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Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Under 2020 genomförde sekretariatet för selektivt fiske, vid institutionen för akvatiska resurser (SLU Aqua) tillsammans med svenskt yrkesfiske, 2 projekt inom ramen för regeringens satsning på selektivt fiske. Den övergripande målsättningen för alla projekt inom selektivt fiske är att underlätta införandet av den landningsskyldighet som sedan 2015 införts i och med reformen av EU:s gemensamma fiskeripolitik, samt att utveckla mer skonsamma och rovdjursäkra fiskemetoder. Projekten syftade därför till att minska oönskad fångst i svenskt fiske antingen genom att utveckla befintliga fiskemetoder (framförallt inom trålfiske) eller genom att utveckla alternativa fiskemetoder (främst passiva redskap såsom fällor och burar), eller att minska bottenpåverkan vid trålfiske. De tre projekt som utfördes under 2020 var: 1. "Ökad användning av utvecklade redskap" (HaV Dnr 2215-2019) – Kapitel 2 2. "Redskapsutveckling för fiske efter skrubbskädda i Östersjön" (HaV Dnr 808-2020) – Kapitel 3 3. "Utveckling av riktat hållbart skrubbskäddefiske i Östersjön" (HaV Dnr 2776-2020) – Kapitel 4 Projekten genomfördes genom att projektförslag togs fram gemensamt av SLU Aqua och näringen utifrån fiskets uttryckliga behov och idéer. Projektförslagen prioriterades och beslutades av en särskild styrgrupp på Havs- och vattenmyndigheten (HaV) där HaV och Jordbruksverket beslutar, varefter SLU Aqua upphandlade utförare och agerade projektledare. Vinnande part ansvarade sedan för att anskaffa och utveckla respektive projektidé enligt projektplanen med stöd från sekretariatet. Projektet "Ökad användning av utvecklade redskap" togs dock fram gemensamt av näringens producentorganisationer Havs- och kustfiskarnas producentorganisation (HKPO) och Sveriges fiskares producentorganisation (SFPO), Havs och vattenmyndigheten, Jordbruksverket samt SLU som en följd av ytterst begränsat upptag i praktiskt fiske av tidigare utvecklade och utvärderade redskap inom ramen för sekretariatets arbete.

The purpose of the dissertation is to analyze the institutionalization of national masculinity policy in Sweden, focusing on idea and policy development regarding the issue of men and gender equality from the 1980s until the 2020s. Swedish national masculinity policy can be characterized as a delimitable area within gender equality policy that is specifically focused on promoting the development of gender equal men. The dissertation shows Sweden as pioneering in regard to this institutional invention promoting "the new man" and as active in disseminating these ambitions internationally. The main material consists of reports from Swedish governmental working groups and inquiries on men and gender equality during the period, as well as the gender equality policy bills and written communications submitted by the Swedish government to parliament. A methodological approach for an ideational policy analysis in historical perspective is outlined to study the institutionalization process of this policy area over time. The dissertation analyzes the discursive framework that the issue of men and gender equality has been embedded in, how the issue has been addressed at the political level, how it has been problematized in the working groups and inquiries, and finally formally institutionalized by the government. Based on Carol Bacchi's method for policy analysis, the dissertation shows how policy problems regarding men and gender equality have been constructed and represented in different ways during the institutionalization process and what the discursive effects of different policy representations have been. In comparison to previous research on masculinity politics in various men's groups or social movements, the dissertation shows the need to analyze "national masculinity policy" in relation to institutional factors and frameworks. The development of national masculinity policy is discussed in relation to theories of institutional change. The dissertation shows how ideas about men and gender equality that have been developed in research, social movements, and public debate have influenced politics, confirming the assumptions in feminist institutional research that emphasize the importance of ideas for institutional change. This development is described in terms of idea-based incremental institutional change. The dissertation also points to the importance of actors in problem representation processes, using the concept of interpretive repertoire to highlight how the actors who participated in the governmental inquiries on men and gender equality balanced the different perspectives found in their contexts (ideas in public debate, research, and policy). In other words, the dissertation studies the path from idea to formal institution when it comes to the question of the new man in Sweden.

Up until 2020 Aleksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime had ruled Belarus for 26 years without major challenges. Thus, the popular mobilization that took shape in connection with the August 2020 presidential election came as a surprise. It was not the first time that elections in Belarus were not fair – but it was the first time that large sectors of the population reacted openly. Six months later, Belarusians all over the country were still contesting the falsified results. What contributed to this mobilization and politicization of a previously largely apolitical society? Why does that development represent such a serious threat to the authoritarian system? This study sees the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath as illustrating the 'politics of uncertainty' of electoral authoritarian regimes. Because of the intrinsic insecurity of authoritarian systems, all regular elections in that context entail risks, which in theory might lead to change. In Belarus, the emergence of latent threats to the regime's legitimacy in the form of social cleavages and an economic crisis, combined with the fundamental dynamics of the 'election game', amplified this instability. The election served as the starting point for a process of transformation that became the most serious threat ever faced by the Lukashenka regime.

The European Commission expects the use of biomass for energy in the EU to increase significantly between 2010 and 2020 to meet a legally binding target to cover at least 20% of EU's total energy use from renewable sources in 2020. According to estimates made by the member states of the EU, the direct supply of biomass from forests is expected to increase by 45% on a volume basis between 2006 and 2020 in response to increasing demand (Beurskens LWM, Hekkenberg M, Vethman P. Renewable energy projections as published in the national renewable energy action plans of the European Member states. ECN and EEA; 2011. http://https://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2010/e10069.pdf [accessed 25.04.2014]; Dees M, Yousef A, Ermert J. Analysis of the quantitative tables of the national renewable energy action plans prepared by the 27 European Union Member States in 2010. BEE working paper D7.2. Biomass Energy Europe project. FELIS Department of Remote Sensing and landscape information Systems, University of Freiburg, Germany; 2011). Our aims were to test the hypotheses that European private forest owners' attitudes towards supplying woody biomass for energy (1) can be explained by their responses to changes in prices and markets and (2) are positive so that the forest biomass share of the EU 2020 renewable energy target can be met. Based on survey data collected in 2010 from 800 private forest owners in Sweden, Germany and Portugal our results show that the respondents' attitudes towards supplying woody biomass for energy cannot be explained as direct responses to changes in prices and markets. Our results, furthermore, imply that European private forest owners cannot be expected to supply the requested amounts of woody biomass for energy to meet the forest biomass share of the EU 2020 renewable energy target, at least if stemwood is to play the important role as studies by Verkerk PJ, Anttila P, Eggers J, Lindner M, Asikainen A. The realisable potential supply of woody biomass from forests in the European Union. For Ecol Manag 2011;261: 2007-2015, UNECE and FAO. The European forest sector outlook study,II 2010-2030. United Nations, New York and Geneva; 2011 [abbreviated to EFSOS II] and Elbersen B, Staritsky I, Hengeveld G, Schelhaas MJ, Naeff H, Bottcher H. Atlas of EU biomass potentials; 2012. Available from: http://www.biomassfutures.eu [accessed 14.10.2013] suggest. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In this report we aim to analyse the economic and environmental impacts of Pillar I direct payments, and to demonstrate alternative instruments that are better suited to achieve CAP objectives. The instruments—a targeted payment to land at risk of abandonment and a tax on mineral fertilisers—were selected on the basis of the Polluter Pays and Provider Gets Principles. We do this using two state‐of‐the‐art agricultural economic simulation models. The first model, CAPRI, is used to quantify the large‐scale or aggregate impacts for individual countries, the EU and the world. The other model, AgriPoliS, is used to quantify the fine‐scale or farm and field level impacts in a selection of contrasting agricultural regions, to consider the potential influence of the large spatial variability in agricultural and environmental conditions across the EU. The results show that direct payments are keeping more farms in the sector and more land in agricultural use than would otherwise be the case, and thus avoiding land abandonment, principally in marginal regions. Particularly the area of grassland is substantially higher, because it is generally less productive than arable land and hence more dependent on direct payments for keeping it in agricultural use. The magnitudes of the impacts of direct payments on land use therefore vary strongly across regions due to spatial variability in productivity: marginal regions with large areas of less productive land are heavily influenced by direct payments, while regions with large areas of relatively productive land are hardly affected, because this land would be farmed in any case. By keeping more farmers in the sector longer, direct payments are slowing structural change, which can hamper agricultural development. However the potential benefits of faster structural change vary considerably among our study regions. In relatively productive regions direct payments are hindering development, because too many farmers are staying in the sector and preventing the consolidation of land in larger farms, which would improve their competitiveness and increase farm profits. On the contrary, the mass departure of farms that is currently avoided, will not lead to the same general benefits in marginal regions. Instead of freed land being absorbed by remaining farms, large areas of relatively unproductive land are abandoned without payments. This land is unprofitable to maintain in agricultural land use, even if integrated into larger farms, because current market prices are too low to motivate farming it. Consequently direct payments pose a serious goal conflict: the avoidance of land abandonment on the one hand, which can have negative impacts on public goods, and restricting agricultural development on the other hand. Once again this goal conflict is rooted in the spatial variability of agricultural conditions in the EU. Maintaining extensively managed farmland, particularly semi‐natural pastures, is central for conservation of biodiversity and preservation of the cultural landscape. Therefore direct payments are contributing to the provisioning of these public goods, but principally in marginal areas. Further, abandonment of land can reduce its agricultural productivity due to erosion or afforestation. Thus, direct payments are contributing to food security by preserving the productive potential of land for the future, but only marginal land since relatively productive land is farmed in any case. Production of agricultural commodities is affected to a lesser degree by direct payments than land use per se. Nevertheless, food exports from the EU are higher and imports lower as a consequence of direct payments. However, the additional supply generated by direct payments also lowers output prices, which reduces the profitability of commodity production; thereby partially offsetting the additional revenues from direct payments. The higher agricultural output brought about by direct payments causes higher levels of environmentally damaging greenhouse‐gas emissions, nutrient surpluses and pesticide use. The higher greenhouse‐gas emissions for the EU are, to some extent, moderated by lower emissions in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the net effect of direct payments is higher global emissions of greenhouse gases. The environmental impacts of higher nutrient surpluses and pesticide inputs are less conclusive, since these depend also on spatial factors, i.e., where the emissions occur. Although EU‐scale and regional emissions are higher due to direct payments, agricultural production is less intensive generally, on account of the lower output prices. Analysing the net effects of these two opposing forces requires additional biophysical modelling at relevant spatial scales, such as watersheds or landscapes, which is beyond the scope of this study. Pillar I direct payments generate a significant transfer of income to farmers and land owners who are not necessarily farmers; 40 billion euro annually. Of this transfer a substantial proportion goes to farmers in relatively productive regions and, further, to a minority of farmers that need them least. In relatively productive regions payments are not needed for continued agricultural production and preservation of farmland, but instead rather fuel higher land and rental prices, which hampers structural change. On the contrary, the need for support is greatest in marginal regions, because some form of payment to marginal land is needed to avoid its abandonment and the loss of associated public goods. Finally, the direct payments even come at the cost of lower market returns for farmers due to slower structural change (smaller and less competitive farms) and lower output prices (due to greater EU output). On the other hand the lower output prices lead to somewhat lower food prices, but at the greater cost of financing the direct payments. Our main conclusion is that Pillar I direct payments are generating serious goal conflicts due to spatial variability in conditions across the EU. On the one hand these payments are contributing to the provisioning of public goods by preserving marginal agricultural land. On the other hand they are hampering agricultural development, primarily in relatively productive regions. Payments to relatively productive land that would be farmed any way not only inflate land values (capitalisation) but also slow structural change, which are both likely to hinder agricultural development and hence the competitiveness of the EU on the global market. The direct payments also increase environmental pressure; by subsidising land use generally and the associated production, they are incapable of controlling environmentally damaging emissions, which is also in conflict with broad CAP objectives. The goal conflict arises because direct payments are universal, a payment principal that does not consider spatial variability in the EU and the associated trade‐offs in regard to development and environmental effectiveness. Our analysis considered two alternative policy instruments that have the potential to curb the identified goal conflicts associated with direct payments, by applying the Polluter Pays and Provider (of public goods) Gets Principles at appropriate spatial scales. Replacing direct payments with a payment targeted on marginal land (and associated public goods) prevents land abandonment at a lower cost, by avoiding payments to relatively productive land that is farmed in any case. This also allows surviving farms in regions with relatively productive land to compensate for lost direct payments through expansion and associated scale economies, as well as higher output prices. This instrument therefore finances the provisioning of public goods without adverse effects on development and the efficiency of agricultural production. The EU‐wide tax on mineral fertiliser demonstrates that this instrument has the potential to reduce nutrient surpluses. Since direct payments cause higher levels of polluting emissions, policy instruments targeting emissions at relevant spatial scales are needed to achieve cost‐effective abatement. Overall we find that Pillar I direct payments are not addressing the diversity of challenges facing European agriculture. In fact our quantitative analysis indicates that the potential for the current system to meet these challenges is seriously impaired by goal conflicts and spatial variability across the EU. A better policy requires that instruments are targeted on desired outcomes and designed according to sound principles, specifically the Polluter Pays and Provider Gets Principles. These principles would ensure that farmers are provided with appropriate incentives to i) generate public goods that otherwise would be underprovided; ii) mitigate environmentally damaging emissions at the lowest possible cost to society; and iii) continually strive to improve environmental performance. Such instruments are also fairer and promote a more competitive or viable agricultural sector by not obstructing structural change and hence agricultural development.

Refined baseline inventories of non-indigenous species (NIS) are set per European Union Member State (MS), in the context of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). The inventories are based on the initial assessment of the MSFD (2012) and the updated data of the European Alien Species Information Network, in collaboration with NIS experts appointed by the MSs. The analysis revealed that a large number of NIS was not reported from the initial assessments. Moreover, several NIS initially listed are currently considered as native in Europe or were proven to be historical misreportings. The refined baseline inventories constitute a milestone for the MSFD Descriptor 2 implementation, providing an improved basis for reporting new NIS introductions, facilitating the MSFD D2 assessment. In addition, the inventories can help MSs in the establishment of monitoring systems of targeted NIS, and foster cooperation on monitoring of NIS across or within shared marine subregions.

This review discusses food safety aspects of importance from a One Health perspective, focusing on Europe. Using examples of food pathogen/food commodity combinations, spread of antimicrobial resistance in the food web and the risk of transmission of zoonotic pathogens in a circular system, it demonstrates how different perspectives are interconnected. The chosen examples all show the complexity of the food system and the necessity of using a One Health approach. Food safety resources should be allocated where they contribute most One Health benefits. Data on occurrence and disease burden and knowledge of source attribution are crucial in assessing costs and benefits of control measures. Future achievements in food safety, public health and welfare will largely be based on how well politicians, researchers, industry, national agencies and other stakeholders manage to collaborate using the One Health approach. It can be concluded that closer cooperation between different disciplines is necessary to avoid silo thinking when addressing important food safety challenges. The importance of this is often mentioned, but more proof of concept is needed by the research community.

This study starts out with the hypothesis that the integration process in Europe is connected to cross-border régionalisation, a process which supports the institutionalization of subnational cross-border cooperation - region-building. Cross-border régionalisation is characterized by the decentralisation of vertical links and enhanced opportunities for horizontal links across state borders. In addition, political integration is expected to have some impact on the cross-border institutional forms that emerge at the subnational level. Three different approaches are utilized in order to establish the empirical connection between political integration and region-building. These are: an analysis of the factors which determine the general pattern of cross-border cooperation in Europe, an analysis of the policy network related to the regional and structural policies of the European Union (EU), and case studies of cooperation in the heartland of Europe, the Regio Basiliensis along the external border of the EU, and the EUREGIO along one of the internal borders. Two institutional factors are found to have a significant impact on the number of subnational cross-border cooperations, EU-membership and centrality. Federal constitution was shown not to be significant. It is suggested that the interaction between actors at different politico- administrative levels creates network relations, which typically bring both private and public actors together. More precisely, region-building is described as the outcome of the interaction which takes place between actors. A closer examination of the emerging policy network shows that community initiatives, the Interreg-programme in particular, improve the prospects for multi­level interaction. The EU plays a crucial role in providing the incentives for cooperation by increasing resource dependency and by establishing direct ties between the European Commission and a large number of subnational actors through partnerships. It appears as if the Commission wishes to demonstrate its capacity to deal with problems relevant to individual citizens. By, in part, bypassing central governments, it seems to increase its own importance vis- à-vis member states. The modus vivendi of cross-border region-building and régionalisation is the degree to which institutional actors at different levels share the same objectives. As shown by the case studies, there is a common interest in cross-border cooperation up to the point were public statues are introduced. Interests seem to coincide as long as the structures and contents of cross-border cooperation do not ultimately challenge the authority of state institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that it seems impossible to give cross-border regions any rights under international law. Functional cooperation, rather than regionalist manifestations of cultural or political unity across borders, constitutes the backbone of region-building. Activities transcending borders are less controversial than those that may contribute to the establishment of new borders. It is concluded that region-building is a process which is embedded in the institutionalization of a multi-level interaction pattern. More favourable multilevel relations have been achieved through the transfer of some authority to the supranational level. This is the main reason why traditional integration theory fails to explain why there is a connection between political integration and cross-border cooperation. ; digitalisering@umu

The purpose of this thesis is to map and assess the organisational and ideological development of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform party, the ELDR. More specifically, it seeks to analyse the degree of integration between the members of the ELDR over time, to identify factors that may or may not generate integration, to relate the development of the ELDR to earlier research about European parties, and finally to contribute to the ongoing debate about whether or not the traditional national party families are about to establish parties at the European level. The thesis is based on the assumption that parties adapt to their environment, in this case, the system of multi-level governance that characterises the European Union. As the European parties are composed of national parties, they are also dependent on the member parties' opportunities and motives for cooperation. If there is integration, we can, however, not only expect the European parties to adapt to their environment. As they become independent actors, they may also influence their environment. In other words, we can anticipate interaction between the European and national levels that leads to mutual adaptation, or Europeanisation. To be able to capture the interaction between the two levels, theories from international relations and comparative politics are combined. Based on interviews, participant observation, documentary research and content analysis of European election manifestos, the analyses shows that the members of the ELDR have over time reached a rather advanced level of integration, both organisationally and ideologically. Although it is possible to identify constraining factors to this development, the ELDR has, at least from what is known from literature, reached about the same level of development as the two other European parties, the Christian democratic EPP and the Social democratic PES. The internal integration of the ELDR is the outcome of a successive transfer of power from the member parties to the ELDR. By now, the ELDR can therefore be defined as a rather independent actor and as a type of party at the European level. This type of party is, however, not comparable to national parties. It is instead adapted to the institutional structure of the European Union, with, at least partly, a different organisation and different functions from those of national parties. ; digitalisering@umu

The EU Renewable Energy Strategy (RES) Directive requires that each member state obtain 20% of its energy supply from renewable sources by 2020. If fully implemented, this implies major changes in institutions, infrastructure, land use, and natural resource flows. This study applies a political geography perspective to explore the transition to renewable energy use in the heating and cooling segment of the Swedish energy system, 1980–2010. The Nordic welfare model, which developed mainly after the Second World War, required relatively uniform, standardized local and regional authorities functioning as implementation agents for national politics. Since 1980, the welfare orientation has gradually been complemented by competition politics promoting technological change, innovation, and entrepreneurship. This combination of welfare state organization and competition politics provided the dynamics necessary for energy transition, which occurred in a semi-public sphere of actors at various geographical scales. However, our analysis, suggest that this was partly an unintended policy outcome, since it was based on a welfare model with no significant energy aims. Our case study suggests that state organization plays a significant role, and that the EU RES Directive implementation will be uneven across Europe, reflecting various welfare models with different institutional pre-requisites for energy transition.

Groundwater monitoring is recommended as a higher-tier option in the regulatory groundwater assessment of crop protection products in the European Union. However, to date little guidance has been provided on the study designs. The SETAC EMAG-Pest GW group (a mixture of regulatory, academic, and industry scientists) was created in 2015 to establish scientific recommendations for conducting such studies. This report provides recommendations for study designs and study procedures made by the Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC) Environmental Monitoring Advisory Group on Pesticides (EMAG-Pest). Because of the need to assess the vulnerability to leaching in both site selection and extrapolating study results, information on assessing vulnerability to leaching is also a major topic in this report. The design of groundwater monitoring studies must consider to which groundwater the groundwater quality standard is applicable and the associated spatial and temporal aspects of its application, the objective of the study, the properties of the active substance and its metabolites, and site characteristics. This limits the applicability of standardised study designs. The effect of the choice of groundwater to which the water quality guideline is applied on study design is illustrated and examples of actual study designs are presented.

The European Commission adopted the European (EU) Forest Strategy in 2021, where forests and forest management practises such as closer-to-nature forestry (CNF) are identified as a key in solving the two crises of climate change and biodiversity loss. This interview study analyses the attitudes of different forest stakeholders towards CNF and their preferred regulation method of it. Seven stakeholders participated in the interviews, representing three stakeholder groups: forest owners, environmental organisations, and industry organisations. Two environmental organisations and one of the forest owners' organisations had their own definition of CNF, which entailed mainly natural regeneration and an avoidance of clear cuts. Their perceived purpose of CNF was the same as that of the EU Forest Strategy, as a forest management method aiming to promote climate change adaptation, biodiversity conservation and timber production. Those who did not have a definition, two of the forest owner's organisations and two industrial organisations, explained that the definitions of CNF varied depending on the purpose of using it. The three organisations that had a definition of CNF, were also in favour of an EU regulation of CNF. The four organisations that were opposed, argued that the conditions across Europe vary too much to have a common regulation. Instead, they preferred market solutions and other ways of reaching the same goals. The results might depend on a larger inclination of believing in legislation if you have a clear definition of it, but also on the attitudes towards legislation varying in general between stakeholder types. During the finalisation of this study, the European Forest Institute released a report with seven principles of CNF, which calls for further research.

This report presents the outcome of the joint work of PhD students and senior researchers working with DNA-based biodiversity assessment approaches with the goal to facilitate others the access to definitions and explanations about novel DNA-based methods. The work was performed during a PhD course (SLU PNS0169) at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) in Uppsala, Sweden. The course was co-organized by the EU COST research network DNAqua-Net and the SLU Research Schools Focus on Soils and Water (FoSW) and Ecology - basics and applications. DNAqua-Net (COST Action CA15219, 2016-2020) is a network connecting researchers, water managers, politicians and other stakeholders with the aim to develop new genetic tools for bioassessment of aquatic ecosystems in Europe and beyond. The PhD course offered a comprehensive overview of the paradigm shift from traditional morphology-based species identification to novel identification approaches based on molecular markers. We covered the use of molecular tools in both basic research and applied use with a focus on aquatic ecosystem assessment, from species collection to the use of diversity in environmental legislation. The focus of the course was on DNA (meta)barcoding and aquatic organisms. The knowledge gained was shared with the general public by creating Wikipedia pages and through this collaborative Open Access publication, co-authored by all course participants.

The objective of this report was to study how some countries work in practice with the ecosystem service concept. The approach chosen was rather broad focusing on green infrastructure planning, development or management including urban, rural and coastal areas at all scales. The countries chosen were Great Britain, Germany and Norway, since this allowed to read documents in the national languages. For each country also the national ecosystem service assessments based in the EU biodiversity strategy to 2020 have been investigated. It can be concluded that the three countries have come differently far in their work to implement the ecosystem service concept in planning practice. Great Britain can be seen as most advanced with comprehensive assessments at national level and regional and local examples which take their point of departure in the ecosystem service concept. The green structure plans of Birmingham and Manchester as well as the work in the South Downs can be pointed out as inspiring examples. In Germany comprehensive assessments at national levels have been carried out in later years. The practical examples found have often a research connection or had not their starting point in the ecosystem services concept, but have been interpreted within its context afterwards. This might be seen as an indication that the implementation of the ecosystem service concept in Germany at regional and local level outside research environments is still limited. Norway has comparable work ongoing regarding the implementation of the ecosystem service concept despite not being member of the EU and thus not been obliged to follow the EU biodiversity strategy. National assessments of ecosystem services have been carried out, partly in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. The number of research environments working with the ecosystem service concept is of course smaller than in the other countries considered here. However, in Norway as in Sweden, there is an ambition to implement the ecosystem service concept within municipal planning. Interestingly, in Norway the ecosystem service concept has also been integrated in the environmental impact assessment legislation. Studying these three countries' approach to work with the ecosystem service concept in practice in relation to green infrastructure has given interesting first insights. To get a more comprehensive and detailed overview further studies would be needed, preferably including site visits and personal contact with research institutes leading in the field as well as meeting local and regional authorities.