Suchergebnisse

Le 5 mai 1998, la Fédération de Russie a mis en application la Convention pour la protection des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales. Cependant, on a pu trouver des affaires qui démontrent une incompréhension quant au caractère obligatoire des décisions de la Cour, qui sont parfois prises pour de simples recommandations. Cet article analyse l'application russe de la Convention en étudiant certaines affaires des 15 dernières années. L'article passe en revue les amendements législatifs qui devraient contribuer à la mise en œuvre de la Convention au niveau national. Par ailleurs, cet article analyse la structure législative de la Fédération de Russie par rapport à la Convention, en y incluant la cour constitutionnelle, la cour suprême, la cour commerciale suprême, le procureur général, et le ministère de la Justice. Parmi les problèmes du système législatif russe, on peut inclure la difficulté à mettre en œuvre les jugements de la Cour européenne et la lenteur des procédures. L'article conclut que bien qu'il y ait une vraie reconnaissance de la Convention par la Russie, avec des résultats significatifs, il reste encore de nombreuses lacunes en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre des lois directement issues de la Convention.

U povijesnom razvoju francuskog upravnog suca razlikuje se više vremenskih trenutaka. Prvo je razdoblje od 1974-1989. u kojem se se sudske odluke vrlo rijetko temeljile na odredbama Konvencije. Drugo razdoblje započinje 20. listopada 1989. godine, presudom u predmetu Nicolo. Upravno je sudovanje prihvatilo, nakon spomenute presude, nadzirati usklađenost nacionalnog zakona s Konvencijom. Državni savjet se odvažio u početku oprezno, a poslije sve žešće, provoditi takava nadzor usklađenosti koji ga je doveo do toga da ne samo zabranjuje primjenu zakona zbog suprotnosti s Konvencijom, nego i da osudi državu za naknadu štete koja je proizašla iz takvog zakona, osobito kada je zakonodavac zanemario neke smjernice. U trećem razdoblju Državni savjet, nakon dugo opiranja, uskladio s pravnom praksom suda u Strasbourgu. S druge strane, čini se da ima znatno restriktivniju koncepciju obveze neovisnosti, nepristranosti i propisivanje obveze da sud mora biti reguliran zakonom, kako u sastavu tijela koji sud, kao i u vođenju spora od strane Europskog suda za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. ; In the historical development of the French administrative judge several moments in time have been differentiated. The first period was from 1947-1989 where court decisions were very rarely based on Convention provisions. The second period started October 20, 1989 with the court decision in the Nicolo case. Administrative adjudication process accepted, after the above mentioned decision, to supervise the harmonisation of national law with the Convention. The Government Council carefully dared at the beginning and later more frequently to implement such supervision of harmonisation. This brought about not just forbidding the application of the law due to contrariness to the Convention, but to also to suing the state for damages which occurred from such law, particularly when the legislator ignored some directions. In the third period the Government Council, after much resistance, harmonised with Strasbourg Court legal practise. On the other hand, it seems that it has a significantly more restrictive concept of the obligation of independence, impartiality, and prescribing obligations that the court has to be legally regulated both in system of bodies and in dispute settlement by the European Court for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The reflection about the fundamental rights of entities is not so new as we might be tempted to believe. However, the reflection raises the question by its antithetical. Natural persons appear to be the only beneficiaries of such rights. They were the centre of all doctrinal attention. The intimacy of the relationship between man and the concept of human rights, from which flows the fundamental rights, easily justified the exclusion of entities. The idea of including groups and organizations, which seemed unthinkable will be accepted in fine, indeed will become indispensable to an effective democracy, dear to the European system of human rights and our study. Entities undoubtedly play a vital role in the achievement of a democratic society, particularly through the press or the actions of political parties. They contribute enormously to a country's economy by the actions of commercial enterprises or other businesses, and even to the development and fufillment of individuals through associations whose missions are many and vary. We can not reasonably refuse such a subject of law the protection of the Convention. Beside, it is with the strength of the evidence that these entities have benefited from various provisions of the Convention. Groups for political purposes or unions cannot accomplish peacefully their mission without the protection of Article 11 of the convention enshrining the freedom of association and peaceful protest. Also, entities deprived of exercising the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, as defined in Article I of Additional Protocol No. 1, cannot thrive in an area where the public authority intervains regularly. Safeguarding these rights, with others, is therefore vital for corporations. Decryption of rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the european legislation calls to observe systematically the different movements of European jurisprudence. To do this, our thinking prefers a dogmatic approach, based on the particularity of legal entities to the end of assertaining their rights and ...

The reflection about the fundamental rights of entities is not so new as we might be tempted to believe. However, the reflection raises the question by its antithetical. Natural persons appear to be the only beneficiaries of such rights. They were the centre of all doctrinal attention. The intimacy of the relationship between man and the concept of human rights, from which flows the fundamental rights, easily justified the exclusion of entities. The idea of including groups and organizations, which seemed unthinkable will be accepted in fine, indeed will become indispensable to an effective democracy, dear to the European system of human rights and our study. Entities undoubtedly play a vital role in the achievement of a democratic society, particularly through the press or the actions of political parties. They contribute enormously to a country's economy by the actions of commercial enterprises or other businesses, and even to the development and fufillment of individuals through associations whose missions are many and vary. We can not reasonably refuse such a subject of law the protection of the Convention. Beside, it is with the strength of the evidence that these entities have benefited from various provisions of the Convention. Groups for political purposes or unions cannot accomplish peacefully their mission without the protection of Article 11 of the convention enshrining the freedom of association and peaceful protest. Also, entities deprived of exercising the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, as defined in Article I of Additional Protocol No. 1, cannot thrive in an area where the public authority intervains regularly. Safeguarding these rights, with others, is therefore vital for corporations. Decryption of rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the european legislation calls to observe systematically the different movements of European jurisprudence. To do this, our thinking prefers a dogmatic approach, based on the particularity of legal entities to the end of assertaining their rights and ...

The Protection of the right to education has been the subject of endness debates troughout thepreparatory work on the European Convention of Human Rights. While the idea of a right to educationfor all was quite evident in the mind of the drafters of the European Convention of Human Rights, therespect for religious and philosophical convictions of parents, who come first in the education of theirchildren, has been more controversial. Theses doubts explain the inscription of this right in Article 2 ofthe Protocol to the Convention on 20 March 1952. Its importance mustn't be overlooked. Described asa « matrix right », the right to education contributes to a concrete and effective guarantee of the rightsand freedoms protected by the European Convention of Human Rights. It ensures personal blossomingand the right to make up their own minds. Therefore, everybody can claim this right, whether it be apupil or a student, regardless of the institution (public or private school, primary school or furthereducation). Aware of this key issue to protect a democratic society, the European Court of HumanRights has interpreted article 2 of the Protocol in order to reach a fair balance between the nationalmargin of appreciation and the protection of the right to education. That's the reason why the Courtrequires States to achieve some positive obligations especially to enable everyone to use existingeducation means. Through the guarantee to an equal access of everyone to education institutions, theEuropean Court of Human Rights also encourages national authorities to observe the distinctivefeatures of each individual. In order to do so, the authorities must remain neutral both in educationalinstitutions and their curriculum. No pupil or student must feel excluded or chastised because of hispersonal convictions. Then, securing the universal right to education implies securing the right to apluralistic education. ; La protection du droit à l'instruction a fait l'objet de longues discussions lors des travaux préparatoiresà la ...

As early as 1968, the fifth merits judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established that civil and political rights could generate action obligations on the European States. This judgment was challenging the usual definition of those rights, which were traditionally considered as charging the public authorities with only negative obligations. In contrast, economic, social and cultural rights were positioned as imposing positive obligations on the public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has since created an increasing number of positive obligations and several techniques were developed for this purpose. This study aims to explore the "positive obligations technique", that is to say, the Court's use of the terms "positive obligations" or "positive measures". This technique not only allows the Court judge to impose action obligations on the European States, also recognizes the Court judge's competence to monitor the implementation by the public authorities of its own decisions, to give a horizontal effect to the Convention and to extend the concept of "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This technique also permits to modulate the Court's control over the European States, granting a wide margin of appreciation or reducing it to nothing. The increasing diversification of the use of this technique in European case law is however a source of discrepancy. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the technique of positive obligations is a tool for adaptation of the conventional norma to the changes of the democratic and liberal European States. ; La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a, en 1968, dès son cinquième arrêt au principal, établi que des droits civils et politiques pouvaient générer des obligations d'action à la charge des États. Cette affirmation venait remettre en cause la définition traditionnelle de ces droits. En effet, ils étaient classiquement considérés comme mettant à la charge des États uniquement des obligations négatives. En revanche, les droits économiques ...

As early as 1968, the fifth merits judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established that civil and political rights could generate action obligations on the European States. This judgment was challenging the usual definition of those rights, which were traditionally considered as charging the public authorities with only negative obligations. In contrast, economic, social and cultural rights were positioned as imposing positive obligations on the public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has since created an increasing number of positive obligations and several techniques were developed for this purpose. This study aims to explore the "positive obligations technique", that is to say, the Court's use of the terms "positive obligations" or "positive measures". This technique not only allows the Court judge to impose action obligations on the European States, also recognizes the Court judge's competence to monitor the implementation by the public authorities of its own decisions, to give a horizontal effect to the Convention and to extend the concept of "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This technique also permits to modulate the Court's control over the European States, granting a wide margin of appreciation or reducing it to nothing. The increasing diversification of the use of this technique in European case law is however a source of discrepancy. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the technique of positive obligations is a tool for adaptation of the conventional norma to the changes of the democratic and liberal European States. ; La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a, en 1968, dès son cinquième arrêt au principal, établi que des droits civils et politiques pouvaient générer des obligations d'action à la charge des États. Cette affirmation venait remettre en cause la définition traditionnelle de ces droits. En effet, ils étaient classiquement considérés comme mettant à la charge des États uniquement des obligations négatives. En revanche, les droits économiques ...

As early as 1968, the fifth merits judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established that civil and political rights could generate action obligations on the European States. This judgment was challenging the usual definition of those rights, which were traditionally considered as charging the public authorities with only negative obligations. In contrast, economic, social and cultural rights were positioned as imposing positive obligations on the public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has since created an increasing number of positive obligations and several techniques were developed for this purpose. This study aims to explore the "positive obligations technique", that is to say, the Court's use of the terms "positive obligations" or "positive measures". This technique not only allows the Court judge to impose action obligations on the European States, also recognizes the Court judge's competence to monitor the implementation by the public authorities of its own decisions, to give a horizontal effect to the Convention and to extend the concept of "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This technique also permits to modulate the Court's control over the European States, granting a wide margin of appreciation or reducing it to nothing. The increasing diversification of the use of this technique in European case law is however a source of discrepancy. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the technique of positive obligations is a tool for adaptation of the conventional norma to the changes of the democratic and liberal European States. ; La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a, en 1968, dès son cinquième arrêt au principal, établi que des droits civils et politiques pouvaient générer des obligations d'action à la charge des États. Cette affirmation venait remettre en cause la définition traditionnelle de ces droits. En effet, ils étaient classiquement considérés comme mettant à la charge des États uniquement des obligations négatives. En revanche, les droits économiques ...

The United-Kingdom has, for long, been seen as the home of Liberty. Indeed, it is the first country where historical documents recognized rights and freedoms. However, the decline of the British culture of Liberty during the eighties led to a change of the traditional sources of protection. This change was materialized in the Human Rights Act 1998, which is designed to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. But has this new document succeeded in reviving the spirit of liberty characteristic to the British psyche ? Answering this question requires an assessment of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the effectiveness of the protection of liberty but also its impact on the British Constitution as a whole. The study of the British system enables us to consider the British contribution to the debate on fundamental rights and its significance to the development of constitutionalism. ; Traditionnellement perçu comme le berceau des droits et libertés, le Royaume-Uni est le premier pays à les avoir consacrés dans des documents historiques qui ont posé lesbases de l'histoire politique des droits de l'homme. Pourtant, si cette culture des libertés a pendant longtemps caractérisé le système constitutionnel britannique, le déclin qu'elle a connu au cours des années 1980 a appelé à une modification des modalités traditionnelles de leur protection, qui s'est concrétisée par l'adoption du Human Rights Act 1998. Mais, ce nouvel instrument de protection des droits et ibertés, qui ambitionne de donner davantage d'effets aux droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre juridique britannique, est-il parvenu à relever le défi qui lui était lancé en ravivant l'esprit des libertés propre à la psyché britannique ? La réponse à cette question nécessite d'apprécier les incidences du Human Rights Act 1998, un document à la croisée du droit constitutionnel et du droit conventionnel, non seulement sur l'efficacité de la protection des ...

The United-Kingdom has, for long, been seen as the home of Liberty. Indeed, it is the first country where historical documents recognized rights and freedoms. However, the decline of the British culture of Liberty during the eighties led to a change of the traditional sources of protection. This change was materialized in the Human Rights Act 1998, which is designed to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. But has this new document succeeded in reviving the spirit of liberty characteristic to the British psyche ? Answering this question requires an assessment of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the effectiveness of the protection of liberty but also its impact on the British Constitution as a whole. The study of the British system enables us to consider the British contribution to the debate on fundamental rights and its significance to the development of constitutionalism. ; Traditionnellement perçu comme le berceau des droits et libertés, le Royaume-Uni est le premier pays à les avoir consacrés dans des documents historiques qui ont posé lesbases de l'histoire politique des droits de l'homme. Pourtant, si cette culture des libertés a pendant longtemps caractérisé le système constitutionnel britannique, le déclin qu'elle a connu au cours des années 1980 a appelé à une modification des modalités traditionnelles de leur protection, qui s'est concrétisée par l'adoption du Human Rights Act 1998. Mais, ce nouvel instrument de protection des droits et ibertés, qui ambitionne de donner davantage d'effets aux droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre juridique britannique, est-il parvenu à relever le défi qui lui était lancé en ravivant l'esprit des libertés propre à la psyché britannique ? La réponse à cette question nécessite d'apprécier les incidences du Human Rights Act 1998, un document à la croisée du droit constitutionnel et du droit conventionnel, non seulement sur l'efficacité de la protection des libertés mais, plus largement, sur la Constitution du Royaume-Uni. L'étude du système de protection britannique des droits et libertés, tel qu'il est transformé par le Human Rights Act 1998, est alors l'occasion d'envisager la teneur de la contribution du Royaume-Uni au débat sur la protection des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l'apport de l'expérience britannique au développement du constitutionnalisme.

The United-Kingdom has, for long, been seen as the home of Liberty. Indeed, it is the first country where historical documents recognized rights and freedoms. However, the decline of the British culture of Liberty during the eighties led to a change of the traditional sources of protection. This change was materialized in the Human Rights Act 1998, which is designed to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. But has this new document succeeded in reviving the spirit of liberty characteristic to the British psyche ? Answering this question requires an assessment of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the effectiveness of the protection of liberty but also its impact on the British Constitution as a whole. The study of the British system enables us to consider the British contribution to the debate on fundamental rights and its significance to the development of constitutionalism. ; Traditionnellement perçu comme le berceau des droits et libertés, le Royaume-Uni est le premier pays à les avoir consacrés dans des documents historiques qui ont posé lesbases de l'histoire politique des droits de l'homme. Pourtant, si cette culture des libertés a pendant longtemps caractérisé le système constitutionnel britannique, le déclin qu'elle a connu au cours des années 1980 a appelé à une modification des modalités traditionnelles de leur protection, qui s'est concrétisée par l'adoption du Human Rights Act 1998. Mais, ce nouvel instrument de protection des droits et ibertés, qui ambitionne de donner davantage d'effets aux droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre juridique britannique, est-il parvenu à relever le défi qui lui était lancé en ravivant l'esprit des libertés propre à la psyché britannique ? La réponse à cette question nécessite d'apprécier les incidences du Human Rights Act 1998, un document à la croisée du droit constitutionnel et du droit conventionnel, non seulement sur l'efficacité de la protection des libertés mais, plus largement, sur la Constitution du Royaume-Uni. L'étude du système de protection britannique des droits et libertés, tel qu'il est transformé par le Human Rights Act 1998, est alors l'occasion d'envisager la teneur de la contribution du Royaume-Uni au débat sur la protection des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l'apport de l'expérience britannique au développement du constitutionnalisme.

The United-Kingdom has, for long, been seen as the home of Liberty. Indeed, it is the first country where historical documents recognized rights and freedoms. However, the decline of the British culture of Liberty during the eighties led to a change of the traditional sources of protection. This change was materialized in the Human Rights Act 1998, which is designed to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. But has this new document succeeded in reviving the spirit of liberty characteristic to the British psyche ? Answering this question requires an assessment of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the effectiveness of the protection of liberty but also its impact on the British Constitution as a whole. The study of the British system enables us to consider the British contribution to the debate on fundamental rights and its significance to the development of constitutionalism. ; Traditionnellement perçu comme le berceau des droits et libertés, le Royaume-Uni est le premier pays à les avoir consacrés dans des documents historiques qui ont posé lesbases de l'histoire politique des droits de l'homme. Pourtant, si cette culture des libertés a pendant longtemps caractérisé le système constitutionnel britannique, le déclin qu'elle a connu au cours des années 1980 a appelé à une modification des modalités traditionnelles de leur protection, qui s'est concrétisée par l'adoption du Human Rights Act 1998. Mais, ce nouvel instrument de protection des droits et ibertés, qui ambitionne de donner davantage d'effets aux droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre juridique britannique, est-il parvenu à relever le défi qui lui était lancé en ravivant l'esprit des libertés propre à la psyché britannique ? La réponse à cette question nécessite d'apprécier les incidences du Human Rights Act 1998, un document à la croisée du droit constitutionnel et du droit conventionnel, non seulement sur l'efficacité de la protection des libertés mais, plus largement, sur la Constitution du Royaume-Uni. L'étude du système de protection britannique des droits et libertés, tel qu'il est transformé par le Human Rights Act 1998, est alors l'occasion d'envisager la teneur de la contribution du Royaume-Uni au débat sur la protection des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l'apport de l'expérience britannique au développement du constitutionnalisme.