Suchergebnisse
Filter
309 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
MORTALIDAD EN EDADES REPRODUCTIVAS. ARGENTINA, 2005-2020
In: Chakiñan: revista de ciencias sociales y humanidades, Heft 20, S. 142-159
ISSN: 2550-6722
Resulta significativo el cuidado de la salud de las personas en edades reproductivas, pues mantienen la capacidad productiva de las poblaciones y sostienen financieramente sus sistemas de seguridad social. El objetivo fue indagar respecto a este cuidado en Argentina en el período 2005-2020 mediante el análisis de las tendencias de la mortalidad. Interesó especialmente estimar la participación relativa de las muertes evitables en total de muertes contabilizadas anualmente, su composición según causas específicas y su dinámica según sexo. Se trabajó con una metodología cuantitativa y descriptiva basada en el cálculo de tasas específicas de mortalidad para la población de 15 a 44 años, y el análisis de regresión joinpoint para evaluar su tendencia temporal, con base en información oficial. Los resultados mostraron un predominio de causas evitables en el total de muertes relevadas, pero mayormente en hombres (principalmente, evitables por prevención). Entre estos últimos, la tasa de mortalidad evitable descendió significativamente y en las mujeres no varió. Asimismo, se observaron reducciones significativas de las tasas de mortalidad por enfermedades infecciosas y parasitarias, enfermedades del sistema circulatorio y accidentes. Como contrapartida, se incrementaron significativamente las tasas de mortalidad por enfermedades respiratorias, tumores (en mujeres) y eventos de intención no determinada.
Ruslands strategi i Arktis ; Russia's Strategy in the Arctic
In: Staun , J M 2015 ' Ruslands strategi i Arktis ' Forsvarsakademiets Forlag .
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
BASE
Juhlajulkaisu Pekka Vihervuori: 1950 - 25/8 - 2020
In: Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja
In: C-sarja N:o 44
Grenz\Raum: dänisch-deutsche Geschichte(n), 1920-2020
Sekretatiatet för selektivt fiske : rapportering av 2020 års verksamhet
Under 2020 genomförde sekretariatet för selektivt fiske, vid institutionen för akvatiska resurser (SLU Aqua) tillsammans med svenskt yrkesfiske, 2 projekt inom ramen för regeringens satsning på selektivt fiske. Den övergripande målsättningen för alla projekt inom selektivt fiske är att underlätta införandet av den landningsskyldighet som sedan 2015 införts i och med reformen av EU:s gemensamma fiskeripolitik, samt att utveckla mer skonsamma och rovdjursäkra fiskemetoder. Projekten syftade därför till att minska oönskad fångst i svenskt fiske antingen genom att utveckla befintliga fiskemetoder (framförallt inom trålfiske) eller genom att utveckla alternativa fiskemetoder (främst passiva redskap såsom fällor och burar), eller att minska bottenpåverkan vid trålfiske. De tre projekt som utfördes under 2020 var: 1. "Ökad användning av utvecklade redskap" (HaV Dnr 2215-2019) – Kapitel 2 2. "Redskapsutveckling för fiske efter skrubbskädda i Östersjön" (HaV Dnr 808-2020) – Kapitel 3 3. "Utveckling av riktat hållbart skrubbskäddefiske i Östersjön" (HaV Dnr 2776-2020) – Kapitel 4 Projekten genomfördes genom att projektförslag togs fram gemensamt av SLU Aqua och näringen utifrån fiskets uttryckliga behov och idéer. Projektförslagen prioriterades och beslutades av en särskild styrgrupp på Havs- och vattenmyndigheten (HaV) där HaV och Jordbruksverket beslutar, varefter SLU Aqua upphandlade utförare och agerade projektledare. Vinnande part ansvarade sedan för att anskaffa och utveckla respektive projektidé enligt projektplanen med stöd från sekretariatet. Projektet "Ökad användning av utvecklade redskap" togs dock fram gemensamt av näringens producentorganisationer Havs- och kustfiskarnas producentorganisation (HKPO) och Sveriges fiskares producentorganisation (SFPO), Havs och vattenmyndigheten, Jordbruksverket samt SLU som en följd av ytterst begränsat upptag i praktiskt fiske av tidigare utvecklade och utvärderade redskap inom ramen för sekretariatets arbete.
BASE
Den nye mannen : Statlig maskulinitetspolitik i Sverige från 1980-talet till 2020-talet ; The New Man : National Masculinity Policy in Sweden 1980–2020
The purpose of the dissertation is to analyze the institutionalization of national masculinity policy in Sweden, focusing on idea and policy development regarding the issue of men and gender equality from the 1980s until the 2020s. Swedish national masculinity policy can be characterized as a delimitable area within gender equality policy that is specifically focused on promoting the development of gender equal men. The dissertation shows Sweden as pioneering in regard to this institutional invention promoting "the new man" and as active in disseminating these ambitions internationally. The main material consists of reports from Swedish governmental working groups and inquiries on men and gender equality during the period, as well as the gender equality policy bills and written communications submitted by the Swedish government to parliament. A methodological approach for an ideational policy analysis in historical perspective is outlined to study the institutionalization process of this policy area over time. The dissertation analyzes the discursive framework that the issue of men and gender equality has been embedded in, how the issue has been addressed at the political level, how it has been problematized in the working groups and inquiries, and finally formally institutionalized by the government. Based on Carol Bacchi's method for policy analysis, the dissertation shows how policy problems regarding men and gender equality have been constructed and represented in different ways during the institutionalization process and what the discursive effects of different policy representations have been. In comparison to previous research on masculinity politics in various men's groups or social movements, the dissertation shows the need to analyze "national masculinity policy" in relation to institutional factors and frameworks. The development of national masculinity policy is discussed in relation to theories of institutional change. The dissertation shows how ideas about men and gender equality that have been developed in research, social movements, and public debate have influenced politics, confirming the assumptions in feminist institutional research that emphasize the importance of ideas for institutional change. This development is described in terms of idea-based incremental institutional change. The dissertation also points to the importance of actors in problem representation processes, using the concept of interpretive repertoire to highlight how the actors who participated in the governmental inquiries on men and gender equality balanced the different perspectives found in their contexts (ideas in public debate, research, and policy). In other words, the dissertation studies the path from idea to formal institution when it comes to the question of the new man in Sweden.
BASE
Osäkerhetens politik i praktiken : Presidentvalet 2020 som förändrade Belarus
Up until 2020 Aleksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime had ruled Belarus for 26 years without major challenges. Thus, the popular mobilization that took shape in connection with the August 2020 presidential election came as a surprise. It was not the first time that elections in Belarus were not fair – but it was the first time that large sectors of the population reacted openly. Six months later, Belarusians all over the country were still contesting the falsified results. What contributed to this mobilization and politicization of a previously largely apolitical society? Why does that development represent such a serious threat to the authoritarian system? This study sees the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath as illustrating the 'politics of uncertainty' of electoral authoritarian regimes. Because of the intrinsic insecurity of authoritarian systems, all regular elections in that context entail risks, which in theory might lead to change. In Belarus, the emergence of latent threats to the regime's legitimacy in the form of social cleavages and an economic crisis, combined with the fundamental dynamics of the 'election game', amplified this instability. The election served as the starting point for a process of transformation that became the most serious threat ever faced by the Lukashenka regime.
BASE
When Europe negotiates: from Europe agreements to eastern enlargement?
In: Licentiatserien 1997,3
Checkpoint 2020: människor, gränser och visioner i Öresundsbrons tid
In: Centrum för Öresundsstudier 40
Öresundsbron fyller 20 år! Vad har hänt under dessa år? Och vart är vi på väg? Danska och svenska forskare, analytiker och journalister ger i denna antologi en aktuell bild av brons betydelse och utvecklingen i regionen. Gräns- och id-kontroller, pendling och ett förändrat politiskt samarbete har präglat bilden under de senaste åren, men vad betyder detta i ett större sammanhang och hur kan det tolkas? Coronapandemin som fått stor påverkan på Öresundsregionen utbröt under slutarbetet med denna bok våren 2020 och kommenteras kort. Dessutom möter vi den danska tonåringen som går på skategymnasium i Malmö, forskaren som gått från att demonstrera mot bron till att hylla regionen, författaren som utforskat sin transidentitet i Köpenhamn och en rad andra personer som lever och verkar omkring Öresund. I sex essäer utvecklar forskarna sin syn på hur Öresundsbron utgör en gräns mellan två länder och inte bara en fast förbindelse samt hur den nya benämningen Greater Copenhagen anknyter till bron och berättelsen om Öresundsregionen. De undersöker hur bron skapar nya mönster för tillgänglighet, urbanisering och geografisk olikhet och hur en till synes vanlig tv-serie lyckades förnya och fördjupa brons symbolkraft. Vidare får vi ta del av hur bron är en projektionsyta för olika slags engagemang och identiteter som kan vara både lokala och kosmopolitiska. I den avslutande essän ställs den kritiska frågan huruvida Öresundsbron som vi känner den i dag är ett tecken på en ny tid och modernitet med förankring i den djupa nationalstaten. En inledning och en epilog ramar in de sex forskaressäerna, samt ett rikt urval av röster och reflektioner om bron och regionen. Längre intervjuer med människor som rör sig i den dansk-svenska gränsregionen varvas med kommentarer från makthavare och allmänhet. Tillsammans bidrar de olika inslagen till en komplex bild av Öresundsbrons betydelse
Sveriges framtida befolkning 2003 - 2020: Svensk och utländsk bakgrund
In: Demografiska rapporter 2003,5
Forest owner motivations and attitudes towards supplying biomass for energy in Europe
The European Commission expects the use of biomass for energy in the EU to increase significantly between 2010 and 2020 to meet a legally binding target to cover at least 20% of EU's total energy use from renewable sources in 2020. According to estimates made by the member states of the EU, the direct supply of biomass from forests is expected to increase by 45% on a volume basis between 2006 and 2020 in response to increasing demand (Beurskens LWM, Hekkenberg M, Vethman P. Renewable energy projections as published in the national renewable energy action plans of the European Member states. ECN and EEA; 2011. http://https://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2010/e10069.pdf [accessed 25.04.2014]; Dees M, Yousef A, Ermert J. Analysis of the quantitative tables of the national renewable energy action plans prepared by the 27 European Union Member States in 2010. BEE working paper D7.2. Biomass Energy Europe project. FELIS Department of Remote Sensing and landscape information Systems, University of Freiburg, Germany; 2011). Our aims were to test the hypotheses that European private forest owners' attitudes towards supplying woody biomass for energy (1) can be explained by their responses to changes in prices and markets and (2) are positive so that the forest biomass share of the EU 2020 renewable energy target can be met. Based on survey data collected in 2010 from 800 private forest owners in Sweden, Germany and Portugal our results show that the respondents' attitudes towards supplying woody biomass for energy cannot be explained as direct responses to changes in prices and markets. Our results, furthermore, imply that European private forest owners cannot be expected to supply the requested amounts of woody biomass for energy to meet the forest biomass share of the EU 2020 renewable energy target, at least if stemwood is to play the important role as studies by Verkerk PJ, Anttila P, Eggers J, Lindner M, Asikainen A. The realisable potential supply of woody biomass from forests in the European Union. For Ecol Manag 2011;261: 2007-2015, UNECE and FAO. The European forest sector outlook study,II 2010-2030. United Nations, New York and Geneva; 2011 [abbreviated to EFSOS II] and Elbersen B, Staritsky I, Hengeveld G, Schelhaas MJ, Naeff H, Bottcher H. Atlas of EU biomass potentials; 2012. Available from: http://www.biomassfutures.eu [accessed 14.10.2013] suggest. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
BASE