Suchergebnisse

Adapted from the source document.

This article reviews the issue of negativity in election campaigns in academic literature, & presents some data from Lithuanian Presidential campaign (1997 & 2002) analysis. The article aims to ascertain how often various types of negativity are used in the Lithuanian presidential campaigns as well as to deliberate about their potential effect on election results. Comparison of the data of two Lithuanian Presidential campaigns' newspapers' analyses indicates the possibility of growing importance of negativity in election campaigns. As analysis shows, there is no agreement among the scholars about the effect of different types of negativity. It is evident that more detail studies of negativity of election campaigns in Lithuania are needed. Adapted from the source document.

The paper discusses women's images & women related themes as they were presented in the Lithuanian national mass-media in the EP elections (May-June, 2004). Monitoring of the two largest Lithuanian dailies demonstrated that the EP elections had a second-rate status, which was enhanced by the first-round of the nation-wide Presidential elections, taking place on the very same day (May 14, 2004). Newspapers provided superficial references to women & did not produce any articulated discourse about women's representation in the EP. The result -- the Lithuanian delegation to the EP has 5 women among its 13 members -- is to be attributed to national political culture, appearance of the new populist party & individual candidates' electoral strategies, but not to women-friendly public discourse & political communication. Adapted from the source document.

Article treats a 2003-2004 political crisis in Lithuania as not confined to the Presidential institution. This is the crisis of an entire political system that had been maturing since long before. Four groups of factors are identified: 1) exhaustion of the intellectual resources of the political process & the lack of regularity, characteristic to the newly emerging political forces; 2) political anomie, which spans all levels of the political system; 3) entropy of the presidential institution, stimulating the redistribution of authority among separate state structures; & 4) populism & radicalism. The first three groups of factors may conventionally be called 'pre-Paksist', whereas the fourth was particularly activated during the Paksas's presidential tenure. The article argues that the impeachment of the President brought to an end anything but the first stage of the political crisis resolution process. That is why the author leaves the results of the Presidential impeachment aside in this research. The second stage commenced along with the early presidential elections. In general one must note that the political crisis in Lithuania is solvable by democratic & legal means. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje siekiama paaiskinti, kodel Andriaus Kubiliaus vyriausybes partijos (TS-LKD, LRLS ir LiCS), nepaisant nepalankiu aplinkybiu ir prognoziu, sugebejo gerai pasirodyti 2012 m. Seimo rinkimuose ir tapti daugiausia balsu gavusia valdanciaja koalicija nuo Lietuvos Nepriklausomybes atkurimo. Naudojamos dvi pagrindines teorijos: partines tapatybes ir ekonominio balsavimo. Atitinkamai pagal jas straipsnyje iskeliamos ir tikrinamos dvi hipotezes, kuriu pirmoji numato lemiama partines tapatybes vaidmeni, o antroji teigia, kad A. Kubiliaus vyriausybes partijos pritrauke ir nauju, racionalia ekonominio balsavimo logika besiremianciu rinkeju. 2012 m. porinkimines apklausos duomenu individo lygmeniu analize suteikia paramos abiem hipotezems. Straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad partine tapatybe buvo butina, taciau nepakankama gero vyriausybes pasirodymo 2012 m. Seimo rinkimuose salyga: dalis ekonomika vertinusiu kaip blogejancia istikimu rinkeju buvo prarasta, taciau siuos praradimus kompensavo nauju ekonomika retrospektyviai teigiamai vertinusiu rinkeju dalis This article aims to explain why the parties of Andrius Kubilius' government (HU-LCD, LRLM and LCU), notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances and corresponding forecasts, managed to perform well in 2012 Seimas elections and became the first governing coalition according to the joint received vote share since the restoration of Lithuania's independence. Two main theories are employed: party identification and economic voting. Corresponding to them, two hypotheses are raised and tested in this article: first hypothesis anticipates a decisive role of party identification and the second one asserts that the parties in A. Kubilius' government attracted new voters according to the logic of economic voting. Analysis of individual level data from the 2012 post-electoral survey provides support for both hypotheses. The article concludes that party identification was necessary, though not sufficient condition of good government performance in the 2012 Seimas elections: a part of the faithful voters was lost, but these losses were compensated by new voters that positively (and retrospectively) evaluated the economy of Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

Socialiniu tinklu itakos rinkiminiam elgesiui analize remiasi prielaida, kad zmoniu sprendimui del balsavimo svarbi politines informacijos komunikacija daznai vyksta nedidelese, stipriais rysiais besiremianciose grupese, kuriu narius sieja pasitikejimas. 2012 metais atliktos porinkimines Lietuvos gyventoju apklausos duomenys leido atlikti rinkeju socialiniu tinklu charakteristiku itakos balsavimui rinkimuose analize. Sios analizes rezultatai atskleidzia, kad socialiai izoliuoti, su artimais zmonemis apie politika nediskutuojantys, apolitiskiems tinklams priklausantys rinkejai reciau balsuoja rinkimuose nei rinkejai, integruoti i tinklus, kuriu nariai turi tam tikras politines preferencijas, kuriuose rinkejai randa zmoniu, kuriu ziniomis apie politini gyvenima gali pasitiketi. Rinkejai, priklausantys politiskai homogeniskiems tinklams, anksciau priima sprendima, uz kuria partija balsuos rinkimuose, taip pat didele tokiu rinkeju dalis yra lojalus tam tikrai partijai rinkimuose This article is aimed at presenting analysis of relation between characteristics of social networks of people and their participation in the election and voting as well as revealing how social network data complements models explaining electoral behaviour of population. Evidence from the 2012 post-election survey of Lithuanian population confirms many insights of social network scientists about influence of social interaction in the networks on electoral behaviour of people. It was found that the likelihood of participating in the elections increase when people belong to politicised social networks and have knowledgeable political discussants. It was also found that political homogeneity of social networks has a positive effect on an early decision about the vote and stability of voting. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents macro-level study of voting in Lithuania's local elections, with emphasis on changing electoral support for the incumbent parties. Presented statistical analysis of vote change in two periods between municipal elections (year 1997-2000 and 2002-2007) aims to explain the success (and failure) of dominant parties in national government and municipal councils (two separate cases). Article is mainly oriented into the search of economic voting, but hypotheses related to other, political-institutional factors are also tested. It is discovered that dynamics of unemployment change helps to explain vote change for the party that is dominant in the municipal council, but it is not important when state of economy is worsening. The dominant party in the national government is unanimously punished when unemployment is rising, but when the state of economy is improving, average vote change for such party is not outstanding. The dispersion of vote change in both cases (when dependent variable is vote change for the dominant party in the national government) is better explained by the political-institutional variables (firstly, turnout change). Adapted from the source document.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses & political considerations on the possible directions of foreign & security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign & security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlapping integrational spaces." Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighborhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe & is manifesting itself through the Eastern policies of the EU & NATO. From the other side, Ukraine is influenced by Russia & structures backed by Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States -- CIS, Common Economical Space -- CES). Thus, Ukraine becomes the special object of contest between East & West. Sometimes this contest creates the stability & cooperation, sometimes -- the conflict. Ukraine tries to use these situations to strengthen its state identity & crystallize the geopolitical functions. Using these insights the article analyses what & how the complex of domestic & external factors influenced the foreign & security policy of Ukraine during the transformation of political regime in 2004-2005 & after the "Orange revolution." It is asserted that Ukraine met the 2004 Presidential elections in very difficult situation: the efforts of the external actors to influence the geopolitical self-determination of the country intensified its domestic problems (fragmentation of the society & the state, crisis of the oligarchic political system etc). During this pressure the strategy of Yushchenko & Timoshenko alliance that relied on the fight with the corrupt political economical system & stressed the orientation to the West was more effective. Although the victory of the alliance created the premises of the pro-Western policy, the integration of Ukraine with the West is still very murky. This integration can create the conflicts with Moscow. Whereas the West is politically not prepared to propose the quicker integration plan. Hence a lot will depend on the capabilities of Kiev to sustain the consolidated Yushchenko-Timoshenko alliance, which won the presidential elections & declared the Western orientation, & to win the parliamentary elections in spring of 2006. The victory would be signal that Ukraine is prepared to continue the liberal reforms & pro-Western foreign policy. The article also proposes the guidelines for Lithuanian foreign policy towards the Ukraine. Adapted from the source document.

An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje nagrinejamas partines tapatybes reiskinys Lietuvoje, remiantis 2012 m. porinkimines gyventoju apklausos duomenimis. Pirmoje straipsnio dalyje aptariamos skirtingos partines tapatybes teorijos ir sufor-muluojamos hipotezes apie partine tapatybe Lietuvoje galincius lemti veiksnius. Antroje dalyje aptariamos metodologines partines tapatybes matavimo problemos ir analizuojamas partines tapatybes Lietuvoje lygis. Trecioji dalis skirta partines tapatybes formavimosi aiskinimui. Tikrinamos trys pagrin-dines hipotezes - 1) partine tapatybe lemia politine socializacija seimoje; 2) partine tapatybe susiformuoja politiniu skirciu pagrindu; 3) politine tapa-tybe priklauso nuo dalyvavimo demokratiniame procese patirties kaupimo laiko. Straipsnyje pristatomi logistines regresijos rezultatai vercia koreguoti partines tapatybes teorija The article analyses the formation of party identification in Lithuania, using the data of post-election survey of 2012. In the first part, the two rival theories of party identification are introduced and hypotheses about the factors of party identification formation are presented. In the second part, the methodological issues of the measurement of party identification are discussed and the level of party identification in Lithuania is examined. The third part of the article focuses on the determinants of party identification. Three main hypotheses are tested: 1) party identification derives from the political socialisation in a family; 2) party identification is formed on the basis of social cleavages; 3) party identification depends on the length of democratic experience of electorate. The results of the logistic regression presented in the article impel to revise the theory of party identification. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnio tikslas yra isnagrineti Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija rinkimu kampanijos metu ir nustatyti, kurie kanalai labiausiai gali susieti auditorija tarpusavyje. Straipsnyje apzvelgiama fragmentacijos reiksme demokratijai ir jos tyrimuose vartojamos savokos, pristatomi empirinio tyrimo poziuriai, besiremiantys auditorijos sutapimo analize. Remiantis reprezentatyvios apklausos duomenimis ir pristatytais poziuriais, analizuo-jama Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija. Kadangi nustatytas gana didelis skirtingu kanalu susiklojimas, straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija kol kas nera labai fragmentiska. Taciau palyginimas su ankstesniu metu duomenimis rodo tam tikrus fragmentacijos didejimo polinkius. Labiausiai Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija susiejantis kanalas yra televizija, taciau vis didesne svarba igyja ir populiarus interneto portalai The aim of the article is to analyse the extent of media audience fragmentation in Lithuania during the 2012 Parliament election campaign and to define which media channels are best able to unify the audience. The article reviews the significance of fragmentation in terms of democracy and concepts used in its analysis, and presents approaches for its empirical study, based on audience duplication. On the basis of this approach and data from a representative survey, the fragmentation of Lithuanian media audience is analysed. Since the analysis shows a considerable overlap of audience of different media outlets, the main conclusion is made that the Lithuanian media audience is not (yet) fragmented. The media that unites the biggest share of the audience is television, although popular internet portals are also becoming very important. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje aptariamas Lietuvos prisijungimas prie euro zonos, ivertinant pirmojo nesekmingo bandymo tai padaryti 2007 m. ir antrojo rezultatyvaus bandymo isivesti eura nuo 2015 m. priezastis ir politines ekonomijos aiskinimus. Siekiama atskleisti su dalyvavimu euro zonoje susijusius teisinius ir institucinius pokycius, pavyzdziui, nemazoritariniu instituciju stiprejima, analizuojamos pinigu politikos sasajos su biudzeto ir darbo rinkos reguliavimo politikos sritimis. Teigiama, jog, nors sparciam Lietuvos prisijungimui prie euro zonos tinkamas salygas sudare valiutu valdybos modelio ir fiksuoto valiutos kurso egzistavimas, del politinio sutarimo trukumo ir nesuderintu skirtingu, bet fiksuoto kurso salygomis funkciskai susijusiu viesosios politikos priemoniu, ypac artejant Seimo rinkimams, euro ivedimas buvo atidetas desimciai metu nuo istojimo i ES ir Lietuva si tiksla realizavo paskutine is triju Baltijos saliu. Pasakytina, kad del skirtingu pinigu politikos ir valiutos keitimo kursu rezimu Baltijos salyse ir Lenkijoje pirmosiose euro isivedimas tapo svarbiausiu isejimo is krizes zingsniu, o pastarojoje po 2009 m. stojimas i euro zona buvo atidetas neribotam laikui. Svarbiausias elito motyvas prisijungti prie euro zonos yra susijes su ekonomine nauda, kurios tikimasi isivedus eura, is maziau svarbiu motyvu paminetini 'vieta prie stalo', t. y. dalyvavimas priimant sprendimus euro zonoje, ir gilesne integracija kaip priemone apsisaugoti nuo isores gresmiu The article discusses Lithuania's accession into the euro zone, first, by presenting the political economy analysis of the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce euro in 2007 and then comparing it with the second, successful attempt to do that in 2015. It is argued that although the existence of a currency board reduced uncertainty linked to the fluctuating exchange rate regime and facilitated the participation in the Exchange rate mechanism II, due to the lack of political consensus in the country and misaligned monetary and budgetary and regulatory policies, in particular as Parliamentary elections approached, the actual accession into the euro zone was achieved only ten years after joining the EU and Lithuania was the last of the three Baltic States to accomplish that. According to the survey of political elites in Lithuania conducted for this project, the main motive for joining the euro zone is mostly linked to the perceived economic benefits, while the 'seat at the table', i.e., the possibility to participate in the decision-making of the euro zone and security benefits from being part of the core member states of the EU are less important. Adapted from the source document.

The article discusses factors, determining loyalty of the European Parliament members, which is marginalized in most of researches on the European Parliament. The initial assumption holds that as given the rates of loyalty to the national states are high it is groundless to assess it as a neutral variable. Loyalty of the European Parliament members to national states can significantly contribute to the studies of European Parliament's internal relations and power contribution. The first section of this article presents and analyses main insights of the influence of national parties and political groups on the voting behavior of the European Parliament members, justifying objective reasons which caused marginalization of importance of the European Parliament members' loyalty to national states. It should be noted that the European Parliament members, like most of other politicians, have fixed set of objectives forming their choices. Goals of re-election, positions and policy (leading to power gains/losses) are leading. In the hands of national parties and political groups these goals become instruments of pressure and enforcement, determining behavior of the European Parliament members. National parties controlling the access of candidates to the electoral lists and defining their position on those lists gain extreme importance in the competition for loyalty. Since political groups of the European Parliament have dominant political force for the second objective of the parliament members each of them have an interest in maintaining balance between loyalty to the national party and particular political group. Loyalty to national states loses its importance as it has minimal influence on the success of achieving objectives of the parliament members. The second section is devoted to the research of links between voting of European Parliament members and their national states, more specifically -- to the analysis of European Parliament members' loyalty to their national states. Lithuania is chosen as a case study. The fact that loyalty to the national states during 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 terms of the European Parliament is over 85 % indicates that this variable should not be seen as accidental or insignificant. It is argued that loyalty to the national state mainly reflects voting unity of national delegation. The rest of this section analyzes factors which can explain why, despite the fact that national delegation is very diverse in the context of left-right ideological divide, rates of loyalty to the national states, demonstrated by the national delegations, remain very high. The article concludes stating that loyalty of European Parliament members to their national states is a valuable source of data for the analysis of the party behavior in the European Parliament as well as outside it and should not be overlooked. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.