Asma Boujenna – Universidad AbdelMalek Essâadi – Tetuan, Marruecos - 0000-0002-0023-7759 ; Vanessa Martos Núñez – Universidad de Granada - 0000-0001-6442-7968 ; Belén García del Moral Garrido – Universidad de Almería - 0000-0001-9803-9939 ; Luis F. Garcia del Moral – Universidad de Granada - 0000-0002-0533-2915 ; Recepción: 08.04.2022 | Aceptado: 18.04.2022 ; Correspondencia a través de ORCID: Luis F. García del Moral - 0000-0002-0533-2915 ; El punto de compensación para el CO2 (ΓCO2) es el límite mínimo de CO2 atmosférico necesario para una asimilación fotosintética positiva. Por debajo de este límite los procesos respiratorios predominan sobre los fotosintéticos, la fotosíntesis neta tiene valores negativos y el crecimiento se detiene, con consecuencias negativas sobre el rendimiento y la productividad. Las diferencias en ΓCO2, se han utilizado para seleccionar genotipos con una mayor capacidad de captación de CO2 y con mejor productividad. El objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir al conocimiento práctico, por parte del alumnado de una asignatura de Ecofisiología Vegetal, de cómo se puede calcular el valor del ΓCO2 y su interés para evaluar la eficiencia en la captación de CO2 por plantas con metabolismo fotosintético C3 o C4. Abstract: The compensation point for CO2 (ΓCO2) is the minimum limit of atmospheric CO2 necessary for positive photosynthetic assimilation. Below this limit, respiratory processes predominate over photosynthetic ones, net photosynthesis has negative values and growth stops, with negative consequences on yield and productivity. Differences in ΓCO2 have been used to select genotypes with a higher CO2 uptake capacity and better productivity. The objective of this work is to contribute to the practical knowledge, by students of a Plant Ecophysiology course, of how the value of ΓCO2 can be calculated and its interest in evaluating the efficiency of CO2 uptake by plants with C3 or C4 photosynthetic metabolism. ; Financiación: Grupo de investigación AGR123 de la Junta de Andalucía y proyecto "SUSTAINABLE" funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Project H2020-MSCA-RISE-2020, Grant Agreement 101007702.
El desarrollo del «Estado de las Autonomías» tras el restablecimiento de la democracia en España ha potenciado la proliferación de narrativas sobre el pasado que buscan legitimar las nuevas estructuras administrativas y homogeneizar sus formaciones identitarias. Esto se solapa con un creciente interés de la ciudadanía por el pasado y su escenificación en la esfera pública a través de recreaciones históricas. El estudio analiza tres recreaciones históricas en el noroeste español y su vinculación con discursos constructores de alteridad identitaria a nivel sociopolítico. Igualmente, estudia los intercambios y mediaciones producidas entre el conocimiento académico y su recepción por parte del público, demostrando cómo ciertas cuestiones sociopolíticas se ven reflejadas en eventos aparentemente neutrales. [ABSTRACT] The development of a quasi-federal administrative framework based on Regional Governments (Comunidades Autónomas) after the restoration of democracy in Spain, has led to the proliferation of narratives about the past that seek to legitimize the new administrative structures and homogenize their identity formations so as to reinforce their internal social cohesion. This process is paralleled by a growing public interest in the past and its staging through historical reenactments. The paper analyzes the connection between both processes in three historical recreations in northwest Spain. Also, it considers the reenactments as spaces where academic knowledge reaches and is assumed in multiple ways by the public. Despite the events seem to be largely neutral at first sight, our research suggests that they are actually highly ideologically charged.
Partimos de la caracterización sociocultural de los grupos castreños cantábricos como paso indispensable para comprender el sentido histórico profundo del potente cambio cultural que supuso la conquista militar del extremo norte peninsular y su inserción en el sistema imperial romano. Nuevos datos arqueológicos nos permiten discutir la información sobre las operaciones armadas de conquista que nos ofrecían las fuentes clásicas y comprender qué papeles jugaron los diferentes grupos (meseteños y cantábricos, principalmente) en aquella. Una relectura de la información arqueológica nos permitirá entender los diferentes tipos y resistencias a la romanización, básicamente uno asociado a la minería del oro y otro a un paisaje agrario. [ABSTRACT]The sociocultural characterization of Cantabrian Iron Age communities is as an essential step to un-derstand the deep historical sense of cultural change that occured after the military conquest of Northern Spain, and its integration into the Roman imperial system. New archaeological data allow us to discuss the view on military operations that classical sources offered us. We will understand what roles were played by different groups –of Central Iberia and Western Cantabrian Mountains, primarily– in that conquest. Also, a reading of the archaeological information will help us to understand the different types of resistance to the Roman, basi-cally one associated with gold mining and other to agrarian landscape.
Presentamos varios yacimientos militares romanos recientemente descubiertos en el área asturleonesa. Sus ubicaciones y características formales son propias de los campamentos romanos temporales – castra aestiva – de cronología altoimperial. Por ello, sería presumible relacionarlos con las Guerras Cántabras. Su georreferenciación ofrece información sobre las operaciones militares de conquista en un escenario inédito para las interpretaciones tradicionales de las fuentes clásicas. [ABSTRACT] This article presents a number of Roman military sites recently discovered in Asturias and León (Northern Iberia). Their specific locations and formal features are related with Roman marching camps – castra aestiva – dating back to the Early Roman Empire period. The paper argues that those sites are most likely related with Cantabrian Wars. Their georeferencing provides us with novel information on military operations that stands apart from traditional interpretations of the classical sources.
Los Estados miembros han ido acercando sus tradicionales políticas migratorias, fundamentalmente a través de la cooperación reforzada, hacia la consecución de un mercado único de trabajo. Paralelamente las instituciones europeas han realizado una labor accesoria, sin carácter decisorio ni ejecutivo, correspondiendo el protagonismo a los Ministros de Interior y de Justicia, mientras que la Comisión y el Parlamento Europeo han quedado como meros órganos consultivos. El nuevo acuerdo "Schengen III" confirma la vocación y la evolución legislativa en materia de control social, como uno de los elementos cardinales de la construcción europea. Por eso, el balance de la incipiente política migratoria de la UE no es mínimamente satisfactorio, sobre todo en lo que concierne al trato equitativo de los nacionales de terceros países, a las políticas de integración y a las políticas orientadas al retorno o a la readmisión. La futura C.Eur. garantiza la ausencia total de controles de las personas, con independencia de su nacionalidad, en las fronteras interiores y la instauración progresiva de un sistema integrado de gestión de las fronteras exteriores. Junto a ello establece un estatuto uniforme del derecho de asilo y de la protección subsidiaria de los nacionales de terceros países, al tiempo que se instaurarán procedimientos comunes para la concesión o retirada de los mencionados estatutos. Tras su entrada en vigor, se prevé una política común de inmigración con una gestión eficaz y justa de los flujos migratorios. Members States have harmonized their immigration policies in order to establish a single labour market. Until now the Community institutions have played only a complementary role because the Home Affairs and Justice Ministers of the Members States have been the leading figures so far. The Commission and the European Parliament have acted mainly as advisory bodies. The new Schengen III agreement reinforces the legal transformation regarding social control as one of the key features of the European integration ...
Las modificaciones que la nueva Ley de Patentes 24/2015 de 24 de julio introduce en la Ley de Hipoteca Mobiliaria y Prenda sin Desplazamiento representan un avance con respecto a la redacción anterior de los artículos aplicables a la propiedad industrial e intelectual. Este artículo examina las modificaciones legislativas introducidas desde el punto de vista de Derecho sustantivo proyectándolo al ámbito de Derecho Internacional Privado, así como las perspectivas de futuro a la luz de los recientes trabajos internacionales en materia de garantías sobre bienes inmateriales.
Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar un ámbito tan clave como de creciente importancia, tanto nacional como internacional, como es la cooperación en materia de enseñanza/formación en materia militar entre España y los Estados de Iberoamérica. Para ello, tras plantear una serie de presupuestos básicos sobre los que se sustentará todo el estudio, se comenzará por presentar un diagnóstico del estado de cosas actual, tanto en lo relativo a las Fuerzas Armadas españolas como a las de los países iberoamericanos, prestando atención singular a las iniciativas, posiciones y políticas en curso en lo referente a la cooperación en enseñanza/formación militar a día de hoy. A continuación se examinarán, comparativamente, los programas que desarrollan algunos países de nuestro entorno en lo que generalmente se ha denominado como "sus zonas de influencia históricas". Finalmente, se presentarán una serie de recomendaciones, cuantitativas y cualitativas, en aquellos puntos o aspectos en los que se identifiquen, bien deficiencias, bien posibilidades de potenciar los programas implementados, bien oportunidades de explorar (o explotar) nuevas iniciativas; guiando siempre tal empeño además en el expreso deseo y necesidad compartidos por el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo españoles de reforzar la cooperación entre las Fuerzas Armadas españolas y las de los países iberoamericanos. This paper intends to analyze the cooperation in the matter of military education/formation between Spain and the States of Latin America. A key scope of increasing importance as national as much as international. For it, after stablishing a series of basic premises on which all the study will be sustained, it will begin presenting a diagnosis of the present state of things, as much with respect to the Spanish Armed Forces as to those of the Latin American countries, giving singular attention to the initiatives, positions and policies in course with respect to the cooperation in education/military formation. Next, they will be examined, comparatively, the ...
President Obama travelled to Europe this week for a one-day summit of the G-20 in London and a NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. He then went to Prague to deliver a non-proliferation speech, which, with exquisite timing on the part of the North Koreans, came on the same day as that country tested a ballistic missile delivery system over Japan. In both the G-20 and the NATO summit, protestors took to the streets, in some cases becoming quite destructive.Obama's performance in Europe is being debated in the strongest terms in the United States: did he deliver? While many were again moved by his ability to dazzle European audiences, a consensus seems to be emerging that he is coming back home empty-handed. It would be easy to dismiss this divergence of views as politics as usual, with the Republicans criticizing him harshly while his own party lavishes praise on his performance, but it is somewhat more complicated than that: the question today is how much his popularity and charisma translate into getting palpable results that meet US interests.Dominique Moïsi recently commented on the risks of ignoring the dichotomy between Obama's essence (whohe is)and his performance (what he does). For the rest of the world in general, and for Europeans in particular, his electoral triumph has evoked enthusiasm and restored confidence in the resilience and vitality of American democracy, which many had come to doubt. With Obama, the man himself is the message. They like who he is, but will they also like what he does to protect American interests around the world? Changes in foreign policy are often less about grand declarations than they are about alterations in tone, outlook and priorities. However, underlying the rhetoric and the diplomatic dialogue, there are always the nation's interests which are much more immutable than changes in leadership. Obama has already changed the tone and texture of American diplomacy, but transforming the substance of US foreign policy will take much longer and will be much more difficult to achieve.Speaking to a spell-bound audience of French and German students in Strasbourg, France, he urged Europeans to join in a common effort to restructure the global economy and renew the trans-Atlantic alliance. In his cool yet direct way, Obama managed to talk to Europeans in some pretty harsh terms about the strained relationship. He had a difficult message to convey. To soften it, he first confessed America's own hubris: "In America there is a failure to appreciate Europe's leading role in the world. Instead of celebrating your dynamic union.there have been times when America has shown arrogance and been dismissive and even derisive."Then it was Europe's turn:"…But in Europe there is an anti-Americanism that is… casual but that can also be insidious…there have been times when Europeans choose to blame America for much of what is bad…these attitudes have become too common. They are not wise. They do not represent the truth. They fail to acknowledge that America cannot confront the challenges of this century alone but that Europe cannot confront them without America."He then reminded them that Islamic extremism is a threat to Europe as much as it is a threat to the United States. He pointed out some changes his administration has already made to bring it more in line with international sentiment: the closing of Guantánamo, the outlawing of torture, abandoning the use of the terms "enemy combatant" and "the war on terror." "America is changing but it cannot be America alone that changes," he said. He pledged a united front to tackle the Afghanistan war, the Palestinian conflict and the global crisis. Now it is up to Europe to do more, he implied.His speech brought applause from the crowd at several instances. Unfortunately, he was less effective in obtaining what he wanted from European decision-makers. This led pundits here to comment acidly that while Obama's aura and Michelle's grace are both national assets, they are not enough to persuade allies to do what is in the American interest. His harshest critics in the US said that in order to conquer their sympathies, Obama deferred to the European agenda and conceded too much: his mea culpa about American arrogance was too much for the opposition party to swallow. The truth is that he had two very difficult cases to make: first he had to persuade European leaders to increase their fiscal stimulus to 2% of their GDP; then he had to coax them into contributing more troops to the Afghan war. He was rebuffed on both fronts.On the economic front, it was a demand Europeans were not ready to make, given that, unlike the US, these social democracies already are financing large welfare states. Also in contrast with the US, Europe still has room left to use monetary policy to stimulate their economies. However, Obama was successful in starting to rebuild frayed relations not only with Europe but also with Russia and China. The G-20 communiqué contains several important steps toward strengthening international financial regulation, and it includes a directive to triple the IMF resources to 750 billion dollars to help distressed countries as well as a new trade finance initiative of 250 billion by the World Bank. An extra 100 billion in aid for the poorest countries will be raised from capital markets rather than the embers themselves. For a one-day summit, this is indeed progress: Obama is moving the ball down the line without turning it over to the other side. Later down the road, if and when the global economy needs further stimulus, he will be in a good position to make the case for more.In the case of NATO, his success was even perhaps more modest: he got a token increase in European troops for Afghanistan, but these are temporary only and will be deployed to train Afghan police and military, not in a fighting capacity. However, Obama used the forum to redefine America's intention there in much narrower terms, away from the unrealistic goal of establishing a Jeffersonian- style democracy and towards a new focus on rebuilding relations with the native population and containing Al Qaeda. He is also going to travel to Turkey next, to assuage fears in the Muslim world about American intentions toward them.In spite of the new commitment to increase the numbers of boots on the ground, it is clear that the Europeans are looking for an exit strategy in Afghanistan and that Americans, now more than ever, own that war: Obama is increasing the number of troops from 35.000 to 68.000 and has widened the theater of operations to include Pakistan. It is undoubtedly now an American war, a decision that may haunt him for years to come.The lost irony here is that Europeans have been very strident in opposing American unilateralism in Iraq, but when asked for a multilateral effort in Afghanistan, this one being the "legal" war that was approved by the UN Security Council, their response is a tepid 5,000 troops with no permission to engage, only to train Afghan military and police. Europe today has neither the stomach nor the resources for any type of war.In Prague, Obama outlined his vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. He warned that the non-proliferation regime is breaking down and called for a global summit on nuclear security. He said he hoped to negotiate a new treaty to end the production of fissile materials. On the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, he opened two big loopholes: he said the US will deploy it "if it is effective" and "if Iran does not change its behavior." This is a major change of policy from the Bush years. It was very well received by the Russians but Obama will be severely criticized if his efforts to change the course in Iran fall flat, which is the most likely scenario.Ironically, while Obama's Prague speech on non-proliferation focused on preventing Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, Pakistan, a US ally, is not only a nuclear state itself, in possession of around five dozen nuclear weapons, but has a pathetically weak government that lacks the most rudimentary capacity of a modern state: it cannot control its own territory, its institutions are shaky and it is therefore very close to becoming a failed state. For now, it seems that the administration's best bet is to take a minimalist posture of what success here would look like: setting the bar for victory in the region lower, for example to the more modest goals of denying Al Qaeda safe havens and preventing the total collapse of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Otherwise, the US runs again the risk of being trapped in a quagmire with no end in sight.The greatest paradox of the present world crisis is that among steep criticism of the American model and proposals to "rethink the American paradigm", the rest of the world is still looking to the United States to save them. No other power or world order is emerging to take its place and there is immense yearning and expectation that Obama will deliver a miracle and restore growth, prosperity and order around the world. However, under the new reality of dispersion of power, which is already becoming the defining trait of the 21st century, conflicts will at best be managed by concerted action among allies, but no longer solved by the absolute power and domination of the United States.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Documento de trabajo del Proyecto de Investigación UCM «Lenguaje, Pedagogía y Derecho. Un problema de la Antropología moral de Kant» (CCG08-UCM/HUM-4166). Autor: Nuria Sánchez Madrid. Con el fin de facilitar la localización de los textos, se han numerado todos los párrafos de la ed. de la obra en el vol. XII de la ed. en Suhrkamp (Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 2), a los que hacen referencia los distintos apartados de lo que llamamos índice.