Suchergebnisse

NATO har i det seneste årti orienteret sig mod de defensive aktiviteter i cyberspace, men i slutningen af 2017 gjorde alliancen det klart, at fremtidig planlægning af militære operationer også kommer til at indeholde muligheden for offensive cyberspaceoperationer (OCO). Inklusionen af OCO sker ved hjælp af en såkaldt "effektbaseret model". Ifølge denne model efterspørger NATOs øverstkommanderende – igennem det nyoprettede NATO Cyber Operations Centre – en specifik cybereffekt hos medlemsstaterne. Nærværende artikel peger på modellens muligheder og udfordringer. For selvom OCO indeholder et potentiale som redskab for løbende forstyrrelser af modstanderens netværk, så indeholder OCO også en række begrænsninger og faldgruber, når de skal integreres i en forespørgselsdreven og effektbaseret model: Det gælder i særlig grad manglende koordination omkring effekter (risiko for kollisioner) samt vanskeligheder ved inddæmning og vurdering af effekter. Disse begrænsninger svækker signalet om, at alliancen nu mestrer og for alvor vil gøre brug af cyberdomænet. Ønsker NATO at sende et klart signal, bør alliancen drøfte internt, hvordan man forholder sig til de aktiviteter, der ikke blot knytter sig til væbnet konflikt, som cyberspace også – og primært – tilbyder.
Absract in English
For the past decade, NATO has prioritised a strengthened cyber defence. However, at the end of 2017, the alliance made it clear that future operational planning will include the possibility of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The integration of OCO will happen through an effect-based model where the NATO commander – through the new NATO Cyber Operations Centre – requests a specific effect from member states. This article assesses the risks and opportunities of this model. It argues that even though OCO holds much potential for constant disruptions of an adversary's networks, OCO comes with several limitations and pitfalls when integrated through a request- and effect-based model. These include the risk of confliction and the difficulty of containing and assessing cyber effects. Such limitations weaken the ability to signal that NATO has the capacity to master this new domain. If NATO wants a to send a clear signal to adversaries, then the alliance needs to start discussing how it can utilise the possibilities below the threshold of armed conflict, which cyberspace primarily offers.

AbstractI estimate whether the ability to anonymously surrender an infant to a safe haven site such as a hospital, police station, or fire station in the United States affects child well‐being. By analyzing variation in state safe haven policies, I find safe haven laws significantly increase infant foster care entrance. I further find suggestive evidence of safe havens reducing infant deaths. The mortality effects are immediate but subside over time, implying infants have been relinquished when their alternative was not death from abuse or abandonment. Robustness checks and falsification tests support these findings.

In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.

During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th and 18th centuries. This noble group was re-garded as a strong partner of the German Imperial Catholic Church, the Reichskirche. Last but not least its members owed their remarkable political careers to the Church, but their idea of marriage were never-the-less in opposition to the canonical marriage laws; in fact, in planning exactly these political careers, which they owed to the Church, their concept of marriage clashed with the impediments to marriage that too close kinship posed. My paper aims at ana-lysing the marriage law of the Church as a papal instrument of influence over this special group of nobles. ; During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th ...

Omfattende kommersiell datasporing og salg av svært detaljerte digitale profiler for markedsføring kan utnyttes og manipuleres av fremmede makter for spionasje, sabotasje og subversion. Datasettenes digitale natur medfører større detaljgrad, maskinlesbarhet optimalisert for automatisering, lange tidsserier, sanntidspotensial og mindre ressurskrevende datainnhenting sammenlignet med analoge metoder. Et globalt, uoversiktlig datamarked er sårbart for dataangrep og manglende verdikjedekontroll. Påstått anonymisering er ikke tilfredsstillende, og økt lagrings- og prosesseringskraft gjør datasettene stadig mer sårbare for reidentifikasjon. Samfunnsdigitalisering, smarte enheter og overvåkningskapitalismen intensiverer og forenkler inntrengningen i den private sfære. Morgendagens ledere kan i teorien spores fra vugge til grav, den store datamengden kan utlede informasjon som burde være gradert. Overvåkningskapitalismen, i kombinasjon med åpenhetens dilemma, tilsier at store datamengder i fri dressur derfor bør være en kilde til bekymring. Samlet vil de strategiske effektene av persondata kunne få potensielle konsekvenser for både samfunns- og statssikkerheten. I det digitale rom blir derfor personvernsikkerhetsdilemma en falsk dikotomi. En demokratisk stat vil aldri kunne kontrollere borgernes totale digitale liv. Stadig økt overvåkning vil alltid møte kritikk knyttet til at det utfordrer demokratiske prinsipper. Og statens overvåkningsmonopol er utfordret. Artikkelen konkluderer derfor med at vi i større grad bør anse personvern som et kollektivt anliggende, og at sterk personvernlovgivning kan være et verktøy for nasjonal sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Digital Tracking – a Matter of National SecurityMore complex threat actors and risk assessments, e.g., hybrid threats, are often met with calls for increased government surveillance, which is of concern for democratic integrity. The two are therefore often presented as opposite poles. However, surveillance capitalism and the sale of extensive digital profiles can be manipulated and exploited by foreign powers for espionage, sabotage and subversion. The strategic effect is likely to increase as digitalization of governance, Smart Cities and IoT, as well as data storage and processing capacity, increase. The large amount of data can uncover information that should have been subject to clearance, tomorrow's leaders can in theory be tracked from infancy. In essence, the sale of personal data can have strategic effects on national security. As Surveillance capitalisms challenge the government surveillance monopoly, we should view privacy as a collective value for national defense.

This article analyzes Sweden's foreign policy 2011–2018. The article is part of a special issue on how the Nordic countries have responded to recent geopolitical change. The international context in which Sweden finds itself has in a number of ways changed drastically during the time of analysis. The foundations of Sweden's foreign policy, however, have seen less change. The Swedish policy adjustments we see are rather the effects of radical change taking place in the previous two decades: the EU membership, the partnership with NATO, and the abandonment of the policy of neutrality. Sweden is thus learning how to adapt to this transformation of its international orientation during a turbulent time in global politics. The article includes an overview of Swedish foreign policy and the literature on the topic. We discuss the major actors, institutions, tools and frameworks in the foreign policy making process. A detailed analysis of the Foreign Minister's Statement of Government Policy provides a temporal comparison over the last decade.

Gjennom EØS-avtalen ble det norske forskningssystemet koblet til en overnasjonal politikk preget av lagvis endring og ekspansjon. EUs økende engasjement i forskningspolitikken har resultert i et bredt sammensatt sett av forsknings- og innovasjonspolitiske virkemidler og en økende andel av EUs budsjett. Dette politikkområdet er båret av overnasjonale prinsipper for forskningsfinansiering og intense transnasjonale nettverk i sektoren. EØS-avtalen skapte en forutsigbar ramme for samhandling mellom norske og europeiske forskningsmiljøer med EUs rammeprogram for forskning som gravitasjonspunkt. Denne artikkelen retter oppmerksomheten mot de effekter denne 25-årige koblingen har hatt på det nasjonale forskningspolitiske nivå og på forskningsmiljøenes faglige aktiviteter.
Abstract in English:Free Flow of Science? The EEA Agreement's Significance for Research in NorwayThe EEA agreement linked the Norwegian research system with the EU's research policy domain, a policy area marked by layered change and expansion. The EU's increasing research policy engagement has resulted in a broad panoply of research and innovation instruments and an increasing share of the EU's budget. Integration in this policy area is carried by supranational principles for research funding and set of intense transnational policy and research networks. The EEA agreement created a predictable frame for interaction between Norwegian and European research with the Framework programmes for research as the node. This article looks at the effects that this connection has had on the national policy and research performing levels for the past 25 years.

Mesteparten av norske havområder ligger nord for polarsirkelen og er åsted for noen av verdens rikeste fiskerier. De største fiskebestandene er delt med andre land, og internasjonalt samarbeid om ressursforvaltningen er derfor en viktig dimensjon ved nordområdepolitikken. Slikt samarbeid er basert på globale normer om hvordan levende marine ressurser skal forvaltes og deles og foregår på en rekke arenaer både bilateralt og regionalt. Samtidig er det også utfordringer knyttet til blant annet fordeling av ressurser i Norskehavet og klimaendringer som medfører at fiskebestandenes utbredelse er omskiftelig. Et føre-var tiltak i forhold til det siste er etableringen av en avtale om å forhindre uregulert fiske i Polhavet.
Abstract in English:Oceans, Fish and Resource Management in the Northern AreasMost of Norway's oceans are situated to the north of the Arctic Circle and some of the world's richest fishing grounds are there. The largest fish stocks are shared with other countries, and international cooperation on the management of the resources is therefore an important aspect of Norway's northern policy. Such cooperation is based on the international norms for how living marine resources are to be managed and shared, and it takes place in a number of bilateral and regional fora. There are challenges related to the allocation of pelagic resources in the Norwegian Sea and climate change driving change in the geographical distribution of fish stocks in the ocean. A recent precautionary measure in relation to climate change and its effects on marine ecosystems is the establishment of an international agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in international waters in the central Arctic Ocean.

Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.

La oss være optimister og tenke oss frem til en verden i 2040 der klimamålene er nådd. Her må vi som Hornburg og Sending peker på i sin artikkel i forrige nummer av Internasjonal politikk tenke internasjonalt, også om perspektivet er Norge. Hva slags scenarier kan ligge til grunn for en slik utvikling? Artikkelen trekker opp tre slike. Det ene er at USA og Kina slår seg sammen i et klimanøytralt energikartell. Gjennom bruk av både handelsmakt og militær makt presser de frem et belte av kjernekraftverk og fornybare kraftkilder støttet opp av amerikansk teknologi og kinesisk industri. Det andre er at tingene går sin skjeve gang og at klimaets «vippepunkt» passeres. Ekstremvær, tørke og havstigning skaper større ødeleggelser enn finansmarkedet kan bære, produksjon og handel stopper opp og utslippene synker. Det tredje er en utvikling hvor marked og stater går sammen om forskning, utvikling og gjennomføring av nødvendige tiltak. Dette krever internasjonalt samarbeid om offentlige regulering og innovative bedrifter som sammen med statene kan satse på teknologisk og sosial utvikling. Bare i det siste scenariet vil vi kunne redde både klodens klima og demokratiet som styringsform.
Abstract in English:
Inspired by Hornburg and Sending in the previous issue, this comment draws up three different scenarios where the climate goals have been reached by 2040. Two are dystopian, one is optimistic but the only way to save both democracy and earth's present climate. Solutions must involve the big emission countries like the US, China and India. What would the world look like if USA and China decide to form a Cartel backed by economic and military power to monopolise the energy sector based on nuclear power and other fossil free sources" Another alternative is "business as usual" leading to the "tipping point" of global warming, with devastating effects on the global economy. Industry and trade cease in most parts of the world, and emissions are thereby reduced. The third scenario is where business and governments cooperate in research and development. This entails innovative market leaders, but also the use of strict regulation and interventions in the markets by government. Global firms can cooperate with progressive governments to circumvent governments in countries that refuse to act.

Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
Abstract in English:The US way or the Huawei: An analysis of how small and medium states stand on the Chinese giant's role in 5GThis article examines the technological and strategic rivalry between the US and China on the implementation of 5G networks, asking what influences how other states position themselves between the two superpowers. By building on three branches of political realism – balance-of-threat theory's notion that perception of threat drives states' alliance choices, patron-client theory's belief that the US can expect its client states to adhere to American foreign policy, and the theory that trade relations can be used as power tools – I derive a set of hypotheses and potentially relevant explanatory variables. As dependent variable, I measure 70 states' stances on China's controversial telecom giant Huawei's role in 5G. Bivariate analysis reveals three primary patterns: (1) States who are dwarfed by China's power, as well as states in China's immediate geographic region, appear to be more acceptive of Huawei's 5G. (2) States who see the US as their patron and who rely on Washington's security guarantee appear to be much more rejective of the company's 5G. (3) Trade relations to both the US and China appear to have little or no effect on states' stances. Of the three branches of realism, it is the patron-client theory that offers the most weight in explaining states' stances on Huawei's 5G.

Artikkelen ser på mulighetene og utfordringene med avskrekking som strategisk tilnærming til det stadig viktigere cyberdomenet, fra et småstatsperspektiv. Forfatterne argumenterer for at det er essensielt å opprette og ansvarliggjøre en multinasjonal og multidepartemental/-sektoriell cyberorganisasjon for at reell cyberavskrekking skal være mulig å generere.
Innledningsvis beskriver artikkelen den klassiske og utvidete oppfatningen av avskrekking, og hvilke kriterier som må ligge til grunn for å kunne oppnå avskrekkende effekt: kapasitet, kredibilitet og evnen til å kommunisere effektivt. Sett fra et globalt sikkerhetsperspektiv har muligheten til å generere avskrekkende effekt vært med på å forme verden, spesielt i perioden 1945 til 1990. Kompleksiteten i sikkerhetssektoren har imidlertid økt signifikant siden da, mye grunnet økt global konnektivitet og fremveksten av cyberdomenet.
Artikkelen diskuterer hvordan kriteriene for avskrekking utfordres når strategien skal appliseres i cyberdomenet, med fokus på problemene knyttet til antallet aktører/vektorer, ulike motiver for handlinger, manglende felles grunnlag som utgangspunkt for å adressere utfordringene, og forskjellig oppfatning omkring attribusjon og proporsjonalitetsprinsippet. Forfatterne fremholder at disse utfordringene gjør det vanskeligere, men desto viktigere å identifisere hvordan man kan generere avskrekking i cyberdomenet – spesielt for høyteknologiske småstater, som Norge. Å håndtere dette på en god måte forutsetter at man ser på bredden av avskrekkingsteori i sammenheng over tid, og småstater må erkjenne sine svakheter og spille på sine styrker. Anbefalingene som fremlegges, er åpningstrekk som gjør nettopp dette, og som samtidig bereder grunnen for å dra veksler på komplementære effekter av ulike dimensjoner ved avskrekkingststrategi på lengre sikt.
Abstract in English
This article explores the possibilities and challenges associated with deterrence as strategy in the increasingly significant cyber-domain, from a small state perspective. The authors argue that genuine cyber-deterrence is contingent upon the creation of an accountable cyberorganization, with a multinational and multi-departmental/sectorial composition.
The article addresses classical and broader deterrence, and the criterions that must be met in order to successfully deter; capability, credibility, and the ability to communicate effectively. From a global perspective, the ability to generate effective deterrence has been key to shape the international security landscape in the period from 1945 to 1990. However, the complexity of the security sector has increased significantly since then – much due to the seemingly ever-growing global connectedness and the emergence of the cyber-domain.
The article further explores and discusses how the criteria for effective deterrence is tested when applied to the cyber-domain, with emphasis on the problems associated with the number of actors/vectors, varying motives for actions, the lack of a shared conceptual foundation as a basis to address the challenges, and differing opinions concerning attribution and proportionality. The authors argue that these problems make it difficult, but thus the more important to identify how to generate effective deterrence in the cyber-domain – especially for high-tech small states such as Norway. Effective management of the problem-complex requires exploration of the whole range of deterrence theory over time, and small states must recognize their inherent weaknesses and play to their strengths. The recommendation put forth here is an initial move which allows just that, and which at the same time sets the stage for more elaborate strategies that exploit the complementary effects of different dimensions of and approaches to deterrence.