International police and other cooperation is a necessity of the modern world and imperative for the survival of human civilization. The goal of cooperation is that states and the international community unite in opposing crime as the greatest peacetime evil in the world. This is particularly in relation to organized crime, terrorism, and corruption and other most serious forms of crime in contemporary society. Cooperation takes place at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Bilateral cooperation mainly has a trans-border character of neighboring countries, while the regional cooperation between states within certain areas such as the SEE region (Western Balkan) or Europe (e.g. Europol). Multilateral cooperation is mainly on a broader level, e.g. in the field of combating terrorism or through universal organizations (e.g. Interpol). International police cooperation in Europe has a long tradition. One part takes place today in this area through the OSCE, with the caveat that this is a global organization that deals with security issues. The Council of Europe is the next organization through which co-operation began in the past and is partly carried out to this day, given that it brings all European countries together (except Belarus). Cooperation is more intensive still throughout the European Union, its forerunners, the current forms of the organization and present mechanisms (EAW- European surrender and arrest warrant).53 The cooperation in the EU, that takes place through Europol as a specialized agency of the Union is especially current, but with minimal operational competencies. In the SEE region, a significant cooperation between countries of the former Yugoslavia and countries in its neighborhood has been achieved. This cooperation is not only based on bilateral and multilateral acts, but primarily regional documents of which the most important are the International Convention on Police Cooperation in SEE and SELEC Convention. According to these and other acts, all the countries in the region have taken part in regional cooperation, since the fight against crime is the common interest of all. This applies in particular to organized crime, terrorism, corruption and other most serious forms of crime. Extremely important shapes, forms and mechanisms of international police cooperation are: exchange of information, joint investigation teams, joint operational actions, liaison officers, contact points, regional centers for police and customs cooperation, joint police stations and others. To recap, international police cooperation in the world today is an expression of anti-criminal solidarity between states and its prospects are clear, because the danger of crime is global and requires a harmonized response at the international level.
When in 2007, after the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands, European politicians defined their mandate to work on the Reform Treaty, they explicitly promised that 'the constitutional concept is . abandoned' and that 'the Treaty of European Union and Treaty on Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character.' In its Maastricht and Lisbon decisions, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the European Union did not have a constitution since it did not have demos. The main purpose of this article is to prove the opposite. Accepting Weiler's argumentation that the EU is a political messianic venture par excellence, the author claims that, in addition to pursuing messianic goals, Europe's political elite has for a long time been streaming to root Political Messianism into democracy and position the EU in the global world. The main vehicle to transform the Community/Union from an international to a constitutional legal order has been constitutionalism. Starting from the French revolutionary Declaration, which declared civil rights and in Article 16 proclaimed 'a society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all,' the author has showed that the Union has an antirevolutionary, uncodified and evolutive constitution, whose elements are to be found in the Lisbon Treaty and its related documents, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, and to some extent in the constitutional orders of the Member States. The European constitution does not mirror a national constitution in the sense that it is attributable to the people, nor it is a revolutionary product aimed at limiting the government in the name of individual freedom. It is a rule of law-oriented type of constitution, born in the process of constitutionalization and aimed at submitting public power to law on the Union level. From the perspective of modern constitutionalism, the quality of this constitution is a matter of concern, since it has managed to connect the rule of law with the protection of human rights, but has failed to do the same with regard to democracy. Despite some efforts to entrench the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty, the present crisis in the Union is to a great extent the result of this failure. The fact that democratic defects at the Union level appear less visible when pitted against the state of affairs in national constitutional systems cannot mitigate this failure. Yet, assuming that the EU will survive the present crisis and having in mind that the Union is 'work in progress', the issue which still remains open is whether the future efforts to eliminate the defects of the European Constitution should be tied to traditional ways of thinking about democratic accountability within nation states, or one should stop thinking in terms of a Westphalian nation-state, and accept that transnational systems can provide a cure for democratic failings in ways that differ from traditional postulates of democracy.
This paper show why the standardization of administrative procedure is important for the state legal system that, in the last two decades, the administrative procedure codes were adopted in almost all of the European states. Afterwards author analyzed main driving forces for development of administrative procedural law at the level of the European Union and the Council of Europe. The most important legal sources of European administrative procedural law (basic standards, principles, recommendations and guidelines in this area) are concisely presented but it is clearly indicated that there are certain ambiguities, that these sources don't apply equally to all institutions of the Union, and that they still don't make finished, complete and forever given system that can be automatically transferred to jurisprudence of the member states and candidate countries. Moreover, often administrative process laws of the member states contain rules that are not existing in this kind of regulation at European Union level and that is why the process of adopting the first European Union general law on administrative procedure was initiated, which would further improve the standards of European administrative process in general. When it comes to the general administrative procedure of the Republic of Serbia it has been shown that in spite of the strategic orientation towards the reform of the Law on Administrative Procedure expressed in numerous strategies, our executive authorities in this area have not yet moved beyond the development of the third version of the Draft Law on General administrative Procedure which was afterward adopted by the Government as the Bill. In his final remarks the author concludes stating that the largest number of European standards of administrative process are included in the final version of the Draft, but without eliminating the shortcomings of the existing Law, and without normative adjusting to the circumstances in which the Serbian administration operates, and with unnecessary abandonment of some solutions that have proved to be right in the decades-long practice of administrative authorities.
The main objective of this paper is to determine the level of relevance of the economic development and the level of pollution of thirteen states that joined the European Union (EU) in the last three enlargement rounds (2004, 2007, and 2013), with the length of transitional periods, i.e. the number of regulations that have agreed transitional periods. The initial assumption is that the level of economic development of countries joining the EU and the level of pollution are affecting the length of transitional periods and the number of regulations that are agreed upon transitional periods. Accordingly, the paper points to the level of economic development (measured by GDP) and the level of pollution (emissions measured by CO2/pc and CO2/gdp). All the states are grouped into five regional groups (Mediterranean, Central Europe, the Baltics, South-East Europe and the member states of the former Yugoslavia) . Separate part of the paper analyzes in detail the types of regulations relating to the agreed transitional periods, and the number and length of transitional periods that are contracted by the states of the five groups. For the analysis we used the transitional periods in the field of energy, environment and transport, given their potential importance for CO2 emissions. The final part of the paper analyses perceived relevance between the level of economic development, levels of pollution, the length of transitional periods and the number of regulations that are agreed upon transitional periods.
Based on the experience of former rightist and communist dictatorships in Europe regarding different forms of opposition - both open and hidden within these regimes' structures - the author analyzes the role of the opposition in the process of the sweeping democratic change that has taken place the "new democracies" of Central and Eastern Europe in the direction of the state of law and civil society. His conclusion is, that in today's Central European countries political multi-party pluralism which includes viable parliamentary opposition was given a smooth start and has since taken root. However in the countries with only superficial democracy and an obvious "democratic deficit" - for example Croatia (and Slovakia) - parliamentary opposition plays the second fiddle. The prime movers of the change - and of the democratization as well - are still the ruling parties (not unlike during the communist single-party regimes). Changes occur only when the ruling party or its major fraction opt for them considering them the lesser of two evils, either because they are no longer satisfied with the distribution of power and goods within the existing status quo or because they are aware that it cannot be maintained in its present form. This happened in the Soviet Union , first under Nikita Khruschev and then again under Mihail Gorbachev. Changes, however, when imposed from above get out of hand and backfire against those who have set them off (remember Gorbachev); what emerges is usually a compromise between tbe vestige of the old and the emerging regime. (SOI : PM: S. 92)
The dissolution of the great Soviet empire and the demise of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has undoubtedly been one of the most significant political developments at the turn of the 20th century. Whether this has been brought about by international factors or has been the consequence of the internal cave-in of the system, has been the subject of numerous and extensive analyses. It is obvious that the geostrategic shifts and the completely altered position of the new state (the Russian Federation) have made it necessary to look into the political aspect of the problem. That Russia is not faced with an imminent threat from abroad is certainly an extraordinary change, unprecedented in the long Russian history. This particularly applies to the western Russian borders, which used to be almost continually threatened. Political relations that have been developing between Russia and the West, despite all the obstacles, have been improving and both sides demonstrate a willingness to continue with this trend. (SOI : PM: S. 167)
Mediterranean cooperation is dealt with in the context of the creation of the Euromediterranean zone. The European Union has been developing various modes of cooperation with non-member Mediterranean countries by signing association agreements or cooperation agreements. The new European states, created after the disintegration of former socialist federations demonstrate interest for the Mediterranean cooperation, though they tend to have different attitudes towards it. Their interest is solely based on the fact that the Mediterranean cooperation has not been standardized and that it has a poorly developed institutional framework. To these countries this enables and facilitates to tune in from time to time, when it suits their purposes. Regarding the role of the new states, the author distinguishes between two types of cooperation: (a) autonomous regional cooperation, which is not beneficial for the new states (e.g. those on the Balkans) and (b) occasional, specialized and dispersed cooperation which might attract the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. (SOI : PM: S. 176)
In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.
The author analyzes the position of Croatia following the Dayton accord. These accords have secured the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the consociational principle as stipulated by Arend Lijphart. However, fierce integrational nationalisms still rage in B&H, they spill over into the neighbouring states where they create military and political instability. In Croatia, the populist and vindictive nationalism is on the wane, but not so th original democratic nationalism. The latter is manifested in its twin task: on to join the prestigious union of European states while the other is to go on w the unification of the entire Croatian ethnic corpus. The first brand of nationalism has been trying by hook or by crook to ensure a place for Croatia the Council of Europe in order to escape the trap of a community of Balkan states as envisaged by Eurostrategists and their latest "globally regional European" policy. Thus, the post-Dayton Croatia will be marked by fault-lines and conflicts between these two types of nationalisms; one, pro-European and the other integrational (aimed at bringing together the entire Croatian ethnos). (SOI : PM: S. 149)
Hladni rat je predstavljao rat ideologija bez presedana u istoriji. Nijedan drugi rat, ni pre ni posle ovog višedecenijskog hladnog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, nije bio rat koji se vodio u tolikoj meri u sferi meke moći kao Hladni rat. Odsustvo neposrednog oružanog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza učinilo je da se Hladni rat odvija kao takmičenje u sferi ekonomije, tehnologije i nauke, kao trka u nuklearnom i konvencionalnom naoružanju i kao svemirsko nadmetanje. Pored takmičenja u sferi tvrde moći, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez vodili su intenzivnu bitku u oblasti meke moći. Ovo je bio sukob između američke liberalno-demokratske ideologije i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Svaka od ove dve zemlje težila je tome da ubedi građane one druge zemlje da je njen društveni i ekonomski sistem idealan i da je bolji i pravedniji od sistema njenog glavnog suparnika. Uzrok propasti Sovjetskog Saveza i komunizma u istočnoj Evropi nikada sa sgurnošću neće moći da bude određen. Okolnosti koje su dovele do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine i urušavanja komunizma u Evropi ne mogu se svesti na skup vojnih, političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih činilaca koji su, nezavisno jedni od drugih, doveli do tektonskih promena u međunarodnim odnosima. Svi ovi činioci zajedno, isprepletani u kompleksnu mrežu poluga, učinili su da se Sovjetski Savez uruši i da Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama prepusti ulogu pobednika u Hladnom ratu. Pritom, Amerika nije bila samo vojni i ekonomski pobednik. Amerika je iz Hladnog rata izašla kao moralni i ideološki pobednik. Hladni rat predstavlja temu izuzetno velikog broja radova, ali mali broj tih radova se bavi analizom američko-sovjetskog sukoba u sferi meke moći. Stoga je cilj ovog istraživanja i rada rasvetljavanje, objašnjene i tumačenje poluga meke moći koje su Sjedinjene Američke Države institucionalizovale, pokrenule i upotrebile u ideološkoj borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza u vreme Hladnog rata. Međutim, Sjedinjene Američke Države nisu od svog nastanka u drugoj polovini 18. veka do Hladnog rata osmišljeno primenjivale svoju meku moć. Do Hladnog rata upotreba poluga meke moći bila praksa kojom su se Sjedinjene Američke Države bavile isključivo u vreme učešća u oružanim sukobima. Tek sa Hladnim ratom u Americi se javlja potreba za namenskom i osmišljenom upotrebom poluga meke moći. Odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata Sovjetski Savez je počeo da vrši uticaj na druge zemlje šireći marksističku ideologiju i komunističke ideje. Osim širenja marksističke ideologije Sovjetski Savez je vodio i dobro osmišljenu kampanju protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i američkog načina života. Američka administracija je kao odgovor na sovjetsku spoljnu politiku u periodu od 1946. do 1950. godine stvorila politiku obuzdavanja Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetskog uticaja u svetu svim sredstvima. Ovo je podrazumevalo kako upotrebu poluga tvrde moći tako i primenu poluga meke moći. U to vreme u američkom društvu postojao je konsenzus o upotrebi političkih, vojnih i ekonomskih oruđa u borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza, ali je upotreba poluga meke moći bila predmet duge javne rasprave. Jedna od izuzetno važnih poluga meke moći su državni programi informisanja, odnosno ono što se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama smatra propagandom, a propaganda se od nastanka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do danas smatra nečasnom delatnošću autokratskih režima. Sjedinjene Američke Države su u periodu neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata sprovele zakonske, institucionalne i strukturalne promene koje su omogućile trajno ustanovljavanje poluga meke moći zarad širenja američkih vrednosti, ideja i kulture i zarad ideološke borbe protiv Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Zakoni doneti u to vreme su na snazi i danas i pružaju okvir za mnogobrojne programe i aktivnosti na polju primene poluga meke moći po celom svetu. ; The Cold War was a war without precedent in the history. No war before this prolonged cold conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was waged that much in the realm of soft power as the Cold War. In the absence of an immediate armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conducted as a competition in the areas of economy, technology and science, nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the space race. Besides the competition in the realm of hard power, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued an intensive battle in the realm of soft power. This was a conflict between the American ideology of a liberal democracy and the Soviet Marxist ideology. Each of the two attempted to persuade the citizens of the other country that its social and economic practice was an ideal one, better and more just than the other one. The source of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe will never be fully determined. The circumstances that brought about the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall down of communism in Europe cannot be summarized as an aggregation of military, political, economic and social factors that independently from each other led to the colossal changes in the world order. All of these factors, entangled together in a complex net, caused the implosion of the Soviet Union which left the United States as the winner in the Cold War. Yet, the United States was not only a military and economic victor, it resurfaced as a moral and ideological champion, as well. The Cold Was has been a theme of numerous papers but only a handful of these papers tackled the American-Soviet conflict in the realm of soft power. Thus, the objective of this research and dissertation is to shed the light, explain and construe the instruments of soft power that the United States institutionalized, put into motion and deployed in the ideological battle against Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, since its birth in the 18th century until the Cold War, the United States had not wielded its soft power strategically. Up to the Cold War, the soft power instruments were used exclusively during the times when the United States was involved in an armed conflict. Only in the Cold War, the need for intentional and thoughtful use of soft power instruments emerged. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got set off to exert its influence by diffusing its Marxist ideology and communist values. In addition to spreading its ideology, the Soviet Union led a well-planned campaign against the United States and the American way of life. From 1946 to 1950, in response to the Soviet policy towards the United States, the American administration coined the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet influence in the world. The policy of containment included both the use of the instruments of hard power and of soft power. At that time, there was a consensus in the American society on the use of political, military and economic means in fighting the Soviet Union, while the use of soft power instruments was a subject of a prolonged public discourse. Government information programs, perceived as propaganda in the United States, have always been a very important soft power instrument, and propaganda has been considered by Americans to be a dishonest activity of autocratic governments. In the period right after the Second World War, the United States implemented legislative, institutional and structural changes that allowed for permanent establishment of the soft power instruments. These foreign policy instruments made it possible for the United States government to diffuse American values, ideas and culture and to wage an ideological war against the Soviet Union and its Marxist principles. The acts adopted at that time are in place nowadays, and provide a legal framework for numerous programs and activities in the realm of soft power.
The financial crisis has adversely affected all the countries of the world in the conditions of globalization with different intensity, no matter if it is higher or lower level of development and different economic structures. In the context of globalization in the countries in transition, the banking system was reformed, thus creating a new financial market. The International Monetary Fund has taken an active part in the transition process of Eastern European countries by providing advice and approving financial arrangements. Developed countries of the world have implemented measures of non-standard monetary policy to overcome the global financial crisis. In some parts of Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to the general corporate identity (bank name, abbreviated name, trademark and slogan of the bank), the countries also applied qualitative features of the bank's corporate identity (image, reputation and goodwill). As they enter the 21st century, banks in developed countries are increasingly emphasizing the corporate culture and style of business of the bank. In the practice of banks, the following performances are most often present: financial, marketing, performance management, employee performance, business philosophy, reputation and the image of the bank. The banks' performance analysis included 13 Central and Eastern European countries divided into three groups. Performance over the period 2008-2018 is analyzed, related to: share of total assets in GDP, share of total loans in GDP, share of total deposit in GDP and level of capital adequacy of Central and Eastern European countries. The analysis shows that the central banks of the countries of Central Europe are dominant, and that in certain performances they are approached by the banks of the countries of Eastern Europe (members of the European Union and the Western Balkans). ; Finansijska kriza je negativno uticala na sve zemlje sveta u uslovima globalizacije sa različitim intezitetom, bez razlike da li se radi o višem ili nižem nivou razvijenosti i različitim privrednim strukturama. U uslovima globalizacije u zemljama u tranziciji izvršena je reforma bankarskog sistema i na taj način je započeto stvaranje novog finansijskog tržišta. Međunarodni monetarni fond uzeo je aktivno učešće u procesu tranzicije zemalja istočne Evrope pružanjem saveta i odobravanjem finansijskih aranžmana. Razvijene zemlje sveta su radi prevazilaženja svetske finansijske krize primenile mere nestandardne monetarne politike.Zemlje centralne i istočne Evrope su u određenom delu pored opšteg korporativnog identiteta (naziv banke, skraćenog imena, zaštitnog znaka i slogana banke) primenjivale i kvalitativna obeležja korporativnog identiteta (imidž, reputacije i gudvila) banke. Ulaskom u 21. vek banke razvijenih zemalja sve više stavljaju naglasak na korporativnu kulturu i stil poslovanja banke. U praksi banaka najčešće su prisutne sledeće performanse: finansijske, marketing, menadžment performanse, performanse zaposlenih, poslovne filozofije, ugleda, reputacije i imidža banke. Analiza performansi banaka obuhvatila je 13 zemalja centralne i istočne Evrope podeljenih u tri grupe. Analizirane su performanse u vremenskom periodu od 2008-2018. godine koje se odnose na: učešće ukupne aktive u BDP-u, učešće ukupnih kredita u BDP-u, učešće ukupnog depozita u BDP-u i nivo adekvatnosti kapitala zemalja centralne i istočne Evrope. Analiza pokazuje da su dominantne banke zemalja centralne Evrope, a da se njima u određenim performansama približavaju banke zemalja istočne Evrope (članice Evropske Unije i zapadnog Balkana).
