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Machine generated contents note: Preface; Part I. The Macroeconomic Framework: 1. Introduction and overview; 2. Concepts and definitions: the macroeconomic accounts; 3. Short-run macroeconomics and long-run growth; Part II. A Benchmark Macroeconomic Model: 4. The aggregate production function, the labor market, and aggregate supply; 5. Aggregate demand and goods market equilibrium; 6. Financial markets; 7. Short-run macroeconomic equilibrium; 8. Medium-run macroeconomic equilibrium; Part III. Public finance and macroeconomic performance: 9. The intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector; 10. Sovereign risk premia; 11. Fiscal institutions; 12. Privatization; 13. High inflation and inflation stabilization; Part IV. Monetary Institutions and Monetary Policy: 14. Monetary institutions; 15. Inflation targeting; Part V. Exchange Rate Management: 16. Equilibrium real exchange rates; 17. The benchmark model with floating exchange rates; 18. Exchange rate regimes; 19. Managing an officially-determined rate; Part VI. The Financial Sector and Macroeconomic Performance: 20. Finance, welfare, and growth; 21. Financial repression; 22. Financial reform; 23. The benchmark model with banks; 24. Coping with capital inflows; Part 7. Varieties of Emerging-Market Crises; 25. Sovereign debt crises; 26. Banking crises; 27. Currency crises and crisis interactions; 28. Lessons from the emerging market crises of the nineties; 29. Lessons from the great recession

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Contributors -- General Preface -- Introduction -- aggregation (econometrics) -- ARCH models -- Bayesian methods in macroeconometrics -- Bayesian time series analysis -- central limit theorems -- cointegration -- continuous and discrete time models -- data filters -- equilibrium-correction models -- forecasting -- fractals -- functional central limit theorems -- generalized method of moments estimation -- Granger-Sims causality -- heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrections -- impulse response function

Abstract
We examine the endogenous choice of commitment device to consumers' expectations with network effects. Under Cournot competition, we show that choosing commitment to expectations for each firm is a dominant strategy regardless of the strength of network effects. However, under Bertrand competition, three types of commitment with both/no commitment/multiple emerge in equilibrium depending on the strength of network effects. Thus, we obtain different Pareto efficiency between Bertrand and Cournot competition, depending on the intensity of competition.

AbstractA previous study finds that increased competition in health care markets improves social welfare, although consumers use "too much" health care when they have health insurance. The analysis assumes that consumers have a constant Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. This note shows that this finding can be extended to the case where consumers are simply risk averse. Furthermore, if insurers offered insurance policies with slightly lower usage prices than the equilibrium level, social welfare would be improved.

Developments of International Trade Theory offers the life-long reflections of a distinguished Japanese scholar who pioneered the application of general equilibrium theory to international trade. Written in a style that makes it easily accessible to scholars and students, the book combines standard topics on international trade with a discussion of the evolution of the theory and as well as recent discussions on topics such as immiserizing growth. This book consists of two parts. Part I examines the historical progression of international trade theory, and Part II addresses the modern theory and recent developments of international trade. In this way the book offers a comprehensive evaluation of the non-monetary problems of international economics. Taking advantage of the publication of this new edition, the author includes two new chapters, "Adam Smith and Disequilibrium Economic Theory" and "Complete Specialization in Classical Economics," which readers will profit from reading after they have studied the basic theories of international trade in the main part of the book

Macroeconomic models and assumptions have traditionally been evaluated using non-experimental "field" data. However, in many instances the field data necessary to evaluate such models and assumptions are not available. Recently, researchers have begun to explore ways of implementing micro-founded macroeconomic models in the controlled conditions of the experimental laboratory as an alternative means of gathering the data necessary to address the empirical relevance of macroeconomic models and assumptions as well as to understand questions of equilibrium selection or policy prescriptions. This volume is the first-ever collection of laboratory studies aimed at understanding macroeconomic phenomena. The chapters, by leading researchers in the field, explore consumption behavior, expectation formation, monetary economics and central bank policy in a variety of different macroeconomic models. Readers will come away with a better understanding of how to implement macroeconomic models in the laboratory and the valuable insights that laboratory research can bring to our understanding of macroeconomics

The goal of this section is to point out the observed
difficulties with the classical/neoclassical theory of labour markets.
According to classical and neoclassical economics, the labour market is
a market like any other market. The equilibrium wage is determined by
the intersection of the supply and demand for labour.

We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a "property rule" or a "liability rule". High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiated. With a cost of renegotiation, property rules are favored when this cost is higher, reversing a central conclusion of the law-and-economics literature. (JEL C78, D86, F13, F15, K12)

AbstractIn an overlapping generations model with multiple steady states, we analyse the impact of endogenous environmental policies on the relevance of history and expectations for the equilibrium selection. In a polluting regime, environmental preferences cause an increasing energy tax which raises the risk that the economy transitions to the inferior equilibrium under pessimistic expectations. However, higher environmental preferences imply an earlier switch to the clean energy regime. Then, the conflict between production and environmental preferences is resolved and the prospects of selecting the superior equilibrium improve, since positive expectations become more relevant. In an empirical analysis we find that people with environmental preferences tend to have more optimistic expectations about economic development. Using these findings to analyse the steady-state dynamics implies that agents with environmental preferences support higher energy taxes and switch to clean production more quickly. Due to their optimism, the likelihood of reaching the superior stable steady state increases.

AbstractThis paper compares different fiscal integration schemes on the basis of their ability to finance public investments and resilience to debt distress and contagion. Complete integration schemes, where a central authority chooses the level of public investments with productivity‐enhancing externalities across different jurisdictions, are shown to be superior to incomplete integration schemes, where member governments choose public investments unilaterally. As a result, equilibrium income is greater for citizens of both member states under a complete integration scheme. Moreover, complete integration schemes are shown to be more resilient to idiosyncratic shocks and more effective in limiting contagion of debt distress. This is mainly because the central authority can credibly borrow more without risking default than member states taken together can and it can "transfer resilience" across them if needed. These findings inform discussions on structural aspects of secular stagnation in Europe by emphasizing a potential challenge in the institutional design of fiscal responsibilities.

There is no agreement about the reasons for Stalin's Great Terror of 1937–1939. This paper argues that the problem faced by Stalin was similar to the standard principal–agent problem: the country was run as one enormous firm with Stalin as the only residual claimant. The monetary incentive structure was inadequate and the threat of mass shirking by the agents was real. A simple model of a principal with two agents is developed to address the problem. Assuming that the agents can observe and can reveal each other's shirking, it is shown that, under some assumptions, an equilibrium exists with the following strategy profiles: unless someone's shirking is revealed, the principal is committed to randomly punishing one of the agents with positive probability; an individual agent never shirks and always reveals a co‐worker's shirking. A case study of the period is used to check the plausibility of this hypothesis.

Robert Solow has called repeatedly for the development of models that combine equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium outcomes, or what he calls medium-run macroeconomics. This essay recounts the history of his various attempts to address that issue. It starts in the early 1950s, when Solow developed his long-run growth model, and ends in the mid-1990s with the publication of A Critical Essay on Modern Macroeconomic Theory written with Frank Hahn. This narrative involves different economists associated with various research traditions, from the neoclassical synthesis in the 1960s, via the new classical economics in the 1970s, to the new neoclassical synthesis in the 1990s.

Trying to summarize the essentials of macroeconomic theory in the wake of the financial crisis that has shaken not only Western economies but also the macroeconomic profession is no easy task. In particular, the notion that markets are self-correcting and always in equilibrium appears to have taken a heavy blow. However, the jury is still out on which areas should be considered as failures and what which constitute the future of research. The overall aim of this text is to provide a compact overview of the contributions that are currently regarded as the most important for macroeconomic analys

This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers' education is provided free of charge by governments. We study …firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota of skilled migrants. Additional migration raises earnings prospects in the source country and attracts more talented people to that profession, what we refer to as the sector-speci…c brain gain e¤ect. This game presents a single stable equilibrium with positive migration. Compared to the cooperative equilibrium, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the poor country systematically under-invests in education. Whether migration is too strong or too weak depends on the size of the brain gain e¤ect. Furthermore, the size of the welfare gain to be reaped by moving from non-cooperative to the cooperative organization of migration also depends on the strength of the sector-speci…c brain gain.