Profit sharing has been proposed as a solution to underemploymentresulting from collective bargaining, but the empirical results areambiguous and the theoretical basis for this claim is weak. This papershows equity sharing can, in theory, solve the principle shortcomings ofprofit sharing. First, equity sharing can resolve both underemployment andover employment. Second, the results do not depend on assuming thatinsiders and the firm are prevented from bargaining over employmentlevel. Third the system does not require government intervention sinceboth sides can benefit from adopting equity sharing.Keywords: Bargaining game, profit sharing model, equity sharing.
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It is unsurprising that equity has featured so prominently in the Pandemic Treaty negotiations – the Treaty is a direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was characterised by gross inequality between high-income and LMICs. For all the talk at the start of the Treaty negotiation process of equity, of doing things differently in the future, it appears that very little will change. If it works, and there are very good reasons to believe that it will not work, it will at best make sure that a small proportion of vaccines end up where they need to be, and the rest will continue to go to the highest bidder, regardless of need, equity, or justice.
PurposeThis paper explores knowledge sharing (KS) and intellectual capital (IC) impacts on the success rate of equity crowdfunding (EC) campaigns in the Italian market, which represents a new model for financing entrepreneurial initiatives.Design/methodology/approachThe relation between KS, IC and the success rate of EC campaigns is analysed with a panel regression that measures IC through the value added intellectual coefficient. Social network analysis is used to measure KS in the users' network on Twitter for EC campaigning. Specifically, the authors consider the information users exchange on social networks as a proxy of KS and identify the hubs influencing information dissemination, the size and strength of networks for each EC campaign. Finally, the success rate of EC campaigns is a ratio of the number of positive campaigns to the total number of campaigns for each platform.FindingsThe success rate of EC campaigns is positively related to IC and significantly and positively related to the number of connections the EC platforms have.Practical implicationsThe positive relationship between the hub role of social network platforms and the success of EC campaigns provides an important signal to crowdfunding operators. As more potential investors focus on an EC campaign, a bandwagon effect could involve uninformed investors. This result is crucial in order to better understand how social media activity affects crowdfunding success.Originality/valueAlthough the literature has examined the impact of KS on general firm performance and the mediating role of intellectual capital, no prior studies have examined the impacts of KS and IC on the success rate of EC campaigns in a specific market.
Is inequality within countries relevant for global climate policy? Most burden-sharing proposals for climate mitigation treat states as homogenous agents, even those that aim to protect individual rights. This can lead to free riders in some large emerging economies and expose the poor to mitigation burdens in others. Proposals that incorporate an exemption for the poor can avoid these outcomes, but do not account for the role of internal policies on the poor's actual emissions and mitigation burdens. This will create moral hazards in the design of such agreements and risk the misallocation of mitigation costs when implemented. To ensure equitable outcomes at the individual level, international agreements would need to build in additional provisions to encourage benefiting states to reduce emissions and target exemptions to the poor. But such agreements will face political conflicts over sovereignty and the burdensomeness of such provisions. Adapted from the source document.
Reviews instances of water conflict and cooperation and evaluates approaches based on international water law, needs-based equity, and economic equity.
This study looks at contemporary politics in Suriname, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago as it relates to the issue of ethnic identity and the demands being made for power sharing by the various ethnic collectivities as a mechanism for addressing the material and symbolic insecurities which they claim to experience.
AbstractThe paper argues that negotiation costs can prevent the international community from finding a new international climate agreement. To define a feasible way of facilitating the negotiation process, I analyze basic equity principles and their relationship to climate policy and economic development. Based on the most relevant principles, I propose a general synthetic rule for burden sharing in international climate policy. The rule avoids complexity and comprises both egalitarian and cost-sharing aspects, which appears to be crucial for achieving a climate agreement. Carbon budgets for the different countries are calculated under different parameter assumptions.