Suchergebnisse

In the translated lecture the author tries and answers the question on what ground are we entitled to ascribe "centrality" to Central Europe. He points out that, in contemporary usage, the term "Europe" stands for three different, not overlapping phenomena: geographical, political, and cultural.

Socialism was born out of the belief in the bright future of mankind. Thus, the utopian vision of classless society occupied the minds of the early communist avant-garde. Yet, such hopes did not survive the initial revolutionary enthusiasm. As the social organization of the 'real socialism' turned out to be a rigid bureaucratic system, the visions of the 'bright future' were replaced by the 'picture of the golden age', namely the image of the revolution itself. Accordingly, rituals commemorating the 'founding fathers of socialism' substituted the ritualized commitments to building the 'ideal society of equals'. The ideological content of socialism vanished. Past memories occupied the present. With the breakdown of communism the present could for a moment release itself from the iron grip of the past. The "envelope of the unhistorical" seemed to be open for the deeds of new reformers. Yet, the present could not escape too far. It was almost immediately caught again either by the past or by the future. In the first case, post-communist nationalisms (Brubaker 1996) monopolized the political field; in the second case, the "scientists of the not yet" (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 1-11) disseminated their neoliberal visions of free-market economy. As a result, the present was defined either in terms of national myths going far back to history or by visions to be realized by imitation of the Western model of capitalism. The focus of this paper is the different paths taken by different countries in the region after the collapse of socialism. The paper distinguishes between the 'nationalizing alternative' as one basic direction, and the 'catching up option' as another one. The paper further argues that this dichotomy itself forms around two clusters of several potential stances which could have been taken in the process of transformations. The goal of the paper is to propose a general framework, with the help of which the interactions 'behind' the political decisions taken by political elites in the post-socialist countries ...

In this article the authors describe what forms of political participation, outside the electoral process, the populations of twenty-one European countries tend to employ & to what degree. They identify three types of non-electoral political participation: active-conventional, active-demonstrational, & passive participation. Overall non-electoral political participation is considerably lower in the post-communist & Mediterranean countries than in the Western European & Scandinavian countries. In the latter countries the passive type of political participation is clearly a much stronger form of participation than the other two types. Conversely, in the Mediterranean countries passive participation is weaker & is exceeded in places by the active-conventional type of participation. The Mediterranean area is also notable for the unusually strong presence of the active-demonstrational type of participation. The authors also examine the social micro- & macro-conditions related to these three types of political participation. In conclusion they attempt to address the question of whether there is a connection between political activity & satisfaction with the way democracy works.

One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe? ; One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe?

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.