Suchergebnisse

Glavni cilj disertacije je analizirati ideologiju glavnih predstavnika radikalne desnice u Poljskoj. Ova doktorska disertacija dizajnirana je kao studija slučaja unutar okvira kulturalnog pristupa u političkim znanostima. Kao metoda istraživanja odabrana je kombinacija kvalitativne analize sadržaja i konceptualne analize ideologije Michaela Freedena. Iako je najveći fokus istraživanja na dvjema političkim strankama (Zakon i pravda i Liga poljskih obitelji) kao glavnim predstavnicima radikalno desne političke scene u Poljskoj, istraživanje se bavi i drugim akterima, prije svega organizacijama civilnog društva, društvenim pokretima i medijima, koji sudjeluju u konstruiranju i promoviranju ideologije radikalne desnice. Pritom istraživanje nije ograničeno na sadržaj ideologije i aktere koji tu ideologiju promoviraju, već ono uključuje i analizu procesa putem kojih se ideologija radikalne desnice eksplicira i formulira, kao i analizu dinamičnih odnosa među akterima procesa proizvodnje ideologije doprinoseći istraživanju ideologije radikalne desnice kao i istraživanju procesa konstruiranja političkih ideologija općenito. Kao polazište za navedenu analizu u disertaciji se koristi ponešto modificirana definicija radikalne desnice poznatog politologa Casa Muddea prema kojoj su konstitutivna obilježja radikalne desnice integralni nacionalizam, autoritarnost i populizam. Analizom je utvrđeno kako su sve tri ideološke karakteristike tipične za radikalnu desnicu prisutne kod glavnih aktera istraživanih u ovoj disertaciji. Na tragu konceptualne analize, ova disertacija je pokazala kako središnji konstitutivni koncept radikalno desne ideologije u Poljskoj predstavlja nacija, i kako svi ostali okolni koncepti detektirani analizom, poput solidarnosti, jednakosti šansi, pravde, demokracije, slobode, zadobivaju svoje značenje na temelju svog odnosa prema središnjem konstitutivnom obilježju ideologije. ; In the last thirty years or so, the influence of the radical right has been constantly growing throughout Europe. This political success has been accompanied by an increasingly intensive scientific research on the phenomenon of the radical right, which has resulted in several studies that address various aspects of the radical right phenomenon in Europe. Paradoxically, despite such an abundance of research papers, their review suggests that there are relatively few papers that have a systematic and in-depth approach to the political ideology of the radical right. This doctoral dissertation fills this research gap and focuses on the political ideology of the radical right, taking into account the thesis of the well-known researcher of political ideologies Michael Freeden, that political ideologies are the center of political analysis because the study of ideologies can provide relevant insights necessary for understanding politics and political processes. In the context of the debate on the wave of radicalism in Europe, Poland is a particularly interesting case. Firstly, it is the largest and most populous post-communist country that became a member of the EU and a country in which the radical right won three parliamentary and three presidential elections between 2005 and 2020. Secondly, in academic papers and media Poland is often portrayed as an example of a country that has successfully gone through the process of transformation to liberal democracy and as an example of the most successful transition economy in Europe. The Polish case is also interesting because it is a a country with more than 90% of declared Catholics and where, primarily due to historical development, Catholicism plays a significant role in political, social, and cultural life; it has become a key component of the Polish national identity. In contrast to Western European countries, in Poland Political Catholicism, did not spark the development of strong Christian- Democratic parties, it rather gave rise to radical right-wing parties instead. In addition to cultural factors, historical heritage is often considered a fertile ground for the emergence of this type of parties, especially its influence on political processes and on the processes of building a national identity. Namely, the Polish historical heritage, specifically the one related to the 20th century, was marked by a short period of democratic rule (1918-1925), and two long periods of authoritarian rule, that of Jozef Pilsudski (1925 to 1939), and that of the communist authoritarians (1945 to 1989). Thus, the main goal of the dissertation is to analyze the ideology of the main representatives of the radical right in Poland by exploring its discursive manifestations, as well as the way in which the radical right ideology is produced. This doctoral dissertation is designed as a case study within the framework of a cultural approach in political sciences. The cultural approach is characterized by the insistence on the importance of context, which, on the other hand, makes it difficult to define clear independent, dependent, and intervening variables. Therefore, in the cultural approach, a case is most often taken as the analytical unit taking into consideration all the complexity of its historical and socio-political distinctiveness. Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the research method, and conceptual analysis of Michael Freeden's ideology was added to it, since this approach allows us to better understand the morphology of ideologies and their operationalization in politics. The first chapter is about the theoretical and methodological framework. Since the concept of the radical right is one of the deeply contested concepts which there is no consensus about in political science, and since the aim of this doctoral dissertation is to explain this concept, the first part of the chapter consists of a review and analysis of recent literature. The notion of the radical right was analyzed through comparison with related terms such as the extreme right, right-wing populism, and the far right. As a starting point for analysis in the dissertation, a somewhat modified definition of the radical right by the well-known political scientist Cas Mudde is used. According to him, the constitutive features of the radical right are integral nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism. Like the concept of the radical right, the concept of ideology is also ambivalent and can be understood in different ways which result in multiple uses of the term ideology which are often contradictory. This doctoral dissertation is largely based on the morphological approach to the study of ideology developed by Michael Freeden. The second chapter deals with the history of Poland before 1989. The first part of the chapter explains the early context of the emergence of Polish nationalism, which has its roots in the 'noble democracy' of the 17th century, as well as in the national struggles for independence of the 19th century. However, the chapter focuses on two periods that significantly influenced the emergence and growth of Polish political nationalism in the early 2000s. The first is the interwar period (1918-1939) in which two traditions of Polish political thought, Sanacja and Endeca, crystallized, and from which two visions of the Polish nation, national identity, and the nation-state, emerged. The second period is after the Second World War, i.e., the period of the People's Republic of Poland in which the legitimization and institutionalization of the nationalist discourse take place. Equally, in this period there emerged and formed social groups with different visions of the Polish state after the fall of communism. The third chapter deals with the transformation of the People's Republic of Poland into the The third Republic and with an account of political and social events in the first decade after the fall of communism. This chapter sheds light on the political and social context within which the dominant social divisions in Polish society emerged, which in large part resulted in the evolution of radical right-wing parties in the early 2000s. In particular, the very nature of the transformation process emerged as the main subject of dispute. Namely, the Polish right believes that due to the contractual transformation of the system, the 'revolution' is not over and that the left-liberal groups have made an agreement with the former communist establishment. They believe that the Third Republic is a product of this agreement and that it serves the left-liberal and former communist elites to maintain positions of power and rule the The third Republic to the detriment of the oppressed people. This conspiratorial narrative represents the foundation around which the politics and ideology of the radical right have been built in Poland since 2000. The fourth chapter deals with the emergence and profiling of two radical right-wing parties, Law and Justice (Polish: Prawo I Sprawiedliwość – PiS) and the League of Polish Families (Polish: Liga Polskich Rodzin – LPR) . The chapter is structured in such a way as to first present the history of the formation of these parties, with an emphasis on the main actors who participated as the originators and implementers of these projects. In both cases, these are largely the 'family projects' of the Kaczynski brothers (Law and Justice) and father and son Giertych (League of Polish Families). From the Kaczynskis' biographies, it is obvious that they come from an environment dominated by the legacy of Sanacja, while father and son Giertych openly presents themselves as the heirs of the interwar Endecja. After presenting their political activities and the first successes in the elections, the ideology of these two parties is reconstructed, primarily from their programs and other party publications. The research showed that until 2005 both parties contained all the constitutive elements of the radical right according to Mudde's conceptualization. While these constitutive elements have been present in the League of Polish Families since its founding, the party Law and Justice gradually became radicalized. This period, at least from the perspectives of PiS and LPR, is dominated by the conflict between the post-communist elites (former communists and left-liberal intellectuals) gathered around the left Democratic Left Alliance (Polish: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and the so-called "patriotic' camp that emerged from Solidarity. This chapter also covers the period between 2005 and 2007 when these two parties, together with the Self-Defense party, formed a government that lasted less than two years. This first, shorter coming to power of the radical right in Poland is not important because of the public policies they pursued during that period, but because of the experience and lessons gained by PiS during its rule in the liberal democratic system. Namely, after 2007, the LPR disappeared from the Polish political scene, leaving the PiS as the only relevant political actor of the radical right. The fifth chapter covers the period between 2007 and 2015. It is the period of rule by the Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO), a center-right party with strong pro-EU views and liberal economic and social policies. Due to the disappearance of the left from the Polish political scene, the main social and political conflict underwent a radical change. PiS formulated a new conflict – the struggle between solidarity and liberal or corporate Poland – and built its ideology around this conflict. This period in Polish political and social life was marked by the immigration crisis that hit Europe and the debate on the acceptance of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, the so-called Istanbul Convention. Both topics as well as the pro-European orientation of the PO government led to the mobilization of radical right-wing social groups and media that skillfully occupied public space by successfully imposing their topics on the public agenda. As this dissertation will show, PiS has adapted its discourse to that of radical right-wing organizations and has successfully presented itself as their political representative. On the one hand, this 'alliance' helped the PiS succeed in the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, while on the other it marked the further radicalization of the PiS, especially when it comes to issues of morals and values. The sixth chapter deals with the period between 2015 and 2020. During that period, the PiS won both the presidential and the parliamentary elections twice. This chapter emphasizes how PiS translates its ideology into public policies. Namely, during this period PiS focused its efforts on two projects: 'repairing the state' and rebuilding the community (nation). The first project was marked by the judicial reform and the crisis related to the Constitutional Court; it aimed to strengthen the executive branch to the detriment of other branches of government. The PiS community reconstruction project was conceived as a change in the material and spiritual dimension of the community. The first is mostly related to social policies, the emphasis being on family policies. Changes in the spiritual dimension imply changes in cultural policy, within which there has been a reform of public media and the announcement of the "recolonization" of private media. In changing the spiritual dimension, PiS placed special emphasis on the defense of the traditional way of life on the one hand, and on the politics of history on the other, in which the Institute of National Remembrance played an exceptional role. The seventh chapter takes the form of a final discussion in which the basic theses of the radical right ideology in Poland are reconstructed. The aim of this discussion is to position the topic of this dissertation within the framework of a broader theoretical discussion between liberals and their critics. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main research results in this doctoral dissertation and points to the possible direction of future research, especially research of countries with a strong radical right and with a similar historical and cultural heritage. Equally, the conclusion points to the fact that this dissertation has not fully answered the research question related to finding out how ideology is constructed, and the actors involved in the process. Namely, the problem was the research design and selection of the analysis method. The conclusion is that a more complete answer to this research question would require some field research, preferably using the method of interview or survey. Finally, we believe that some future research on ideology should move in that direction.

Rad se bavi istraživanjem učinaka personalizacije izbornog sustava prije svega na političke stranke i kandidate za zastupnike. Pod personalizacijom izbornog sustava smatra se uvođenje mehanizama u izborni sustav koji osiguravaju veću ulogu birača u izboru njihovih parlamentarnih zastupnika. U radu su predstavljene četiri gusto opisane studije slučaja koje su služile kao temelj za testiranje temeljne i pomoćnih hipoteza. Rad sadrži fokusiranu poredbenu analizu dometa personalizacije izbornog sustava u odnosu na tri ključna slučaja (Austrija, Nizozemska i Finska), kao i u odnosu na kontrolni slučaj Kosovo. U radu je dokazano da snažni personalizirani izborni sustavi, koji imaju najveće vrijednosti personalizacije, odnosno izmjerene vrijednosti utjecaja dva institucionalna potičuća mehanizma koji su predstavljali nezavisne varijable ovog istraživanja (a. preferencijsko glasovanje unutar razmjernog sustava stranačkih lista i b. procedura selekcije kandidata), dovode do personalizacije političkih stranaka na razini zastupnika. Kroz dokazivanje pomoćnih hipoteza ispraćeni su učinci personalizacije izbornog sustava na političke stranke, kandidate/zastupnike, birače odnosno stranački/politički sustav. U radu predstavljeni nalazi fokusirane poredbene analize potvrđuju da snažna personalizacija izbornog sustava vodi personalizaciji izborne kampanje te smanjenoj ulozi političkih stranaka u političkom životu. Smanjena uloga stranaka u kampanjama otvara prostor jačanju uloge konkretnih donatora. Poslanici postaju nezavisniji u odnosu na stranku, ali s druge strane otvoreni za utjecaje donatora svojih kampanja. Nemogućnost opoziva, odnosno tekovina da je zastupnik, a ne stranka vlasnik mandata, dodatno ojačava poziciju zastupnika, a slabi poziciju stranke. Pozicija zastupnika jača, kao i birača koji imaju u snažno personaliziranim izbornim sustavima mogućnost presudnog utjecanja na to tko će ih zastupati u parlamentu, odnosno na koga će privremeno prenijeti suverenitet kao njegovi nositelji. Finski primjer najbolje pokazuje utjecaj snažne personalizacije izbornog sustava na političke stranke, kandidate i birače u konsolidiranoj demokraciji. Slučaj Kosova kao kontrolni slučaj govori da ukoliko izostane prevlast osobnog u odnosu na stranačko u unutarstranačkim procesima, učinci snažnog preferencijskog sustava bit će umanjeni. Izostanak vladavine prava utječe na ravnopravnost kandidata u predizbornim kampanjama, ali snažno preferencijsko glasovanje umanjuje negativne efekte izostanka demokratskih procedura unutar stranke te potiče daljnju demokratsku konsolidaciju u nekonsolidiranim demokracijama. ; The doctoral dissertation deals with research into the effects of personalization of the electoral system primarily on political parties and candidates for deputies. The personalization of the electoral system means the introduction of mechanisms in the electoral system that ensure a greater role for voters in the election of their parliamentary representatives. I define the electoral system as a "set of laws and party rules governing electoral competition between and within the parties" (Cox 1997: 38). This wider definition of the electoral system gives us space to build a more complete picture of the electoral system's impact on political parties, candidates and voters as main actors in the electoral process. The focus of the research is the relationship between personal and party representation. In order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of personalization on political parties, the research framework is narrowed down to list proportional electoral systems with preferential voting. Contemporary liberal democracy is characterized by a highly personalized politics. Governments are more recognizable by their leaders than by the parties that are the basis of their constitution. This personalization trend is not characteristic exclusively of presidential systems, but has become a feature of parliamentary political systems. In addition to personalization of the party at the leader level, there is also the personalization of politics at the level of members of parliament (MPs). In this paper, we only use the term 'personalization of a party' in reference to personalization at the level of the MP. We will not deal with the question of the presidentialization of political parties. Under the personalization of a political party at the level of MPs, we mean strengthening the position of deputies in the intra-party decision-making process. Thanks to the introduction of preferential voting in list proportional list systems, the group of electoral systems in which voters play an important role in the selection of their representatives has significantly expanded. Historically speaking, the representative position has been strengthened by the accepted attitude that the MP, not the party, is the 'owner of the mandate'; preferential voting supports this. This paper deals with the personalization of politics at the level of the representative—the political party. That is to say, it explores the question of to what degree personalization of the electoral system affects the political party, its intra- and its inter-party dimension. Moreover, the paper deals with personal and party representation, an area that is a new field of interest for political scientists. Through this relationship, I explore the effect of electoral systems on political parties, candidates and voters. in developing this work, I was guided by the results achieved by Katz (1980, 1986) and Marsh 9 (1985) who first dealt with this issue. In his book A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (1980), Katz took his first steps in the research of preferential systems. Five years later, Marsh (1985) was dealing with differences between the preferential systems in Europe. In their works, Katz and Marsh set forth the first hypotheses about the effects of preferential voting. Although there has been a growing interest in research in this area over the last decade, no significant progress has yet been made. Karvonen (2004) made a significant step in systematizing the hypotheses of Katz and Marsh, and he added some more points. In his last paper on this subject (2011), Karvonen was working within the same group of hypotheses, which were open to further research. They are the basis of this research, with additional contributions. A major impetus for this work was one of the most influential articles in this field, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas' by Carey and Shugart (1995), which examines the question of the influence of electoral systems on the candidate's electoral strategies—that is, how electoral systems influence the pre-election roles of parties and their candidates. The authors developed three variables: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank in ballots; (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of copartisans; and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. By combining these three variables, there are up to thirteen combinations. This approach set me up to explore the impact that personalization creates when it comes to the relationship between the MP candidate and the party, or the MP and the party. Most authors agree that the introduction of personalization of the electoral system significantly affects interparty relations, which are sometimes reflected in a high degree of autonomy in campaigning and even in the collection and spending of funds for funding of their personal campaign. The bidding of candidates from the same party exercises a strong influence on intra-party relations, and it often happens that rival relations within the parties remain in the shadow of rival relations between the parties.

Basic education of the future – Let's turn the trend! was a development project on compulsory education in Finland. The aim was to assess the current situation, examine the reasons for the drop in the learning outcomes at the national and international levels and study the needs to develop teaching and learning in the Finnish educational system. Two working groups coordinated by a broad-based steering group were set up for the purposes of the project. The objective of the working group on competence and learning was to discover means to improve learning outcomes, bridge the gap in the learning outcomes between girls and boys, ensure regional equality, safeguard equal opportunities for further studies and halt the trend of increasing disparities within and between schools. The project also examined the position of minorities and their learning outcomes in the Finnish educational system. The working group on motivation and teaching explored different learning environments, study materials including educational games, and innovations that support learning, investigated how learning motivation and well-being could be improved, and assessed the significance of motivation and school satisfaction for learning and school attendance. The group members also looked at the content and methods of education and pre- and in-service training for teachers. In the autumn an online survey was organized and 7,000 people responded. Also, six regional events were held in late autumn in 2014. The purpose of these events was to facilitate an extensive public discussion about the future of basic education. The working groups' proposals as well as the results of the survey were presented in more detail at the beginning of March when the report on this development project was published. The proposals are to be exploited in the drawing up of the government programme after the next parliamentary elections in April 2015. ; Osnovno obrazovanje u budućnosti – Promijenimo trend! razvojni je projekt u osnovnom i srednjoškolskom obrazovanju u Finskoj. Cilj je procijeniti trenutnu situaciju, proučiti razloge za pad u ishodima učenja na nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj razini i proučiti potrebe za razvojem poučavanja i učenja u finskom obrazovnom sustavu. Dvije radne skupine koordinira upravni odbor. Cilj radne skupine zadužene za kompetencije i učenje je pronaći načine za poboljšanje ishoda učenja, premošćivanje jaza između ishoda učenja djevojčica i dječaka, uspostavljanja regionalne ravnopravnosti; očuvanje jednakih mogućnosti za buduća istraživanja i zaustavljanja trenda povećanja nejednakosti unutar škola i među školama. Projekt će također proučiti položaj manjina i njihove ishode učenja u finskom obrazovnom sustavu. Radna skupina zadužena za motivaciju i poučavanje proučit će različita okruženja za učenje, zatim materijale koji uključuju obrazovne igre i inovacije koje potpomažu učenje, proučiti kako se motivacija za učenje i dobrobit mogu poboljšati te ocijeniti važnost motivacije i zadovoljstva školom za učenje i pohađanje škole. Također će biti istraženi sadržaj i metode obrazovanja, zatim obrazovanje budućih nastavnika i nastavnika praktičara. Online anketa organizirana je prošlu jesen i anketirano je 7000 ispitanika. Također, u kasnu jesen održana su regionalna događanja. Svrha tih događanja je olakšati opsežnu javnu raspravu o budućnosti osnovnog obrazovanja. Prijedlozi radnih skupina kao i rezultati ankete bit će detaljnije prikazani početkom ožujka 2015. kada će biti prikazan i izvještaj o razvojnom projektu. Prijedlozi će se razmatrati i putem razvoja Vladina programa nakon sljedećih parlamentarnih izbora u travnju 2015.

U radu se istražuju ustroj i djelovanje Izvršnog vijeća Sabora NRH, republičkog izvršnog tijela vlasti, u razdoblju od njegova osnivanja Ustavnim zakonom NRH 1953. godine do donošenja novog Ustava SRH 1963. godine. U navedenom razdoblju rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz tri mandatna razdoblja: prvo 6.2.-18.12.1953, drugo 18.12.1953.-10.4.1958. te treće mandatno razdoblje 10.4.1958.-27.6.1963. godine. Istraživanje se prvenstveno temelji na analizi arhivskoga gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu te zakona, podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima (Narodne novine, Službeni list FNRJ). U prvom dijelu rada analiziraju se odredbe o postupku izbora Izvršnog vijeća te donosi pregled i popisi izabranih članova po mandatnim razdobljima. U nastavku rada naglasak je na definiranju poslova iz stručne nadležnosti, te pregledu organizacije i rekonstrukciji unutarnjeg ustroja Izvršnog vijeća (upravljanje Izvršnim vijećem, stručna tijela: odbori i komisije, administracija Izvršnog vijeća). U posljednjem poglavlju analiziraju se osnovna obilježja i rezultati rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju, s posebnim osvrtom na rad u sjednicama, pripremanje prijedloga zakona, te donošenje podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata iz njegove nadležnosti. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (1953-1963), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest i n its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. It was constituted by 15 to 30 members, elected from members of the Republican Chamber of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Three mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The first mandate from 6th February till 18th December 1953, the second mandate from 18th December 1953 till 10th April 1958 and the third mandate from 10th April 1958 till 27th June 1963. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. According to the provisions of Constitutional Law from 1953, it is defined which functions has the Executive Council taken over from the authority of the abrogated Government of the People's Republic of Croatia and Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Further analysis points that in period from 1953 to 1956 Executive Council was acting as executive-administrative body and from 1956 to 1963 primarily as executive-political body. In 1956, due to the reorganisation of the public administration, the majority of administrative functions until then under the jurisdiction of the Executive Council were transferred to the authority of the Republic's governing bodies. According to that, Executive Council acts primarily as executive-political body, under which authority is enforcement of general politics and measures, as well as adoption of acts and putting precise tasks to governing bodies for their accomplishment. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in three parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards and commissions) and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as education, science and culture. Less activity concerned the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to other administrative fields, first of all, system of justice and home affairs, health care system and social policy, as well as labour relations.

Komentiraju se slijed dosadašnjih pokušaja te aktualni napo-ri u vezi s decentralizacijom. Elaborira se četrnaest prijedloga za korjenitu decentralizaciju, koja jedina ima smisla ako se lokalna i regionalna samouprava želi konstituirati kao jedan od ključnih aktera ekonomskog, društvenog i socijalnog razvoja te ekonomske stabilnosti zemlje. Riječ je o: oblikovanju strategije decentralizacije; u čvršćenju strukture za regionalni razvoj; zadržavanja dvostupanjske strukture terito- rijalne samouprave, ali različite od postojeće; formiranju pet regija umjesto sadašnjih dvadeset županija; spajanju preko 550 lokalnih jedinica u 150 velikih općina; zadržavanju i ja-č anju mjesne samouprave; preoblikovanje županija u uprav- ne okruge s primjenom načela one-stop-shop, smanjenjem broja tih okruga na desetak i širenjem njihova djelokruga na poslove sadašnjih područnih jedinica središnjih tijela državne uprave; jačanju financijskog kapaciteta lokalne samouprave tako da se dosegne udio lokalnih rashoda u rashodima opće drž ave od 25% u narednih pet godina; uvođenju mješovitog izbornog sustava tako da se pored proporcionalnog uvede većinsko predstavništvo; formiranju Agencije za lokalne službenike kao nezavisnog tijela na razini države; usposta- vi jedinstvenog informacijskog sustava lokalne samouprave; prenošenju dijela poslova državne uprave na obavljanje većim jedinicama lokalne samouprave; formiranju ekspertne radne skupine za pripremu decentralizacije; planiranju decentralizacije tako da se čitav program provede do lokalnih izbora 2017. Navode se i mogućnosti usavršavanja postojećeg centraliziranog modela organizacije države, ponajprije kroz diferencijaciju položaja objektivno različitih jedinica te poticanje i nametanje intermunicipalne suradnje. ; The paper begins with a comment on the sequence of previous attempts at decentralisation and a description of current efforts made concerning the decentralisation process. Fourteen suggestions for substantive decentralisation are elaborated. A substantive decentralisation is the only reasonable decentralisation form if local and regional self-government is to be constituted as one of the key actors of economic and social development, and of economic stability of the country. These fourteen sugges- tions include: (1) designing a decentralisation strategy; (2) strengthening the structure for regional development; (3) maintaining the two-tier system of territorial self-government, which should nevertheless differ from the existing model; (4) forming five regions instead of the existing twenty counties; (5) merging more than 550 local units into 150 large municipalities; (6) maintaining and strengthening forms of intra-municipal self-government; (7) reshaping counties into state administrative units with the implementation of one-stop-shop principle, by reducing them to ten units and by widening their competences to the tasks of the existing branch of- fices of various ministries; (8) strengthening the financial capacity of local self-government so as to rise the share of local expenditures in the general state expenditures to 25 per cent in the next five years; (9) considering the introduction of mixed electoral system, so as to introduce plurality representation along with proportional; (10) establishing an Agency for Local Civil Servants as a central level independent body; (11) establishing an integrated information system on local governments; (12) transferring certain state administrative tasks to larger local self-government units; (13) forming an group of experts that would professionaly prepare decentralisation; (14) planning decentralisation so that the whole programme will have been finished by 2017 local elections. The author has also made suggestions for the another scenario – improvement of the existing cen- tralised model of state organisation, primarily via deeper differentiation between the objectively different local units, and stimulation and imposition of intermunicipal cooperation.

U radu autor analizira djelovanje Samostalne demokratske stranke (SDS) u Slavoniji i Srijemu 1924.-1929. Čitatelj se upućuje na okolnosti nastanka stranke, ustroj stranačke infrastrukture, etničku i socijalnu strukturu, tisak te rezultate na parlamentarnim, oblasnim i lokalnim izborima. SDS je, usprkos isticanju unitarističke dogme o jedinstvenom jugoslavenskom narodu, počivao na podršci srpskih birača i nalazio se u stalnom nadmetanju s radikalima za poziciju najjače srpske stranke slavonsko-srijemskog prostora. ; In this paper the author analyses the activities of the Independent Democratic Party (SDS) in Slavonia and Syrmia from 1924 to 1929. The reader will be familiarised with the circumstances of the development of the party, the organization of the party's infrastructure, the ethnic and social structure, the press and the results of parliamentary, regional and local elections. Although the Independent Democratic Party advocated the unitary dogma of a single Yugoslav nation, it was drew on the support of Serbian voters and constantly competed with the Radicals for the position of the most powerful Serbian party in the Slavonian-Syrmian territory. The Independent Democratic Party in Slavonia and Syrmia managed during the last four and a half years of the parliamentary regime of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to make itself into a significant political factor. In the territories of the Virovitica and Požega County it was in a constant struggle with the Radicals for the position of the second most important political power, while in the territory of the Syrmian County it lagged behind the Radicals. However, it did not succeed in approaching Radić's Party which during that period succeeded in keeping the position of dominant political party. With respect to the Democratic Party that it had emerged from, the conclusion can be drawn that it attracted the majority of the members and adherents of the former united Democrats. The Independent Democratic Party in Slavonia and Syrmia drew heavily on the support of the Serbian electorate. On the one hand, this implies that the party had not entirely succeeded in affirming its unitary Yugoslav political platform, since it was evident that it was rejected by the Croats, the majority population. The struggle for the sympathy of the Serbian voters naturally led to fierce political confrontations with the Radicals, which were only temporarily calmed by the coalitions of the two parties at the level of the state as a whole. At the same time the Independent Democratic Party above all proved to be the political representative of the Serbian peasantry of the Slavonian-Syrmian area which implied confrontations with the Radicals and also with the ever-greatger influence of farmers. Various forms of para-political organization on which the unique Democratic Party had been successfully working before the party split (Peasant Councils, Voluntary Association and the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists) considerably supplemented and thereby strengthened the power of the Independent Democratic Party after spring 1924. While monarchism and the Serbian electoral base considerably facilitated a short-term coalition with the Radicals in 1925 (National Block), the Independent Democratic Party and the Croatian Peasant Party (Peasant Democratic Coalition) shared lesser connecting features. The party leadership and certain sincere supporters of a coalition with Radić's Party (the leader of the Party in Osijek, Milan Stijić or the Pakrac Orthodox priest Danilo Podunavac) endeavoured to ease the ideological and programme differences by emphasizing the mutual menace to both the Croats and Serbs of the transriparian Serb areas. However, other Slavonian-Syrmian party leaders (Svetislav Popović and Milenko Marković) considered an alliance with the Croatian Peasant Party to be a great violation of the dogma of the national unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or a threat to the centralistic state. Hence, it would be no exaggeration to state that Alexander's undemocratic act (probably) pre-empted a schism within the Independent Democratic Party.

U legitimiranju komunističke vlasti u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svjetskog rata važnu ulogu imale su i tradicionalne institucije zakonodavne, izvršne i sudbene vlasti. Njihovo oblikovanje u Federalnoj Državi/Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj započelo je 1943. te je nastavljeno do donošenja Ustava NRH 18. siječnja 1947., kojim dobivaju ustavnu potvrdu. U odnosu na njihove ustavne pozicije, u dosadašnjim istraživanjima poslijeratnog političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj zaključeno je da su stvarnu vlast i monopol odlučivanja imala najviša tijela KPJ, tj. KPH. Pri tome stvarni položaj i uloga središnjih državnih tijela u funkcioniranju političkog sustava vlasti u Hrvatskoj nakon 1945. do sada nisu sustavno istraženi te se ovim radom daje doprinos na tom području. Prezentiraju se rezultati istraživanja organizacije i djelovanja Sabora NRH u sustavu vlasti u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju formalnog federalizma i stvarnog centralizma (1945. – 1953.). Postavljeno je više istraživačkih ciljeva: odnos između njegova formalnog ustavnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja u sustavu vlasti, ustroj, sastav, zakonodavna djelatnost i druge funkcije, odnosi s KPH/SKH i republičkim institucijama vlasti, te utjecaj njegova djelovanja na svakodnevni život stanovništva. Njegova organizacija i djelovanje uspoređeni su s organizacijom i djelovanjem Narodne skupštine FNRJ, institucija zakonodavne vlasti drugih jugoslavenskih republika, te drugih država u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast, ponajprije Ruske Sovjetske Federativne Socijalističke Republike (RSFSR) i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika (SSSR). Postavljeno je nekoliko hipoteza koje su istraživanjem i potvrđene: ustavni položaj vrhovnog tijela državne vlasti u Hrvatskoj Sabor NRH nije ostvarivao u praksi; bio je organiziran po uzoru na Narodnu skupštinu FNRJ; njegova zakonodavna djelatnost nije uključivala stvarnu raspravu, već samo formalno normiranje prethodno definiranih političkih ciljeva i ideja KPH/SKH; u Saboru NRH nije bilo pluralizma političkoga mišljenja; građani su se obraćali Saboru NRH prvenstveno s ciljem ostvarivanja osobnih prava, ponajprije socijalnih. Osnovne metode korištene u istraživanju su kritička analiza izvora i komparativna metoda. Rezultati su prezentirani kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a u pojedinim poglavljima sistematizirani su u obliku grafičkih i tabličnih prikaza. Doktorskim radom daje se doprinos boljem poznavanju institucija i političkog sustava vlasti FD/NRH u razdoblju 1945. – 1953. Istraživanje može biti poticaj sličnim istraživanjima i u drugim bivšim jugoslavenskim republikama. Omogućuje se usporedba s političkim sustavima vlasti u drugim europskim državama u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast. ; The important role in legitimising the communist system of government in Croatia/Yugoslavia after the Second World War was played by the traditional institutions of legislative, executive and judicial government. Their organization in Federal State / People's Republic of Croatia began in 1943, and continued until the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia adoption on 18th January 1947, which gave them constitutional confirmation. As the supreme state governing institutions were declared People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament and its Presidium; Government of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme executive and administrative governing institution, and Supreme Court of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme judicial institution. In relation to their constitutional position, in previous researches of post-war political system in Croatia, was concluded that the real authority and decision-making monopoly had the highest body of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, ie. Communist Party of Croatia. In doing so, the actual position and the role of republic governmental institutions in the communist system of government in Croatia after 1945 haven't been systematically researched, and this doctoral thesis makes a contribution in this scope. The doctoral thesis presents the results of researching the organisation and activity of People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament during the period of formal federalism and actual centralism (1945 – 1953). The aim is to explain the realation between the constitutional and actual position of the Parliament in the communist system of government, its structure, composition, legislative activity, relations with the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communists of Croatia and republic governmental institutions, as well as the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population. Parliament's organisation and activity is also compared to the organisation and activity of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia, as well as with legislative institutions of the former Yugoslavian republics and other European states with established communist rule, primarily Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A number of hypotheses are confirmed by research: the constitutional position of the supreme state governing institution, Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia didn't achieve in practice; it was organized on the model of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia; its legislative activity didn't include the actual debate, but only a formal adoption and promulgation of pre-defined political goals and ideas of the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communist of Croatia; in People's Republic of Croatia'a Parliament, there wasn't pluralism of political opinion; citizens addressed the Parliament, primarily with the aim of solving personal problems, especially social. Main methods used in research were critical analysis of resources (notably original, unpublished archival documents) and comparative method. The research results are presented by a combination of thematic and chronological approach. In certain chapters, they are systematized in the form of graphical and tabular overviews. Doctoral thesis is structured as follows. In the first, introductory chapter are explained the research topic, main goals, hypotheses and scientific contribution, methodology, as well as literature and resources used in the research. The chapter gives an overview of the previous researches relevant to the topic, and the classification of legislatures in such researches. The second chapter gives an overview of the Yugoslav/Croatian communist system of government and the position of legislatures in this system in theory. There are explained the main characteristics of the then revolutionary ideology of the ruling Communist Party, as well as formal constitutional provision. They are compared with the main characteristics of the Soviet communist system of government. It also gives an overview of the classical Marxist theory about the state, government and legislatures, and demonstrates how it was used in the writings and speeches of Yugoslav theoreticians and politicians. The third and fourth chapter give an overview of the People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament organization and activity in practice, divided into two chronological periods: until the adoption of the People's Republic of Croatia's Constitution in January 1947, and thereafter up in 1953. The fifth, concluding chapter, summarizes the main research results. Chapter six contains several appendixes: the results of parliamentary elections in Croatia 1946, 1947 and 1950; a list of councilors, ie. representatives in State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia and in People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament 1943 – 1953; a list of members of the Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia 1945 – 1953; a list of representatives from Croatia in Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia / National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1945 – 1953; a list of laws adopted by the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1946 – 1953; a list of tables and figures used in doctoral thesis). Seventh chapter contains a list of sources and literature used in the research. Doctoral thesis contributes to better understanding of institutions and the political system of government in Croatia in the period 1945 – 1953. Comparative approach in the presentation of research results, gives a contribution to knowledge of the political system of government and central governing institutions in the former Yugoslavia, as well in the other former Yugoslavian republics. At the same time, it can be a impulse for similar researces in those states. It also enables comparation with the political systems of government and legislatures in other European states with established communist rule. Through the analysis of the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population, it gives contribution to the history of everyday life in communist Croatia and Yugoslavia.

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVA Nova promjena u vezi s plaćanjima naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma, tretirane kao parafiskalni namet, potiče nas da opetovano progovorimo o tom problemu. Na Poduzetničkom portalu čitamo: Premda se službeno zovu "neporezna davanja" u javnosti se već uvriježio termin "parafiskalni nameti", a popisan je 161 parafiskalni namet, koji kažu naciji oduzima oko 2,5 % BDP-a. Detaljnije pak pojašnjenje prema definiciji Ministarstva financija kaže: "parafiskalni nameti su sva propisana obvezna neporezna davanja koja plaćaju poduzeća središnjim tijelima državne uprave, jedinicama lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ili drugim tijelima s javnim ovlastima, ako pri tome: platitelj ne dobiva za uzvrat neku uslugu, dobro ili pravo .". Ako je tome tako zbog čega se onda naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma tretira kao parafiskalni namet? Naime, u ovome slučaju nesporno je da platitelj dobiva za uzvrat uslugu, dobro ili pravo. To bi trebalo biti svima jasno ako samo pogledaju Zakon o šumama, gdje su navedene općekorisne funkcije šuma kako slijedi: 1. zaštita tla, prometnica i drugih objekata od erozije, bujica i poplava; 2. utjecaj na vodni režim i kvalitetu voda; 3. utjecaj na plodnost tla i poljodjelsku proizvodnju; 4. utjecaj na klimu i ublažavanje posljedica klimatskih promjena; 5. zaštita i unapređenje čovjekova okoliša; 6. stvaranje kisika, ponor ugljika i pročišćavanje atmosfere; 7. rekreativna, turistička i zdravstvena funkcija; 8. stvaranje povoljnih uvjeta za divljač i ostalu faunu te 9. povećan utjecaj zaštitnih šuma i šuma posebne namjene na bioraznolikost. U pojedinim funkcijama imaju korist samo neki, a u nekima svi. Naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma prvotno je iznosila 0,07 % od ukupnoga godišnjeg prihoda, 2010. godine pada na 0,0525 %, a potom 2012. godine na 0,0265 % da bi 2018. godine bili oslobođeni plaćanja oni koji ostvaruju ukupni prihod manji od 3 milijuna kn godišnje. Sada se oslobađaju plaćanja oni s ukupnim godišnjim prihodom manjim od 7,5 milijuna kn, a postotak pada na 0,024. Da bi nam bilo jasnije, izračunajmo koliko je to novaca godišnje – na 3 milijuna kn to je bilo 795,00 kn/god., a na 7,5 milijuna kn to je 1.800,00 kn/god. (velik novac !?). Sagledavajući kronologiju smanjenja naknade za općekorisne funkcije šume i histeriju koja vlada oko parafiskalnih nameta, ne bi nas iznenadilo da obnašatelji vlasti nakon parlamentarnih izbora potpuno ukinu ovaj po nama potreban ekološki progresivni porez. Nažalost, ne bi bilo prvi puta da se radi populizma povlače potezi koji nisu dobri ni za državu ni za društvo. Od glavnih gospodarskih djelatnosti: 1. proizvodnje drvnih šumskih proizvoda, 2. proizvodnje šumskog reprodukcijskog materijala i 3. proizvodnje nedrvnih šumskih proizvoda, očekuje se i dobit koja se uplaćuje u državni proračun. Sve to unatoč netržišnom poslovanju u prometu tim proizvodima i nužnim potrebama pravodobnog i sveobuhvatnog rada na uzgojnim i zaštitarskim radovima u šumskom ekosustavu koji se često "preskače", kako bi dobit bila čim veća. Više puta ukazivali smo da u šumarstvu nema dobiti, ako vratimo šumi ono što smo joj uzeli, a da bi ona bila u optimumu, ili slikovito rečeno "vječna". O svakoj od devet navedenih općekorisnih funkcija često smo govorili, potkrijepivši naše riječi istraživačkim rezultatima. Brojke su impresivne i najbolje se pamte. Govoreći, zbog manjka prostora u rubrici, primjerice samo o njenoj hidrološkoj funkciji, rečeno je kako niti jedan vegetacijski oblik ne utječe tako djelotvorno na vodu kao šuma - ona uravnotežuje raspored vode u prostoru, ravnomjerno opskrbljuje vodotoke i ublažava pojavu visokih vodnih valova, utječe na čistoću vode i broj izvorišta. Procjeđivanjem vode kroz živo i rahlo šumsko tlo, ona u podzemne tokove ulazi pitka. Ako uzmemo u obračun prosječnu godišnju količinu oborina u Hrvatskoj od 1200 mm i površinu šuma od samo 2 milijuna ha (ona je veća) računa se da iz šume istječe oko 13 milijardi tona pitke vode. Tko dobiva tu uslugu – svi uključivši i platitelja! Ovako bi mogli i o ostalim općekorisnim funkcijama. E sada, neki kažu pisano je već o svemu tome i rečeno na mnogim šumarskim skupovima, ali mi šumari govorimo sami sebi – a mi pitamo kolegice i kolege: servirani su vam podaci u ovoj rubrici i drugim tekstovima – zašto to ne širite među poznanike, a oni politički angažirani šumarski stručnjaci među kolege političare na lokalnoj, regionalnoj pa i državnoj razini? Pitamo se, da li je pristojno reći da ste se "zavukli u mišju rupu"? Vi odgovorite! Uredništvo ; EDITORIAL A new change referring to the payment of non-market forest function fees, regarded as a parafiscal tax, urges us to again discuss this problem. We read on the Entrepreneurial Portal: Although officially called "non-tax benefits", the term "parafiscal levies" has already become commonplace in the public, and 161 parafiscal levies have been listed, which is believed to take away about 2.5 % of the GDP from the nation. A more detailed explanation according to the definition of the Ministry of Finance states: "parafiscal levies are all prescribed mandatory non-tax benefits paid by companies to central state administrative bodies, local and regional self-government units or other bodies with public authority, if the payer does not receive a service, goods or right in return .". If so, then why is the non-market forest function fee treated as a parafiscal levy? In this case it is indisputable that the payer receives a service, goods or right in return. It should be clear to everyone who reads the Forest Act and where the non-market forest functions are listed as follows: 1. protection of soil, roads and other facilities from erosion, torrents and floods; 2. impact on water regime and water quality; 3. impact on soil fertility and agricultural production; 4. impact on climate and mitigation of climate change; 5. protection and improvement of the human environment; 6. oxygen generation, carbon sink and atmospheric purification; 7. recreation, tourist and health function; 8. creation of favourable conditions for wildlife and other fauna, and 9: increased impact of protective forests and special purpose forests on biodiversity. Some of the functions provide benefits only for some individuals, while other functions provide benefits for all. The non-market forest function fee initially amounted to 0.07 % of the total annual income, in 2010 it dropped to 0,0525 %, and then in 2012 to 0.0265 %, whereas in 2018 all those who generated total income less than 3 million kuna annually were exempt from payment. Now all these with a total annual income of less than 7.5 million kuna are exempt from payment, and the percentage has dropped to 0.024. To make it clearer, let us calculate how much money it is per year - at 3 million kuna it was 795.00 kuna/year, and at 7.5 million kuna it was 1,800.00 kuna / year (what an amount!). In view of the chronology of the reduction of the non-market forest function fee and the hysteria surrounding parafiscal levies, it would not at all surprise us if, after the parliamentary elections, the government completely abolishes this, in our view, necessary and environmentally progressive tax. Regrettably, it would not be the first time that populism takes steps that are not good either for the state or for the society. The main economic activities, including 1. production of wood forest products, 2. production of forest reproductive material and 3. production of non-wood forest products, are expected to generate income which is paid into the state budget. All this despite non-market business moves in the trade of these products and the necessary need for timely and comprehensive work on silvicultural and protection operations in the forest ecosystem, which are often "skipped" in order to maximize profit. We have repeatedly pointed out that there is no profit in forestry if we return to the forest what we have taken from it so as to leave it in the optimal state, or figuratively speaking, so as to make it "eternal". We have often discussed every one of the nine non-market functions listed above, corroborating our words with research results. The numbers are impressive and are easy to remember. Due to limited space in the column, let us only take the hydrological function; no vegetation form affects water as effectively as a forest - it balances the distribution of water in space, evenly supplies watercourses and mitigates high water waves, and affects water purity and the number of water springs. Water filtered through live and friable forest soil reaches ground courses as potable water. If we take into account the average annual rainfall in Croatia of 1200 mm and the forest area of only 2 million ha (it is larger), it is calculated that about 13 billion tons of drinking water flows from the forest. Who receives this service? Everyone, including the payer! We could continue in the same way with other non-market forest functions. Some would say, these issues have been treated at a number of forestry conferences, but we foresters speak for ourselves - and we ask our colleagues: you have been served information in this column and in other articles - why do not you spread it among your acquaintances, and why those politically active forestry experts do not raise these issues among their fellow politicians at the local, regional and even state level? We wonder, is it polite to say that you have "crawled into a mouse hole"? You answer it! Editorial Board

The political and social renascence that took place in the latter part of the 19th century made possible the revival of economic, cultural, and artistic activities. This became particularly evident in the building activity spreading, as in the rest of Europe of that period, in the wake of the then fashionable neo-styles that made a somewhat belated appearance at Vis. A Neo-Gothic building, designed to house the premises of the Hrvatski Dom, was built in the central part of the water-front (luka) et the very beginning of the current century, while a Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house was erected for the Tramontana family in 1911. The local school, designed by the native architect Marinković, was built in the Neo-Classicist style in 1910. The building housing the Army Club premises (Dom JNA) and the new fishmarket were also erected in the Neo-Classicist style. Some Neo-Classicist tombs may be seen on the cemetery where the Neo-Renaissance Dojmi Chapel stands out among other monuments. A Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house, belonging to the Mardešić Gariboldi family, was built at Komiža in in the early part of the current century, while the construction of a building in the Secessionist style (The Hum Café) followed shortly. The trend prevailing at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries is evident also in a series of simple, modest houses designed in no definite style at all, but containing elements of various neo-styles or of the Viennese Secession in their facades. Gutters for carrying off rain water, usually sunk in decorative roof cornices supported by consoles; rows of tall windows with simply dressed stone frames that were molded in some cases; standard shop entrances in the ground floor; balconies with wrought-iron balustrades; basement windows protected with iron grating, etc., all these elements were commonplace during that period lasting through the thirties of the current century when the increasing use of concrete almost entirely repleced stone as building material, rendering the facade construction an utterly simple affair. Among the movables dating from the above mentioned period, the Neo-Gothic furniture of the pharmacy (Narodna Apoteka) at Komiža, and the home furniture owned by the Lučić-Roki family at Vis (designed by Dragutin Inkiostri Medenjak, painter and decorator, 1866-1942) are worth mentioning. So are several pieces of furniture, etc., dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries scattered in various houses on the island. Two painters native from Komiža, Vinko Foretić and Miho Marinković, contributed to the development of the modern art in Croatia during the early part of the current century. While the former returned to his native island after years of youthful wanderings, dedicating his ability to landscape painting and portraying of life and people of Komiža, the latter ended his days as a university professor (member of the Faculty of Architecture) in Belgrade. Boasting marvellous scenery and views of the sea, picturesque water-front and interesting fishermen popular even abroad, Komiža has attracted a number of artists for a long period now. One of them was Đuro Tiljak who came to live on the island time and again where he painted considerable number of his canvases. A memorial collection of his works, comprising all his creations involving the island, was opened at Komiža in 1967. The Island of Vis, having played a most important part in the People's Revolution, has a special niche in its history. Owing to its geographical position, lying far from the mainland in the open sea, the island, turned into a wartime garrison by the People's Liberation Army as soon as Italy surrendered to the Allies in 1943, became an impregnable fortress in the Adriatic, successfully resisting the attacks of German forces in the area. That is why a number of localities and structures on the island, reminding us of those eventful years, are significant not only for the history of Dalmatia but of the whole of Yugoslavia. The glorious days of the recent past are re-awakened by memorial tablets or slogans found on old stone-built houses in the island villages and hamlets; by graves of fallen partisans scattered in a number of grave-yards and on the former aerodrome – once a lonely window flung open to the outer world and now a peaceful green vineyard; and also by miscellaneous articles or documents surviving in the silanders' homes. Numerous traces of red – or blue – painted slogans still found on the walls of houses at Vis, Komiža, Podšpilje, Marinje Zemlje, Dračevo Polje, Podstražje, and other villages and hamlets on the island, bear eloquent testimony to the wartime events, particularly to the significant ones in 1944. The cave located to the nort-west of Borovik is no doubt the most important monument belonging to that period as it served as sheltered headquarters for the People's Liberation Army from where its Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, controlled its activities in the field aiming at the liberation of the country. The cave has therefore been named Titova Špilja. Several memorial tablets have been erected in the post-war period, either to mark some historic spots or to honour the victims of the Fascist persecution, fallen partisans, etc., Among the memorial tablets set up at Komiža, the one on the Tower is in memory of the 1940 municipal election victory of the workpeople of Komiža when 18 councilmen were returned, who directed the municipal affairs under the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia; others, set up on various houses at Vis, mark the one-time seats of the District Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia for the central Dalmatian archipelago, and of the Regional Committee of the People's Liberation Movement, etc. A memorial tablet, set up on the Kučić Family house at Komiža, reminds us of the decision made by the local Communist Party Committee in 1941 to start attacking the invader's forces, while the inscription on another tablet erected on the house owned by Luka Borčić (at Žena Glava), records the spot where – from January through October 1944 – the Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia conducted the armed revolt of the people against the Fascist invader. Fallen partisans have been hounoured by memorial tablets set up at Vis, Komiža, Podstražje, Marinje Zemlje, Podšpilje, and on the Island of Biševo. Both native and British airmen, killed in action in the course of the struggle for liberation, have also been honoured, the native flyers at Velo Polje and the British at the Čunkovica crossroads. Monuments remind us of the executed hostages at Vis and Komiža in 1943 while a memorial tablet records the spot where Nikola Marinković – Top was killed. As a part of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the stay on the island (in 1944) of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, and of Marshal Tito himself, several buildings were dedicated in 1964 to the fighters killed in action and to the victims of Fascist cruelty. Among such buildings are the memorial school, designed by the Architect N. Šegvić, and the memorial premises for popular meetings, etc., designed by S. Planić. A memorial well built at Podšpilje bears the inscription of some verses by J. Franičević and of names of the fallen fighters. A large monolith erected at Vis marks the spot where the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the People's Liberation Army, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, reviewed the First Dalmatian Brigade decorating it for bravery with the Order of People's Liberation. A sentence from his speech reading: »Tuđe nećemo – svoje ne damo« (We do not what is not ours but we will not surrender what is ours) has been cut in the monolith. A number of buildings at Vis bear inscriptions recording various wartime events, e. g. the stay there (in 1944) of the presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia, of the People's Committe, of the Vis Island District Committee, etc. Some buildings at Komiža are marked in a similar way, and we learn from the inscriptions which of the houses were occupied by the Military Command, Military Hospital, Refugee Collecting Station, etc. Memorial tablets have also been set up at Borovik Village, in order to mark the houses once occupied by the Centrl Comittee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the 26th Division Headquarters, and the Soviet, British, and American military missions. The Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, the Agitprop, the Slobodna Dalmacija Editorial Office, etc., were housed at Žena Glava Village, while various aerodrome services etc. had their quarters at Marinje Zemlje. The headquarters of the 1st Dalmatian Brigade and 3rd Overseas Brigade were at Podselje. A number of miscellaneous movable articles connected with the People's War of Liberation have been preserved and are now on show at the Museum at Vis as also in some private homes. A significant architectural contribution has been recorded on the island in the field of building construction. The Yugoslav Army Club premises at Komiža and a number of handsome dwelling-houses (all designed by the Architect Vitić) and the large Wine Cellars (designed by the Architect Fabris) are particularly noteworthy.

"Izrada hrvatske poljoprivredne strategije jedan mi je od prioriteta, a ona neće zanemariti ni aspekte ruralnog razvoja, okoliš, proizvode zaštićenog podrijetla, ruralni turizam, obnovljive izvore energije." Ovo je izjava novoga resornog ministra poljoprivrede iz opširnog intervjua kojega je dao Večernjem listu 10. ožujka 2016. god. U nastavku navodi kako je za izradu strategije poljoprivrede i prehrambene industrije, šumarstva i prerade drva rok do kraja 2016. god. Također navodi kako je trenutno u tijeku redefiniranje Programa ruralnog razvoja. O nedostatku strategija Države za gotovo sve resore gospodarstva, kao i očekivanjima da se iste konačno naprave, što se odnosi i na šumarstvo i preradu drva, pisali smo u br. 5-6 Šumarskoga lista 2011. god. Bilo je to vrijeme uoči novih parlamentarnih izbora, pa su se strategije očekivale od nove Vlade. Kao što vidimo, protekao je cijeli mandat sada već stare Vlade i ništa nije učinjeno, pa se stihijski radilo. Bez strategije i uz slabu kontrolu resornog ministarstva, koje bi trebalo biti odgovorno za šumarsku politiku i strategiju, posebice prepuštanje Hrvatskim šumama d.o.o. i nekompetentnom rukovodstvu da provodi svoju šumarsku politiku uz svoju strategiju, iako su uvjetno rečeno samo "koncesionari", evidentno je da su nastale velike štete za šume i šumarstvo. Nestručno vođenje firme i robovanje "profitu" pod svaku cijenu, zahtijeva od nas da postavimo pitanja i na njih tražimo odgovore. Na temelju činjeničnog stanja će se uz ostalo temeljiti, nadamo se, napokon zacrtana konzistentna šumarska politika i strategija. Naravno da ne možemo ovdje postaviti sva sporna pitanja, pa stoga dopunu prepuštamo čitateljstvu. Neka od tih pitanja su: treba li preskočiti jedan etat jer smo dirnuli u glavnicu; da li je narušen omjer smjese sječom vrjednijih vrsta drveća; da li je narušena debljinska struktura sastojina; da li se, gdje i koliko kasnilo s uzgojnim radovima njege i čišćenja koji određuju buduću sastojinu; koje sastojine trebaju ići u prijevremenu obnovu jer su nestručnim gospodarenjem dovedene u stanje da ne koriste optimalno potencijale šumskoga staništa; što je s prirodnom obnovom sastojina; zašto i koliko ostaje drvne sirovine u šumi; što je sa šumskim redom; koliko i zašto imamo toliko oštećenih stabala prouzročenih vučom sortimenata; zašto imamo previše Ad stabala; kako obrađujemo sortimente da ne oštećujemo šumsko tlo; da li su nam i zašto šumske vlake postale vododerine; da li je istina da od ubranih prihoda za korištenje šumskih cesta samo manji dio vraćamo za njihovo održavanje, pa su stoga u vrlo lošem stanju; da li privatnicima plaćamo vuču i dalje tako malo da vozni park obnavljaju kupnjom naših isluženih traktora koji zagađuju okoliš; zašto je nekim pilanskim klasama trupaca cijena niža od ogrjevnog drva; što je s pošumljavanjem opožarenih površina koje su potencijalna opasnost za eroziju tla; kome i zašto je prepušteno gospodarenje (osim sirovinskog) s ostalim gospodarskim potencijalima šume i naposljetku pitanje koliko će šuma i šumarstvo platiti robovanje isključivo novčanom profitu utopljenom u nezajažljivost birokracije? Kada neslužbeno razgovaramo s našim kolegama, pa i s nekima koji su trenutno u vladajućoj strukturi Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o., svi negoduju, pa i čude se nekim naredbama neutemeljenim na načelima šumarske struke i znanjima koje su na Fakultetu polučili. Višekratna eksperimentiranja iz strogo centralizirano ustrojene uprave, a zapravo jednog čovjeka, dovela su šumarstvo gotovo do ruba obstojnosti struke. U ovoj smo rubrici uz ostalo pisali o odstupanju jednog od načela iz 10 sentenci o šumi, uvaženog akademika Dušana Klepca, a ono se odnosi upravo na organizacijski oblik šumarstva od centralističkoga do proklamirano decentralističkoga, koji kao najpovoljniji "omogućuje na istom prostoru i istoj organizacijskoj jedinici korištenje svih izravnih i neizravnih beneficija koje šuma pruža". Rekli smo tada da je to danas strogo centralistički oblik, u kojemu za svaku sitnicu treba tražiti odobrenje centra, gdje upravitelji uprava nemaju nikakvih ingerencija, čime im je ograničena inventivnost i primjena stečenih šumarskih znanja i iskustava te narušen ugled pred zaposlenicima i lokalnom zajednicom, gdje revirnici i ostali inženjeri sve više postaju kancelarijski službenici, a beneficije šume su svedene na isključivo sirovinsku bazu. Time se zapravo želi poništiti i omalovažiti multifunkcionalnu ulogu šume, a šumarske stručnjake svesti na razinu neinventivnih nadničara. Začuđujuće je da su osim središnjice HŠD-a, koja je posebice u ovoj rubrici Šumarskoga lista upozoravala na činjenično stanje, mnogi smatrali da će se nešto samo po sebi riješiti, i što je još gore, ne osjećaju se odgovornima. O svemu tome, pa i po pitanju prerade drva i energetske strategije također smo više puta pisali u ovoj rubrici i još u nekim tekstovima – samo treba "prolistati" Šumarski list i početi aktivno štiti struku, jer inače nemamo pravo prigovarati. Uredništvo ; "Formulating the Croatian agricultural strategy is one of my priorities, which will on no account neglect the aspects of rural development, environment, products of protected designation of origin, rural tourism and renewable energy sources." This is what the new Minister of Agriculture stressed in an extensive interview given to Večernji List (Evening Paper) on 16 March 2016. The Minister went on to say that the deadline for drawing up the strategy of agriculture and food industry, forestry and wood processing was the end of 2016. He pointed out that the Rural Development Programme was currently being redefined. In the Forestry Journal No. 5-6 we already wrote about the non-existence of state strategies for almost all economic sectors, including forestry and wood processing, and about general expectations that they would finally be formulated. Since this was at the time of new parliamentary elections, the strategies were expected to be drawn up by the new Government. As we can see, the entire mandate of the old Government had elapsed without anything being done in this respect, which in a way legitimized disorganized work. Lack of strategies and poor control in the competent ministry responsible for the forestry policy and strategy, and particularly the fact that the company Hrvatske Šume Ltd and its incompetent management were allowed to implement their own forestry policy and their own strategy, despite being, conditionally said, "concessionnaires", resulted in evident and great damage for forests and forestry. In view of how incompetently the company is managed and how its primary goal is "profit" at any cost, we must demand the answers to some questions that will reveal the factual state. These answers will, we hope, finally lay the foundations for a consistent forestry policy and strategy. It is not possible to raise all controversial issues here, so we leave additional issues to the readers. Here are several of these questions: should one annual cut be skipped because we have nipped into the growing stock; has the mixture ratio been disturbed by cutting more valuable tree species; has the stand diameter structure been disturbed; have the silvicultural operations of tending and cleaning, which determine the future stand, been delayed and by how much; which stands should be regenerated prematurely owing to inexpert management which brought them into a state in which they cannot make optimal use of forest site potentials; what about natural stand regeneration; how much raw wood material remains in the forest and why; what about the forest order; what quantity of damaged trees is caused by skidding the assortments and why; why are there too many accidentally cut trees; how do we process assortments so as to avoid damage to forest soil; have forest skidding lines turned into gullies and why; is it true that only a small portion of the money collected from forest road use is spent on their maintenance, leading to their extremely poor condition; do we continue to pay very low amounts for skidding to private entrepreneurs, so that they restock their vehicle fleet by purchasing old tractors that pollute the environment; why is the price of some sawlog classes lower than the price of fuelwood; what about afforesting burnt areas, which are a potential hazard for soil erosion; who has been entrusted with the management (in addition to raw material) of other economic forest potentials and why: and finally, how much will forests and forestry suffer because of blind servitude to monetary profit only, dictated by greedy bureaucracy? In unofficial conversations, our colleagues, including some colleagues who are currently in the managing structure of the company Hrvatske Šume Ltd, express disapproval and wonder at some directives that are not based on the principles of the forestry profession and on the expertise acquired at the Faculty of Forestry. Multiple experiments conducted by the strictly centralized management, or better said, by one man, have led forestry almost to the very brink of survival. Among other things, we already wrote about abandoning one of the principles contained in the 10 sentences on forests by distinguished Academician Dušan Klepac. This principle relates precisely to the organisational form of forestry, from centralist to decentralist, which "allows the use of all direct and indirect benefits of a forest in the same space and in the same organisational unit". We have already pointed out that at present this form is strictly centralist, according to which approval of the centre must be obtained for any little thing, and in which forest administration managers have no jurisdiction over anything. Naturally, this hampers their inventiveness and limits the application of forestry knowledge and experience, as well as undermines them before other employees and the local community. Moreover, forest rangers and engineers are increasingly turning into office clerks, while the benefits of a forest are exclusively limited to the raw material base. In fact, all this is aimed at nullifying and undermining the multifunctional role of a forest and downgrading forestry experts to the level of uninventive labourers. It is surprising that, with the exception of the management of the Croatian Forestry Association, which has repeatedly warned of the factual state in this column, many believe that things will work out by themselves, or even worse, do not feel responsible for any of the above. We have tackled these issues, as well as issues of wood processing and energy strategies, on several occasions in this column and in some other texts - all we need to do is browse through Forestry Journal and start protecting the profession more actively; otherwise, we have no right to complain. Editorial Board

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.