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Nationalism both within the European Economic Community and in nations outside the EEC framework is diluting the effectiveness of European unity movement in stimulating international co-operation. Isolation tendencies in the EEC, residual in the political parties that opposed Euro pean union, threaten to disintegrate the Community. At the same time, the rising wall of tariff exclusiveness and plans for a Europe-Africa preferential trade zone manifest a nationalism that infuses the entire EEC. Nationalism on both the nation- state and the Community-wide bases makes the EEC a divisive force in the world. Persistence of nationalism is largely re lated to the small number of members in EEC. The establish ment of the Community was a miscalculation which calls for new policies by countries which are not EEC members.

At head of title: Joint committee print. ; Paper no. 1. Comparative features of central banks in selected foreign countries. Paper no. 2. Governmental policies to deal with prices in key industries in selected foreign countries. Paper no. 3. A description and analysis of certain European capital markets. Paper no. 4. Private trade barriers and the Atlantic community. Paper no. 5. Unemployment programs in Sweden. Paper no. 6. Subsidies to shipping by eleven countries. Paper no. 7. European social security systems. Paper no. 8. Programs for relocating workers used by governments of selected countries. Paper no. 9. Foreign banking in the United States. Paper no. 10. Foreign government restraints on United States bank operations abroad. Paper no. 11. Guaranteed minimum income programs used by governments of selected countries. Paper no. 12. The Euro-dollar market and its public policy implications. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Any discussion of European economics and Eu ropean defense will not be practical and realistic unless based on the assumption that Britain is essentially a part of Europe. Economically, Europe, including Britain, is playing a vital role in the development of the underdeveloped countries. Britain's contribution represents a greater proportion of its resources than that of the United States. Militarily, for the purposes of collective defense, including nuclear defense, all the nations of the North Atlantic alliance, both North American and Euro pean, are interdependent. Their collaboration must be organ ized on a basis of equal partnership. With this end in view, we are now seeking to enable Europe to play a more influential part in the policy-making, the management, and control of the nuclear power of the alliance. Western economic and defense policies must support each other. The Cold War is, in many ways, a total war. The Communist total challenge must be met by a total response—political, economic, and strategic.

Africanists in the United States African Studies Association have been so relatively successful in establishing interdisciplinary communication and co-operation that Euro pean scholars have been considering setting up similar organi zations. As the latest area field to emerge in the United States, African studies have benefited from the experiences of other area programs. Also, the notion that area studies might be substitutes for the traditional university depart ments had subsided by the time that African studies centers began to proliferate. The African Studies Association is prob ably unique in its lack of research or policy-directing aspects, and its small size relative to the other professional associations has allowed Africanists to get to know each other according to particular interests in African regions or problems, rather than along disciplinary lines alone. The problem of co-ordina tion between linguists and nonlinguists was ameliorated because descriptive linguistics, the variety of most interest to African ists, has been considered to be a subfield of anthropology in most major departments—although a shortage of linguists with an African background has hampered the expansion of the teaching of African languages. The many disciplines required for studying African history may open the way for further interdisciplinary efforts.

Most of the uncommitted countries became inde pendent after World War II with the disintegration of Euro pean colonial empires. The members of the two great political and military alliances today consider them neutral because they do not want to participate in those alliances. The un committed countries do not regard themselves as neutral; they refuse to take sides because they wish to take active part in the shaping of their own future and to influence world affairs in general. Within one of the alliances, they would be weak and submerged. They do not believe the present partition of the world settles their national problems or the problem of pre serving peace. They are more interested in social and eco nomic development than in the East-West antagonism. They are, most of all, interested in national independence. They recognize that such independence does not settle all problems, that the present era is one of increasing unity of the world. They are firm in their belief, however, that unity with peace, unity not foreshadowed with future wars, can be achieved only on the basis of freedom for all nations and not on the basis of dominance by the few who are more developed, as was the case in the past.—Ed.

Our belief in the self-determination, self-govern ment, and independence of peoples has persisted throughout American history. The rapid political and social changes that are occurring in the countries of tropical Africa have drawn our sympathy and, in a more active way, have drawn our sup port through material and technical assistance granted to them directly or through the organization of the United Nations. It is of fairly recent date that the United States has officially co-operated in this area, an area that was previously a sphere in which European interests were predominant. While we have begun to offer assistance to the African states, we are hopeful, at the same time, that the long-established ties with the Euro pean countries can continue in another form, advantageous to both. The needs, we recognize, of the African states are of such magnitude that they cannot be fulfilled by any one country. We have, therefore, co-operated in efforts to promote economic development initiated by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. We are being called upon more and more to share our material benefits with the less-developed parts of the world. The African states form one of these areas, indeed a very im portant one, and we are ready to play our role in responding to their needs.—Ed.

At present, NATO is at an impasse. The problem is not so much differences between De Gaulle's and Kennedy's designs for projected unions as differences over military strategy and armaments. Europe, because of policies we are advocating and pursuing there, could turn inward militarily as well as economically. The United States, until recently, provided European security and also maintained world-wide commitments. Now, European countries have de veloped their own nuclear weapons, and we have not been able to design an operational strategic concept that will permit centralized control of their use. We should now enlist Euro pean co-operation not only to strengthen their own defensive ability but also to make greater contributions to the total security of the free world. American policy inconsistency, however, is perplexing to the Europeans. The Europeans do not believe that a primarily conventional strategy will provide deterrence in Europe. They do not believe American policy offers sufficient options between defeat and thermonuclear war so long as NATO conventional forces confront nuclear-armed Soviet forces. They suspect the United States of being more interested in detente with the Soviet Union that in maintaining Western security. The United States failure to share nuclear assets could, in time, divide the Atlantic. Nuclear-sharing could be the key to cross-Atlantic co-operation in the techno logical sphere, stimulating economic growth and political harmony, frustrating Soviet exploitation of their military power.—Ed.

The recent challenges by Mao of Kremlin leadership in the Soviet bloc and by De Gaulle of American leadership in the Western bloc have made the foundations of the Cold War unstable. China defied all the rules of the nuclear club, until she could get into it; France accepted the new principle that national sovereignty now resides in oblitera tive capacity and that prestige depends upon it. De Gaulle's design for Europe calls for forbidding all peace-making until the Americans no longer need their land bases in Europe and leave and until the new Europe is strong enough to deal with a Soviet Union which, eventually weakened by conflict with China, will have no choice but to join the great Gaullist Euro pean family. The prospect of a European power independent of the United States and unchecked by Great Britain drew protest from Moscow. In view of these circumstances, making peace in co-operation with Russia is not out of the question. The United States and the Soviet Union, the two great powers, have been drifting toward a common ground. Peace with Russia has gained in credibility, but peace with China has not in the public mind, although the requirements for the continua tion of civilized life may demand it. In the interest of survival, the game of playing power politics as if the nuclear missile had not been invented must be discontinued by all. National security which rests on the stock-piling of ultimate weapons is an illusion. Mutual trust is the only adequate basis for true and solid peace among nations.—Ed.

The first item on the agenda toward an understanding of Latin American (LA) culture is to question the usefulness of speaking of a single culture. On the contrary, we have a congeries of cultures in LA, interrelated in complex ways, but also genuine and distinct entities. Viewed in this light, it is still possible to speak of LA and the contributions to it by the Indian cultures. But the Indians are not to be judged by what they have contributed to some culture other than their own; they like all the others are justified by their existence. At the time Columbus came to America there was a tremendous difference among Indian groups. For all of the thousands of cultures discernible at the time of first contact, anthropol'ts are now satisfied to divide them into a half dozen large culture areas: The greater southwest, Mesoamerica, the people of the tropical forests and southern Andes, the circum-Caribbean and sub-Andean peoples, the central Andes, and the marginal peoples. These areas differed from each other not only in culture but also in density of pop. After 450 yrs the Indians are still with us. But they have fared quite differently in different areas of LA. In Indo-America (Andes, Mexico, Guatemala) the Indians remain surprisingly in the pre-Conquest pattern because they were so many and could be used more or less as they were. In Mestizo-America (Circum-Caribbean and tropical forest areas) the Indians have generally disappeared or been acculturated. They were village dwellers and had no place to run. They also did not have the mass of pop of the Indo-American areas. In Euro-America the Indian pop was sparse and tribal. Here the Indian remains in tribal groups in the hinterland. The only place, then, where the Indian has substantially disappeared is the Caribbean area, largely because they received the brunt of the first exploitation by Europeans. That the Indians will change their ways and become like us is doubted. There is a continuing process of Indians leaving their communities and becoming acculturated to the national culture. But modern medicine reduces the death rate, and it seems likely that Indian societies will grow faster than they lose adherents. To suppose that out of the present heterogeneity will come a single homogeneous LA culture is only possible if one assumes that the homogeneous European is dominant over the much more heterogeneous Indian. J. E. Hughes.