Suchergebnisse

Die Diskussion über die Wahrscheinlichkeit asymmetrischer Schocks in Europa hat trotz Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion an Aktualität nicht verloren. In diesem Beitrag wird daher die Frage gestellt, welche fiskalischen Anpassungsmechanismen geeignet sind, solche asymmetrischen Schocks aufzufangen. In einem ersten Schritt werden die bestehenden marktlichen Instrumente betrachtet. Insbesondere wird die Rolle der internationalen Arbeitskräftemobilität sowie der Flexibilität relativer regionaler Preise thematisiert. Im Rahmen der Arbeit wird anschließend auf die institutionellen Anpassungsmechanismen näher eingegangen. Dabei werden in einem zweiten Schritt die Rolle automatischer Stabilisatoren, mögliche Stabilisierungseffekte des EU-Budgets, Auswirkungen der EU-Strukturförderung und schließlich Möglichkeiten eines europäischen Finanzausgleichs untersucht. Neben diesen automatischen institutionellen Mechanismen werden abschließend dikretionäre Bekämpfungsmöglichkeiten asymmetrischer Schocks, vor allem nationale Fiskalpolitiken sowie diskretionäre Transfers aus dem EU-Budget, unter dem Stichwort "Stabilisierungsfonds" angesprochen.

The economy in the euro area has turned around. While GDP stagnated during the second half of 2001, there are more and more signs that output will increase considerably in the first half of this year. All in all, the slowdown has not been very pronounced. One indication for this is that in 2001, the year of the downturn, unemployment remained more or less constant. The factors which led to the cyclical slowdown have turned around and now stimulate economic activity: Monetary policy has become expansionary, oil prices have dropped substantially, and there is a recovery in the rest of the world. Key interest rates in the euro area have remained unchanged since early November 2001. Real short-term interest rates are well below their historical average. Therefore, economic activity is stimulated by monetary policy. Until spring 2003, the ECB will raise key interest rates to the neutral level which should prevail when the output gap is closed and when inflation is at its target; this neutral rate lies between 4 and 4.5 percent. Money growth has exceeded the reference value of 4.5 percent for M3 considerably for several months. This increase implies that the velocity of money shows an unusually large deviation from its trend. According to the judgment of the ECB, the demand for M3 has become unstable only in the short run due to special factors. If this judgment is correct, money growth will slow down markedly in the coming months. As a consequence, velocity will return to its trend without an increase in inflation. This implies, however, that the expected slowdown of money growth should not be used as an indication that monetary policy is tight and needs to be loosened because the deceleration of M3 growth is nothing but a normalization. Fiscal consolidation has been insufficient in several countries. Governments in Germany, France, Italy and Portugal should begin to pursue a strict consolidation course. Empirical evidence shows that countries that undertook credible consolidation strategies based on expenditure cuts did not experience cyclical downturns. If the governments of these countries were to dampen the increase in government spending, there would be room for a reduction of the tax burden and of budget deficits. This would improve the growth perspectives for the medium term. In 2001, wages in the euro area increased somewhat faster than in the previous years largely reflecting the improvement of the labor market situation due to the strong upswing. Also, employees tried to limit the reduction of real wages, which was the consequence of the higher than expected rate of inflation. In our forecast, wage increases will average about 3 percent both this year and next. This implies that there is room for an increase in employment although it is smaller than at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the development of wages does not imply a risk for price level stability. The leading indicators suggest that the European economy has reached its trough in the first quarter of 2002 and that the upswing is imminent. From spring on, real GDP will increase at a faster pace than potential output. On average, it will increase by 1.7 percent in 2002. In the course of the coming year, the increase in production will gradually slow down. The upswing in the world economy will probably pass its peak in the first half of next year implying a less dynamic external demand for European products. Domestic demand will also lose some momentum. This is due to the fact that monetary policy will return to a neutral course and that the effects of the preceding easing will gradually fade. We expect real GDP to increase by 3 percent in 2003.

The economy in the euro area has turned around. While GDP stagnated during the second half of 2001, there are more and more signs that output will increase considerably in the first half of this year. All in all, the slowdown has not been very pronounced. One indication for this is that in 2001, the year of the downturn, unemployment remained more or less constant. The factors which led to the cyclical slowdown have turned around and now stimulate economic activity: Monetary policy has become expansionary, oil prices have dropped substantially, and there is a recovery in the rest of the world. Key interest rates in the euro area have remained unchanged since early November 2001. Real short-term interest rates are well below their historical average. Therefore, economic activity is stimulated by monetary policy. Until spring 2003, the ECB will raise key interest rates to the neutral level which should prevail when the output gap is closed and when inflation is at its target; this neutral rate lies between 4 and 4.5 percent. Money growth has exceeded the reference value of 4.5 percent for M3 considerably for several months. This increase implies that the velocity of money shows an unusually large deviation from its trend. According to the judgment of the ECB, the demand for M3 has become unstable only in the short run due to special factors. If this judgment is correct, money growth will slow down markedly in the coming months. As a consequence, velocity will return to its trend without an increase in inflation. This implies, however, that the expected slowdown of money growth should not be used as an indication that monetary policy is tight and needs to be loosened because the deceleration of M3 growth is nothing but a normalization. Fiscal consolidation has been insufficient in several countries. Governments in Germany, France, Italy and Portugal should begin to pursue a strict consolidation course. Empirical evidence shows that countries that undertook credible consolidation strategies based on expenditure cuts did not experience cyclical downturns. If the governments of these countries were to dampen the increase in government spending, there would be room for a reduction of the tax burden and of budget deficits. This would improve the growth perspectives for the medium term. In 2001, wages in the euro area increased somewhat faster than in the previous years largely reflecting the improvement of the labor market situation due to the strong upswing. Also, employees tried to limit the reduction of real wages, which was the consequence of the higher than expected rate of inflation. In our forecast, wage increases will average about 3 percent both this year and next. This implies that there is room for an increase in employment although it is smaller than at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the development of wages does not imply a risk for price level stability. The leading indicators suggest that the European economy has reached its trough in the first quarter of 2002 and that the upswing is imminent. From spring on, real GDP will increase at a faster pace than potential output. On average, it will increase by 1.7 percent in 2002. In the course of the coming year, the increase in production will gradually slow down. The upswing in the world economy will probably pass its peak in the first half of next year implying a less dynamic external demand for European products. Domestic demand will also lose some momentum. This is due to the fact that monetary policy will return to a neutral course and that the effects of the preceding easing will gradually fade. We expect real GDP to increase by 3 percent in 2003.

Die Europäische Währungsunion bedeutet eine Zäsur: Neben dem US-Dollar entsteht eine zweite große Weltwährung. Neue Spielregeln bilden sich innerhalb der Europäischen Union, aber auch im internationalen Währungssystem heraus. Darin steckt ein erhebliches Konfliktpotential. Schlimmstenfalls droht die Renaissance einer handelspolitisch motivierten Wechselkurspolitik. Diese Arbeit analysiert, welche wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräume die gemeinsame Währung den Regierungen der Euroland-Staaten eröffnet. Sie beleuchtet, unter welchen Bedingungen das Worst-case-Szenario eines transatlantischen «Wirtschaftskriegs» einzutreten droht. Und sie untersucht, welche institutionellen Innovationen des internationalen Währungssystems in der Lage sind, solchen potentiellen Konflikten vorzubeugen.

Economic activity in the euro area has weakened since last summer. In the second half of 2002, real GDP increased at an annualized rate of around 1 percent only. Economy-wide capacity utilization has further declined and the situation on labor markets has worsened. The increase in consumer prices has calmed down somewhat after an acceleration at the beginning of last year. Still, the inflation rate remains surprisingly high against the background of weak economic activity that has already lasted for two years. Monetary policy in the euro area is clearly expansionary. With only about 0.5 percent, the real interest rate is currently quite low by historical standards. Moreover, the nominal interest rate is well below the rate implied by the standard Taylor rule, even when low estimates of the current size of the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate are employed in the calculation of the rule. Still, monetary policy is probably not too expansionary. According to theory, the equilibrium real interest rate may be substantially below the long-run average real interest rate in situations such as the current one with depressed income and profit expectations. However, these considerations also imply that the ECB should bring the real interest rate back towards the long-run average once the depressing factors will have vanished. The situation of public finances in the euro area deteriorated further in the course of last year, with the aggregated budget in the countries of the euro area approaching a deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2002. The cyclically adjusted budget deficit in the euro area was as high as in 1998, the year immediately before the beginning of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. Whereas most countries have in the meantime complied with the goal of the Stability and Growth Pact to at least balance the budget over the medium term, the budget deficit in Germany, France, Italy and Portugal remained high both in actual and in structural terms. The governments of the three largest countries of the euro area are not likely to switch towards a policy of fiscal consolidation based on cuts in primary spending in 2003 and 2004. Moderate wage settlements would be appropriate in the current cyclical situation. However, wage increases have not slowed down over the past year, and are not expected to do so to any meaningful extent this year and next, reflecting the judgment that labor market rigidities will remain significant over the forecast horizon. Nevertheless, as employment is likely to be slow in responding to a recovery in production, the rise in unit labor costs will decelerate considerably, improving the chances that inflation will fall persistently below 2 percent. The leading indicators suggest that economic activity in the euro area will remain weak in the first half of this year. Under the assumption that the war in the Gulf region is of short duration and that the global political situation calms down afterwards, dampening factors from the Iraq conflict are expected to wane. Impulses from expansionary monetary policy will then increasingly take effect and domestic driving forces will gain the upper hand. We expect real GDP to increase by 1.0 percent and by 2.6 percent in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The situation on the labor market will start to improve towards the end of this year only. Inflation will be moderate over the forecast horizon. In 2004, consumer prices will probably rise by 1.9 percent on average, after 2.2 percent this year.

Economic activity in the euro area has weakened since last summer. In the second half of 2002, real GDP increased at an annualized rate of around 1 percent only. Economy-wide capacity utilization has further declined and the situation on labor markets has worsened. The increase in consumer prices has calmed down somewhat after an acceleration at the beginning of last year. Still, the inflation rate remains surprisingly high against the background of weak economic activity that has already lasted for two years. Monetary policy in the euro area is clearly expansionary. With only about 0.5 percent, the real interest rate is currently quite low by historical standards. Moreover, the nominal interest rate is well below the rate implied by the standard Taylor rule, even when low estimates of the current size of the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate are employed in the calculation of the rule. Still, monetary policy is probably not too expansionary. According to theory, the equilibrium real interest rate may be substantially below the long-run average real interest rate in situations such as the current one with depressed income and profit expectations. However, these considerations also imply that the ECB should bring the real interest rate back towards the long-run average once the depressing factors will have vanished. The situation of public finances in the euro area deteriorated further in the course of last year, with the aggregated budget in the countries of the euro area approaching a deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2002. The cyclically adjusted budget deficit in the euro area was as high as in 1998, the year immediately before the beginning of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. Whereas most countries have in the meantime complied with the goal of the Stability and Growth Pact to at least balance the budget over the medium term, the budget deficit in Germany, France, Italy and Portugal remained high both in actual and in structural terms. The governments of the three largest countries of the euro area are not likely to switch towards a policy of fiscal consolidation based on cuts in primary spending in 2003 and 2004. Moderate wage settlements would be appropriate in the current cyclical situation. However, wage increases have not slowed down over the past year, and are not expected to do so to any meaningful extent this year and next, reflecting the judgment that labor market rigidities will remain significant over the forecast horizon. Nevertheless, as employment is likely to be slow in responding to a recovery in production, the rise in unit labor costs will decelerate considerably, improving the chances that inflation will fall persistently below 2 percent. The leading indicators suggest that economic activity in the euro area will remain weak in the first half of this year. Under the assumption that the war in the Gulf region is of short duration and that the global political situation calms down afterwards, dampening factors from the Iraq conflict are expected to wane. Impulses from expansionary monetary policy will then increasingly take effect and domestic driving forces will gain the upper hand. We expect real GDP to increase by 1.0 percent and by 2.6 percent in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The situation on the labor market will start to improve towards the end of this year only. Inflation will be moderate over the forecast horizon. In 2004, consumer prices will probably rise by 1.9 percent on average, after 2.2 percent this year.

Die Europäische Währungsunion bedeutet eine Zäsur: Neben dem US-Dollar entsteht eine zweite große Weltwährung. Neue Spielregeln bilden sich innerhalb der Europäischen Union, aber auch im internationalen Währungssystem heraus. Darin steckt ein erhebliches Konfliktpotential. Schlimmstenfalls droht die Renaissance einer handelspolitisch motivierten Wechselkurspolitik. Diese Arbeit analysiert, welche wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräume die gemeinsame Währung den Regierungen der Euroland-Staaten eröffnet. Sie beleuchtet, unter welchen Bedingungen das Worst-case-Szenario eines transatlantischen «Wirtschaftskriegs» einzutreten droht. Und sie untersucht, welche institutionellen Innovationen des internationalen Währungssystems in der Lage sind, solchen potentiellen Konflikten vorzubeugen.

Die Europäische Währungsunion bedeutet eine Zäsur: Neben dem US-Dollar entsteht eine zweite große Weltwährung. Neue Spielregeln bilden sich innerhalb der Europäischen Union, aber auch im internationalen Währungssystem heraus. Darin steckt ein erhebliches Konfliktpotential. Schlimmstenfalls droht die Renaissance einer handelspolitisch motivierten Wechselkurspolitik. Diese Arbeit analysiert, welche wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräume die gemeinsame Währung den Regierungen der Euroland-Staaten eröffnet. Sie beleuchtet, unter welchen Bedingungen das Worst-case-Szenario eines transatlantischen "Wirtschaftskriegs" einzutreten droht. Und sie untersucht, welche institutionellen Innovationen des internationalen Währungssystems in der Lage sind, solchen potentiellen Konflikten vorzubeugen.

Ergänzend zu den Beiträgen im ifo Schnelldienst Nr. 7/2008, äußert sich Elmar Brok, Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments, zu der Möglichkeit der Zahlungsunfähigkeit eines Eurolands. Sollte ein Staat der Eurozone wirklich Bankrott gehen, so könnte dadurch die Währungsunion in Frage gestellt werden. Seiner Meinung nach sollte Europa Solidarität üben, aber "mit Vernunft und Maß". Die Instrumente der europäischen Solidarität müssten in ihrer vielfältigen Form genutzt werden. Die Europäische Union habe beispielsweise vor kurzem die Erhöhung des Vorschusses für den Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung und den Europäischen Sozialfonds, die hauptsächlich in den ost- und mitteleuropäischen Staaten zum Einsatz kommen, angekündigt. Insgesamt würden 6,25 Mrd. € zusätzlich zur Förderung von Großprojekten ausgegeben.

The introduction of a common monetary policy in eleven European countries increased the need for leading indicators for that area. A reliable leading indicator should possess the following properties: (1) The movements in the indicator series should resemble those in the business cycle reference series. (2) The relation between the reference series and the indicator should be statistically significant and stable over time. (3) The inclusion of the indicator in out-of-sample forecasting procedures should improve the predictive power. Our analysis deals with tests for these requirements applied to Euroland data. We use frequency domain analysis, Granger-causality tests and out-of sample forecasts. Only a few indicators pass all tests, while the non-monetary indicators perform best. ; Die Einführung einer gemeinsamen Geldpolitik in elf europäischen Ländern erhöhte die Bedeutung von konjunkturellen Frühindikatoren für dieses Gebiet. Brauchbare Frühindikatoren sollten folgende Eigenschaften besitzen: (1) Die konjunkturellen Bewegungen des Frühindikators sollten denen der Referenzreihe folgen. (2) Die Beziehung zwischen den Reihen sollte stabil und signifikant sein. (3) Die Einbeziehung des Indikators sollte die Out-of-sample-Prognose verbessern. Unsere Untersuchung testet diese Anforderungen für Euroland-Daten. Dazu werden Methoden der Spektralanalyse, verschiedene Granger-Kausalitäts-Tests und Out-of-sample-Prognosen verwendet. Nur wenige Indikatoren bestehen die Tests auf die geforderten Eigenschaften, wobei die nichtmonetären Indikatoren besser abschneiden.

The cyclical situation at the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is favorable: The upswing in Euroland has firmed, unemployment is going down, and inflation is low. However, economic growth outside the new currency area has weakened significantly during 1998, and fears are mounting that the crises in various regions of the world economy could endanger the current expansion in Euroland. Against this background, the significance of external conditions for the business cycle in Euroland — as well as the regional structure of exports — is analyzed. An important issue for an adequate design of economic policy is to what extent capacities in Euroland are currently utilized and whether cyclical unemployment is still significant. In addition, it is important to know whether the business cycles in the individual countries converge or not. In light of the findings from these analyses, the course of monetary, fiscal, and wage policy is evaluated in order to assess the outlook for Euroland until the end of 1999.

Election forecasting has become a standard part of the tool kit for political scientists around the world. However, that focus is almost exclusively on forecasting national electoral contests. Here we offer another, unique, focus – the changing political color of the core nations of the European Union, the Fifteen. First, we offer a model that forecasts the fortune of classic right-wing rule for this region, labeled Euroland. Then, we examine those forecasts, as compared with France in particular. France holds special interest because, according to our forecasts for 2015, it could well swing right, while the rest of Euroland goes left. One suggestion, of course, is that the tradition of French exceptionalism will continue.