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From the pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx and understanding the political and social events in France between 1848 and 1852, several interpretations have been made, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, regarding the role played by the lower middle class in moments of crisis. Particularly, after the advent of fascism in 20th century Europe, many voices have risen to signal the XVIII Brumaire as Marx's call of attention on the dangers set by the lower middle class's counterrevolutionary and reactionary spirit. Even more, some think of the XVIII Brumaire, and Marx's take on Bonapartism as the first, and extremely prophetic, definition and description of a modern fascist regime. The purposes of this essay are to: first, define and describe the lower middle class and its social and political consequences according to Marx; and, second, to explore how the lower middle class has been analyzed by a selection of Marxist and non-Marxist authors as a crucial sociological and historical problem. The latter has been taken to the extent of even comparing the political phenomenon of Bonapartism to Fascism and the lower middle class historical relationship in both of them. Bonapartism and Fascism are very distinct types of political regimes, even if they share some similarities. Nevertheless, it would be ahistorical to describe Louis Bonaparte's regime as fascist. Even so, Marx's typically coined reactionary or counter-revolutionary role played by the lower middle class in both cases was similar. (1)Several designations have been used to differentiate the lower middle class from the higher middle class or big bourgeoisie: petite bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertumand, the unpleasant, lumpen-bourgeoisie. It is impossible to assign fixed meanings in distinct times and places to those concepts. What they mean, and enfold, in different historical moments is determined by historically concrete political, social and economic structures and conditions. A social lower middle stratum was economically, but not so much politically, active during the preindustrial era. Its internal structure, predominantly formed by independent peasants, corporate-guild artisans and shopkeepers, and the nature of its relationship to the rest of society was particularly different from the economically, socially and more politically active, lower middle class of primarily dependent clerks, independent peasants, technicians, professionals and small shop owners of capitalist society (2). From Marx to the present there have been few attempts to define the lower middle class because the main issue was not the Kleinburgertum's own historical, social and political particularities; but, the fact that the petite bourgeoisie conformed a "classes class". In Marxist terms, the lower middle class was a class in but not foritself. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was dependent on its own fate but not on its own existence. The lower middle class was torn, and it still may be today, between two possible outcomes: proletarianization or embourgeoisement (3). In the first one, the petite bourgeoisie is condemned to being proletarianized. In fact, during the early industrialization period of England the small artisans and some specialized technicians were dissolved or forced into the industrial working class (4). In the second scenario, they would integrate with the big bourgeoisie finally accomplishing a long social aspiration. It would, certainly, diminish the fears and concerns of being proletarianized and, lastly and possibly, would allow clerks and professionals to be the frontrunners of a classless postindustrial society (5). Accordingly, as Marx said in the XVIII Brumaire, the lower middle class should be viewed as a transitional class whose members would finally end up being part of the proletarians or the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the lower middle class has had a pivotal role in certain historically crucial events: revolutions and counterrevolutions. Marx attributed no apparent class-consciousness to the petite bourgeoisie, except in times of severe crisis. The lower middle class, following Marx, lacked its own class-consciousness because it was afraid to become proletarian and aspired to attain the bourgeoisie's style of living and class standing in society even though it also despised the big bourgeoisie's productive means and way of life. Marx, in a prophetic Freudian style analysis, would ascribe this apparent contradiction to the lower middle class own self-hate. Nevertheless, lacking its own class-consciousness did not mean that the petite bourgeoisie was not capable of generating its own separate culture, life-style and Weltanschauung. The problem was that it engendered its own ethos in direct opposition to the proletarian and bourgeoisie ones; affecting, then, its own cultural authenticity. All this said, the lower middle class may not have been self-conscious but it certainly was self-aware. It had distinctive class awareness (6). The interest of Karl Marx in the lower middle class was provoked by the role the author gave to it during the events that unfolded in France between February 1848 and December 1852, particularly the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in the ascendance to power of Louis Bonaparte in the coup d'état of December 1852. First of all, it is imperative to define how Marx understood the social composition of the lower middle class in mid-nineteen century France. Small independent peasants, clerks and small artisans and shopkeepers were Marx's main petty bourgeoisie members. All of them were part of this classless class because they lacked the property of the main means of capitalist production, that in mid-nineteen century France Marx attributed to the industrial, large-retail and financial sectors; and, because they were not even proletarians either because they were small owners (particularly small peasants and shopkeepers) or because their work did not constitute an intensive manual waged labor (artisans and specially State's clerks). Marx did not see in them any economic conditions of existence, under which they lived, that could separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes. Given this situation, the small peasants, clerks and shopkeepers were not in any hostile opposition (as a clearly defined class with its own interests, culture and mode of life) to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Marx did not witness any sense of class-consciousness in them. He only viewed a local interconnection among small peasants, shopkeepers and clerks; but there was no sense of identification of interests between all of them that could beget unity and political organization. But even if they did not conform a class on itself, they were aware of their own uncertain socio-economic circumstances: at any given moment the big bourgeoisie, either by the action of retail competition or that of bank executions of failed mortgage payments, could toss them into the proletarian class. This socio-economic fear of becoming part of a propertyless class put them in direct opposition with the working class and drove them into the arms of the big bourgeoisie in moments of severe political crisis. Only here did Marx perceive the existence of class-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie. In the XVIII Brumaire Marx distinguishes three moments where the lower middle class acted as a class in itself: in the February Revolution of 1848 when they rebelled, alongside sectors of the big bourgeoisie and the proletarians, against the Orleanist monarchy; in June 1848 when they actively collaborated with the big bourgeoisie in crushing the proletarian rebellion; and finally, in December 1852 when they endorsed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état against the bourgeoisie republic. In the first episode, Marx observes a revolutionary role embedded in the lower middle class. He recognizes a class-consciousness in them; a strive to enact political and social change in the wellbeing of their own interests. In June 1848, Marx assigns them a counter-revolutionary role. They react out of fear and misguided by the bourgeoisie. They are afraid that a proletarian revolution would forever kill their socio-economic aspiration to become part of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx they are right to be fearful. A proletarian revolution would lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat and to the end of all classes. Alas, their desire of a bourgeoisie life-style as a "heaven on earth" would be tromped. A classless society would take away from them what distinguished them from the proletariat and what would, eventually, provided them upwards-social mobility: small private property and better paid and socially-respected professional labor. It has to be added that Marx also makes the bourgeoisie responsible for the lower middle class actions in the June rebellion. The former convinced the latter not to support and even to fight the proletarians by guaranteeing them access to better social standing, better financial and trade benefits and inclusion into the higher middle class. These were all false promises, which lack of satisfaction led to the events of December 1852. The lower middle class, betrayed by the bourgeoisie and immersed in deeply economic despair (which they made the big bourgeoisie responsible for) decided to fully endorse Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état. Again, and maybe more than ever if Marx's argument is to be followed, the lower middle class acted as a fully conscious class and had a counter-revolutionary and, even more, a reactionary role against the French bourgeoisie republic. Why did the lower middle class support Bonapartism? According to Marx, Napoleon III was the only one that could represent the petty bourgeoisie's interests. They did not have any sense of class-consciousness, which meant that they were unable to express their interests in a collective way. Meaning, that they were, like Marx says, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name through a parliament or any other democratic convention or institution. The lower middle class needed, and were also longing for, a paternalistic, authoritarian and charismatic figure that would represent their interest and implement policies accordingly. Louis Bonaparte mirrored everything the lower middle class was pursuing: the protection of their interests by identifying them with France's interests; the understanding of France as an economically based petite bourgeoisie country in opposition to big bourgeoisie enterprises (banks and big retails companies); and, the conversion of the lower middle class's aspiration forgrandeur through the Second French Empire's expansionist foreign policy (7).Bonapartism protected them from the rapacious big bourgeoisie, assured their vital place in society as France's economic engine protecting small private property from socialist distribution of wealth drives coming from the working class and satisfied their sumptuousness desires by establishing a lower middle class based Empire as Europe's major power. Marx's perceptions and warnings on the lower middle class counter-revolutionary and reactionary roles in periods of political and economic crisis has been regarded, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, as an indication for future revolutionary moments and as a prophetic alert on future authoritarian regimes like fascism. Lenin himself defined the petite bourgeoisie as a "half-class" or "quasi-workers" or "quasi-bourgeois" class that would be more difficult to eradicate than the big bourgeoisie and that would be politically unreliable (8). The lower middle class unpredictable behavior and dislike for radical policies could produce a reactionary backlash that could only be prevented by a rapid proletarization of all society. Nevertheless, even if Lenin was afraid of the possibility of an authoritarian government led by Kornilov and backed by the petty bourgeoisie (9); he later acknowledged, particularly by implementing the New Economic Policy, the lower middle class economic importance and envisaged them as a transitory class towards a proletarian society (10). Lastly, several authors have taken the XVIII Brumaire in order to compare Bonapartisim to fascism, even affirming that Napoleon's III rule was the first fascist regime in history, or to seek the social origins of both kinds of regimes in the lower middle classes. Jacob Schapiro not only sees the origins of 20th century fascism in 19th century Bonapartist France, he even defines Bonapartism as a type of fascism based on Marx's description of the regime in the XVIII Brumaire (11). Jost Dulffer analyses such comparison and, even if similarities are found, completely rejects its. He actually trends the historical origins of such comparisons to Trotsky's and August Thalheimer's writings on Nazism during the 1920s and 30s (12). Finally, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized the notion that fascism, just like Bonapartism, was an expression of the lower middle class resentments. According to Lipset, fascism was politically transformed rage of independent artisans, shopkeepers, small peasants and clerks that found themselves squeezed between better organized industrial workers and big businessmen and were "missing the boat" within the rapid social and economic changes of modern society (13). However, Ian Kershaw, Robert Paxton and Thomas Childers empirically confirm that fascism was not only a lower middle class phenomenon and that without the acquiesce of the conservative elites and sectors of the big bourgeoisie it would never had have come to power (14). Even if the comparisons between Bonapartism and fascism are historically pointless it is worth noticing, like Arno Meyer did, that Karl Marx was the first one to tackle the problem of the lower middle class lack of class-consciousness (15). Marx is correct in pointing out the lower middle class's awareness of itself and its dysfunctional and contradictory relationship vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Even more so, Marx accurately identifies the social, political and historical role of the petty bourgeoisie: to gain consciousness in moments of crisis and pivotally function either as a revolutionary actor, alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, or as a counter-revolutionary one, against the proletariat, or as reactionary one against the big bourgeoisie. This is, maybe, Marx's most important and timeless legacy from The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.(1) Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780-1914, Rutledge, New York, 1998, pp. 16-38.(2) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. (3) See Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class, Random House, New York, 1963.(4) See Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1999. (5) See Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.(6) See, Zeldin, Theodore, The Political System of Napoleon III, Macmillan, London, 1958.(7) Lenin, V. I., "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics, University of the Pacific Press, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 9-52. (8) Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 60.(9) Ibid, pp. 93-149.(10) Schapiro, Jacob S., Liberalism and the Challenge to Fascism, McGraw Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 308-31.(11) Dulffer, Jost, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 109-128.(12) Lipset Seymour M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 127-182.(13) See, Childers, Thomas, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote",Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 17-42; Kershaw, Ian,"The Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; and, Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism, Random House, New York, 2004.(14) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

Against the background of a new Labor Day weekend job report that found zero job net growth for the month of August, Republican candidates held another debate, this time under the auspices of MSNBC, not Fox. It took place in the Reagan library, in Simi Valley, California, with the 1980s Air Force One plane used by Reagan looming behind them as a powerful yet incongruent décor. Texas Governor Rick Perry, who entered the race three weeks ago and has already managed to reshape it, made it a contest between himself and Mitt Romney. Jon Huntsman is now a distant third in the polls, and the rest have been consigned to the back bench. Perry has consolidated support across a large swath of the Republican base, including Tea Partiers and the Evangelical right and already has amassed a war chest of campaign funds from contributors from Texas and across the country. Interestingly enough, Karl Rove, the self appointed kingmaker of the GOP and former GW Bush closest advisor, has come out against Perry, calling some of his views "toxic".As the first fundamental tests of the Republican primary approach, the campaign clearly entered a new stage last Wednesday during a debate that was mainly a duel between two protagonists, while the rest, acting as a Greek chorus reinforcing or challenging their responses, were given very little time by hosts Brian Williams (NBC) and John Harris (Politico). The primary field as first constituted was lackluster and therefore demanded new candidates. Perry seems to have satisfied that demand for the time being. Nevertheless, after the debate there was still some discontent among establishment Republicans, so the race is still fluid and new candidates may jump in before the first deadline in October.Governor Perry, as the front-runner in the latest polls, was not surprisingly the target of most of the others throughout the night. He has executive experience, a commanding demeanor, and a record to run on. Although not completely articulate, and lacking Romney's polished eloquence, he is tough and quick in his retorts, and his rhetoric resounded with the audience, drawing the strongest applause every time. His claim that he has created more jobs in Texas than Obama has managed to create nationally may be a winner with voters, but Texas' record on almost every other issue is unflattering and thus, main ammunition for his opponents. He was reminded, for example, that of all fifty states, Texas is last on education, to which he responded that Texas' problems stem from its long border with Mexico. That probably did not go well with the Hispanic voters watching on Univisión and Telemundo, but Perry doesn't seem to care, since he is riding the wave of anti-Latino feelings around the country. Confronted with the claim that Texas has the largest number of people without health insurance than all other 49 states , he did not give a direct answer but chose instead to mumble something about how "all Texans want is to get the federal government out of their lives". Both Michelle Bachman and Rick Santorum questioned Perry's social conservatism given his policy as governor, for example, to inoculate adolescent girls against HPV, which they portrayed as a government intrusion into the family realm and a license to practice pre-marital sex. And Ron Paul, a congressman from Texas, was a constant goad on the Governor's side, reminding the public that Perry used to be a Democrat and wholeheartedly supported Al Gore on his presidential bid in 1988. Perry defended himself well as he dismissed all the charges against him with one-liners and a disdainful smile. A shrewd politician and experience campaigner, he took the initiative at every turn and was able to steer the conversation to his own record of job creation as governor of Texas, contrasting it mockingly with Romney's as governor of Massachusetts. But Romney appeared unfazed as he joked that Perry could not take credit for everything that has gone well in the State of Texas, including its wealth of oil and gas, its zero state income tax and the (related) fact that main corporations made their headquarters there long before Perry was governor. Massachusetts is a much smaller state and has none of those advantages, he added. There were several quick exchanges like this: both candidates were well prepared to respond with facts and statistics, and the perception was that they both did well, with Perry defending himself aggressively at times and Romney maintaining his smooth and relaxed demeanor, even as he waited for the opportunity to deliver a blow to his new challenger.Host Brian Williams soon gave him that opportunity by asking Perry a question about Social Security, the government pension fund that experts say, will become insolvent in the year 2036 if it is not reformed. Perry's answer, which confirmed similar statements in his recently published book, made all the headlines the next day. He called it a "Ponzi scheme' (implying a criminal enterprise) and added that it was a "monstrous lie" to tell young people under thirty that they would get their Social Security when their time comes for them to retire: they won't. This statement has been reported by the Romney campaign as Perry's Waterloo: no candidate will win an election by making this kind of claim against the "third rail" of politics, a cherished and untouchable public trust; to do so is pure political suicide. Similar claims had prompted Karl Rove's comment about Perry's toxicity and spurred doubts about his electability. Ironically, it is the rhetoric and not the substance that separates the two candidates on this issue: as presidents, both would likely propose some privatization of Social Security, perhaps in the form of personal retirement accounts that can be managed by the workers themselves and would allow them to invest in the stock market. Another of Brian William's questions brought an unexpected burst of applause by the all- Republican audience even before Perry had had a chance to answer it. Williams asked how he could sleep at night knowing his state had applied the death penalty to 234 convicts, the highest rate in the nation, and some of whom were perhaps innocent. Perry said the crimes they had perpetrated deserved it, and that yes, he slept fine at night knowing that the appeals process was thorough and fair. Of course, people are entitled to their views on the death penalty, and quotes from the Bible have been used to justify it. But it is sad and even incongruous to see a purportedly well educated middle class audience of a purportedly Christian nation cheer the notion. Patti Davis, President Reagan's daughter, later said to an interviewer it was almost" blasphemous" to celebrate the death penalty at the Reagan library, given the fact that her father had approached the issue with a heavy heart and burden to his conscience, albeit accepting it as a necessary evil. Mitt Romney appeared poised, fluent on the economy and self confident. It may help him knowing that he has 250 billion dollars in his own personal account, and that he has outpaced all other candidates so far in fundraising. He seems to be the choice of the business elite and of urban and suburban Republicans (60% of his donors come from big cities and their surroundings). On the other hand, Perry's supporters say that through his ten years as governor of Texas, Perry has laid the groundwork to raise all the money he might need for a national election. He has a donor network that can "bundle" millions. Texas places no limits on how much donors can give to political campaigns, even as federal law limits donations to the derisory amount of $2,500 per person. Still, some critics say Perry would need to capture a broader donor base to compete in a national election. Michelle Bachman's adventure into the Republican primary may be coming to an end as her star fades and Tea Partiers and Evangelicals transfer their support to Rick Perry. Her campaign is in disarray over fundraising and strategy. Ed Rollins, a veteran GOP operative who managed Reagan's 1984 campaign, resigned as her advisor after Bachman could not be persuaded to focus on campaigning in Iowa only (where the first primary caucus will take place and where she won a straw poll a few weeks ago), instead of trying to run a national campaign. She hasn't been able to raise enough money outside Iowa and that limits her campaign's choices. Perry has taken her thunder. It doesn't help that the Congress woman keeps repeating her Manichean views on every single issue, insisting for example again during this debate, that it was wrong for the US to intervene in Libya because there was no national interest involved in the region, a position that nobody in the GOP establishment shares, especially now that Qaddafi is all but defeated.On Thursday, after two changes in schedule were forced on the White House (one due to the GOP debate on Wednesday, the other due to the opening of the NFL season shown at prime time on Thursday night), President Obama delivered his much awaited jobs creation speech. He unveiled a $ 447 billion plan, a mixture of tax cuts and new spending programs. It includes extending cuts in payroll taxes to individuals and employers, new infrastructure spending, a new mortgage refinancing program, retraining for the unemployed and tax credits to businesses that employ those who have been out of a job for over six moths. He also talked about a private-public infrastructure bank and emphasized that all this new spending would be coupled with more cuts in the deficit later. This was an attempt at a new marketing of the President's measures to stimulate the economy: he was more specific, more conciliatory and avoided using the word "stimulus" that has gotten so much bad press since most people think the initial package did not help the economy one bit.The President spoke with new confidence and conviction; he sounded re-energized and optimistic, and evoked in the public memories of "Obama the candidate". The next morning he was on the road to sell his plan to voters first in Virginia, speaking to 9,000 people gathered at the University of Richmond. Virginia, Ohio and North Carolina are the three states the President strategically chose to visit. Obama won all three in the 2008 election but they each voted Republicans to their legislatures in last year's mid-term elections. The Republican response in Congress was cautiously positive. Indeed, even as Obama's numbers in the polls continue to drop (44% approval rate of his person, with 59% disapproving of his handling of the economy, is the latest), approval of Congress is at an all time low of 13%. A change is tone has registered as Republicans realize that their do-nothing strategy has gone too far and it is time to stop playing the political game and address economic recovery in earnest. It is indeed refreshing, after the acerbic debt ceiling fights, to hear House majority leader Eric Cantor say it's time to build consensus and work together. Their brinkmanship has infuriated their constituents and put at risk all the gains made in last year's mid-term elections.It remains to be seen whether the electorate's disgust with excessive conflict and confrontation within the DC belt also extends to the presidential primary. Will voters choose the bold and aggressive governor from Texas who better reflects their anger with his provocative language (he wants to cut the "head off the snake" (meaning the federal government's interference with states policies), or the cooler, more cerebral, more conciliatory (indeed, in some ways, more Obama-like) candidate from Massachusetts that wants moderation and speaks to the middle class? In this head-to-head contest between Perry and Romney, one can assume people will ultimately choose the one they see can solve their problems, end the paralysis and get the country moving again. But the country's social fabric is torn by unemployment, anger and frustration with government and hopelessness about the future. As the more aggressive candidate, Perry may well be the one that embodies the spirit of the times.In his first national appearance, the Texan did not make any major mistakes. He has dislodged Romney from top in national polls, but not in New Hampshire, where Romney still leads by a wide margin. From now on, the calendar will drive the candidates' strategies. If Perry wins Iowa and Romney New Hampshire, it will definitely become a two person race going forward into South Carolina, where Baptists most likely will choose a Texan Evangelist over a New Englander Mormon. That might interrupt Romney's momentum. Then comes Florida, where there is a big number of Tea Partiers and an even larger number of retirees. The vote of these two groups will be decisive. Perry could lose the retirees on his Social Security attacks, which were mainly addressed to young voters who don't vote in primaries. But there is plenty of time to adjust his views and rectify his blunders so as to become more electable.Cocky, dark and handsome, a cross between Johnny Cash and John Wayne, Perry has a formidable presence that makes a good impression on voters. Blunt and direct in his speech, with a distinct Southern accent, his peculiar kind of charisma compensates for his lack of polish. He is tough and rugged, doesn't back down, and appeared solid in his philosophy of "detax, deregulate and delitigate". He is clearly the candidate that can win the Mid-West and the Deep South. The question is whether he will withstand the deeper scrutiny of a presidential race he entered late, and whether he can refine his arguments and still be reassuring. Romney still appears as the more electable candidate in a national election and the one that can more easily confront Obama. But he has two main weak points: his religion (he is a Mormon, a religion that has a bad name among other Christian denominations) and the Massachusetts health care law he signed when he was governor, that his rivals claim is a replica of what they disdainfully call "Obamacare", which all candidates, including Romney, have avowed to repeal as soon as they get to the White House. Will the race become a two-man contest from this point on? Americans should not hold their breath; there is still talk about new candidates entering the race: Sarah Palin and Rudy Giuliani seem to be waiting on the sidelines, ready to jump into the race at any time if prompted to do so by the polls or by the GOP establishment. The current survivors may still be challenged by others with more staying power and reality show experience.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

El proyecto europeo de la posguerra es inédito en la historia universal. Descansa sobre dos partes principales: la construcción institucional y la idea de Europa. La construcción institucional supone un complejo entramado jurídico y político. Por ejemplo, el Parlamento Europeo, la Comisión Europea, el Tribunal de Justicia o la moneda común (Euro) reflejan esa construcción (1). Por otro lado, la idea de Europa descansa en la posibilidad de articular un conjunto de modus vivendi que no reflejen solo ámbitos de convivencia sino de florecimiento. En parte, la moderna idea de Europa descansa en los escritos de Sir Isaiah Berlín y, contemporáneamente, en el escepticismo post-iluminista de John Gray.¿Cuándo comienza el milagro europeo? ¿Por qué Europa en algún momento de la historia consolidó un proceso de desarrollo estable en el mediano y largo plazo? Un estudio realizado por distintos autores para el Banco Mundial analiza por qué algunas naciones han podido desarrollarse y otras no, introduciendo brevemente el alcance histórico del "milagro europeo". Los países se desarrollan por una complementación entre variables geográficas, institucionales y comerciales: "In an authoritative study on the long-run geographic determinants of development, social ecologist Jared Diamond (1997) argues that Eurasia had large geographical advantages over the Americas and Africa, and that these lie at the heart of current income disparities. He argues that since plant and animal species spread most effectively within ecological zones, the east-west orientation of the Eurasian landmass made it easier to diffuse early human technologies across the continent. As a result, Eurasia enjoyed a larger diversity of plant and animal species, and thus easier domestication of useful species, than did societies in America and Africa—continents that are oriented north-south. High-productivity agriculture led to large, dense, stratified societies, with subsequent advances in technology (weaponry, oceangoing ships) and political organization. Another important causal factor widely studied in economic history is international trade, and hence access to sea-based trade and proximity to export markets.Recent econometric and case studies have shown that even when controlling for historical endogeneity, institutions remain "deep" causal factors, while openness and geography operates at best through them (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik 2003b; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002)."(2) La posición geográfica revela otra cuestión: en parte, el milagro europeo se explica porque la ubicación este-oeste del continente permitía a las personas comparar el desempeño de otros y copiar aquello que funcionaba y descartar las experiencias fallidas. Particularmente, la posibilidad de comparar se daba en la utilización de tecnología agrícola. Sin embargo, la geografía europea generaba los incentivos para la aparición de otra variable central: la competencia. "Each factor can potentially reveal valuable insights about the true causes of countries' development successes and failures. For instance, Western Europe benefited both from the geographical advantages of east-west continental orientation discussed by Diamond (1997), and from being predominantly a coastal region in the temperate ecozone (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). All of this made land scarce and valuable (Herbst 2000).Additionally, rugged mountainous relief effectively separated Western Europe into a system of "competing jurisdictions of decentralized power," constantly warring with one another, none being able to completely defeat and control the others (Landes 1998). These factors raised returns to innovation, discovery, and adoption of new warfare techniques, which later gave Europeans first-mover advantage over other parts of the world."(3)El punto desarrollado es introductorio pero central para comenzar a comprender el significado y alcance del milagro europeo. La idea de Europa contemporánea es consecuencia de un lento proceso de descubrimiento que hizo posible consolidar un capital humano, social e institucional inédito en la historia de la humanidad. El liberalismo es la filosofía política y ética donde descansa el proyecto europeo. Europa como idea y el liberalismo como filosofía política están histórica y analíticamente relacionados. ¿Cuando surgió el liberalismo? ¿En la ciudades italianas (Génova, Venecia o Florencia) en algún momento del siglo XV? ¿En el largo trayecto histórico que va desde la Carta Magna (1216) hasta el iluminismo escocés de Smith, Hume, Hutcheson o Ferguson (1700's), pasando por la "revolución gloriosa" (1688) y los pesos y contrapesos implementados a los Estuardo? ¿En los Países Bajos, donde la aparición del crédito y la moneda generó los primeros mercados de capitales institucionalizados? ¿En la antigua Grecia, donde la filosofía sistematiza el sentido de la individualidad? ¿En la escuela de Salamanca (1600's), donde los escolásticos tardíos reconcilian la fe religiosa y el ganar dinero como virtud? Finalmente, ¿Se consolida el liberalismo en la inédita experiencia contemporánea de las socialdemocracias escandinavas, donde la igualdad y la libertad han encontrado una manera virtuosa para interactuar?Es imposible determinarlo, no solo por razones de verificaron histórica sino porque el liberalismo es una concepción ética y política plural en tiempo, espacio y alcance. Es decir, asume un individualismo metodológico y construye modus vivendi donde la principal filosofía (aunque no la única) consiste en respetar las distintas formas de prosperar que construyen las personas, con la salvedad de no amenazar los distintos (y a veces opuestos) modus vivendi de terceros.El proyecto europeo ha contribuido a reconciliar la tradición de la libertad y la tradición de la igualdad. En parte, esta reconciliación entre igualdad y libertad ha comenzado a hospedarse en la nueva idea de Europa, que va desde el tratado de Roma de 1957 hasta la dinámica ampliación de la Unión, desde los 6 a los 12, de éstos a los 15 y de los 15 a los 27. La nueva Europa descansa en un proyecto inédito en la historia de la humanidad: el proyecto de la creciente convivencia no solo de distintos modus vivendi sino, en algunos casos, de modos opuestos de pensar y vivir una buena vida. El paradigma del proyecto europeo es particularmente liberal porque para consolidarse aspira a la creciente diversidad de sus partes. Es decir, su idea temporaria de todo es superior a la suma de sus partes en tanto descansa en la diversidad creciente de esas partes para consolidar una idea de todo plural, tolerante y pujante. Así, cuantos más modus vivendi se incorporan a este nuevo proyecto europeo, más consolidada se encuentra la idea de Europa. Mientras más diversos son esos modus vivendi, mas consolidado se encuentra aquello que John Gray ha denominado Liberal Project. (4) Esta idea del nuevo proyecto europeo que incipientemente se consolida en la Europa de los 27 refleja dos supuestos metodológicos fuertes. Hay una definición filosófica del proyecto que delimita su alcance y, al hacerlo, asume que el liberal Project carece de un telos universal pero, a la vez, define como valor a ser respetado (universalmente) el modus vivendi europeo de la existencia de derechos en el otro, tanto en su proyecto personal y grupal. Siguiendo a Gray, vemos que el proyecto europeo termina como aspiración política en las fronteras geográficas de la Unión, pero prosigue como idea mas allá de toda geografía, porque (con Berlin y Gray) ha aceptado tácitamente que no hay en él búsqueda de universalidad sino una búsqueda de consolidar buenas formas de vida particular. En palabras de Gray: "El Estado liberal se originó en la búsqueda de un modus vivendi. Los regímenes liberales contemporáneos son floraciones tardías de un proyecto de tolerancia que se inició en Europa en el siglo XVI. La tarea que heredamos consiste en reacondicionar la tolerancia liberal para que pueda guiarnos en la búsqueda de un modus vivendi en un mundo más plural. La tolerancia liberal ha contribuido inconmensurablemente al bienestar humano. No estando en parte alguna tan profundamente arraigada como para darla por descontada, es un logro cuyo valor no podría ser más alto. No podemos prescindir de ese ideal tardomoderno, pero tampoco puede ser nuestra guía en las circunstancias tardomodernas actuales porque el ideal de tolerancia que hemos heredado encarna dos filosofías incompatibles. Vista desde un ángulo, la tolerancia liberal es el ideal de un consenso racional sobre el mejor modo de vida posible. Desde el otro, es la creencia en que los seres humanos pueden florecer en muchas formas de vida. Si el liberalismo tiene un futuro, este reside en el abandono de la búsqueda de un consenso racional sobre el mejor modo de vida posible…" (5)Como sostiene el economista y filósofo político austriaco Friedrich Hayek, las instituciones más sólidas se construyen a través de un proceso de orden espontáneo. Es decir, a través de la interacción de personas que buscando un limitado fin en T1 alcanzan, sin quererlo, un objetivo mas amplio en T2, T3, Tn debido a la sistematización de determinados intercambios que, al haber sido crecientemente aceptados por su eficiencia, devienen normas informales y eventualmente formales (6).La construcción del proyecto europeo recupera para la filosofía política contemporánea esta concepción hayekeana: sin buscarlo, el acuerdo formal de Roma de 1957 comenzó un derrotero que culminaría (momentáneamente) con una idea de Europa, donde 27 países y naciones se complementan en una creciente armonía. Como marcamos, la principal idea sobre la que descansa el proyecto europeo es que distintas partes, con diversas expresiones inconmensurables, se suman y son más grandes que un hipotético todo. A su vez, este hipotético todo deviene inconmensurable, ya que la complementación armónica de partes (en algunos casos sumables y en otros no) da como resultado un todo articulado pero de difícil definición. Así, el orden espontáneo europeo es un ámbito de consenso creciente. Un ámbito del consenso se fortalece y enriquece cuando sus partes desarrollan sus potencialidades en un marco de respeto al desarrollo de las (distintas) potencialidades de los otros. Adquiere aquí una especial significación la existencia de un espacio público que no solo posee los mecanismos institucionales para respetar los derechos del otro sino también posee los valores, ideas y creencias morales como para respetar lo inconmensurable en ese otro. Aquí radica la importancia del "Value Pluralism" articulado por Sir Isaiah Berlin. Para Berlin "…pluralism (is) the recognition of an indefinite variety of cultures and systems of values, all equally ultimate, and incommensurable with one another, so that the belief in a universally valid path to human fulfillment is rendered incoherent…' …The object of this investigation is the almost endless plurality of total views of the world, and this precludes his espousing any exclusive vision of man and his condition…"(7). Es posible pensar que en el inarticulado programa de investigación de Sir Isaiah Berlin descansa un orden espontáneo para una idea de Europa. En un sentido analítico, Berlin toma el orden espontáneo de Hayek y lo introduce en el milagro europeo. Paso seguido, Gray asume el 'value-pluralism' de Berlin para definir los límites del Liberal Project. Al hacerlo, no solo sistematiza el liberal Project sino el papel que para su consolidación tiene el nuevo proyecto europeo. Es decir, los limites que supone la idea de Europa para el liberalismo no es para Gray una derrota analítica debido a la imposibilidad de aspirar a la universalidad. En cambio, es donde el liberalismo se asienta y convive con distintos modus vivendi dentro y fuera de su ámbito de influencia. Al hacerlo, demuestra su fortaleza y vitalidad. Cuando, siguiendo a Gray, el liberalismo redescubre sus límites no está necesariamente anunciando su decadencia. Por el contrario, anuncia y expresa los buenos valores (la buena vida) que tiene para ofrecer. El proyecto europeo expresa parte de ese modus vivendi.(1) Una Buena síntesis de las instituciones formales de la Unión Europea se encuentra enhttp://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm(2) "Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform", versión online http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/. Ver http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/Cnote1_EconomicGrowth.pdf, Country Note 1, Página 58. A su vez, ver el trabajo de Kenneth Pomeranz, "The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy", donde el autor sostiene que Europa Occidental no solo supone una geografía sino una construcción social, política y económica: "It should be noted here that "western Europe," for most authors, is a social, economic, and political construct, not an actual geographic entity: Ireland, southern Italy, and most of Iberia, for instance, did not have much of the economic development usually held to be characteristically European or western European. I will generally use the term in a geographical sense, while pointing out that the areas often taken to stand for "Europe" in these comparisons (e.g., the southern Netherlands, or northern England), might be better compared, in both size and economic characteristics, with such units as China's Jiangsu province, rather than with entire subcontinents such as China or India". Princeton University Press. 2000. Pagina 3.(3)http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/Cnote1_EconomicGrowth.pdf Obra citada, pagina 59.(4) Es necesario remarcar que, como mencionaremos mas adelante, Gray le da al concepto de Liberal Project una connotación analítica e histórica negativa. Gray desarrolla ampliamente esta concepción en un programa de investigación que puede tener su inicio a principios de los 80'. Por ejemplo, ver "Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy" (1989) y en "Post Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought" (1993), ambos publicados por Routledge. La filosofía política de John Gray y su relación con el proyecto europeo y la idea de Europa será desarrollada en posteriores trabajos.(5) Gray, John (2001): "Las dos caras del liberalismo. Una nueva interpretación de la tolerancia liberal". Paidos. Buenos Aires-Argentina. Pagina 11(6) La idea de orden espontáneo recorre gran parte de la obra de Hayek. Sin embargo, no se encuentra sistematizada en un texto en particular. Es posible pensar que un trabajo como "The Sensory Order" revela una incipiente articulación en los primeros años de elaboración científica del autor (este trabajo se encuentra en el campo de la psicología). Mas adelante, el joven economista Hayek deja paso al maduro filósofo político. Una versión de esta madurez se encuentra en The Constitution of Liberty (1960), publicado por University of Chicago Press. En 1974 gana el Premio Nobel en Economía por sus estudios sobre los ciclos económicos y el papel de los precios como información necesaria para la asignación eficiente de recursos (ver http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/press.html). La obra de Hayek es profusa en cuanto a su alcance (economía, filosofía, teoría del conocimiento, filosofía política, historia, psicología) y llega hasta el final de su vida (1899-1992).(7) Berlin, Isaiah: "The Proper Study of Mankind. An Anthology of Essays". Introducción. Página XXX y XXXIV. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York. 1997 *Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales, FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.Master en Filosofía Política, London School of Economics and Political Science.

ResumenEn este artículo examino la gratitud y la ingratitud como herramientas analíticas valiosas para determinar cómo las desigualdades sociales le dan forma a las prácticas de parentesco. Acusar a un pariente de ingratitud revela los límites y las líneas de falla del parentesco, así como también expectativas estrechamente relacionadas sobre qué debe ser dado, cómo debe ser dado y cómo debe ser recibido. Como tal, este ensayo sigue la línea de una valiosa tradición antropológica de unificar los análisis del don y del parentesco. Argumento que expresiones de y discursos sobre la gratitud y la ingratitud remiten muy de cerca a dimensiones de relaciones sociales tales como el género, la generación y la clase social, y simultáneamente revelan tensiones dentro de las relaciones de parentesco donde el deber y la obligación son cuestionados. Los ejemplos etnográficos son tomados del trabajo de campo en Ayacucho, una pequeña ciudad en los Andes peruanos, donde la crianza adoptiva informal y las relaciones tensas entre hijos adultos y sus padres ancianos suministran dos esferas relacionadas de expresiones de ideas acerca de la gratitud y la ingratitud. Analizando estos dos ejemplos, argumento que la gratitud y la ingratitud son heurísticas analíticas, útiles para identificar y centrarse sobre dimensiones de relaciones que, según se entiende, caen dentro del dominio del parentesco, y son potencialmente útiles también en otros escenarios.Palabras clave: Parentesco, crianza, niñez, el don, Perú. Abstract. Towards an Anthropology of Ingratitude: Notes from Andean KinshipAccusations of ingratitude to kin reveal much about the edges and fault lines of kinship that would otherwise not be apparent. But equally, they reveal much that is unexpected about the gift – about expectations of what should be given and how it should be received. In this article, I bring together anthropological literature on the gift and on kinship in order to argue that expressions of gratitude or ingratitude index dimensions of social relations such as gender, generation, and social class, and simultaneously reveal tensions within kinship relations where duty and obligation are contested. Examples are drawn from fieldwork where informal fostering and the fraught relations between grown children and their aging parents provide arenas for analysis of expressions of gratitude and ingratitude. Analyzing these examples, I argue for gratitude as an analytical heuristic, useful to identify and focus upon dimensions of relations understood to fall within the domain of kinship, and potentially useful in other settings as well.Key words: fostering, childhood, the gift, the Andes. 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Objetivos: Desarrollar una escala de probabilidad de morir por Infección respiratoria aguda en menores de un año, según los determinantes sociales de la salud. Metodología: Se revisó y analizó la información de la base de datos de la cohorte de nacidos vivos del 2011 en Bogotá, incluyendo 106.758 menores de edad, para establecer un modelo de regresión de Cox, que prediga la mortalidad por infección respiratoria aguda. Resultados: El riesgo de morir fue 2,5 veces entre los de bajo peso al nacer, ( 2500 gr), (IC 95% 1.3-4.66), en presencia de prematurez, HR 2,67 (IC 95% 1.4-5.09), pertenecer al sistema general de seguridad social subsidiado, riesgo HR 2.6 (IC 95% 1.62-4.15) y residir en localidades tales como: Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Santa Fe, Usme, Rafael Uribe, Barrios Unidos y Teusaquillo, riesgo HR 4,8 (IC95% 1.9-12). La escala de vulnerabilidad, predijo mejor el riesgo de morir por IRA, al comparar con los no fallecidos, que al comparar con los fallecidos por otras causas y presentó una discriminación aceptable. Conclusiones: Este estudio permitió identificar y cuantificar el peso de determinantes que se pueden relacionar con la predicción de muerte por IRA en menores de un año en Bogotá, los cuales han sido descritos por otros estudios a nivel mundial. Palabras clave: (MeSH terms): Proportional hazards models, Infant mortality, Respiratory Tract Diseases, Pneumonia, Social Determinants of Health. ; Abstract. Objectives: To develop a scale of probability of dying for acute respiratory infection in children under one year, according to the social determinants of health. Methodology: Data from the 2011 live birth cohort database in Bogotá, including 106,758 minors, were reviewed and analyzed to establish a Cox regression model predicting mortality from acute respiratory infection. Results: The risk of dying was 2.5 times among those with low birth weight (2500 g), (95% CI 1.3-4.66), in the presence of prematurity, HR 2.67 (95% CI 1.4-5.09 ), belong to the general subsidized social security system, risk HR 2.6 (IC 95% 1.62-4.15) and to reside in localities such as Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Santa Fe, Usme, Rafael Uribe, Barrios Unidos and Teusaquillo, risk HR 4,8 (95% CI 1.9-12). The vulnerability scale, better predicted the risk of dying from ARI, compared with those who did not died, compared to those who died from other causes and presented acceptable discrimination. Conclusions: This study allowed us to identify and quantify the weight of determinants that can be related to the prediction of ARI death in children under one year of age in Bogotá, which have been described by other studies worldwide. Key words: (MeSH terms): Proportional hazards models, Infant mortality, Respiratory Tract Diseases, Pneumonia, Social Determinants of Health. ; Maestría