Suchergebnisse

Med fem ulike bidrag fra norske samfunnsforskere setter dette fokusnummeret søkelys på norsk klima- og utenrikspolitikk. Bidragene i fokusnummeret viser at det har skjedd en vesentlig sammenkobling av politikkområder som tidligere har vært atskilt, og at klimapolitikken spiller en stadig større rolle i andre politikkområder, slik som utenriks-, handels- og kraftpolitikken. I tillegg kommer det frem at det internasjonale klimaregimet, til tross for nær universell ratifisering av Parisavtalen, stadig fragmenteres. Norge har reagert på dette med å knytte seg stadig tettere til EU, både når det gjelder klima- og kraftpolitikk. Videre påpeker fokusnummeret at internasjonale omdømmekostnader og økende global etterspørsel etter fornybar energi øker presset på en rask grønn omstilling, også innenlands. I sum fremstår Norges ambisjon om å være en global klimaforkjemper som stadig mer uforenelig med rollen som storskala produsent av olje og gass.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Climate and Foreign Policy: Is the Ambition to Be a Global Climate Leader Compatible with Norway's Role as an Oil Producer?The five contributions in this special issue all focus on various aspects of Norwegian climate and foreign policy. The special issue highlights the interconnectedness of policy areas that previously have been separate in showing how climate policy plays an increasing role in other policy domains, such as foreign, trade and energy politics. Even if the Paris Agreement enjoys near universal ratification, the international climate regime is becoming increasingly fragmented. As a result, Norwegian climate policy is becoming increasingly integrated with the EU in both climate and energy regulation. Moreover, the special issue highlights how international reputational costs and increasing future demand for renewable energy are putting additional pressure on a rapid green transition, also domestically. Taken together, Norway's ambition to be a global climate leader appears more and more incompatible with its role as a large producer of oil and gas.

Norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk har ligget ganske fast frem til i dag. På 2020-tallet, i det avgjørende tiåret for klimapolitikken, blir imidlertid den norske linjen utfordret. Det skyldes at en nasjonal forutsetning som hittil har vært Norges fremste styrke, nemlig det fornybare kraftsystemet, ikke lenger opplagt kan ivareta den samme funksjonen i norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det fornybare kraftsystemet og en aktiv utenrikspolitikk for fleksible ordninger i internasjonalt klimasamarbeid har ivaretatt den norske legitimiteten. Fremover vil derimot kravene til hva klimapolitikken skal levere skjerpes kraftig, når elektrifisering og industriell omstilling skal bidra til å nå klimamålene. En energiomstilling som svarer til ambisjonsnivået i klimapolitikken, vil bety at klima-utenrikspolitikken må balansere flere hensyn enn tidligere. Ingenting ved klimapolitikken er lenger kun innenrikspolitikk.
Nordsjøen står overfor en storstilt havvindutbygging. Uavhengig av hva Norge gjør vil europeisk havvindsutbygging dreie Europa i retning av økt gjensidig avhengighet, både fysisk i form av grenseoverskridende infrastruktur, og regulatorisk, gjennom felles regler for salg av kraft over landegrenser. Jo mer omfattende det grønne skiftet blir, jo tydeligere blir det at norsk og europeisk energiomstilling henger sammen, og at denne gjensidig avhengige energiomstillingen er av de aller viktigste komponentene i Norge og andre staters klimapolitikk. Denne omstillingen trigger imidlertid sterke suverenitetsimpulser i mange norske politiske partier. En storstilt norsk havvindutbygging reiser kontroversielle spørsmål om finansiering, ilandføring og kabelforbindelser, som alle med betydelig sannsynlighet åpner for vanskelige politiske dragkamper. Energiomstilling er nå en helt nødvendig del av en videreutviklet norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det innebærer en utenrikspolitikk som utfordrer norsk suverenitet i langt større grad enn tidligere. Det beveger norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk potensielt fra kontinuitet og konsensus til uenighet og strid.
Abstract in English:Power Shortage on the Horizon: Norwegian Climate Foreign Policy from Consensus to Conflict?Until recently, Norwegian climate foreign policy has been relatively consensual. In the 2020s – the decisive decade for climate politics – the Norwegian stance is however being challenged. This is because a national precondition that until now has been Norway's foremost strength, i.e., the renewable power system, can no longer uphold the same function in Norwegian climate foreign policy. The renewable power system and an active foreign policy emphasizing flexible mechanisms in international climate cooperation have preserved the legitimacy of Norwegian climate policies. However, in the future, climate policies will face dramatically sharpened demands, as reaching the climate goals will now also depend on electrification and industrial change. An energy transition that corresponds to the upgraded climate policy ambitions implies a climate foreign policy that needs to balance more concerns than in the past. There is now no element of climate policy that is domestic politics only.
The North Sea is facing a major offshore wind power expansion. Irrespective of what Norway decides, a European offshore expansion will move Europe towards greater mutual interdependence, both physically in terms of border-crossing infrastructure, and regulatory, through common rules and regulations for the sale of power across national borders. The more extensive the green energy transition becomes, the more obvious it is that Norwegian and European energy transitions are connected, and that this mutually interdependent energy transition constitutes one of the most important components of the climate policies of Norway and other states. This transition, however, triggers strong sovereignty impulses in many Norwegian political parties. A major Norwegian offshore wind power expansion raises controversial questions about financing, how and where to connect the wind parks to the grid, and subsea cable connections. There is a considerable likelihood that Norwegian offshore wind policy will be characterized by major political tugs-of-war. Energy transition is now a completely necessary part of the development of Norwegian climate foreign policy. This implies a foreign policy that challenges Norwegian sovereignty to a far greater extent than before, which potentially moves Norwegian climate foreign policy from continuity and consensus to disagreement and strife.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Etter å ha gått seirende ut av «klimavalget 2021», står den rødgrønne regjeringen overfor oppgaven med å sikre Norges grønne omstilling. I den offentlige debatten står gjerne argumenter om global solidaritet og miljøhensyn fremst i begrunnelsene for nødvendigheten av en grønn omstilling, mens motstandere av et raskt skifte fokuserer på de negative økonomiske konsekvensene de mener et raskt skifte vil få for Norge. Denne artikkelen søker å nyansere dette bildet, og argumenterer for et bredere kost-nytte-perspektiv som også tar høyde for diplomatiske kostnader ved å fortsette med oljeleting, samt de økonomiske konsekvensene av en treg omstilling. Selv om man holder konsekvensene av klimaendringene helt utenfor vurderingen, argumenterer vi for at usikkerheten rundt fremtidig oljepris og omdømmerisikoen Norge løper ved å fortsette å basere økonomien på ikke-fornybare energikilder, burde være gode argumenter for å revurdere Norges oljepolitikk.
Abstract in English:Norway's Oil Dilemma After Glasgow: An Immoral Argument for a Rapid Green TransitionAfter winning the "2021 climate election", Norway's new government faces the task of ensuring Norway's green transition. In the public debate, global solidarity and environmental considerations are often at the forefront of arguments for the necessity of a rapid green transition, while opponents of a rapid transition tend to focus on the negative financial consequences they believe such a change will have for Norway. This article seeks to nuance this debate, and argues for a broader cost-benefit perspective that also takes into account diplomatic costs of continuing with oil exploration, as well as the economic consequences of a slow transition. We argue that, even if not considering other consequences of climate change, the uncertainty surrounding future oil prices and the reputational risk Norway runs by continuing basing the economy on non-renewable energy sources should be good enough arguments to reconsider Norway's oil policy.