Suchergebnisse

The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy. ; The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy.

Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.

Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.

The article presents the history of the military higher education system, which is connected to the shaping of the Polish statehood as well as its present state. The structure of this type of education system was dependent on the e ectiveness of socio-economic, political and military activities of public authorities. However, it is only the November Uprising which is generally associated with the revolt of the o cers from the O cer Cadets School [Szkoła Podchorazych] in Warsaw. The changes which occur within the military education system on account of its adjustment to the requirements of the Act "Law on higher education" of 27 June 2005 are very positive. They accommodate military higher education institutions to the public system of higher education, they in uence the development and the quality of education in these institutions, they obliged them to implement the regulations arising from the National Quali cations Framework and to observe all the procedures arising from the legislations which are enacted in the domain of higher education by the competent public authorities.

In 2009, following the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the United States, the American public entered into a fierce debate on how to reform its health care system. The intense debate on health care reform, however, is not a new phenomenon in American political life. Debate over health care has cycled its way into the American political discourse every twenty-years or so. History suggests that forceful opposition has prevailed against most major efforts to alter the health system in the United States. Yet, once again the Democratically-controlled Congress and Presidency in the United States aspire to break this cycle of history. With both houses in Congress passing a bill with significant reforms, it seems that this time may be different. While it is very likely some reforms will pass in 2010, no law has been signed yet56. In the end, only time will dictate the outcome of this round of health reform debates. Through a thorough literature review, this article provides the Polish reader a sense of health care reform efforts in the U.S. from the historical perspective and discusses the current proposed reforms. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the American health insurance system, failed efforts of past health reform initiatives, their contrast with today's efforts, and current health and economic indicators that could lead to reform in 2010.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

In this article the author refers to issues relating to the system of control and enforcement of state aid law in the European Union in the years 2000-2010. It presented the architecture of the state aid control system in the light of new rules and procedures for its admissibility. The analysis concerned the European Commission's powers and the role of the Member States' courts in state aid policy-making. The article contains empirical data showing the direction of changes in the value and structure of state aid in the European Union. The study involved the practice issued by the European Commission decisions declaring state aid as incompatible with European competition law and these are the subject of the investigation procedure. In this context information is presented on the number of cases and the value of state aid to be recovered in the Member States, referring to the interventions undertaken in various sectors of the European Community. ; W artykule autor odnosi się do problematyki kontroli i egzekwowania prawa pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej w latach 2000-2010. Przedstawiono system kontroli pomocy publicznej w świetle nowych reguł i procedur jej dopuszczalności. Zaprezentowano kompetencje Komisji Europejskiej i rolę sądów państw członkowskich w kształtowaniu polityki udzielania pomocy publicznej. Artykuł zawiera dane empiryczne przedstawiające kierunki zmian w wartości i strukturze udzielania pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej. Analizie poddano praktykę wydawanych przez Komisję Europejską decyzji, uznających pomoc publiczną za niezgodną z europejskim prawem konkurencji oraz będących przedmiotem prowadzonego postępowania wyjaśniającego. W tym kontekście zaprezentowano informacje dotyczące liczby spraw i wartość pomocy publicznej podlegającej zwrotowi w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich oraz odnoszące się do interwencji podjętych w różnych sektorach gospodarki Wspólnoty.

In this article the author refers to issues relating to the system of control and enforcement of state aid law in the European Union in the years 2000-2010. It presented the architecture of the state aid control system in the light of new rules and procedures for its admissibility. The analysis concerned the European Commission's powers and the role of the Member States' courts in state aid policy-making. The article contains empirical data showing the direction of changes in the value and structure of state aid in the European Union. The study involved the practice issued by the European Commission decisions declaring state aid as incompatible with European competition law and these are the subject of the investigation procedure. In this context information is presented on the number of cases and the value of state aid to be recovered in the Member States, referring to the interventions undertaken in various sectors of the European Community. ; W artykule autor odnosi się do problematyki kontroli i egzekwowania prawa pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej w latach 2000-2010. Przedstawiono system kontroli pomocy publicznej w świetle nowych reguł i procedur jej dopuszczalności. Zaprezentowano kompetencje Komisji Europejskiej i rolę sądów państw członkowskich w kształtowaniu polityki udzielania pomocy publicznej. Artykuł zawiera dane empiryczne przedstawiające kierunki zmian w wartości i strukturze udzielania pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej. Analizie poddano praktykę wydawanych przez Komisję Europejską decyzji, uznających pomoc publiczną za niezgodną z europejskim prawem konkurencji oraz będących przedmiotem prowadzonego postępowania wyjaśniającego. W tym kontekście zaprezentowano informacje dotyczące liczby spraw i wartość pomocy publicznej podlegającej zwrotowi w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich oraz odnoszące się do interwencji podjętych w różnych sektorach gospodarki Wspólnoty.

Intencją autorów jest przyjrzenie się obecnemu kierunkowi reform szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce przez pryzmat zrealizowanej nordyckiej utopii, czyli tych rozwiązań systemowych dotyczących szkolnictwa i uniwersytetów, do których w sensie ideowym i strukturalnym zmierza także polskie szkolnictwo wyższe. Mimo wieloletniej tradycji wykorzystywania uniwersytetów do realizacji idei egalitaryzmu i utylitaryzmu społecznego w myśl założeń państwa opiekuńczego, państwa nordyckie w ciągu ostatnich dwudziestu lat stopniowo zmieniły politykę szkolnictwa wyższego i poczyniły znaczące kroki w kierunku zastąpienia modelu kontroli państwa nad szkolnictwem wyższym modelem luźniejszego nadzoru państwowego nad tym sektorem. Przeszły zatem wcześniej niż Polska zmianę, którą teoretycy umiejscawiają w szerszym kontekście ewolucji humboldtowskiego modelu szkolnictwa wyższego w kierunku modelu anglo-amerykańskiego. Niniejszy tekst dotyczy głównych aspektów i linii podziału między systemem anglo-amerykańskim i humboldtowskim w odniesieniu do dwóch metaobszarów funkcjonowania szkolnictwa wyższego, tj. zarządzania i finansowania. Zestawienie proponowanych rozwiązań polskich z wprowadzonymi już rozwiązaniami w krajach nordyckich ma na celu ukazanie skomplikowania i większej złożoności tego procesu niż mogłoby to wynikać ze schematycznych opisów typów idealnych. ; The authors' intent is to examine the current direction of reforms in Poland's higher education in the light of the fulfilled Nordic utopia, i.e. the systemie Solutions in school education and universities which Poland's higher education is aiming for, ideologically and structurally. Despite many years of tradition in employing universities as a tool to establish the idea of egalitarism and social utilitarianism within a welfare State, Nordic countries have gradually modified their higher education policies in the last twenty years, making significant steps towards replacing the State control model with a more loose State supervision over the sector. Therefore, they went ahead of Poland in making a change which theoreticians put in a broader context of evolution from the Humboldtian to the Anglo- American model of higher education. The paper focuses on key aspects and dividing lines between the Anglo-American model and the Humboldtian model, making a reference to two meta-areas of higher education i.e. management and funding. The proposed Polish Solutions are juxtaposed with the already-implemented Nordic Solutions in order to show that this process is more complex than one might assume on the basis of formulaic descriptions of ideal types.

The aim of the study is a comparison of re-privatization policy pursued in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with particular emphasis on the former GDR. Poland has chosen a completely different approach to this issue from that of the Germans. Despite the claims of former owners concerned, in almost 2/3 of the former GDR territory, the German legislature quickly and decisively resolved these issues, so that they do not impinge on the current social and economic life of Germany. Poland however, after two decades of transformation, has still not developed a clear position on this issue, while successive legislation projects end in failure or are postponed indefinitely. This practice leads to doubt as to whether our country can be regarded as fully integrated with the West in terms of compliance with standards of the modern state, which resolves sensitive issues and seeks to eliminate hot spots in contacts with foreign countries (e.g. the return of former Jewish property). Reprivatization is important for several reasons, of both legal and economic nature. Lack of a solution raises a sense of injustice among former owners, generates numerous conflicts on the citizen-state line, and calls into question the constitutionally guaranteed protection of property rights in Poland. On the other hand, a thankless objective of an economist is to assess the economic aspects of a possible compensation program – could Poland afford it? What would be the costs of abandonment of any action? In the first part of the study the regulations on property restitution in the former Eastern bloc countries are shortly discussed. Then attention is paid to the legal and economic conditions of the property restitution process in Poland. The article ends with conclusions. ; Cel opracowania stanowi porównanie polityki reprywatyzacyjnej prowadzonej w Polsce i w innych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem byłej NRD. W Polsce zaobserwować można zupełnie odmienne podejście do tej problematyki niż u naszych zachodnich sąsiadów. Pomimo, że roszczenia dawnych właścicieli dotyczyły niemal 2/3 terytorium byłej NRD, niemiecki ustawodawca szybko i zdecydowanie rozwiązał te kwestie, dzięki czemu nie rzutują one na obecne życie społeczne i gospodarcze RFN. Polska natomiast po dwóch dekadach transformacji wciąż nie wypracowała jasnego stanowiska w tej sprawie, zaś kolejne rządy podejmują bezskuteczne próby regulacji lub odsuwają problem w bliżej nieokreśloną przyszłość. Taka praktyka każe wątpić, czy można uznać nasz kraj za w pełni zintegrowany z Zachodem, w sensie spełniania standardów nowoczesnego państwa, które rozwiązuje drażliwe sprawy i stara się likwidować punkty zapalne w kontaktach z zagranicą (np. zwrot mienia pożydowskiego). Reprywatyzacja jest istotna z kilku przynajmniej powodów o naturze zarówno prawnej, jak i ekonomicznej. Brak rozwiązania dawnych krzywd rodzi poczucie niesprawiedliwości, generuje liczne konflikty na linii obywatel-państwo i rodzi wątpliwości w gwarantowaną konstytucyjnie ochronę praw własności w naszym kraju. Z drugiej strony należy pytać o aspekty ekonomiczne ewentualnego programu odszkodowawczego – czy Polskę po prostu na to stać? Jakie są koszty zaniechania jakichkolwiek działań? W pierwszej części opracowania omówione zostaną uwarunkowania prawne i ekonomiczne procesu reprywatyzacji w Polsce. Następnie przybliżone zostaną regulacje dotyczące zwrotu majątku w wybranych krajach byłego bloku wschodniego. Artykuł kończą wnioski.

The aim of the study is a comparison of re-privatization policy pursued in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with particular emphasis on the former GDR. Poland has chosen a completely different approach to this issue from that of the Germans. Despite the claims of former owners concerned, in almost 2/3 of the former GDR territory, the German legislature quickly and decisively resolved these issues, so that they do not impinge on the current social and economic life of Germany. Poland however, after two decades of transformation, has still not developed a clear position on this issue, while successive legislation projects end in failure or are postponed indefinitely. This practice leads to doubt as to whether our country can be regarded as fully integrated with the West in terms of compliance with standards of the modern state, which resolves sensitive issues and seeks to eliminate hot spots in contacts with foreign countries (e.g. the return of former Jewish property). Reprivatization is important for several reasons, of both legal and economic nature. Lack of a solution raises a sense of injustice among former owners, generates numerous conflicts on the citizen-state line, and calls into question the constitutionally guaranteed protection of property rights in Poland. On the other hand, a thankless objective of an economist is to assess the economic aspects of a possible compensation program – could Poland afford it? What would be the costs of abandonment of any action? In the first part of the study the regulations on property restitution in the former Eastern bloc countries are shortly discussed. Then attention is paid to the legal and economic conditions of the property restitution process in Poland. The article ends with conclusions. ; Cel opracowania stanowi porównanie polityki reprywatyzacyjnej prowadzonej w Polsce i w innych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem byłej NRD. W Polsce zaobserwować można zupełnie odmienne podejście do tej problematyki niż u naszych zachodnich sąsiadów. Pomimo, że roszczenia dawnych właścicieli dotyczyły niemal 2/3 terytorium byłej NRD, niemiecki ustawodawca szybko i zdecydowanie rozwiązał te kwestie, dzięki czemu nie rzutują one na obecne życie społeczne i gospodarcze RFN. Polska natomiast po dwóch dekadach transformacji wciąż nie wypracowała jasnego stanowiska w tej sprawie, zaś kolejne rządy podejmują bezskuteczne próby regulacji lub odsuwają problem w bliżej nieokreśloną przyszłość. Taka praktyka każe wątpić, czy można uznać nasz kraj za w pełni zintegrowany z Zachodem, w sensie spełniania standardów nowoczesnego państwa, które rozwiązuje drażliwe sprawy i stara się likwidować punkty zapalne w kontaktach z zagranicą (np. zwrot mienia pożydowskiego). Reprywatyzacja jest istotna z kilku przynajmniej powodów o naturze zarówno prawnej, jak i ekonomicznej. Brak rozwiązania dawnych krzywd rodzi poczucie niesprawiedliwości, generuje liczne konflikty na linii obywatel-państwo i rodzi wątpliwości w gwarantowaną konstytucyjnie ochronę praw własności w naszym kraju. Z drugiej strony należy pytać o aspekty ekonomiczne ewentualnego programu odszkodowawczego – czy Polskę po prostu na to stać? Jakie są koszty zaniechania jakichkolwiek działań? W pierwszej części opracowania omówione zostaną uwarunkowania prawne i ekonomiczne procesu reprywatyzacji w Polsce. Następnie przybliżone zostaną regulacje dotyczące zwrotu majątku w wybranych krajach byłego bloku wschodniego. Artykuł kończą wnioski.

Implementing the concept of sustainable development is one of the major challenges facing the modern world. One of the instruments creating sustainable development might be state aid. State aid has an impact not only on the economic sphere but also the environmental and social. State aid can have beneficial, negative or neutral impact on the implementation of sustainable development. The impact of state aid should be considered including the three spheres: economic, social and environmental. The main objective of this article is to try to identify tools and approaches that can be used to examine the impact of the measure state aid for sustainable development and to show which state aid is detrimental to sustainable development. The article presents such instruments and give its in-depth describe. The article consists of three main parts. The first part shows state aid in the concept of sustainable development. Another part shows which state aid can be regarded as harmful to sustainable development. The third part presents the tool with which we can identify harmful state aid. ; Wdrażanie koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju należy do najważniejszych wyzwań stojących przed współczesnym światem. Jednym z instrumentów kreowania zrównoważonego rozwoju może być pomoc publiczna. Pomoc publiczna ma bowiem wpływ nie tylko na sferę ekonomiczna, ale także środowiskową i społeczna. Pomoc publiczna może mięć korzystny, niekorzystny lub też neutralny wpływ na wdrażanie zrównoważonego rozwoju. Aby to ocenić, należy rozpatrywać wpływ pomocy publicznej łącznie na trzy sfery: ekonomiczna, społeczna i środowiskową. Głównym celem artykułu jest podjecie próby wskazania narzędzi i sposobów, za pomocą których można badać wpływ danego środka pomocy publicznej na zrównoważony rozwój i pokazywać, jaka pomoc publiczna jest szkodliwa dla zrównoważonego rozwoju. Artykuł prezentuje taki instrument i dokonuje jego wszechstronnego opisu. Opracowanie składa sie z trzech zasadniczych części. W pierwszej pokazano miejsce pomocy publicznej w koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju. Kolejna cześć prezentuje, jaka pomoc publiczna można traktować za szkodliwa dla zrównoważonego rozwoju. Cześć trzecia przedstawia narzędzie, za pomocą którego można identyfikować szkodliwa pomoc publiczna.

Implementing the concept of sustainable development is one of the major challenges facing the modern world. One of the instruments creating sustainable development might be state aid. State aid has an impact not only on the economic sphere but also the environmental and social. State aid can have beneficial, negative or neutral impact on the implementation of sustainable development. The impact of state aid should be considered including the three spheres: economic, social and environmental. The main objective of this article is to try to identify tools and approaches that can be used to examine the impact of the measure state aid for sustainable development and to show which state aid is detrimental to sustainable development. The article presents such instruments and give its in-depth describe. The article consists of three main parts. The first part shows state aid in the concept of sustainable development. Another part shows which state aid can be regarded as harmful to sustainable development. The third part presents the tool with which we can identify harmful state aid. ; Wdrażanie koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju należy do najważniejszych wyzwań stojących przed współczesnym światem. Jednym z instrumentów kreowania zrównoważonego rozwoju może być pomoc publiczna. Pomoc publiczna ma bowiem wpływ nie tylko na sferę ekonomiczna, ale także środowiskową i społeczna. Pomoc publiczna może mięć korzystny, niekorzystny lub też neutralny wpływ na wdrażanie zrównoważonego rozwoju. Aby to ocenić, należy rozpatrywać wpływ pomocy publicznej łącznie na trzy sfery: ekonomiczna, społeczna i środowiskową. Głównym celem artykułu jest podjecie próby wskazania narzędzi i sposobów, za pomocą których można badać wpływ danego środka pomocy publicznej na zrównoważony rozwój i pokazywać, jaka pomoc publiczna jest szkodliwa dla zrównoważonego rozwoju. Artykuł prezentuje taki instrument i dokonuje jego wszechstronnego opisu. Opracowanie składa sie z trzech zasadniczych części. W pierwszej pokazano miejsce pomocy publicznej w koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju. Kolejna cześć prezentuje, jaka pomoc publiczna można traktować za szkodliwa dla zrównoważonego rozwoju. Cześć trzecia przedstawia narzędzie, za pomocą którego można identyfikować szkodliwa pomoc publiczna.