Suchergebnisse

The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy. ; The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy.

Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.

Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.

The article presents the history of the military higher education system, which is connected to the shaping of the Polish statehood as well as its present state. The structure of this type of education system was dependent on the e ectiveness of socio-economic, political and military activities of public authorities. However, it is only the November Uprising which is generally associated with the revolt of the o cers from the O cer Cadets School [Szkoła Podchorazych] in Warsaw. The changes which occur within the military education system on account of its adjustment to the requirements of the Act "Law on higher education" of 27 June 2005 are very positive. They accommodate military higher education institutions to the public system of higher education, they in uence the development and the quality of education in these institutions, they obliged them to implement the regulations arising from the National Quali cations Framework and to observe all the procedures arising from the legislations which are enacted in the domain of higher education by the competent public authorities.

This paper analyzes the issue of nations without states in contemporary Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. The political map of the continent comprises forty-seven countries, most of which are nation-states. However, the cultural mosaic of Europe is far more complex; there are around fifty ethnic groups (in addition to historical, territorial, or indigenous ethnic minorities and an enormous number of immigrant ethnic communities) lacking a state-based organization. Together, these people add up to 78 million, or almost 15% of the European population. Twenty-seven groups can be considered nations without states; they are culturally and ethnically based and have various forms of territorial integrity and political organization. However, they did not create a state organization, despite many attempts by some through history. Without a state organization, those communities have poorer opportunities to protect their folk culture and to reproduce various elements of ethnic identity. This is why they seek territorial autonomy or independent statehood through nationalist movements. In many cases, these ambitions are encompassed in regional movements. These movements have been popular in Europe, particularly because the idea of a "Europe of regions" as part of the European Union has had broad political support and acceptance. However, it has not actually succeeded. The EU and Europe as a whole are still a Europe of (nation)-states. In general, regional movements have been successful and through this some nations without states have attained part of their political ambitions in the form of territorial autonomy. The regionalization of former centralist states (e.g., Spain and the United Kingdom) increased the chances of ethnic survival for the Catalans, Basques, Scots, and Welsh. On the other hand, the regionalization of nations without states represented territorial division, a kind of "divide and rule" strategy serving to reduce their ambitions towards national independence. The territorial and political reconstruction of nation-states has been successful, but it did not solve all ethnic problems. The European political map reveals another interesting phenomenon: a double state for some nations. These are particularly typical for the Balkans. Because of political and territorial development after the Second World War and during the transition period in the 1990s and beyond, the principle of immutable political borders (logically encompassing the creation of new nation-states as well) led to further political and territorial divisions and (in fact, paradoxically) fragmentation. Some of these "inner" autonomous territories are functioning as de facto states. The cases of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina are good examples of these processes. This development has not garnered much political support in most European countries or at the EU level. However, it is an undesirable reality and is certainly one of changes among the political and territorial (or even greater) challenges for the Europe of tomorrow. It forces a reexamination of the phenomenon and value of nations. The existence of nations without states represents a potential for the creation of new (nation) states.

In 2009, following the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the United States, the American public entered into a fierce debate on how to reform its health care system. The intense debate on health care reform, however, is not a new phenomenon in American political life. Debate over health care has cycled its way into the American political discourse every twenty-years or so. History suggests that forceful opposition has prevailed against most major efforts to alter the health system in the United States. Yet, once again the Democratically-controlled Congress and Presidency in the United States aspire to break this cycle of history. With both houses in Congress passing a bill with significant reforms, it seems that this time may be different. While it is very likely some reforms will pass in 2010, no law has been signed yet56. In the end, only time will dictate the outcome of this round of health reform debates. Through a thorough literature review, this article provides the Polish reader a sense of health care reform efforts in the U.S. from the historical perspective and discusses the current proposed reforms. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the American health insurance system, failed efforts of past health reform initiatives, their contrast with today's efforts, and current health and economic indicators that could lead to reform in 2010.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.