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General elections were held in the Kingdom of Sweden on the 9th of September 2018; parliamentary (riksdagsval), municipal (landstingsval), and local elections (kommunalval). Citizens and residents of Sweden elect 349 members of parliament, county representatives from 20 counties, and representatives of municipalities within those counties, depending on the population in each unit. Since these are general elections, the results do not vary much, and the results are similar at all levels of government. This paper presents the results decided at all levels, detailing the results for the parliamentary elections. The results of this election took European and international public by surprise. The Sweden Democrats have crystallized as a third political option in Sweden, repeating an outstanding result in two cycles in a row. The success of the Swedish Democrats has tarnished the image of liberal and tolerant Sweden and its image of neutrality in the world. It remains to be seen how Swedish politics will respond to future challenges.

General Elections are the embodiments of the mandate stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Article 1 paragraph (2) which affirms that "sovereignty is in the hands of the people and carried out according to the Constitution". The Formulation Document that will be formulated in the research are: (1) What is the violation in the general election? And (2) What is law enforcement in general election. The method used in this study is normative legal research, normative legal research methods or library law research methods are methods or procedures that are used in legal research by examining existing library material. Election violations constitute acts prohibited by the Election Law against election organizers resulting in the imposition of sanctions for violations. The enactment of Law Number 7 Year 2017 on General Elections provides for different types of violations, disputes, criminal offenses and electoral disputes. The crime of elections is a criminal offense punishable by a particular punishment based on the criminal justice system. The purpose of election is to carry out popular sovereignty and the realization of the political rights of the people to produce leaders who will occupy important positions in the government.

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article argues that the increasing international interest in elections as exemplified by the rise of international election monitoring induces temporal shifts in the use of violent intimidation by political actors. The presence of international electoral missions lowers the potential for election-day violence relative to the pre-election period because domestic actors likely refrain from intimidating opposition candidates or voters before the eyes of international observers, but creates incentives for political actors to engage in violent manipulation in parts of the electoral process receiving considerably less international attention, such as the pre-election period. The article expects that international election observation increases the incidence of violent manipulation during electoral campaigns. An empirical analysis of election-related violence for African elections in the 1990-2009 period shows that the presence of election observers increases the incidence of pre-election violence, but has no effect on election-day violence. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Data from the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) show that during the 2004 presidential election campaign, party affiliation was not entirely stable. The gap between Democrats & Republicans narrowed, continuing a pattern evident in the 2000 NAES. However, the Democrats retained their edge in party identification. Demographically, Republican party identification grew most among white evangelical Protestants. Slight gains were made among men & women. An analysis of party breakdown by state shows Republicans made significant gains in southern states but also grew in Maine & Oregon. The Democratic party made gains in a handful of states around the country. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

Elections, John C. Courtney, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004, pp.
ix, 201.The expansion of the number of democratic regimes around the world and
the decline of trust in government in established democracies have renewed
interest in election laws and how these rules define the national
community, allow citizens to express their preferences, and influence the
composition of legislatures. In Canada, the study of electoral laws has
frequently dealt with how electoral formulae translate votes into
legislative representation.

It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

"Administering Elections provides a digest of contemporary American election administration using a systems perspective. This provides insight into the interconnected nature of all components of elections administration, and sheds like on the potential consequences of reforms that fail to account for this"--

AbstractTwo decades after the 'third wave of democratization', extensive violence continues to follow elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas national processes connected to pre-election violence have received increased scholarly attention, little is known of local dynamics of violence after elections. This article examines the 2011 Nigerian post-election violence with regard to the ways in which national electoral processes interweave with local social and political disputes. The most affected state, Kaduna State, has a history of violent local relations connected to which group should control politics and the state. It is argued that electoral polarisation aggravated national ethno-religious divisions that corresponded to the dividing line of the conflict in Kaduna. A rapid escalation of violence was facilitated by local social networks nurtured by ethno-religious grievances.

Although the Storting election of 11 September 2017 reduced the number of seats backing the incumbent conservative government, it still gave the two governing parties and their supporting centre-right parties a parliamentary majority. Thus, Prime Minister Solberg's premiership will continue after the election. In the previous period, the government could secure a parliamentary majority with either of the two centrist parties; the Liberal Party or the Christian Democrats. After the 2017 election, they will need the support of both parties to secure a majority, unless they can get help from one or more of the centre-left opposition parties. When Solberg formed her government back in 2013, the populist right-wing Progress Party entered government for the first time. Even Progress Party leaders feared that they would lose support from anti-establishment voters. Poor turnout at the 2015 local election did not bode well. However, the Progress Party did far better in the 2017 national elections and lost only 1.1 percentage points and two seats compared with the 2013 election. A major success factor for the Progress Party was the attention given to immigration issues during the election campaign (see below). At the previous election, in 2013, the Green Party won a seat for the first time, increasing the number of parties in parliament from seven to eight. In 2017, the far-left Red Party increased the number of parties from eight to nine. Despite the re-election of the incumbent government, the election signalled a shift to the left, even to the left of the Labour Party.

General elections are held every five years in South Africa. During the 12 to 24 hour period after the close of the voting booths, the expected final results are of huge interest to the electorate and politicians. In the past, the Council for Scientic and Industrial Research (CSIR) has developed an election forecasting model in order to provide the media and political analysts with forecasts of the final results during this period of peak interest. In formulating this model, which forecasts the election results as the results from voting districts (VDs) become available, some assumptions had to be made. In particular, assumptions were made about the clustering of previous voting patterns as well as the order in which VD results are released.This election forecasting model had been used successfully for a number of elections in the past and in these previous elections, with around 5%{10% of the results available, the predictions produced by the model were very close to the final outcome, particularly for the ANC, being the largest party. For the 2014 national election, however, the predictions, with close to 50% of the voting district results known (equivalent to an estimated 40% of the total votes), were still not accurate and varied by more than 1% for both the ANC and the EFF. This paper outlines a post-election analysis to determine the reasons for these discrepancies and how they relate directly to the model assumptions. The aim is to highlight how practical realities can affect the assumptions and consequently their impact on the forecasted results. Reference is made to previous election forecasts and the 2014 post-election analysis is presented.Keywords: Forecasting, elections, assumptions, post-election analysis