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We recently welcomed Simon Usherwood to eu!radio! He is a professor at the Open University in Britain, and Chair of UACES. He shared his thoughts on the forthcoming European Parliament elections.
The post European elections: voting matters! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The article assesses voting patterns from the 2001 general & local elections in GB, which saw a strong, predictable endorsement of Labour & rejection of the Conservatives. Analyzed are the systemic anti-Conservative electoral bias & the performance of minor parties; the role of tactical voting; geographic & demographic influences on results; the implications of declining turnout; & the impact of ticket splitting. The conclusion evaluates the failed Conservative strategies, which underscore a continuing vacuum of leadership, direction, & party unity, all exacerbated by the worsening electoral bias. 4 Tables, 14 References. K. Coddon

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.--

"Preface" -- "Contents" -- "List of Abbreviations" -- "Chapter 1: Elections and Voting Paradoxes" -- "1.1 Introduction" -- "1.2 A Tale of Two Mathematicians" -- "1.3 The Historic Analyses of Borda and Condorcet" -- "1.3.1 Borda´s Paradox" -- "1.3.2 Borda´s Solution to the Possibility of Borda´s Paradox" -- "1.3.3 Condorcet´s Paradox" -- "1.3.4 Condorcet´s Other Paradox" -- "1.3.5 Borda Versus Condorcet: Over 200 Years Later" -- "1.4 Other Voting Paradoxes" -- "1.4.1 Monotonicity Paradoxes" -- "1.4.2 Choice Set Variance Paradoxes" -- "1.4.2.1 Ostrogorski´s Paradox" -- "1.4.2.2 Majority Paradox" -- "1.4.2.3 Referendum Paradox" -- "1.5 Conclusion" -- "References" -- "Chapter 2: Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes" -- "2.1 Introduction" -- "2.2 Models with Independent Voter Preferences" -- "2.2.1 The Dual Culture Condition" -- "2.2.2 Impartial Culture Condition" -- "2.2.3 Condorcet´s Paradox and Social Homogeneity with DC" -- "2.2.4 Condorcet Efficiency with DC" -- "2.3 Models with Dependent Voter Preferences" -- "2.3.1 The Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition" -- "2.3.2 Condorcet´s Paradox and Dependent Preferences with IAC" -- "2.3.3 Condorcet Efficiency and Dependent Preferences with IAC" -- "2.4 The Relevance of DC, IC, UC and IAC Models" -- "2.4.1 Performing Empirically-Based Evaluations of Theory" -- "2.4.2 An Empirically Based Evaluation of Preliminary Results" -- "2.5 The Likelihood of Observing Other Voting Paradoxes" -- "2.5.1 Borda´s Paradox" -- "2.5.2 Condorcet´s Other Paradox" -- "2.5.3 The No Show Paradox" -- "2.5.4 Ostrogorski´s Paradox" -- "2.5.5 The Majority Paradox" -- "2.5.6 The Referendum Paradox" -- "2.6 Adding Additional Internal Structure to Voters´ Preferences" -- "2.7 Conclusion" -- "References" -- "Chapter 3: Measures of Agreement in Voters´ Preferences" -- "3.1 Introduction

The expanded banking system will help the Election Commission conduct voting for General elections on single day and in single phase All elections from panchayats to Parliament can be conducted with the help of expanded banking system with minimum cost and without rigging and impersonate voting. This record was migrated from the OpenDepot repository service in June, 2017 before shutting down.