. Zendejas

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) asserts that East & West are not so different that Western political theory could gain but little purchase in Eastern Europe. Taking the example of national minority rights in Romania, it is argued that universal ethical values underpin solutions to minority issues; the necessity of confronting modernity is the basis of key questions facing Western & Eastern European societies; globalization's interconnectedness makes this focus on modernity crucial; & that a society, as a functional system, must identify & resolve member problems. Following a brief look at Romania's ethnic diversity, nationalism as a form of political legitimation in postcommunist societies is touched on. Romanian nationalism, 1992-1996, is next addressed, noting how it effectively undermined pre-1990 legal protections of national minorities. Reconciliation with the Hungarian minority followed after the 1996 elections & in accordance with criteria for NATO & EU integration, & it is noted that the Hungarian minority question in Romania became one of regional stability as Hungary took responsibility for Hungarians outside its borders. In this light, it is contended that, contra Kymlicka, there is no need for any new political theory to account for Romanian diversity as Western thought & ideas were consistently drawn on by minority representatives & activists. Attention turns to principles of cultural autonomy & justice as applied to the Romanian case, delineating three levels of cost: civil/political rights, special measures, & social/economic rights. J. Zendejas

The message of Habermas's "Manifesto"(2003) that the citizens of Europe need to become aware of their common politics in which a "European identity" would enable the EU to confront the US with an alternative vision & concept of world order is questioned in terms of whether or not the Manifesto actually represents a European "counterhegemonic project." Habermas was convinced that the moment was a good historical point for concentrating the elements of European identity into a political force supporting international politics of the governments of Germany, France & Belgium within the EU, but the two parallel aims of Europe as a profitable junior partner to the US, & constructing a strong European competitor are contradictory. The critiques of the Manifesto as a document of "European anti-Americanism" and a contribution to the split of Europe established the process that finally decided the fate of the Franco-German initiative which proposed to lead the EU into opposition against US policy on Iraq & to realize projects of political integration. The main lesson that may be learned from Habermas' failed Manifesto is that the field of international politics is not the appropriate place for rallying critical intellectuals against American imperialism. Progressive movements need to be addressed as potential actors for the construction of a counter-hegemony which is not based on competition between two neoliberal variants of capitalism, but upon the program of a real alternative to American & European leg of global capitalism, namely a new socialist project. References. J. Harwell

In this forward by the Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy magazine, the author contextualizes the surprising developments in Venezuela over the past decade to counter the common wisdom about the primacy of an incompetent opposition funded by displaced Venezuelan elites as the context for an exploration of Venezuelan history and its role in the region. The particularity of Venezuelan history in the 21st century can be interpreted as either a relic of the past or a harbinger of things to come in Latin America & elsewhere in the developing world. As a model in the region, the politics of rage, race, & revenge used by Chavez to mobilize supporters are reflected in new political movements sprouting throughout the region. Their grievances all stem from their countries poor economic performance, the chronic inability of governments to deploy more effective social policies, & an intense democratization process that has enabled the emergence of new political actors capable of challenging the traditional political parties. The assumption that corruption is the single most important cause of poverty & inequality has become an impediment to political, economic, & social progress threatened the region. The Venezuelan experience serves as an example of the collateral damages caused by ineffective, misguided & bankrupt war on corruption. The dominant thought that the money is there, it's just a matter of distributing it better is refuted to show the money stopped being there years ago. Whether the conclusion that "in revolutionary times stealing is more important than ideas" will be answered if Venezuela replaces real achievements with corruption, rage, & revenge to define the nation's political soul. J. Harwell

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) begins discussion with why Eastern Central European postcommunist societies might be reluctant to apply liberal & democratic approaches with respect to accommodating ethnocultural diversity. The region's historical legacy is seen as a prime basis for this aversion. Four options for minorities are next cited: marginalization, assimilation, & two forms of integration -- de facto autonomy & personal cultural autonomy. Eastern Central European countries have tried to limit their minorities to the first two options; some attention is given to Greece, seen as one of the most insecure countries regarding minority rights (despite not being a postcommunist country in transition), & its efforts to reform its minority & citizenship policies. Light is shed on the "minority rights paradox" whereby regardless of the growth of a culture of minority rights in society as a whole, there is almost no minority-rights-based political culture in the minorities themselves. Three reasons for this paradox are given, along with an exception that confirms the rule, ie, Hungarian minorities in Southeast Europe. It is contended that should this paradox be eclipsed, then minorities stand a chance to achieve recognition of & respect for their rights. Although majority nation building must concomitantly eschew coercive practices, hegemonic methods, restrictive policies, & exclusivist agendas that foster ethnocultural conflict; nation-building projects must respect all other nation-building projects that citizens might identify with, eg, in the case of Greece, the Macedonian & Turkish nations. J. Zendejas

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) begins discussion with why Eastern Central European postcommunist societies might be reluctant to apply liberal & democratic approaches with respect to accommodating ethnocultural diversity. The region's historical legacy is seen as a prime basis for this aversion. Four options for minorities are next cited: marginalization, assimilation, & two forms of integration -- de facto autonomy & personal cultural autonomy. Eastern Central European countries have tried to limit their minorities to the first two options; some attention is given to Greece, seen as one of the most insecure countries regarding minority rights (despite not being a postcommunist country in transition), & its efforts to reform its minority & citizenship policies. Light is shed on the "minority rights paradox" whereby regardless of the growth of a culture of minority rights in society as a whole, there is almost no minority-rights-based political culture in the minorities themselves. Three reasons for this paradox are given, along with an exception that confirms the rule, ie, Hungarian minorities in Southeast Europe. It is contended that should this paradox be eclipsed, then minorities stand a chance to achieve recognition of & respect for their rights. Although majority nation building must concomitantly eschew coercive practices, hegemonic methods, restrictive policies, & exclusivist agendas that foster ethnocultural conflict; nation-building projects must respect all other nation-building projects that citizens might identify with, eg, in the case of Greece, the Macedonian & Turkish nations. J. Zendejas

The possibility for a world trade system to put basic human rights & the environment at its core has an edgy feel, especially since, for the first time in our history of humanity, economic values have now superseded every human value, & the language of economics is like a gang of thieves breaking & entering our brains & stealing our sense of compassion. The possibility for trade justice to thrive requires not being passive spectators but actors to rewrite the play to not even allow people to be labeled consumers. Change will never come about by governments or businesses that have no emotion other than fear & greed. Change will always come about by moral dissenters to the persistence of small committee groups of people willing to fail over long periods of time until the damn of oppression, indifference, & greed finally cracks. It is a lifetime's work to clear away all the fatuous fantasies & false promises created by the media & political & economic market leaders. The real threat to corporate globalization is the peer is the irresistible appeal of carnival as a tactic of dissent in which spontaneity & pleasure characterize resistance & rebellion. The people that make up the rag-tag line encircling the globe of millions of grassroots initiatives who know that freedom isn't the right to vote a dozen times in your life, but the right to decide your economic as well as your political destiny, which is what economic globalization is stealing from people all over the world. This is the new politics for a new century, and this above all else brings optimism. References. J. Harwell