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While a number of answers have been given by election research and electoral sociology why Norway is not a part of the European Union there is still room for alternative perspectives. An important but overlooked reason might be how the Norwegian population sees itself in the European context. Norwegians view themselves as open, small and healthy group, whereas they view Europe as a closed, large and sick entity. This view has not developed overnight, but is an outgrowth of largely historical reasons that date as far back as year 1660 and were strengthened by the events that took place in both the 19th and 20th century. L. Pitkaniemi

Even if Norway has said no to the EU, the country is practically very integrated with the Union via the EEA and the Schengen Agreement. Norwegian intellectuals who oppose the EU view it in general through methodological nationalism, normative nationalism, instrumentalism and neoliberalism. Intellectuals who support the EU come with their own biases, such as an emphasis on cosmopolitanism and a righteous based Europe. The opinion of intellectuals matters a great deal, since the intellectuals reflect the prevailing opinion in the society. In order for the Norwegian EU debate to advance, it would be important for the emphasis to move away from the previously mentioned generalizations. L. Pitkaniemi

A review essay on books by (1) Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe. Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 2008); (2) Ian Bache & Andrew Jordan [Eds], The Europeanization of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006/08). Adapted from the source document.

A review essay on books by (1) Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps. Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); (2) Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unnaccountable Elite (London: Hurst & Co., 2007); (3) Brian Hocking and David Spence [Eds], Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) & (4) Graham Ziegner [Ed], British Diplomacy: Foreign Secretaries Reflect (London: Politico's, 2007).

A review essay on books by (1) Ben Tonra & Thomas Christiansen, Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy (Manchester, UK: Manchester U Press, 2004); (2) Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, & Brian White (Eds), Contemporary European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2004); & (3) Karl Von Wogau (Ed), The Path to European Defence (Antwerpen, Belgium: Maklu, 2004). 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article addresses the problem of welfare gaps in Europe in the context of the planned enlargement of the EU & NATO. In the beginning of 1990s one of the greatest challenges facing the West was the possibility of uncontrolled mass migration from the former Soviet bloc. The Western institutions, the EU & NATO, could meet this challenge by introducing restrictions on the movement of people, but they decided to embark on what could be termed a policy of "institutional migration." They both decided to go east & at the same time formulated clear entry criteria for those who wanted to join them. After a decade of difficult negotiations, Europe will take the next step on 1 May 2004 when 10 new countries will join the European integration project as new members. However, there are some signs that this enlargement can result in the creation of not a united but a more divided Europe, where the principle of solidarity may become a victim of short-sighted political games. The introduction of restrictions on the access to the common labor market to the citizens of the new member states is an unfortunate symbolic signal sent by the old members of the EU & may herald the creation of a Europe of two speeds, a development that may have far-reaching consequences for the future of the whole European integration project that for more than 50 years has secured peace on the continent. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.