Suchergebnisse

In March 2010, the Europe 2020 strategy was released as the follow-up to the very ambitious Lisbon Strategy. Like its predecessor, the strategy aims to increase Europe's competitiveness in the world economy. Also like its predecessor, Europe 2020 is likely to be ineffectual. The strategy focuses too much on areas that are outside the EU's legal competence, it lacks recourse for non-compliance and it contains goals that have very little to do with increasing competitiveness. The probable failure of Europe 2020 could have been avoided had the European Commission focused on policy areas over which the EU has competence, and had been given the tools to accomplish the goals that were outside its competence.

This study deals with the European Commission Communication Europe 2020, which was a direct result of the global economic crisis that began in 2007-2008. The focus is to explore how the Commission gained an extended role as political entrepreneur by launching the Europe 2020 Strategy and turning crisis into a window of opportunity. Europe 2020 was a Commission initiative to deal with the crisis by promoting smart, sustainable and socially inclusive development beyond the narrow scope of economic growth. The Commission addressed the economic crisis as an existential threat to European economy, but also to wealth, health integration and stability. It is argued that the crisis management of the Commission, was, in times of weakened member-state capacities, a result of political entrepreneurship.

In March 2010, the European Commission launched the Europe 2020 strategy 'for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' in the EU. Education is a major pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy due to its long-run impact on economic growth, productivity, and social cohesion. The Europe 2020 strategy established two headline targets on early leavers from education and training and tertiary educational attainment at the EU level. This paper attempts to assess the Europe 2020 strategy for the education pillar in terms of convergence across countries. Despite the fact that every country in the EU has its own national targets in these two headline indicators, progress on the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy requires convergence. Thus, even if the EU as a whole meets its targets in 2020, the existence of a growing divide between the best and worst performing countries would cast doubt on the prospects of real economic convergence and the sustainability of the process. Our empirical findings reveal the existence of convergence clubs in educational attainment and the early leavers rate, and points towards the idea of multi-speed transitional dynamics in Europe, calling into question the convergence in educational performance in the EU.