Problems of integration cannot be separated from conflicts. They are two sides of the same coin. A long, escalating conflict may contribute to disintegration. Schermerhorn (1978) on his valuable book mentions there are three models of integration: first, the harmony of the cultural problems; second, the conflict between subordination of an ethnic group and the superordinates, and third, problems of legitimacy. We have found many ethnic conflicts in the Indonesia's plural society, especially the Chinese ethnic. The Indonesian Chinese minorities of Jakarta are still traumatized by and frightened of their memories for the Medan Riots (1994), the May Riots (1998) and the NTT incidents (2012), all of which are caused by the hatred feelings of majority towards the Indonesian Chinese ethnic.Since the New Order Era, in order to come up with those problems, the government had issued numerous sets of regulations; however they had not fostered harmony of the ethnic relations within such plural society, particularly between the Indonesian Chinese ethnic and indigenous peoples in numerous regions. Based on the microscopic research on the Medan Riots, I have found a certain model problem of conflicts and integration: a certain relation between the Chinese ethnic and the bureaucracy has become one of the factors keeping the legitimation of conflicts.
This article makes a case for extending social constructivist approaches to the study of grievance in natural resource conflicts. It does this by analyzing the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, which is often portrayed as a paradigmatic resource conflict due to the importance of the natural gas industry there. It is argued here, however, that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-based collective action frame. The argument is strengthened by comparison with two other resource-rich Indonesian provinces where resource extraction patterns were similar to Aceh but where no protracted violence occurred because similar identity resources were not available to local actors.
This article makes a case for extending social constructivist approaches to the study of grievance in natural resource conflicts. It does this by analyzing the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, which is often portrayed as a paradigmatic resource conflict due to the importance of the natural gas industry there. It is argued here, however, that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-based collective action frame. The argument is strengthened by comparison with two other resource-rich Indonesian provinces where resource extraction patterns were similar to Aceh but where no protracted violence occurred because similar identity resources were not available to local actors.
The search for durable peace in lands torn by ethno-national conflict is among the most urgent issues shaping our global future. Looking at the recent and current peace processes in Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka Bose addresses the question of how peace can be made, and kept, between warring groups with seemingly incompatible claims.
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I went to Florida for a relative's Bat Mitzvah. As I have remarked earlier here, these events make me feel uncomfy as I am not a believer. Many of the prayers and songs are burned into my memory based on the years I had to go to the various services before I left home. My father kept reminding me of the Jewish opportunities at college, which caused me to wonder whether he was either relentlessly optimistic or just in denial. So, the only times I go to synagogues or temples are wedding and Bax Mitzvahs. This time, something else helped make me feel a part of this community, reinforcing my identity as a Jew--the obstacles in the driveway that forced me to drive left/right/left/right and prevented me or anyone from entering the parking lot quickly. Yes, this synagogue had an entrance similar to those at military bases... which speaks to the threats facing Jews in North America. At the last BM in the fall, there was a metal detector and some heavy security at the door of the synagogue in NY. It used to be the case that when I walked in a strange city, I knew I was near an American embassy when I noted an increase in security barriers. These days, seeing such stuff tells me that I am near either an embassy or a synagogue. The threat of violence is real. Anti-semitism, along with the other hates--misogyny, racism, Islamophobia, homophobia, and xenophobia--is on the rise. At CPAC this week, the ethnic outbidding to appeal to the whitest, most "christian" folks produced much targeting of transgender people, but these folks and their pals didn't stop there. Nick Fuentes, who got to hang with Trump not that long ago, apparently talked about all kinds of folks (or isms, which really are targeting people) that need to go.So, identity is about us and them. And right now these folks out there are making me feel more Jewish because a basic part of that id is the threat, realized in pogroms long ago, in the Holocaust, and now in smaller scale violence, is increasing again. So, I don't believe in all the religious stuff, but I do believe that there are folks out there that would love to put me and my relatives into showers and ovens. So, I feel the us because the them is getting so toxic, so scary.This is not going to go away anytime soon especially when major political parties--Republicans in the US--worry more about alienating the Nazi wannabe's in their base than standing up for freedom. The supposed party of freedom is very much becoming a party of tyranny. While I loved seeing my extended family this weekend, I can't help but notice the dark side of identity and the threat we face. the traditions/service remind me of who I am not the obstacle course into the synagogue reminds me of who I am
The aim of this book is to identify the causal factors that influence the transnational networks between Kurdish organizations. Research findings reveal that political rationality and external threats seem to be stronger predictors of political behavior than ethnic ties in the Kurdish case.
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Black-Korean Conflict in American Cities -- Chapter 2. Explaining Black-Korean Conflicts -- Chapter 3. Comparing New York City and Los Angeles -- Chapter 4. New York City: Heat without Fire -- Chapter 5. Los Angeles: Fire without Smoke -- Chapter 6. No Fire Next Time -- Appendix -- Notes -- References -- Index
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This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the link between migrant ethnicity, space and socio-economic inequality. In the last three decades, the migratory pressure in Europe has reached significant levels. The massive flux of different ethnic groups has created significant tensions in many countries, causing widespread political conflicts and is now eroding the credibility of traditional political institutions. Here, we focused on three main issues, i.e., the residential segregation of immigrants, the immigrant's earnings at the neighbourhood level and the school choice of immigrant families. Our approach has been quantitative and has tried to combine and integrate certain social, economic and geographical factors. The core of our study has been a detailed analysis on a census-style database on the Italian city of Brescia, which permitted us to geolocalise households at a block level. The structure of the dissertation includes four main chapters followed by a conclusion chapter. First presents an extensive literature review that examined various socio-economic aspects of migrations. We first considered housing market discrimination, segregation theories, segregation measurement. Besides we introduced literature on labour market discrimination, social inequality and neighbourhood and network effects. Furthermore, we reviewed second generation problems, education inequality, social cohesion and assimilation theories. The second presents an empirical study on Brescia, one of the most relevant cities in Italy for the share of immigrants. While this context allowed us to reflect on complex forms of segregation in South Europe, we explored segregation in the city. We analysed segregation by aggregate ethnic groups to cover the whole city immigrant population. These aggregates are East Europeans, South Asians, Middle Easterns and North Africans, Sub Saharan Africans, Chinese, East and South East Asians and South Americans. Segregation is particularly strong for South Asians and Chinese communities. The third chapter examines neighbourhood effect on immigrants' earnings. The chapter considers the economic and social nexus of segregation by estimating neighbourhood effects on immigrants' earnings within an urban context. For doing this, we linked socio-economic and spatial-demographic characteristics of immigrants by following an "egohood" approach, which jointly considers socialisation and proximity effects. An egohood is an ego-centred circular neighbourhood of given dimension around individual residence. We found that immigrants in areas with high probability to meet co-ethnics had lower earnings; there was no effect for the probability to meet natives. The fourth examines ethnic differentials in school choices in primary school as a determinant of education inequality. Education inequality is crucial in countries receiving considerable levels of migrations. We hypothesised that households choose schools by homophily, i.e. they chose a school with a high percentage of co-ethnics. Furthermore, we hypothesised that and households prefer schools with a high share of high socio economics status-pupils while being constrained by geographical proximity. Households are sensitive to socio-economic status, ethnic composition and home-school distance. However, we also found that choices by second-generation immigrants, i.e., those who were born in Italy, had lower differences with natives, while born abroad children display different choices. The fifth presents conclusions, limitation and future developments of this dissertation. Finally, some chapters reproduce independent research articles. This implies that some repetitions are possible, especially when discussing previous research and presenting the study context.
AbstractConflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
This article discusses the views and attitudes of the Malay-speaking Muslims of Thailand's Far South (henceforth, simply the Malays) about their collective position in Thai politics. Since 2004, the Far South, comprising the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, has been engulfed in political violence that has claimed several thousand lives. Consequently, the conflict is often the subject of conversations among the Malays. More importantly, the Malays sometimes evoke their collective memory of episodes of past violence involving members of the Far South Malay society and the Thai state in their discussions about contemporary incidents. Why do the Malays hark back to the past when they discuss contemporary political violence? What connections do the Malays make between past and contemporary events? In this article, I discuss Malay collective memory about the Pattani Demonstration of 1975 and the Tomb of Martyrs at the Tok Ayoh Cemetery in Pattani province. I argue that, among the Malays, historic graves in Thailand's Far South are commemorative objects that aid the circulation of stories about collective victimhood pertaining to events such as the Pattani Demonstration. Such stories are central to the maintenance of a shared sense of community among the Malays vis-à-vis the rest of Thai society. (J Southeast Asian Stud/GIGA)
A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) discusses the validity of objections to territorial autonomy as a mechanism for reducing ethnic conflict: (1) Territorial autonomy is seen to lead to secession. (2) The putative minority homeland is no more culturally homogeneous than the whole state. After reviewing the history of territorial autonomy in the USSR, attention turns to actual experience of territorial autonomy among four groups. Analysis indicates that problems arise when territorial autonomy is taken away from groups that can cite a historical precedence for it during the Soviet period. In Gagauzia & Crimea, granting of territorial autonomy has been a positive experience; although in Dniestra, the outcome remains in question. While not a perfect solution, territorial autonomy is favored as a form of minority rights protection regime. J. Zendejas