Suchergebnisse

NATO har i det seneste årti orienteret sig mod de defensive aktiviteter i cyberspace, men i slutningen af 2017 gjorde alliancen det klart, at fremtidig planlægning af militære operationer også kommer til at indeholde muligheden for offensive cyberspaceoperationer (OCO). Inklusionen af OCO sker ved hjælp af en såkaldt "effektbaseret model". Ifølge denne model efterspørger NATOs øverstkommanderende – igennem det nyoprettede NATO Cyber Operations Centre – en specifik cybereffekt hos medlemsstaterne. Nærværende artikel peger på modellens muligheder og udfordringer. For selvom OCO indeholder et potentiale som redskab for løbende forstyrrelser af modstanderens netværk, så indeholder OCO også en række begrænsninger og faldgruber, når de skal integreres i en forespørgselsdreven og effektbaseret model: Det gælder i særlig grad manglende koordination omkring effekter (risiko for kollisioner) samt vanskeligheder ved inddæmning og vurdering af effekter. Disse begrænsninger svækker signalet om, at alliancen nu mestrer og for alvor vil gøre brug af cyberdomænet. Ønsker NATO at sende et klart signal, bør alliancen drøfte internt, hvordan man forholder sig til de aktiviteter, der ikke blot knytter sig til væbnet konflikt, som cyberspace også – og primært – tilbyder.
Absract in English
For the past decade, NATO has prioritised a strengthened cyber defence. However, at the end of 2017, the alliance made it clear that future operational planning will include the possibility of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The integration of OCO will happen through an effect-based model where the NATO commander – through the new NATO Cyber Operations Centre – requests a specific effect from member states. This article assesses the risks and opportunities of this model. It argues that even though OCO holds much potential for constant disruptions of an adversary's networks, OCO comes with several limitations and pitfalls when integrated through a request- and effect-based model. These include the risk of confliction and the difficulty of containing and assessing cyber effects. Such limitations weaken the ability to signal that NATO has the capacity to master this new domain. If NATO wants a to send a clear signal to adversaries, then the alliance needs to start discussing how it can utilise the possibilities below the threshold of armed conflict, which cyberspace primarily offers.

AbstractI estimate whether the ability to anonymously surrender an infant to a safe haven site such as a hospital, police station, or fire station in the United States affects child well‐being. By analyzing variation in state safe haven policies, I find safe haven laws significantly increase infant foster care entrance. I further find suggestive evidence of safe havens reducing infant deaths. The mortality effects are immediate but subside over time, implying infants have been relinquished when their alternative was not death from abuse or abandonment. Robustness checks and falsification tests support these findings.

In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.