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This book examines the political order and the issues, processes and approaches in applying governance insights to tourist destinations. The book consists of 16 chapters presented in three parts. Part I introduces the reader to the issues and considerations of tourist destination governance. The four chapters in this part address the diversity of questions of relevance around regional destination development, community involvement, responsiveness and future outcomes of governance in the context of tourism. This includes an exploration of a variety of challenges regarding governance in emerging tourist destinations within the Greater Mekong in Asia, the conflicts in governance within a regional community in Scotland which has had a long history of golf tourism, the development of a typology of issues and pressures that affect tourist destination governance and the role of knowledge in good governance for tourist destinations. Part II explores the complexities and considerations of decision making and the significant role it plays in its specific relevance to tourist destination governance and tourism development within regional communities. In acknowledging that tourist destination development may involve contentious, complicated and arduous processes, this part recognizes that decision making has a prominent role to play in achieving effectiveness in governance. The three chapters in this part examine tourist destination decision making during times of crisis in Thailand, stakeholder roles in governance and decision making for a wildlife tour in Tonga, and the utilization of community involvement and empowerment as keys to success in regional tourist destinations. Part III provides further understanding regarding the approaches and solutions of tourist destination governance. This includes aspects of structural change, community engagement, networks and collaborations in the context of destinations. The five chapters in this part include the exploration of a process of governance change within a broader mountain tourist destination in Switzerland, utilizing effective networks as assistance to governance in destinations, community-based tourism governance solutions in a case study in Thailand and insights from complexity, network and stakeholder theories as approaches, including an understanding of a micro-macro context of tourist destination governance at its local/regional and national level. The concluding chapter examines the theory and methodology of governance studies, provide insights for tourist destination managers and researchers, and identify opportunities for further research into destination governance issues. This chapter discusses the application of governance concepts to other countries' governance and issues of conceptual importance, such as the need for ideology in the discussion of governance. This raises the question: does good governance of a tourist destination have to be based on democratic principles? Finally, the chapter looks at the concept of governance effectiveness.

Foreword -- Preface / Fredric Michael Litto -- The reconfiguration of human relations in the connected society : thoughts and ideas -- Living inside the net : the primacy of interactions and processes / Brasilina Passarelli, School of Communications and Arts, ECA of the University of São Paulo, USP, Brazil, Francisco Paletta, School of Communications and Arts, ECA of the University of São Paulo - USP, Brazil -- Critics about the convergence culture / Andres Kalikoske, University of Rio dos Sinos Valley, Brazil -- The extensive communications to hybridism and "animaverbivocovisualidade" (av3) / Antonio Miranda, University of Brasília, Brazil -- Elmira luzia simeão, University of Brasília, Brazil -- Digital inclusion : from connectivity to the development of information culture / Aurora Cuevas Cerveró, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain -- Why the institutional access digital divide might be more significant than the home broadband divide / Joseph Dean Straubhaar, the University of Texas at Austin, United States of America -- Digital inclusion projects in Brazil -- Digital inclusion, crowdsourcing and crowdfunding in Brazil: a brief review / Beatrice Bonami Rosa, Digital Culture Observatory at the School of the Future Research Laboratory, Brazil, Maria Lujan Túbio, Post Doctoral Student at ECA -- From information society to community service : the birth of e citizenship / Benedito Medeiros Neto, University of Brasília, Brazil -- -- Digital inclusion and computational thinking : new challenges and opportunities for media professionals / Rafael Vergili, Digital Culture Observatory at the School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil / Walter Teixeira Lima, Methodist University of São Paulo, Brazil -- Digital inclusion and public policies in Brazil / Drica Guzzi, School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil -- E-portfolios as tools for collaborative learning on digital platforms / Ana Claudia Loureiro, School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil, Cristina Zukovsky-Tavares, Faculty of Education, University of São Paulo, Brazil -- Connectedyouthbrazil research : youngsters emerging literacies in a hyperconnected society / Brasilina Passarelli, School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil, Fabiana Grieco Cabral de Mello Vetritti, Digital Culture Observatory at the School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil -- "Stop phubbing me!" : a case study on mobile media and interpersonal relationships in Brazil / Alan César Belo Angeluci, University of São Paulo, Brazil -- Brazil 4d interactive content production for digital television : a experience of interactive content production for digital television / Cristiana Freitas G. de Araujo, University of Brasília, Brazil, Cosette Spindola de Castro, Catholic University of Brasília, Brazil -- Digital literacies and teachers learning proccess / Hélio Antônio Junqueira, Digital Culture Observatory at the School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil -- Netnography of digital inclusion : a study about interactivity and emergent literacies in the acessasp program / Rodrigo Eduardo-Francisco Botelho, Digital Culture Observatory at the School of the Future Research Laboratory, USP, Brazil -- Critical analysis of an amazon program of digital inclusion : navegapará in the city of Belém, Brazil / Waléria de Melo Magalhães, Federal University of Pará, Brazil, Marianne Kogut Eliasquevici, Federal University of Pará, Brazil / Benedito de Jesus Pinheiro Ferreira, federal University of Pará, Brazil -- Digital inclusion projects in Europe -- Information policies : agenda for digital inclusion in the European Union / Maria Teresa Fernández-Bajón, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain -- Institutional policies for digital inclusion in Spain / Maria-Jesús Colmenero-Ruiz, Carlos III University Madrid, Spain, Belén Pérez- Lorenzo, Carlos III University Madrid, Spain -- Trends in information literacy programs to empower people and communities / José-Antonio Gómez-Hernández, University of Murcia, Spain, Tomás Saorín, University of Murcia, Spain -- Technologies for digital inclusion : good practices dealing with diversity / Jorge Morato, Carlos III University Madrid, Spain, Alejandro Ruiz-Robles, University of Piura, Spain, Sonia Sanchez-Cuadrado, Jot Internet Media, Spain, Miguel Angel Marzal, Carlos III University Madrid, Spain -- Discussion on digital inclusion good practices at Europés libraries / María-Jesús Colmenero-Ruiz, Carlos III University Madrid, Spain -- Digital inclusion projects in Americas -- The geography of digital literacy : mapping communications technology training programs in Austin, Texas / Stuart Davis, the University of Texas at Austin, United States of America, Lucia Palmer, the University of texas at Austin, United States of America, Julian Etienne Gomez, the University of Texas at austin, United states of America -- Informational literacy as key element in social and digital inclusion policies in Mexico / Javier Tarango, Autonomous University of Chihuahua, Mexico, Celia Mireles-Cárdenas, autonomous university of San Luis Potosi, Mexico -- Digital revolution in Latin America for beyond technologies / Maria Cristina Gobbi, State University of São Paulo - Julio de Mesquita Filho - UNESP, Brazil, Francisco Machado Filho, State University of São Paulo - Julio de Mesquita Filho - UNESP, Brazil -- Technological illusion and educational resistances : the public discourse about olpc in Peru and its policy failure / Eduardo Villanueva-Mansilla, Pontifical Catholic University in Peru, Peru -- Digital inclusion programs in South America : plan ceibal and digital inclusion in Mercosur countries / María Gladys Ceretta, University of the Republic, Uruguay, Javier alfredo Canzani, University of the Republic, Uruguay -- Comparative approaches of igi-global collection / Joseph Dean Straubhaar, The University of Texas at Austin, United States of America

INTRODUCTION 1 -- 1 THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES -- I. The Indivisibility of Human Rights -- A. Understanding Socio-economic Rights as Human Rights -- B. Two Faces of Liberty: Conflicting Ideologies of Socio-economic and Civil and Political Rights -- C. Socio-economic Rights, Resources and the Negative-Positive Dichotomy -- D. A Unified Approach to Human Rights: To 'Respect, Protect and Promote' the Rights -- E. The Normative Content of Socio-economic Rights: Programmatic Aspirations and the 'Minimum Core' -- II. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in Domestic Courts -- A. Issues of Justiciability: Achieving Social Justice in the Round? -- i. Institutional Competencies -- ii. Welfare Politics, Courts and Conflicting Theories of Constitutional Review -- B. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights through the Traditional Canon of Civil and Political Rights -- C. The Dedicated Pursuit of Social Justice: The South African Model -- D. The Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights: Cooperative Dialogue in the South African Constitutional Court? -- III. Conclusion -- 2 THE REGIONAL PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: EUROPE -- I. Introduction -- II. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 -- A. Background and Context: The Negative-Positive Dichotomy Revisited -- B. Incremental Development of Positive Obligations in ECHR Rights -- C. Methodological Issues: Grafting a Jurisprudence of Positive Obligations onto the ECHR Rights -- D. Reconciling the Development of Positive Obligations with the Negative Thrust of the ECHR -- E. Theoretical Justifications for Positive Obligations and the Problem of Resources -- III. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in the ECHR -- A. Developing Core Values in the ECHR Rights -- B. Article 2: A Right to Health Treatment? -- C. Article 3: Respect for Human Dignity -- D. Article 8: Protecting Physical and Psychological Integrity -- E. Article 14: The Equal Distribution of Public Goods? -- F. Article 6: Due Process in Public Law Challenges -- IV. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in EC -- EU Law -- A. The Development of a Doctrine of Fundamental Rights in EC -- EU Law -- B. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union -- C. The European Court of Justice (ECJ): Social Solidarity and Access to Public Services in Member States -- i. Undue Delay -- ii. Article 49 EC Treaty -- V. Conclusion -- 3 COURTS, THE UK CONSTITUTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 -- I. Introduction -- II. Reading and Giving Effect to ECHR Rights in UK Courts -- A. The Background and Political Context of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 -- B. The Purpose and Structure of the HRA -- C. General Principles of Constitutional Interpretation in the United Kingdom -- D. The Interpretation of Section 3 HRA -- E. Deference: The Boundaries of Interpretative Possibility under Section 3 HRA -- F. Section 2 HRA and the Scope of ECHR Rights: Taking Account of Strasbourg Jurisprudence -- i. Stare Decisis -- G. Section 6 HRA: The Duty of Public Authorities to Act Compatibly with the ECHR Rights -- I. Human Rights or Economic Liberalism: Contested Interpretations of Section 6(3)(b) HRA -- III. Conclusion -- 4 JUDICIAL REVIEW: DEFERENCE, RESOURCES AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT -- I. Introduction -- II. The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review -- A. Ultra Vires or Rights? -- B. The Reception of Human Rights in English Law prior to the HRA -- C. Resistance to Human Rights in English Administrative Law -- D. Judicial Deference, Resources and the Ultra Vires Paradigm of Review -- III. Public Law, Deference and the Human Rights Act -- A. The Limits of Judicial Intervention under Section 6 HRA -- i. Context and Proportionality: A Bright-line Division in Public Law? -- B. Justification, Transparency and Reasons to Defer -- C. Deference Embedded: The Artificial Division between Policy and Law -- D. Deference in Context: Landlord and Tenant Repossession Cases -- E. Deference, the Subject Matter of Disputes and the Nature of the Rights -- F. Democracy, Human Rights Values and the 'Unity of Public Law' -- IV. Conclusion -- 5 FROM NEED TO 'CHOICE' IN PUBLIC SERVICES: THE BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRIORITISATION DISPUTES -- I. Introduction -- A. From Need to Choice in NHS and Public Authority Services: The Post-welfare Landscape of the United Kingdom -- II. NHS Rationing: The Role of Courts in Disputes over Access to Medical Services -- A. The Limits of Judicial Intervention in Health Care Rationing: R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B (Re B) -- B. NHS Policies under Scrutiny: Legitimate Interventions in Public Administrative Law -- i. Legitimate Expectation: The Meeting of Individual Needs -- ii. Irrational Allocation Policies: Distinguishing Re B -- C. Choice, Socio-economic Entitlements and EU Law: Challenging the Status Quo -- III. Local Authority Resource Allocation Disputes -- IV. Interpreting Local Authority Statutory Duties Post-HRA -- A. Section 17 Children Act 1989: Accommodating Children and their

As NATO commemorated its 75th anniversary this month, the direction of the alliance's posture toward the Arctic region has been called into question. The recent accession of Sweden means that seven of eight of the world's Arctic nations fall under NATO's security umbrella, with Russia being the outlier. While some analysts see the addition of Sweden and Finland as an opportunity for NATO to "increase its footprint" and "deter Russia," the last thing the alliance needs is to scour for another avenue for confrontation with Russia. Sweden and Finland's NATO membership undoubtedly affects the alliance's influence in the Arctic. In March, over 20,000 NATO soldiers from 13 nations, including Finland, Sweden, and the United States, participated in the latest leg of the ongoing Nordic Response 2024 exercise in Norway. Additionally, over 50 frigates, submarines, and other vessels, as well as over 100 aircraft, were involved in the exercise. Ultimately, Nordic Response 2024 will involve over 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO allies. Defensive exercises are a necessary feature of NATO's newly increased Arctic presence, but the Russian threat in the Arctic should not be inflated.The Arctic served as a frontline in the confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Over several decades, Russia has revitalized Soviet-era Arctic bases, which outnumber NATO's by about a third. In recent years, Russia has launched significant investment projects and built up its military presence in the Arctic as it develops a crucial northern maritime route linking Asia and Europe. The United States only has one operational heavy icebreaker — compared to the 40 that Russia currently maintains. Irrespective of hawks sounding the alarm about Russia's supposed "militarization" and "dominance" of the Arctic, Russia retains a relative incapacity to threaten a conventional military land incursion into European Arctic territory. Moscow's military efforts in the Arctic have been mainly defensive in nature as it has established multi-layered anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities around the Kola Peninsula, a fundamental Russian interest. Such developments pose little threat to the United States and its NATO allies, especially as Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. Moreover, given that Russia's Arctic coastline is ten times longer than America's, the "icebreaker gap" is to be expected. Russia's fleet of icebreakers is primarily dedicated to escorting commercial shipping through dangerous polar seas. Otherwise, it performs the same missions as the U.S. Coast Guard: "search and rescue, anti-smuggling, oil spill response, and resupply of remote coastal communities and polar research stations." Regarding force projection capabilities, the American-dominated NATO nuclear submarine fleet outmatches the opposing Northern Fleet of the Russian navy.On top of NATO's military capabilities, the alliance's most influential member, the United States, has placed little military importance on the Arctic. Russia's inability to pose severe threats in the Arctic has led to the region appearing at the bottom of the list in the 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy (NSS) overview of regional policies. In addition, the document lacks any language regarding deterring threats to Arctic allies and partners.Rather than seeing the addition of Finland and Sweden as an opportunity to increase the militarization of the Arctic, NATO should work toward utilizing working groups like the Arctic Council to forge multilateral arrangements to reduce tensions, avoid crises, and mitigate the risks of conflict through an accident or miscalculation. In February, Russia suspended annual payments to the Arctic Council until "real work resumes with the participation of all member countries." Yet, while Russia removed several listed multilateral formats from its official Arctic strategy, it kept the point of "the Arctic Council as the key regional platform coordinating international activities in the region." Thus, Russia doesn't appear poised to form an alternative platform. Tensions are high, and Arctic Council cooperation with Moscow effectively ceased after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Despite this, the Council should refrain from pushing out the largest Arctic player and severing an essential communication channel. Deepening isolation has pushed Russia to look east for partners in the Arctic, namely China. Further ostracization will only incentivize Russia to coordinate more with Beijing in the region. Russia and NATO share an interest in maintaining peace in the Arctic region. A war in such terrain would be extremely costly and difficult for both sides. Furthermore, the Arctic Council has facilitated the improvement of marine safety in the Bering Strait, where the U.S. and Russia share a maritime border. Communication channels and shared objectives must also be kept open to keep the peace there.Amid a worsening situation in Ukraine, escalation in the Arctic region would do no favors for the United States or its NATO allies. Russia's considerable influence in the Arctic is not going to change in the near future. Therefore, taking advantage of existing channels will enable the West to signal to Russia that NATO does not intend to engage in offensive operations but is fully prepared to defend its interests.

UPDATE 3/9: The Pentagon said Friday that the effort to establish a maritime corridor from Cyprus to Gaza and a temporary pier to surge humanitarian aid to Palestinians there would require more than 1,000 U.S. forces between the Army and Navy. DoD spokesman Pat Ryder said the operation will take about 60 days to build out and would include elements of the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) from Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia, plus a mix of other units and ships that have yet to be identified.Biden got much more hearty applause Thursday from repeating his shopworn lines about Vladimir Putin marching from Ukraine and into Europe than for announcing a new port to surge "a massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza."The president had very little to say about foreign policy in this year's State of the Union. While this might be no surprise, the fact he raced through his boilerplate about Putin ("If they think Putin will stop at Ukraine I assure you he will not") and pushing for Ukraine aid ("Ukraine can stop Putin if we stand with Ukraine and provide the weapons that it needs to defend itself") at the beginning of his speech, and didn't get to the other major live war — Israel-Gaza — until nearly the end, was a bit odd.But the reception to both couldn't have been more different, with the latter receiving a more restrained reaction. We can only guess that to the fervidly pro-Israel members of Congress, the idea that the president noted that "this war has taken a greater toll on innocent (Palestinian) civilians than all previous wars in Gaza combined" in the same breath as he spoke about the Israeli hostages and the Oct. 7 attacks was an insult. Conversely, to the members of Congress who have been pushing for a permanent ceasefire, his call for "an immediate ceasefire that would last for at least six weeks," I'm sure sounded weak and stage-managed.As did the idea of the construction of a "temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, war, medicine and temporary shelters … and ensure that humanitarian workers aren't caught in the crossfire."First, to many this smacks of a campaign stunt — even Politico reported Thursday that there are no concrete plans in place and the operation won't, at least for now, include Navy ships actually designed for humanitarian response. As QI's Trita Parsi said to me, "the operation to build a temporary port in Gaza is not only costly and time-consuming — it will take at least 60 days before it can be used to get food in, at which point thousands will already have died by starvation — but it also shows the lengths Biden is willing to go to avoid the most obvious and effective solution: a ceasefire and an end to the war."Biden says "we're not waiting for Israelis" but he seems to be ignoring that the issue hasn't been the amount of aid but the Israelis holding it up at the border and the bombing, shelling, and sniping by Israeli Defense Forces keeping trucks and aid workers from getting to where they have to go once inside. Biden says "no American boots on the ground" yet assures trucks won't be caught "in the crossfire." How does he do that, actually, without security and not "waiting for Israelis" to clear the path? Well, Barak Ravid of Axios reports that Israel apparently "welcomes & fully supports the deployment of a temporary dock to facilitate further humanitarian aid to Gazan civilians. The initiative has been discussed by U.S. and Israeli officials, and will be carried out with full coordination between the two parties."That's where the stagecraft comes in. So this isn't about a president finally dishing out tough love but getting a bone from the Israelis to placate a domestic audience — a pledge that may or may not be fulfilled in reality? Time will tell.But as the SOTU "Stop Sending Bombs" signs solemly held up by Reps. Rashida Tlaib and Cori Bush declared, most of the people there who would welcome a humanitarian surge the most are keenly aware that it is U.S. weaponry causing the brunt of death and destruction inside the strip today, and Biden is unwilling to stop that particular gravy train from rolling in. In fact, he has been sending it all along without Congressional approval.Biden delivered his lines on Gaza expecting rousing appreciation. I'm sure he got what he felt was needed, but to this ear, having heard more excitement Thursday night over Biden's "chipflation" outrage, it was all a bit "low energy." And with good reason.

If Secretary of State Antony Blinken's Wednesday address in Washington is any indication, any hopes that the thousands of freshly dug graves across Ukraine and Russia might be giving rise to introspection or regret that diplomatic overtures could have staved off the war, are bound to be dashed. In a speech titled, "The Power and Purpose of American Diplomacy in a New Era," Blinken set forth a vision of U.S. foreign policy that is both exhaustingly familiar and deeply concerning because it indicates, at the very least, that our chief diplomat has very little understanding of what traditional diplomacy actually means. The sense one takes away from the speech is that Blinken believes it to be analogous to edict, fiat, and ukase.Blinken's conception of diplomacy does accurately reflect one thing: the Biden administration's policy of waging a two-front cold war against the two principal authoritarian powers, China and Russia, as laid out in the 2022 National Security Strategy. Whether, by ratcheting up tensions with the two continental Eurasian powers, the policy has succeeded in making America and its allies in Europe and Asia safer, remains an open question.Blinken, addressing (probably some) future members of the American (and international) foreign policy policy elite at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, noted that the students today are facing a vastly transformed international landscape than when he launched his own career at the dawn of the post Cold War era in the early 1990s.The promise of that era has now passed. According to Blinken:…Decades of relative geopolitical stability have given way to an intensifying competition with authoritarian powers, revisionist powers…Beijing and Moscow are working together to make the world safe for autocracy through their "no limits partnership."Today, he went on, far from the sunlit uplands of the Clinton era, we inhabit a world where " democracies are under threat." And the threat is twofold. Externally there is of course Russia and China. But there is a second threat. And that one is closer to home, one that is emerging "from the inside by elected leaders who exploit resentments and stoke fears; erode independent judiciaries and the media; enrich cronies; crack down on civil society and political opposition." Reading Secretary Blinken's speech, it is hard to believe that there was a time, within Blinken's lifetime even, that Democrats like President John F. Kennedy counseled cooperation, even dialogue and empathy, when turning to deal with one's adversaries. It is indeed, given the party's transformation in recent years, difficult to contemplate there was once a president who asked us to temper our self-regard, cautioning that "no government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue."But no more. Antony Blinken has seen the enemy and it is us (and the Russians and the Chinese, and probably the Hungarians and most definitely the North Koreans, and if they keep heading down the 'wrong' path, Poland might get thrown into the mix, but not yet, not with the war still on.) What to do? The answer is simplicity itself: Permanent vigilance in the service of the "international order." For when "the Beijings and Moscows of the world try to rewrite – or rip down – the pillars of the multilateral system; when they falsely claim that the order exists merely to advance the interests of the West at the expense of the rest – a growing global chorus of nations and people will say, and stand up to say: No, the system you are trying to change is our system; it serves our interests."Sentiments such as these aren't necessarily alarming if they're uttered (and they are) by the kind of students in the audience at SAIS today — after all, they're young and idealistic. What's frightening is that they were uttered without irony by the nation's chief diplomat — even if he is a product, as this one is, of both Harvard and Marty Peretz's New Republic. The bigger problem with Blinken's address, aside from it being both astoundingly naive and self-serving, is that is reveals a mindset unalterably opposed to the practice of actual diplomacy which in turn has led to a disdain both for negotiations and for the concepts of national interests, reciprocity and empathy — all of which had been used to keep the peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the first Cold War. Blithely ripping up that playbook in favor of a maximalist doctrine that seeks to confine into permanent obloquy states that view their own interests differently from those of Washington would seem a mistake. But it's a mistake diplomats from both parties seem intent on making.

Стаття присвячена вивченню спільної зовнішньої політики та політики безпеки на сучасному етапі розвитку Європейського Союзу. У статті проаналізовано ініціативи, направлені на посилення цієї політики останніми роками, а також основні напрямки розвитку цієї політики з точки зору необхідності для ЄС реагувати на сучасні безпекові виклики як глобального, так і регіонального характеру. Основним висновком аналізу є твердження про необхідність трансформації СЗППБ, що включає в себе формування синергії з іншими політиками в рамках спільної зовнішньої політики ЄС та поширення на СЗППБ загальних принципів та підходів, що існують у конституційному порядку ЄС. Зазначений процес розпочався, незважаючи на існуючі обмеження, встановлені правилами Лісабонського договору. ; The article is dedicated to the study of Common Foreign and Security Policy at the contemporary stage of the EU evolution. The article provides the analysis of both initiatives aimed at enhancing this policy, which have already been initiated in recent years and the major directions of the transformation of this policy from the perspective of the necessity for the EU to face the contemporary security challenges at the global and regional level. The article refers to the fact that the European integration process has always had the security dimension as the entire project was started to prevent another war between France and Germany, which had previously been the major reason for two world wars. The EU's enlargement after the end of the Cold war also had the security dimension as this process reconnected the European continent previously divided by the «iron curtain». The fact that the new EU members from the Central and Eastern Europe simultaneously became members of NATO only stresses this approach. Thus, security has been among the major issue in the EU relations with its neighbouring countries and primarily within the framework of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership.However, new security challenges for the EU which appeared in the connection with its attempts to enhance its relations with the neighbouring countries emphasized the need to modernize its common and security policy (CFSP), which remains a separate policy area with its special rules and procedures as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty.The aim of the article is to analyze its Common Foreign and Security Policy at the contemporary stage of the evolution of the European Union. The article focuses on the recent initiatives in terms of the reformation and enhancement of this policy area and on the major directions for the implementation of this policy in the context of the existing global and regional challenges. The task of the article is to provide the insight into the evolution of the CFSP from the perspective of both the initiatives for the reformation of this policy area and the EU's reaction on the faced security challenges of the global and regional scale.The major conclusion of the offered analysis is the thesis about the need for further transformation of CFSP, which includes the formation of the synergy with other policies within EU common foreign policy and the spread for CFSP of the common principles and approaches existing in the constitutional order of the EU. Moreover, the article emphasizes the fact that the mentioned process has already been started, despite the existing limitations set by the rules of the Lisbon Treaty.The Russian aggression in Ukraine, the war in Syria as well as a number of armed conflicts in Northern Africa stressed the growing importance of the security dimension for the EU's future. At the same time, this has led to the enhanced demands of the EU member states for a more energetic EU policy in terms of ensuring international peace and security. Moreover, the enhancement of the CFSP is nowadays considered to be not only as one of the means to promote and protect the EU's values on the international arena but also as an instrument for ensuring strategic autonomy of the EU against the background of the escalating regional and global instability. It should be noted that the enhancement of the CFSP was backed by the European Commission, which should have had other priorities due to the institutional reasons. Among the major initiatives aimed at the enhancement of the CFSP one should stress the start of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the creation of the European Defence Fund. By forming PESCO the EU member-states agreed for the enhanced military cooperation. The goals of this cooperation include the development of the common military capacities, investments in the common defence projects and the readiness to participate in common military operations initiated by decisions of the EU's Council. The article consists of two parts. The first one concentrates on the analysis of the evolution of the CFSP after the Lisbon treaty and on the initiatives aimed at enhancing this policy articulated and debated in the recent years. The second part focuses on the major direction of the evolution of this policy in the context of the EU's practical reaction on the contemporary challenges.

It is significant that two forms of protection exist because some sectors of industry produce a large number of designs for products which are on the market for a very short time. Protection without registration formalities and fees is an advantage. However, there are sectors of industry which value the advantages of registration. These sectors value the possibility of longer term protection more than the shorter term protection provided by an unregistered Community design. One of the important benefits is that unregistered Community design protection does not require any documents, but the owners have to prove the exclusive right belongs to them. Another significant advantage is that an unregistered Community design can be changed to a registered design during the twelve- month grace period from the disclosure. ; kropiwnickamagdalena@wp.pl ; Doctoral student at the Department of Intellectual Property at the Faculty of Law at the University of Białystok. ; University of Białystok, Poland, Department of Intellectual Property at the Faculty of Law ; Brancusi, L. (2012). Wzór wspólnotowy i jego zakres ochrony [Community Design and its Scope of Protection]. Warszawa: C.H. Beck. ; Bulling, A., Langohrig, A. & Hellwig, T. (2004). The Community Design: A New Right of Design Protection for the European Community. Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, (86), 111-133. ; Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 Legislation.gov.ukCouncil ; Christiansen, C. B. (2015). Art. 7 CDR Commentary. In G. Hasselblatt (Ed.) Community Design Regulation. A Commentary. (pp. 119-120). C.H. BECK, Hart, Nomos ; Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, Official Journal L 003 , 05/01/2002, P. 0001 – 0024. ; Derclaye, E. (2013). A Decade of Registered and Unregistered Design Rights Decisions in the UK: What Conclusions Can We Draw for the Future of Both Types of Rights. IP Theory, 2(3), 144-157. ; Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 289, 28 October 1998. ; du Vall, M., Kasprzycki, D., Ożegalska-Trybalska, J., Stanisławska-Kloc, S. & Tischner, A. (2011). Ochrona własności intelektualnej w sektorze odzieżowo-tekstylnym. Poradnik dla mikro, małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw [Intellectual Property Protection in the Clothing and Textile Sector. Guide for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises]. Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Prawa Własności Intelektualnej w Krakowie. ; Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design, Brussel 1991, 111/F/5131/91-EN. ; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 19 June 2014, Case C-345/13, , Karen Millen Fashions Ltd v Dunnes Stores, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2013. ; Judgment of the Court in case H. Gautzsch Großhandel GmbH & Co. KG v Münchener Boulevard Möbel Joseph Duna GmbH, C‑479/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:75. ; Judgment of the Court in Neuman and Others v José Manuel Baena Grupo, C-101/11 P and C-102/11 P, EU:C:2012:641. ; Judgment of the Court in PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, C-281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679. ; Kępiński, J. (2010). Wzór przemysłowy i jego ochrona w prawie polskim i wspólnotowym [Industrial Design and its Protection in Polish and Community Law]. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. ; Legal review on industrial design protection in Europe (2016). Under the contract with the Directorate General Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (MARKT2014/083/D). ; Maier, P., & Schlőtelburg M. (2003), Manual on the European Community Design, Köln: Heymanns, 9-18. ; Nowińska, E., Promińska, U., & du Vall, M. (2015). Prawo własności przemysłowej [Industrial Property Law]. Warszawa: LexisNexis. ; Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in case H. Gautzsch Großhandel GmbH & Co. KG v Münchener Boulevard Möbel Joseph Duna GmbH, C-479/12, 5 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:537. ; Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 2 April 2014, Case C-345/13, Karen Millen Fashions Ltd v Dunnes Stores, ECLI:EU:C:2014:206. ; Poźniak-Niedzielska, M. (2007). Ochrona wzorów przemysłowych w prawie europejskim [Industrial Designs Protection in European Law]. Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, (1), 4-11. ; Poźniak-Niedzielska, M., & Sieńczyło-Chlabicz, J. (2016). Europejskie prawo wzorów przemysłowych [European Industrial Design Law]. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. ; Sieńczyło-Chlabicz, J. (2008). Ochrona niezarejestrowanego wzoru wspólnotowego [Unregistered Community Design Protection]. Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, (2), 10-17. ; Stone D. (2012). European Union Design Law: A Practitioner's Guide, Oxford University Press. ; Szczepanowska-Kozłowska K. (2005). Ochrona wzoru w prawie europejskim [Design Protection in European law]. Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, (5), 30-34. ; Tischner A. (2006). Niezarejestrowany wzór wspólnotowy [Unregistered Community Design]. Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, (7), 36-42. ; Wernicka K. (2008). Nowość i indywidualny charakter wzoru przemysłowego w praktyce Urzędu ds. Harmonizacji Rynku Wewnętrznego [The Novelty and Individual Character of the Industrial Design in the Practice of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market]. Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, (8), 42-48. ; 3 ; 1 ; 81 ; 92

Aim: comparative analysis the dynamics of changes in the indices of expenditures (%) on pharmaceutical provision of population from total health expenditure at the macroeconomic level in Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus (RB) and the countries of the European Union (EU).Materials and methods. The studies used data from the World Health Organization and its Regional Office for Europe, as well as data from the legislative and regulatory framework regulating medical and pharmaceutical activities in Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus and the EU. Historical, analytical-comparative, systemic, logical, graphic, mathematical-statistical methods of scientific search and knowledge were used.Results. It has been established that in the group of reference countries, the expenditures indicator (%) for the pharmaceutical provision of the population from the total spending on health during the period of 1990-2015 fluctuated in a wide range of values. The largest range of values was typical for Belarus (from 3.2 % in 1992 to 29.8 % in 2015), and the smallest for the EU countries (from 16.7 % in 2011 to 18.8 % according to 2003 data). Analyzing the dynamics of changes in this indicator, it was established that there was a tendency towards its decline across the EU and Ukraine, while in Belarus, on the contrary, it was increasing. Thus, in 2015, this indicator increased by 2.5 times, compared with the base data in the 1990 analysis. By the average value in order of magnitude of the indicator that was analyzed, the reference countries were located as follows: Ukraine (10.82 %); RB (14.87 %); EU countries (17.88 %).Conclusions. A significant fluctuation in the values of expenditures (%) allocated for pharmaceutical provision of the population in total health expenditures in the group of countries that were studied was established. In addition, the unstable nature of changes in the indicator that was analyzed in Belarus indicates the need for further research in this direction ; Цель: сравнительный анализ динамики изменений расходов (%) на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения от общих расходов на здравоохранение на макроэкономическом уровне в Украине, Республике Беларусь (РБ) и странах Европейского Союза (ЕС).Материалы и методы. В исследованиях использовались данные Всемирной организации здравоохранения и его Европейского регионального бюро, а также данные законодательно-нормативной базы, регулирующей медицинскую и фармацевтическую деятельность в Украине, РБ и странах ЕС. Использовались исторический, аналитико-сравнительный, системный, логический, графический, математико-статистический методы научного поиска и познания.Результаты исследования. Установлено, что по группе референтных стран показатель расходов (%) на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения от общих расходов на здравоохранение в течение 1990-2015 гг. колебался в широком диапазоне значений. Самый высокий диапазон значений был характерен для Беларуси (от 3,2 % по данным 1992 г. до 29,8 % в 2015 г.), а самый низкий ‒ для стран ЕС (с 16,7 % в 2011 г. до 18,8 % по данным 2003 г.). Анализируя динамику изменений указанного показателя, установлено, что в странах ЕС и в Украине наблюдалась тенденция к его снижению, а в Беларуси, наоборот, к увеличению. Так, в 2015 г. данный показатель увеличился в 2,5 раза по сравнению с данными базового в анализе 1990 г. По среднему значение в порядке увеличения показателя, который анализировался, референтные страны были расположены следующим образом: Украина (10,82 %); РБ (14,87 %); страны ЕС (17,88 %).Выводы. Установлено значительное колебание значений расходов (%), выделяемых на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения в общих расходах на здравоохранение в группе стран, которые исследовались. Кроме этого, нестабильный характер изменений показателя, который анализировался, в Белоруссии указывает на необходимость проведения дальнейших исследований в указанном направлении ; Мета: порівняльний аналіз динаміки змін витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я на макроекономічному рівні в Україні, Республіці Білорусь (РБ) та країнах Європейського Союзу (ЄС).Матеріали і методи. У дослідженнях використовувалися дані Всесвітньої організації охорони здоров'я та його Європейського регіонального бюро, а також дані законодавчо-нормативної бази, що регулює медичну та фармацевтичну діяльність в Україні, РБ та країнах ЄС. Використано історичний, аналітико-порівняльний, системний, логічний, графічний, математико-статистичний методи наукового пошуку та пізнання.Результати дослідження. Встановлено, що по групі референтних країн показник витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я упродовж 1990-2015 рр. коливався у широкому діапазоні значень. Найбільший діапазон значень був характерний для Білорусі (від 3,2 % за даними 1992 р. до 29,8 % у 2015 р.), а найменший ‒ для країн ЄС (з 16,7 % у 2011 р. до 18,8 за даними 2003 р.). Аналізуючи динаміку змін зазначеного показника, встановлено, що по країнах ЄС та в Україні спостерігалась тенденція до його зниження, а в Білорусі, навпаки, до збільшення. Так, у 2015 р. зазначений показник збільшився у 2,5 рази, порівняно з даними базового аналізу 1990 р. За середнім значенням у порядку збільшення показника, що аналізувався, референтні країни були розташовані таким чином: Україна (10,82 %); РБ (14,87 %); країни ЄС (17,88 %).Висновки. Встановлено наявність значних коливань значень витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я по групі країн, що досліджувалися. Крім цього, нестабільний характер змін показника, що досліджувався, насамперед, у Білорусі вказує на необхідність проведення подальших досліджень у зазначеному напрямку

Стаття присвячена вивченню спільної зовнішньої політики та політики безпеки на сучасному етапі розвитку Європейського Союзу. У статті проаналізовано ініціативи, направлені на посилення цієї політики останніми роками, а також основні напрямки розвитку цієї політики з точки зору необхідності для ЄС реагувати на сучасні безпекові виклики як глобального, так і регіонального характеру. Основним висновком аналізу є твердження про необхідність трансформації СЗППБ, що включає в себе формування синергії з іншими політиками в рамках спільної зовнішньої політики ЄС та поширення на СЗППБ загальних принципів та підходів, що існують у конституційному порядку ЄС. Зазначений процес розпочався, незважаючи на існуючі обмеження, встановлені правилами Лісабонського договору. ; The article is dedicated to the study of Common Foreign and Security Policy at the contemporary stage of the EU evolution. The article provides the analysis of both initiatives aimed at enhancing this policy, which have already been initiated in recent years and the major directions of the transformation of this policy from the perspective of the necessity for the EU to face the contemporary security challenges at the global and regional level. The article refers to the fact that the European integration process has always had the security dimension as the entire project was started to prevent another war between France and Germany, which had previously been the major reason for two world wars. The EU's enlargement after the end of the Cold war also had the security dimension as this process reconnected the European continent previously divided by the «iron curtain». The fact that the new EU members from the Central and Eastern Europe simultaneously became members of NATO only stresses this approach. Thus, security has been among the major issue in the EU relations with its neighbouring countries and primarily within the framework of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership.However, new security challenges for the EU which appeared in the connection with its attempts to enhance its relations with the neighbouring countries emphasized the need to modernize its common and security policy (CFSP), which remains a separate policy area with its special rules and procedures as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty.The aim of the article is to analyze its Common Foreign and Security Policy at the contemporary stage of the evolution of the European Union. The article focuses on the recent initiatives in terms of the reformation and enhancement of this policy area and on the major directions for the implementation of this policy in the context of the existing global and regional challenges. The task of the article is to provide the insight into the evolution of the CFSP from the perspective of both the initiatives for the reformation of this policy area and the EU's reaction on the faced security challenges of the global and regional scale.The major conclusion of the offered analysis is the thesis about the need for further transformation of CFSP, which includes the formation of the synergy with other policies within EU common foreign policy and the spread for CFSP of the common principles and approaches existing in the constitutional order of the EU. Moreover, the article emphasizes the fact that the mentioned process has already been started, despite the existing limitations set by the rules of the Lisbon Treaty.The Russian aggression in Ukraine, the war in Syria as well as a number of armed conflicts in Northern Africa stressed the growing importance of the security dimension for the EU's future. At the same time, this has led to the enhanced demands of the EU member states for a more energetic EU policy in terms of ensuring international peace and security. Moreover, the enhancement of the CFSP is nowadays considered to be not only as one of the means to promote and protect the EU's values on the international arena but also as an instrument for ensuring strategic autonomy of the EU against the background of the escalating regional and global instability. It should be noted that the enhancement of the CFSP was backed by the European Commission, which should have had other priorities due to the institutional reasons. Among the major initiatives aimed at the enhancement of the CFSP one should stress the start of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the creation of the European Defence Fund. By forming PESCO the EU member-states agreed for the enhanced military cooperation. The goals of this cooperation include the development of the common military capacities, investments in the common defence projects and the readiness to participate in common military operations initiated by decisions of the EU's Council. The article consists of two parts. The first one concentrates on the analysis of the evolution of the CFSP after the Lisbon treaty and on the initiatives aimed at enhancing this policy articulated and debated in the recent years. The second part focuses on the major direction of the evolution of this policy in the context of the EU's practical reaction on the contemporary challenges.

Aim: comparative analysis the dynamics of changes in the indices of expenditures (%) on pharmaceutical provision of population from total health expenditure at the macroeconomic level in Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus (RB) and the countries of the European Union (EU).Materials and methods. The studies used data from the World Health Organization and its Regional Office for Europe, as well as data from the legislative and regulatory framework regulating medical and pharmaceutical activities in Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus and the EU. Historical, analytical-comparative, systemic, logical, graphic, mathematical-statistical methods of scientific search and knowledge were used.Results. It has been established that in the group of reference countries, the expenditures indicator (%) for the pharmaceutical provision of the population from the total spending on health during the period of 1990-2015 fluctuated in a wide range of values. The largest range of values was typical for Belarus (from 3.2 % in 1992 to 29.8 % in 2015), and the smallest for the EU countries (from 16.7 % in 2011 to 18.8 % according to 2003 data). Analyzing the dynamics of changes in this indicator, it was established that there was a tendency towards its decline across the EU and Ukraine, while in Belarus, on the contrary, it was increasing. Thus, in 2015, this indicator increased by 2.5 times, compared with the base data in the 1990 analysis. By the average value in order of magnitude of the indicator that was analyzed, the reference countries were located as follows: Ukraine (10.82 %); RB (14.87 %); EU countries (17.88 %).Conclusions. A significant fluctuation in the values of expenditures (%) allocated for pharmaceutical provision of the population in total health expenditures in the group of countries that were studied was established. In addition, the unstable nature of changes in the indicator that was analyzed in Belarus indicates the need for further research in this direction ; Цель: сравнительный анализ динамики изменений расходов (%) на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения от общих расходов на здравоохранение на макроэкономическом уровне в Украине, Республике Беларусь (РБ) и странах Европейского Союза (ЕС).Материалы и методы. В исследованиях использовались данные Всемирной организации здравоохранения и его Европейского регионального бюро, а также данные законодательно-нормативной базы, регулирующей медицинскую и фармацевтическую деятельность в Украине, РБ и странах ЕС. Использовались исторический, аналитико-сравнительный, системный, логический, графический, математико-статистический методы научного поиска и познания.Результаты исследования. Установлено, что по группе референтных стран показатель расходов (%) на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения от общих расходов на здравоохранение в течение 1990-2015 гг. колебался в широком диапазоне значений. Самый высокий диапазон значений был характерен для Беларуси (от 3,2 % по данным 1992 г. до 29,8 % в 2015 г.), а самый низкий ‒ для стран ЕС (с 16,7 % в 2011 г. до 18,8 % по данным 2003 г.). Анализируя динамику изменений указанного показателя, установлено, что в странах ЕС и в Украине наблюдалась тенденция к его снижению, а в Беларуси, наоборот, к увеличению. Так, в 2015 г. данный показатель увеличился в 2,5 раза по сравнению с данными базового в анализе 1990 г. По среднему значение в порядке увеличения показателя, который анализировался, референтные страны были расположены следующим образом: Украина (10,82 %); РБ (14,87 %); страны ЕС (17,88 %).Выводы. Установлено значительное колебание значений расходов (%), выделяемых на фармацевтическое обеспечение населения в общих расходах на здравоохранение в группе стран, которые исследовались. Кроме этого, нестабильный характер изменений показателя, который анализировался, в Белоруссии указывает на необходимость проведения дальнейших исследований в указанном направлении ; Мета: порівняльний аналіз динаміки змін витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я на макроекономічному рівні в Україні, Республіці Білорусь (РБ) та країнах Європейського Союзу (ЄС).Матеріали і методи. У дослідженнях використовувалися дані Всесвітньої організації охорони здоров'я та його Європейського регіонального бюро, а також дані законодавчо-нормативної бази, що регулює медичну та фармацевтичну діяльність в Україні, РБ та країнах ЄС. Використано історичний, аналітико-порівняльний, системний, логічний, графічний, математико-статистичний методи наукового пошуку та пізнання.Результати дослідження. Встановлено, що по групі референтних країн показник витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я упродовж 1990-2015 рр. коливався у широкому діапазоні значень. Найбільший діапазон значень був характерний для Білорусі (від 3,2 % за даними 1992 р. до 29,8 % у 2015 р.), а найменший ‒ для країн ЄС (з 16,7 % у 2011 р. до 18,8 за даними 2003 р.). Аналізуючи динаміку змін зазначеного показника, встановлено, що по країнах ЄС та в Україні спостерігалась тенденція до його зниження, а в Білорусі, навпаки, до збільшення. Так, у 2015 р. зазначений показник збільшився у 2,5 рази, порівняно з даними базового аналізу 1990 р. За середнім значенням у порядку збільшення показника, що аналізувався, референтні країни були розташовані таким чином: Україна (10,82 %); РБ (14,87 %); країни ЄС (17,88 %).Висновки. Встановлено наявність значних коливань значень витрат (%) на фармацевтичне забезпечення населення від загальних витрат на охорону здоров'я по групі країн, що досліджувалися. Крім цього, нестабільний характер змін показника, що досліджувався, насамперед, у Білорусі вказує на необхідність проведення подальших досліджень у зазначеному напрямку

Purpose of the article. This article conceptualizes diplomacy in diachronic as a political practice of negotiating peace, trade, and war through standardized communications with other foreign policy actors. It is assumed that although the forms and conditions for the implementation of diplomacy changed over time, the foundations of such interaction were developed in ancient times in numerous and diverse networks of contacts and exchanges not only of large and small proto-states of the world, but also between fractions, parties, aristocratic unions, trading companies. Methodology. Historical-logical and systematic methods of analysis are used to clarify the origins of the phenomenon of diplomacy as a mechanism of "international relations", "external relations", trade of the elite of Axum. The scientific novelty consists in positioning the diplomacy of the Aksumite kingdom as a mechanism for resonating the social dimensions of human existence (spirituality, culture, economic and political interests) of ancient Rome, Byzantium in the synergistic effect of the further development of communications of the East and the West. Conclusions. During its heyday, the kingdom of Aksum was the most prominent and important example of the African proto-power. During this period Aksum kingdom made the greatest contribution to the history of mankind. Facts from the eventful history of Axum, his political and commercial influence, active participation in world politics of that time allow us to speak of the outstanding role of Aksum in world history. Aksum kingdoms' elite had strong ties with the peoples of Tropical Africa, the high civilizations of the Mediterranean, the population of the Nile Valley, South Arabia, the Persian Kingdom (including Mesopotamia), India, Ceylon and other distant countries. The multi-vector policy of the Aksumite elite was a product of a long historical development in conditions that are significantly different from the conditions in which civilizations of Europe and Asia developed. ; Цель исследования. В статье концептуализировано дипломатию в диахронии как политическую практику переговоров по вопросам мира, торговли и войны через стандартизованные коммуникации с другими актерами внешней политики. Предполагается, что хотя формы и условия осуществления дипломатии менялись со временем, однако основы такого взаимодействия были заложены в древние времена в многочисленных и разнообразных сетях контактов и обменов не только больших и малых протогосударств мира, но и между фракциями, партиями, аристократическими союзами, торговыми компаниями. Методология. Историко-логический и системный методы анализа используются для уточнения истоков феномена дипломатии как механизма "международных отношений", "внешних отношения", торговли элиты Аксума. Научная новизна заключается в позиционировании дипломатии Аксумитского королевства как механизма резонанса социальных измерений человеческого бытия (духовность, культура, экономические и политические интересы) древнего Рима, Византии в синергетическом эффекте дальнейшего развития коммуникаций Востока и Запада. Выводы. В период своего расцвета Аксумитское королевство было наиболее ярким и важным примером африканской протогосударственности. В этот период Аксумитское королевство сделало наибольший вклад в историю человечества. Факты из насыщенной событиями истории Аксума, его политическое и коммерческое влияние, активное участие в мировой политике того времени позволяют нам говорить о выдающейся роли Акусума в мировой истории. Элита Аксумитского королевства имела устойчивые связи с народами Тропической Африки, высокими цивилизациями Средиземноморья, населением долины Нила, Южной Аравии, Персидским царством (включая Месопотамию), Индией, Цейлоном и другими дальними странами. Многовекторность политики аксумитскои элиты была результатом длительного исторического развития в условиях, которые в значительной степени отличаются от условий, в которых развивались цивилизации Европы и Азии. ; Мета дослідження. У статті концептуалізовано дипломатію в діахронії як політичну практику переговорів щодо питань миру, торгівлі та війни через стандартизовані комунікації з іншими акторами зовнішньої політики. Передбачається, що хоча форми та умови здійснення дипломатії змінювалися з часом, проте основи такої взаємодії були закладені у давні часи в чисельних та різноманітних мережах контактів та обмінів не тільки великих та малих протодержав світу, але і між фракціями, партіями, аристократичними союзами, торговельними компаніями. Методологія. Історико-логічний і системний методи аналізу використовуються для уточнення витоків феномену дипломатії як механізму "міжнародних відносин", "зовнішніх відносини", торгівлі еліти Аксуму. Наукова новизна полягає в позиціонуванні дипломатії Аксумітського королівства як механізму резонансу соціальних вимірів людського буття (духовність, культура, економічні та політичні інтереси) давнього Риму, Візантії в синергетичному ефекті подальшого розвитку комунікацій Сходу і Заходу. Висновки. В період свого розквіту аксумітське королівство було найбільш яскравим і важливим прикладом африканської протодержавності. У цей період Аксумітське королівство зробило найбільший внесок в історію людства. Факти з насиченої подіями історії Аксума, його політичний та комерційний вплив, активна участь у світовій політиці того часу дозволяють нам говорити про вагому роль Акусуму у світовій історії. Еліта Аксумітського королівства мала стійкі зв'язки з народами Тропічної Африки, високими цивілізаціями Середземномор'я, населенням долини Нілу, Південної Аравії, Перським королівством (включаючи Месопотамію), Індією, Цейлоном та іншими далекими країнами. Багатовекторність політики аксумітської еліти була результатом тривалого історичного розвитку в умовах, які значною мірою відрізняються від умов, в яких розвивалися цивілізації Європи та Азії.

The typical methodology for comparing simulated galaxies with observational surveys is usually to apply a spatial selection to the simulation to mimic the region of interest covered by a comparable observational survey sample. In this work, we compare this approach with a more sophisticated post-processing in which the observational uncertainties and selection effects (photometric, surface gravity and effective temperature) are taken into account. We compare a 'solar neighbourhood analogue' region in a model MilkyWay-like galaxy simulated with RAMSES-CH with fourth release Gaia-ESO survey data. We find that a simple spatial cut alone is insufficient and that the observational uncertainties must be accounted for in the comparison. This is particularly true when the scale of uncertainty is large compared to the dynamic range of the data, e.g. in our comparison, the [Mg/Fe] distribution is affected much more than the more accurately determined [Fe/H] distribution. Despite clear differences in the underlying distributions of elemental abundances between simulation and observation, incorporating scatter to our simulation results to mimic observational uncertainty produces reasonable agreement. The quite complete nature of the Gaia-ESO survey means that the selection function has minimal impact on the distribution of observed age and metal abundances but this would become increasingly more important for surveys with narrower selection functions.© 2017 The Author(s). ; This is based on data products from observations made with ESO Telescopes at the La Silla Paranal Observatory under programme ID 188.B-3002 (the Gaia-ESO Public Spectroscopic Survey). We acknowledge the insightful comments and support provided by our colleagues Stefano Pasetto, Daisuke Kawata, Rob Thacker and Dimitris Stamatellos. We would thank the anonymous referee for a very constructive report of the work presented here. BBT acknowledges the support of STFC through its PhD Studentship Programme (ST/F007701/1). We also acknowledge the generous allocation of resources from the Partnership for Advanced Computing in Europe (PRACE) via the DEISA Extreme Computing Initiative (PRACE-3IP Project RI-312763 and PRACE-4IP Project 653838) and STFC's DiRAC Facility (COSMOS: Galactic Archaeology). CGF acknowledges funding from the European Research Council for the FP7 ERC starting grant project LOCALSTAR and the DiRAC Complexity system, operated by the University of Leicester IT Services, which forms part of the STFC DiRAC HPC Facility (www.dirac.ac.uk). This equipment is funded by BIS National E-Infrastructure capital grant ST/K000373/1 and STFC DiRAC Operations grant ST/K0003259/1. DiRAC is part of the National E-Infrastructure. Continued access to the University of Hull's High Performance Computing Facility ('viper'), the HPC facility at the University of Central Lancashire and the computational facilities at Saint Mary's University are likewise gratefully acknowledged. TB was funded by the project grant 'The New Milky Way' from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation. SGS acknowledges the support by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) (ref: UID/FIS/04434/2013 & PTDC/FIS-AST/7073/2014 & Investigador FCT contract of reference IF/00028/2014) through national funds and by FEDER through COMPETE2020 (ref: POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007672 & POCI-01-0145-FEDER-016880). UH acknowledges support from the Swedish National Space Board (SNSB/Rymdstyrelsen). The Gaia-ESO Survey data products have been processed by the Cambridge Astronomy Survey Unit (CASU) at the Institute of Astronomy, University of Cambridge, and by the FLAMES/UVES reduction team at INAF/Osservatorio Astrofisico di Arcetri. These data have been obtained from the Gaia-ESO Survey Data Archive, prepared and hosted by the Wide Field Astronomy Unit, Institute for Astronomy, University of Edinburgh, which is funded by the UK Science and Technology Facilities Council. This work was partly supported by the European Union FP7 programme through ERC grant number 320360 and by the Leverhulme Trust through grant RPG-2012-541. We acknowledge the support from INAF and Ministero dell' Istruzione, dell' Universita' e della Ricerca (MIUR) in the form of the grant 'Premiale VLT 2012'. The results presented here benefit from discussions held during the Gaia-ESO workshops and conferences supported by the ESF (European Science Foundation) through the GREAT Research Network Programme. MTC acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, through grant AYA2013-40611-P. UH acknowledges support from the Swedish National Space Board (SNSB/Rymdstyrelsen). This work was supported by Sonderforschungsbereich SFB 881 'The Milky Way System' (subprojects A5, C9) of the German Research Foundation (DFG). This work benefited from discussions at GNASH workshop, Victoria supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. PHY-1430152 (JINA Center for the Evolution of the Elements). ARC is supported by Australian Research Council Grant DP160100637