Suchergebnisse

General elections were held in the Kingdom of Sweden on the 9th of September 2018; parliamentary (riksdagsval), municipal (landstingsval), and local elections (kommunalval). Citizens and residents of Sweden elect 349 members of parliament, county representatives from 20 counties, and representatives of municipalities within those counties, depending on the population in each unit. Since these are general elections, the results do not vary much, and the results are similar at all levels of government. This paper presents the results decided at all levels, detailing the results for the parliamentary elections. The results of this election took European and international public by surprise. The Sweden Democrats have crystallized as a third political option in Sweden, repeating an outstanding result in two cycles in a row. The success of the Swedish Democrats has tarnished the image of liberal and tolerant Sweden and its image of neutrality in the world. It remains to be seen how Swedish politics will respond to future challenges.

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article argues that the increasing international interest in elections as exemplified by the rise of international election monitoring induces temporal shifts in the use of violent intimidation by political actors. The presence of international electoral missions lowers the potential for election-day violence relative to the pre-election period because domestic actors likely refrain from intimidating opposition candidates or voters before the eyes of international observers, but creates incentives for political actors to engage in violent manipulation in parts of the electoral process receiving considerably less international attention, such as the pre-election period. The article expects that international election observation increases the incidence of violent manipulation during electoral campaigns. An empirical analysis of election-related violence for African elections in the 1990-2009 period shows that the presence of election observers increases the incidence of pre-election violence, but has no effect on election-day violence. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Elections, John C. Courtney, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004, pp.
ix, 201.The expansion of the number of democratic regimes around the world and
the decline of trust in government in established democracies have renewed
interest in election laws and how these rules define the national
community, allow citizens to express their preferences, and influence the
composition of legislatures. In Canada, the study of electoral laws has
frequently dealt with how electoral formulae translate votes into
legislative representation.

It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

AbstractTwo decades after the 'third wave of democratization', extensive violence continues to follow elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas national processes connected to pre-election violence have received increased scholarly attention, little is known of local dynamics of violence after elections. This article examines the 2011 Nigerian post-election violence with regard to the ways in which national electoral processes interweave with local social and political disputes. The most affected state, Kaduna State, has a history of violent local relations connected to which group should control politics and the state. It is argued that electoral polarisation aggravated national ethno-religious divisions that corresponded to the dividing line of the conflict in Kaduna. A rapid escalation of violence was facilitated by local social networks nurtured by ethno-religious grievances.

A commonly held view is that presidential elections are largely personality contests, and that the candidate with the best‐liked personality wins. But is this really the case? Based on a careful analysis of national survey data from the last 11 presidential elections, this article concludes that such a view is unfounded. The most personally popular candidate does not always win in the U.S.—indeed, in recent elections, the most personally popular candidate has generally lost. Much more central to candidate evaluations, and to who emerges victorious, are perceptions of candidates' stands on the issues.