Suchergebnisse

The plans for Economic and Monetary Union in Europe became difficult to achieve during the period 1992-1993. The convergence criteria set up in the Maastricht Treaty block the road towards unification. It is very complex to expect twelve governments with different shades of political colour and twelve states with different economic interests to compromise in such criteria (as inflation, government borrowing, exchange rate stability and interest rates) and eventually, speak with one voice at the end of this decade. This current research provides significant modifications in The Maastricht Treaty , policy making, objectives, even changes in political behavior for better coordination to tackle any turbulence that stands on the way. These changes were unveiled and supported by outside views. The right time for transition to the monetary union depends on the rate of progress in Europe in meeting the stability requirements and in the willingness to move to a more developed political union. Monetary Union could occur late in 1990s but with a number of members left out with major dominant the Germany than the EMS.

The recent crisis in the ERM has meant EMU can no longer proceed along
the lines proposed in the Maastricht Treaty. Proposes that a two or
even multi‐speed EMU should emerge from the crisis. This would be based
on a "hardcore" which would form the basis for exchange rate/macro
policy management for "softer" countries.

Discusses the difficulties that lie in the way of moves towards
monetary union in the European Community: convergence criteria,
attitudes towards various forms of possible political union, German
unification, the location and independence of an independent European
Central Bank, "cohesion" provisions in the Maastricht
Treaty, and the Delors Budget.

ABSTRACTThe notion of a European Monetary Union can be interpreted in different ways. To most non‐economists it probably implies a single European currency and a European central bank. To economists, however, a monetary union implies only (in the words of the 1970 Werner Plan): 'the irrevocable fixing of parities and the total liberalization of capital movements'. To others still a monetary union might be reached if there is a widely used European parallel currency. This article argues that these paradigms imply different degrees of monetary integration, and that the benefits that can be expected from a monetary union for Europe depend on the degree of monetary integration. Which paradigm should be chosen, therefore, depends on the reasons for which a monetary union for Europe is deemed desirable.