Defending Autonomy as a Criterion for Epistemic Virtue
In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Volume 38, Issue 3, p. 364-373
ISSN: 1464-5297
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In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Volume 38, Issue 3, p. 364-373
ISSN: 1464-5297
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Volume 48, Issue 1, p. 1-27
ISSN: 2154-123X
This article argues that Bernard Williams' Critical Theory Principle (CTP) is in tension with his realist commitments, i.e., deriving political norms from practices that are inherent to political life. The Williamsian theory of legitimate state power is based on the central importance of the distinction between political rule and domination. Further, Williams supplements the normative force of his theory with the CTP, i.e., the principle that acceptance of a justification regarding power relations ought not to be created by the very same coercive power. I contend that the CTP is an epistemic criterion of reflective (un)acceptability which is not strictly connected to the question of whether people are dominated or not. I show that there are cases of non-domination that fail the epistemic requirements of the CTP.
In: American anthropologist: AA, Volume 72, Issue 2, p. 349-351
ISSN: 1548-1433
I wish to show that the criterion of polarity is inconsistent with Murdock's conceptual frame for the analysis of kinship terminology. The ignoring or recognition of polarity is a consequence of the ignoring or recognition of the other criteria. However, the criterion of polarity is not merely an unnecessary addition; it might also lead to wrong conclusions. The main error is that Murdock tries to define polarity, only being relevant on the relational level, on the Egocentered level, where kinship terminology is normally analyzed. [kinship terminology]
Epistemic injustices are the distinctly epistemic harms and wrongs which undermine or depreciate our capacities knowers. This dissertation develops a theory of epistemic injustice and justice which accounts for excesses in epistemic goods as a source of epistemic injustice. This is a theory of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. The dissertation can be divided into three parts: 1) motivational, 2) theoretical, 3) applications and implications. First, Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the study of epistemic injustice and epistemic overload. Chapter 1 identifies a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice concerning excesses in epistemic goods as sources of epistemic injustice while canvassing the major themes and debates of the field. Chapter 2 levels an objection to proper epistemology, thereby providing an indirect defense of the study of epistemic injustice. Second, theoretical development occurs in are Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Chapter 3 initiates the argument for epistemic overload, while Chapter 4 extends the case for epistemic overload, identifying several epistemic injustices arising from excesses of understanding, credibility, and truth. Chapter 5 explains the oversights of prior theorists by developing a more descriptively adequate account of social epistemics that explains the many sites of epistemic injustice. Chapter 6 develops a two-stage contractualist theory of epistemic in/justice to explain the bad-making features of epistemic injustices and generates the duty of epistemic charity. The third part of the dissertation applies the findings of earlier chapters to contemporary practical and theoretical problems. Chapter 7 employs the contractualist reasoning of Chapter 6 to address and ameliorate problems from excesses in the uptake and circulation of hermeneutical resources and true-beliefs. Chapter 8 considers the mutual dependence relations between political phenomena and epistemic in/justice, showing that accounts of political justice depend upon or presuppose epistemic justice. Finally, Chapter 9 applies epistemic overload to the use of big data technologies in the context of predive policing algorithms. An abductive argument concludes that the introduction of the Strategic Subjects List as part of a Chicago policing initiative in 2013 introduced understandings which likely contributed to gun-violence in Chicago and which constitutes an epistemic overload. In sum, the dissertation shows the theoretical and practical significance of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. ; Ph. D.
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In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 199, Issue 1, p. 20-25
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 199, Issue 3-4, p. 9013-9039
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 200, Issue 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractIn this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to conceive of anxiety as a response to risk, but psychologists – very reasonably – have little to say about risk itself, as opposed to risk judgement. In this paper, I specify what risk must be like to be the kind of thing to which anxiety can be a response. Third, my account improves on extant accounts of epistemic anxiety in the literature. It is more fleshed out than Jennifer Nagel's (2010a), which is largely agnostic about the nature of epistemic anxiety, focusing instead on what work it does in our epistemic lives. In offering an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotion, my account explains how it is able to do the epistemological work to which Nagel puts it. My account is also more plausible than Juliette Vazard's (2018, 2021), on which epistemic anxiety is an emotional response to potential threat to one's practical interests. Vazard's account cannot distinguish epistemic anxiety from anxiety in general, and also fails to capture all instances of what we want to call epistemic anxiety. My account does better on both counts.
The article deals with the phenomenon of epistemic communities. The concept was coined by P. Haas in the late XX century in an attempt to analyze functions and political prospects of expert and professional knowledge in the modern knowledge-based society. The concept has been widely used during the recent decades in sociology of knowledge, policy studies and social philosophy. Despite the fact that some scholars voiced a number of critical remarks, no (or very few) attempts to rethink the concept of epistemic communities have been made. The article gives a review of research into epistemic communities and introduces the concept of epistemic operating mode in order to rethink the concept and clear up operational mechanisms of epistemic communities as a specific form of knowledge (expert) communities.
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 195, Issue 9, p. 3811-3820
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 200, Issue 3
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 194, Issue 8, p. 2917-2930
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: The American journal of sociology, Volume 38, Issue 5, p. 688-698
ISSN: 1537-5390
In: The American journal of sociology, Volume 2, Issue 2, p. 264-273
ISSN: 1537-5390
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