Suchergebnisse

U povijesnom razvoju francuskog upravnog suca razlikuje se više vremenskih trenutaka. Prvo je razdoblje od 1974-1989. u kojem se se sudske odluke vrlo rijetko temeljile na odredbama Konvencije. Drugo razdoblje započinje 20. listopada 1989. godine, presudom u predmetu Nicolo. Upravno je sudovanje prihvatilo, nakon spomenute presude, nadzirati usklađenost nacionalnog zakona s Konvencijom. Državni savjet se odvažio u početku oprezno, a poslije sve žešće, provoditi takava nadzor usklađenosti koji ga je doveo do toga da ne samo zabranjuje primjenu zakona zbog suprotnosti s Konvencijom, nego i da osudi državu za naknadu štete koja je proizašla iz takvog zakona, osobito kada je zakonodavac zanemario neke smjernice. U trećem razdoblju Državni savjet, nakon dugo opiranja, uskladio s pravnom praksom suda u Strasbourgu. S druge strane, čini se da ima znatno restriktivniju koncepciju obveze neovisnosti, nepristranosti i propisivanje obveze da sud mora biti reguliran zakonom, kako u sastavu tijela koji sud, kao i u vođenju spora od strane Europskog suda za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. ; In the historical development of the French administrative judge several moments in time have been differentiated. The first period was from 1947-1989 where court decisions were very rarely based on Convention provisions. The second period started October 20, 1989 with the court decision in the Nicolo case. Administrative adjudication process accepted, after the above mentioned decision, to supervise the harmonisation of national law with the Convention. The Government Council carefully dared at the beginning and later more frequently to implement such supervision of harmonisation. This brought about not just forbidding the application of the law due to contrariness to the Convention, but to also to suing the state for damages which occurred from such law, particularly when the legislator ignored some directions. In the third period the Government Council, after much resistance, harmonised with Strasbourg Court legal practise. On the other hand, it seems that it has a significantly more restrictive concept of the obligation of independence, impartiality, and prescribing obligations that the court has to be legally regulated both in system of bodies and in dispute settlement by the European Court for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The reflection about the fundamental rights of entities is not so new as we might be tempted to believe. However, the reflection raises the question by its antithetical. Natural persons appear to be the only beneficiaries of such rights. They were the centre of all doctrinal attention. The intimacy of the relationship between man and the concept of human rights, from which flows the fundamental rights, easily justified the exclusion of entities. The idea of including groups and organizations, which seemed unthinkable will be accepted in fine, indeed will become indispensable to an effective democracy, dear to the European system of human rights and our study. Entities undoubtedly play a vital role in the achievement of a democratic society, particularly through the press or the actions of political parties. They contribute enormously to a country's economy by the actions of commercial enterprises or other businesses, and even to the development and fufillment of individuals through associations whose missions are many and vary. We can not reasonably refuse such a subject of law the protection of the Convention. Beside, it is with the strength of the evidence that these entities have benefited from various provisions of the Convention. Groups for political purposes or unions cannot accomplish peacefully their mission without the protection of Article 11 of the convention enshrining the freedom of association and peaceful protest. Also, entities deprived of exercising the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, as defined in Article I of Additional Protocol No. 1, cannot thrive in an area where the public authority intervains regularly. Safeguarding these rights, with others, is therefore vital for corporations. Decryption of rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the european legislation calls to observe systematically the different movements of European jurisprudence. To do this, our thinking prefers a dogmatic approach, based on the particularity of legal entities to the end of assertaining their rights and ...

The reflection about the fundamental rights of entities is not so new as we might be tempted to believe. However, the reflection raises the question by its antithetical. Natural persons appear to be the only beneficiaries of such rights. They were the centre of all doctrinal attention. The intimacy of the relationship between man and the concept of human rights, from which flows the fundamental rights, easily justified the exclusion of entities. The idea of including groups and organizations, which seemed unthinkable will be accepted in fine, indeed will become indispensable to an effective democracy, dear to the European system of human rights and our study. Entities undoubtedly play a vital role in the achievement of a democratic society, particularly through the press or the actions of political parties. They contribute enormously to a country's economy by the actions of commercial enterprises or other businesses, and even to the development and fufillment of individuals through associations whose missions are many and vary. We can not reasonably refuse such a subject of law the protection of the Convention. Beside, it is with the strength of the evidence that these entities have benefited from various provisions of the Convention. Groups for political purposes or unions cannot accomplish peacefully their mission without the protection of Article 11 of the convention enshrining the freedom of association and peaceful protest. Also, entities deprived of exercising the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, as defined in Article I of Additional Protocol No. 1, cannot thrive in an area where the public authority intervains regularly. Safeguarding these rights, with others, is therefore vital for corporations. Decryption of rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the european legislation calls to observe systematically the different movements of European jurisprudence. To do this, our thinking prefers a dogmatic approach, based on the particularity of legal entities to the end of assertaining their rights and ...