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Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to address the misapplication of the embeddedness concept in Ferraris's (2014) paper and show how it needs to be used as a cornerstone economic sociology concept within his proposed framework. This paper is a response to his paper in theMultinational Business Review"Rethinking the literature on 'multiple embeddedness' and subsidiary-specific advantages".Design/methodology/approach– The paper outlines the origin of the embeddedness concept and its evolution within the economic sociology literature. It addresses different types of embeddedness and continues with a critical analysis of Ferraris's (2014) proposed framework of four main types of multinational enterprise (MNE) relationships. It provides suggestions for its improvement and application, as well as discusses the appropriate applications of embeddedness concept by international business (IB) scholars in MNE research.Findings– The paper shows how the embeddedness concept is mostly used as a metaphor and as a simple umbrella label for different types of connections between MNEs, their subsidiaries and different types of environments. The analysis of Ferraris's (2014) proposed framework shows how MNE embeddedness is incorrectly understood as emanating from the balancing of local responsiveness and global integration within MNEs, where subsidiaries develop subsidiary-specific advantages (SSAs) by recombining home – host country-specific advantages and parent – subsidiary firm-specific advantages (FSAs).Originality/value– The paper adds to the existing IB understanding of MNEs' multiple embeddedness and subsidiaries' dual embeddedness through a wider and more structured economic sociology perspective. It provides an appropriate economic sociology-grounded typology of different types of embeddedness. A discussion of possible future research directions stresses how the embeddedness – dissembeddedness capability is a key source of MNE competitive advantage, which moderates the actual recombination process of producing FSAs and SSAs.

AbstractGuided by social information processing theory and regulatory focus theory, this study examines embeddedness contagion related to supervisors' age. Older (vs. younger) supervisors are more likely to become embedded in their organizations, and when employees see these older supervisors as more embedded, they are likely to take this as a positive cue signaling them to become embedded in the organization, too. This tendency is an important topic within employee age research because it can strengthen employees' regulatory focus, which in turn affects their job performance. Analysis of matched data collected from 406 employees and their supervisors showed that supervisors' age was positively related to supervisors' perceptions of their own organizational embeddedness, which then positively affected employees' perceptions of supervisors' and their own embeddedness. Employee embeddedness perceptions, in turn, were positively related to their promotion and prevention focus. Crucially, promotion focus, but not prevention focus, predicted a variety of performance outcomes. Thus, this study explains why employees are more likely to become organizationally embedded in the presence of older supervisors and shows that such embeddedness contagion enhances their work productivity.

The article examines the relationship between community embeddedness and work outcomes (e.g. job motivation, networking behavior, and organizational identification) and the mediating role that organizational embeddedness plays in those relationships. We draw upon conservation of resources theory to explain this mediating effect. Data were collected from 338 employees from multiple organizations at three points in time over a ten-month period; this design allowed us to use latent growth modeling to examine the relationships among changes in the independent, mediating, and outcome variables over time. Results from latent growth modeling analyses generally supported the proposed model. Although community embeddedness has been somewhat marginalized in recent empirical research on organizational embeddedness, this article highlights that it is indeed relevant in predicting job attitudes and job behaviors.

ABSTRACTManagers must regularly make decisions on how to access and deploy their limited resources in order to build organizational capabilities for a sustainable competitive advantage. However, failure to recognize that organizational capabilities involve complex and intricately woven underlying processes may lead to an incomplete understanding of how capabilities affect competitive advantage. As a means of understanding this underlying complexity, we discuss how managerial decisions on resource acquisition and deployment influence capability embeddedness and argue that capability embeddedness has an incremental effect on firm performance beyond the effects from organizational resources and capabilities. To investigate these issues, we present a hierarchical composed error structure framework that relies on cross‐sectional data (and allows for generalizations to panel data). We demonstrate the framework in the context of retailing, where we show that the embeddedness of organizational capabilities influences retailer performance above and beyond the tangible and intangible resources and capabilities that a retailer possesses. Our results illustrate that understanding how resources and capabilities influence performance at different hierarchical levels within a firm can aid managers to make better decisions on how they can embed certain capabilities within the structural and social relationships within the firm. Moreover, understanding whether the underlying objectives of the capabilities that are being built and cultivated have convergent or divergent goals is critical, as it can influence the extent to which the embedded capabilities enhance firm performance.

Dissertation of the University of Utrecht Mutually profitable cooperation is characterized by the fact that the combined efforts of the cooperating parties generate a certain surplus. The first part of the book studies the production of a surplus as a trust problem between two actors. Should an actor provide resources if the other actor can decide on the division of the surplus if it materializes? Under which conditions is trust in a reasonable division of the surplus warranted? We study the effects of `temporal embeddedness'. If both actors interact repeatedly, they can learn something about the other actor's trustworthiness from past interactions. And, they can control their relation by facilitating or hampering future exchange in which both actors should be interested. The first part of the book studies the effects of such `temporal embeddedness' on the provision of a surplus between two actors. Hypotheses are derived on the basis of a simple social capital stock model. These hypotheses are tested using experiments as well as survey data. The second part of the book studies the division of a given surplus. We consider the case where actors are embedded in a network structure and connected actors can engage in dyadic negotiations on the division of a surplus. We show how the actors' network embeddedness determines their success in bargaining. We thus provide predictions on the actors' shares of their surpluses from bilateral negotiations with their partners. Further, we specify conditions for a decay of a negotiation structure into substructures by showing that it is sometimes favorable for an actor not to utilize possible negotiation ties. Predictions on the division of a surplus and on `network breaks' are tested using evidence from laboratory experiments.

AbstractThis study examines whether and when political embeddedness affects firms' growth. Using a dataset of Chinese A‐share firms from 2008 to 2017, we find that both organizational and individual political embeddedness in firms draws negative effects on corporate growth. Such effects mainly come from political embeddedness created by current and local political actors, compared with former and central ones. Moreover, the "grabbing effects" of political embeddedness vary contingent on focal firms' financial situation, political uncertainty, and regional economic and legal environment. That is, the "grabbing effects" are stronger for financially healthy firms than for financially distressed firms. Political uncertainty created by government official replacement refrains political actors from tunneling benefits from affiliated firms and mitigates the negative effects of political embeddedness. Both economic development and legal completeness are conducive to alleviating the "grabbing effects" of political embeddedness. Overall, our findings enrich and extend the "grabbing hand" theory.