Suchergebnisse

Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights prescribes that individual applications must be directed against one of the Convention States. Consequently, private actors involved in proceedings against other private actors before domestic courts must complain about State (in)action in their application to the European Court of Human Rights. In other words, originally 'horizontal' conflicts must be 'verticalised' in order to be admissible. Although such verticalised cases make up a large portion of the Court's case law, the particular nature of these cases, as well as procedural issues that may arise in them, has not received much attention. To fill this gap, this book offers a detailed examination of verticalised cases coming before the Court. The characteristics of and the Court's approach to verticalised cases are explored by means of an in-depth analysis of four types of verticalised cases (cases related to one's surroundings; cases involving a conflict between the right to reputation and private life and the right to freedom of expression; family life cases; and employer-employee cases). On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the Court's current approach to verticalised cases poses problems for private actors, Convention States and the Court itself. In presenting recommendations for the resolution of these problems, the book concludes with a proposal for a new approach to verticalised cases, consisting of a redesigned third-party intervention procedure.

The specificity of the Strasbourg judgments is versatile and concerns many different areas of social life that it is not possible to effectively adapt legal norms and apply their interpretation by one entity of public authority. It can be said with full conviction that the execution of judgments is a continuous process and will last as long as the European Court of Human Rights is functioning; surely it will not end with the completion of the most difficult cases. It is important for the national system for the protection of human rights to be very efficient in the context of the protection of human rights. If, however, there is a violation of the norms of international agreements, Poland must be effective in meeting obligations such as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. There are two aspects involved in fulfilling obligations under international law arising from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The first one is the introduction of appropriate standards of respect for the rights and freedoms enshrined in the treaty, and the second one is the obligation to enforce judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of a stated infringement of the Convention. Both obligations must be carried out simultaneously by the state – which, as a party to the Convention, respects its provisions and fulfills the required international legal obligations. The subject of this paper is to present the powers and legitimacy of the body of the executive in Poland in connection with the execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. ; A especificidade dos acórdãos de Strasburg é versátil e diz respeito a muitas áreas diferentes da vida social, e não é possível adaptar eficazmente as normas jurídicas e aplicar suas interpretações por uma única entidade de autoridade pública. Pode-se dizer que a execução das sentenças é um processo contínuo e durará enquanto o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem estiver em atividade; seguramente não terminará com a conclusão dos casos mais difíceis. É importante que o sistema nacional de proteção dos direitos humanos seja eficiente no contexto da proteção dos direitos humanos. Se, no entanto, houver violação das normas dos acordos internacionais, a Polônia deve ser eficaz no cumprimento de tais obrigações, como as sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos. Existem dois aspectos envolvidos no cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes do direito internacional da Convenção Europeia para a Proteção dos Direitos Humanos e das Liberdades Fundamentais. A primeira é a introdução de padrões apropriados de respeito aos direitos e liberdades consagrados no tratado, e a segunda é a obrigação de executar sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos no caso de uma violação declarada da Convenção. Ambas as obrigações devem ser cumpridas simultaneamente pelo Estado que, como parte da Convenção, respeita suas disposições e cumpre as obrigações legais internacionais exigidas. O tema deste artigo é apresentar os poderes e a legitimidade do órgão do Poder Executivo na Polônia em conexão com a execução das sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos.

This study seeks to shed light on the prohibition of abuse of rights in Article 17 ECHR in order to contribute to a more coherent interpretation of this provision. To that aim it studies the abuse clause from different perspectives. First, it looks at the historical background of the provision to examine what motivated the drafters to include this prohibition. Then it moves on to the case law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights and to legal doctrine, revealing the difficulties and inconsistencies in the current interpretation of the abuse clause. Next, it analyses the interpretation of prohibitions of abuse in other human rights documents to see whether parallels can be drawn with the interpretation of Article 17 ECHR. Subsequently, it addresses the concepts of "abuse of rights" and "militant democracy" and examines the extent to which they offer a framework for understanding the abuse clause. Based on the insights obtained from these different perspectives, this study puts forward a proposal as to how Article 17 ECHR can best be applied in the future

Executive Council Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session 7 – 8 February 2019 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ; The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Court) was established in terms of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Protocol"), adopted on 9 June 1998, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Protocol entered into force on 25 January 2004. The Court became operational in 2006 and is composed of eleven (11) Judges elected by the Executive Council and appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. The Seat of the Court is in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania. Article 31 of the Protocol mandates the Court to "…submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report on its work. The report shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's judgment.

Lately there have been works that show that Kant bases human rights on innate freedom as the only innate right that man has by virtue of his humanity. However, innate freedom cannot justify a theory of human rights because it is only an innate right over my inner self that allows for empirical possession, and although a human right is inalienable, it must be renounced in order to enter the world; Moreover, the four analytical derivations of innate freedom generate consequences that are incompatible with a human rights doctrine, for as human rights refer to all, innate equality and innate independence apply to a limited number of people; Finally, there is a differentiation in the interpretation of humanity's formula in law and ethics, because, subjectively, treating humanity as an end requires the agent to consider that the end of humanity is the motive of his action in ethics, but in law it is only required that its external behavior be in accordance with the end of humanity, and objectively, in law, treating humanity as an end produces criminal law contrary to human rights and the law of humanity requires that innate integrity be suspended during the period of condemnation, furthermore, this differentiation in the idea of ​​humanity becomes explicit in innate imprehensibility, for in ethics lie is the greatest violation of the duty of humanity in his person, but in law only violates the right of humanity if it causes harm to others.

In this article we try to show the troublesome relation between biopolitcs, biopower and human rights in Michel Foucault. The notion of right is a classical notion, insofar as it pertains to the juridical conception of politics and to the techniques of sovereign power. On the other side, the idea of the human animal as human being appears only in Modernity, within the different dispositives that constitute what Foucault called the modern biopower. Therefore, talking of human rights one puts together the idea of right and the idea of human being, i.e. two notions belonging to two historically distinct techniques of power. In the awareness of this distinction, one has to question why Foucault, in face of what was going on in his days, did nevertheless appeal – against governments – to the rights of those who are governed. Classical right may have nothing to do with biopolitics; however with regard to the so-called human rights we cannot claim the same.

In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature (the political formulation of human rights) it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz's approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights.

This article intends to approach, for a philosophical bias, the problem of Human Rights enunciated in Declarations of the XVIII and XX centuries. The basic question is human rights based on the "ideal of humanity" or "human dignity", considering two ideas: 1) the paradox of the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen' and the notion that one feels only a human "With guaranteed rights someone who sees himself contemplated in the legal scope of a nation. 2) Humanity as a "great family" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), and the world as "great nation". Therefore, we promote in this work a debate between three thinkers: Diderot, with his notion of the general will of the human race; Rousseau, with his refutation of Diderot's thesis, denying that there is a "natural or general society among men"; And Kant, who in his 'Perpetual Peace', in his own way, takes up the notion of cosmopolitanism denied by Rousseau and points to the possibility of the right to extend to all mankind.