Suchergebnisse

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or, the Court) is a formidable player in the development of legal approaches to Islam: its jurisdictional remit (covering over 800 million people across 47 countries) is vast; it is a standard setter for human rights protection in general on a global scale; and it has a rapidly growing body of case law relevant to Islam which has influenced states' engagements with Islam within Europe and beyond. Besides the Court's 'direct effects', in terms of impact on relevant legislation, through its decisions to do with Islam, it also has a significant 'indirect', social effect though the messages those decisions communicate about Islam and its place in society. This contribution examines the role of the Court in its direct and indirect effects on Islam, law and Europeanisation.

The Internet-related cases coming to the European Court of Human Rights provide a good illustration of the challenges posed to the protection of human rights as based on the European Convention of Human Rights drafted in 1950. Considering that the Convention is a 70-year-old instrument, the Strasbourg Court has to deal with these cases using the body of principles and interpretation methods and techniques that has been developed so far, and in particular the 'living instrument' doctrine. In this study I propose to explore some main threads in the Court's jurisprudence on Internet-related cases, outlining the specific nature of Internet-related cases, discussing the problem of rights connected with the Internet as well as the impact of the Internet on such classical rights as freedom of expression and the right to privacy. I conclude that the Internet-related case law of the Convention is in a process of constant development. The Strasbourg Court has demonstrated that it is capable of dealing with Internet-related cases based on general Convention norms and using its well-developed interpretation techniques. The striking feature of Strasbourg's case law is the ECtHR's recognition of the considerable importance of the Internet as regards the exercise of freedom of expression, and in particular freedom to seek and access information. Although the ECtHR regards the Internet as a communication medium, however, it recognises its specific features which affect the performance of rights protected by the Convention as well as dangers it poses for the protection of human rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. ; University of Gdańsk, Poland ; Adam Wiśniewski is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Public International Law in the Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Gdańsk, Poland. ; adam.wisniewski@prawo.ug.edu.pl ; 109 ; 133 ; 3 ; Best M.L., Can the Internet Be a Human Right? (in:) S. Hick, E.F. Halpin and E. Hoskins (eds.), Human Rights and the Internet, New York 2000. ; Decision of the ECtHR of 11 March 2014 as to the admissibility of the case of Akdeniz v. Turkey, application no. 20877/10. ; Decision of the ECtHR of 18 October 2005 as to the admissibility of the case of Perrin v. the United Kingdom. ; Directive 2000/31 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. ; Garlicki L. (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Tom I, Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, Warsaw 2010. ; Flogartis S., Zwart T., Fraser J., The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents. Turning Criticism into Strength, Cheltenham/Northampton 2013. ; Gosztonyi G European Court of Human Rights: Internet Access as a Means of Receiving and Imparting Information and Ideas, "International Comparative Jurisprudence" 2020, vol. 6, no. 2, https://ojs.mruni.eu/ojs/international-comparative-jurisprudence/article/view/6292. ; Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 2011, A/HRC/17/27, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G12/153/25/PDF/G1215325.pdf?OpenElement. ; Human Rights Council: The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, 27 June 2016, https://www.article19.org/data/fi les/Internet_Statement_Adopted.pdf. ; Internet: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2011, updated June 2015, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/research_report_internet_eng.pdf. ; Kakavoulis K., The case Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A Brief Critical Analysis, https://www.homodigitalis.gr/en/posts/2900. ; Mik C., Charakter, struktura i zakres zobowiązań z Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, "Państwo i Prawo" 1992, no. 4. ; Murphy T. and O Cuinn G., Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human Rights, "Human Rights Law Review" 2010, vol 10, no. 4. ; Karska E. and Karski K., Introduction: Extraterritorial Scope of Human Rights, "International Community Law Review" 2015, vol. 17, no. 4–5. ; Prebensen S.C., The Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, "Human Rights Law Journal" 1998, vol. 19, no. 1. ; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, GE.11–13201, 16 May 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ 17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. ; Jasmontaite L. and Hert P. de, Access to the Internet in the EU: A Policy Priority, a Fundamental, a Human Right or a Concern for eGovernment? "Brussels Privacy Hub Working Paper" February 2020, vol. 6, no. 19, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339860840_Access_to_the_Internet_in_the_EU_a_policy_priority_a_fundamental_a_human_right_or_a_concern_for_eGovernment. ; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'Freedom of Expression on the Internet: A study of legal provisions and practices related to freedom of expression, the free flow of information and media pluralism on the Internet in OSCE participating States', 15 December 2011, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/f/80723.pdf. ; Rzucidło J., Prawo dostępu do internetu jako podstawowe prawo człowieka: Część I, "Kwartalnik Naukowy Prawo Mediów Elektronicznych" 2010, no. 2. ; Szeghalmi V., Difficulties Regarding the Right to Be Forgotten in the Case Law of the Strasbourg Court, "Athens Journal of Law" 2018, vol. 4, no. 3. ; Wiśniewski A., Koncepcja marginesu oceny w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, Gdańsk 2008. ; Zieliński M., Dostęp do Internetu jako prawo człowieka? W sprawie potrzeby nowej wolności w konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, "Przegląd Sejmowy" 2013, no. 4. ; 26

This article analyzes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from the perspective of the recent extraordinary wave of populism in Europe. It argues that populism poses a serious and distinctive challenge to the ECtHR since supranational judicial review is at odds with the populist ideology. ; This article analyzes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from the perspective of the recent extraordinary wave of populism in Europe. It argues that populism poses a serious and distinctive challenge to the ECtHR since supranational judicial review is at odds with the populist ideology.

POVINNÉ OČKOVANIE DETÍ: STANOVISKO EURÓPSKEHO SÚDU PRE ĽUDSKÉ PRÁVA Vaccination of children is of particular importance not only for their parents, but also for Governments in upholding their obligations under international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the last years, however, the amount of children vaccinated against life-threatening diseases is declining. One of the most frequent arguments against vaccination (especially in case of compulsory vaccination) is the interference with the right to private and family life and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The aim of this paper is to analyse the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic and to highlight its relevance to Slovakia and international human rights law. URL: http://sic.pravo.upjs.sk/ Očkovanie detí má osobitný význam nielen pre rodičov, ale aj pre vlády štátov pri dodržiavaní ich povinností podľa medzinárodných nástrojov v oblasti ľudských práv, ako je napríklad Medzinárodný pakt o hospodárskych, sociálnych a kultúrnych právach alebo Dohovor o právach dieťaťa. V posledných rokoch však klesá počet očkovaných detí proti život ohrozujúcim chorobám. Jedným z najpoužívanejších argumentov proti očkovaniu (najmä v prípade povinného očkovania) je zásah do práva na súkromný a rodinný život a slobody myslenia, svedomia a náboženského vyznania. Cieľom tohto príspevku je analyzovať rozsudok Európskeho súdu pre ľudské práva v prípade Vavřička a ostatní proti Českej republike a poukázať na jeho význam pre Slovenskú republiku a medzinárodné právo v oblasti ľudských práv.

In Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the petition of a person detained by U.K. occupation forces in Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council authorization. One issue before the court in Al-Jedda—whether the petitioner's rights against the U.K. government under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms might disapply the Security Council authorization—illustrates the problem of norm conflict between intergovernmental regimes. The Al-Jedda court avoided directly pitting the differing norms at issue (Security Council resolutions versus European human rights treaty provisions), but in doing so left open such a conflict for where one such norm explicitly requires violation of the other. When this question arises, the court should not hold that the applicability of European treaty norms disapplies Security Council resolutions or other United Nations acts, because so holding would further fragment the international system and leave states in positions where they will be bound to violate at least some of their international obligations.

Faced with a sharp rise in the number of individual applications, the European Court of Human Rights has been forced to provide greater accountability to governments eager to downsize its budget and staff. This has resulted in the introduction of quantitative criteria, to the detriment of quality and of the service rendered to individual victims. These new management policies have admittedly reduced the number of pending cases, but they have also considerably eroded the right of individual application. The new managerial policy has definitely shaped a new Court.

This article researches the basis of the concept of reproductive rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). After a systematic and transversal presentation the ECtHR's jurisprudence on reproductive issues, the article argues that the ECtHR does not capture the specificity of reproductive rights, especially the gender perspective and the importance of reproductive health. Faced with arguments of prioritization of certain rights, the ECtHR repeatedly applies the European Convention on Human Rights to domestic rights as if they were neutral and often avoids addressing claims related to discrimination. Besides, while reproductive health is at the core of reproductive rights, the ECtHR's case law shows self-restraint unless there is a very serious threat on the women's health. This contrasts with international standards on the right to health. Without considering those essentialist and realistic characteristics of reproductive issues, the ECtHR fails to develop a European concept of reproductive rights. The last parts of the article present the political constraints that plague on the ECtHR, which may explain the minimalist jurisprudence in this area. However, those constraints do not justify all the inconsistencies in the ECtHR's use of the European consensus and the margin of appreciation doctrine in the field of reproductive rights.

This paper considers the way in which recent historical work on the history of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience opens up a new interpretation of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the headscarf cases. These decisions have been widely criticized as adopting a militantly secularist approach to the presence of Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere, an approach that seems inconsistent or even overtly discriminatory in light of the court's recent decision in Lautsi that the compulsory display of crucifixes in the classroom did not breach Italy's convention obligations. I argue that the headscarf cases turn less on the balance between state neutrality and religious belief, than on an understanding of certain religious symbols as a threat to public order and as harbingers of sectarian strife which undermine democracy.

The article deals with some problems of court translation, the right to which is provided by the European Convention of Human Rights and other legislations. The translation challenges appear at all stages of the court proceeding, ranging from submitting documents to judgment delivering. Translators and interpreters' competences are outlined. Translation performs important functions in communication of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to the European Council member States and in conducting comparative studies of national and European legislations. Translation has been proved an important means in enhancing the role of the Court in protecting human rights.

In difference to certain other European countries, the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) is rarely discussed in critical terms in Swedish media or in contemporary legal and political debate in Sweden. The article identifies examples of sporadic critical appraisals of the ECtHR in case-law and in legal debate. Interestingly, no political parties represented in the Riksdag have expressed scepticism to the ECHR system and the role of the ECtHR as such. Concerning politics on a European level, however, Sweden has engaged in the reform of the ECtHR in various ways. The article discusses the limited criticism of the ECtHR in the light of the development of constitutional protection of fundamental rights, the status of the convention, and aspects of Swedish legal culture.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its recent decisions regarding the Cyprus problem such as the Loizidou v. Turkey and Case of Cyprus v. Turkey finds Turkey responsible for the current situation in the Island. According to the Court, Turkey violates the rights of the Greek Cypriots were living in the northern part of Cyprus before the military intervention of Turkey took place in 1974. Such violations include inhuman treatment of the families of missing Greek Cypriots, denying some 180.000 Greek Cypriots the right to return to their homes, failure to compensate for loss of property and interference with freedom of religion. Finding Turkey responsible instead of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is based upon the fact that the TRNC was not an independent State and not even recognised by the international community. This way of application of the rules of international law by the ECHR can be strongly criticised on the ground that it does not give any weight to the causes and effects of the events which took place in Cyprus in 1963 to 1974, and also to the factors which lead the Turkish Cypriots to establish their own independent States. When the recent history of Cyprus is examined it can clearly be seen that the legal status of the TRNC is not any less legal than its Greek Cypriot counterpart with regard to its statehood and recognition in international law. This paper examines the judgements of the ECHR in the light of the historical background of the Cyprus problem, and of the legal status of the TRNC in relation to its statehood and its non-recognition in international law.

This article presents a symposium on the "indirect effects" of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the place of religion in the educational sphere. The symposium showcases empirical research providing critical insight into how the Court's decisions may influence related domestic debates, raise public consciousness, and change how social actors perceive their rights and articulate their right claims in the area of religion and education. The research underpinning this symposium represents a clear departure from existing scholarship in this domain: it examines the impact of the Court not from the top-down (Court impact on states and their legislative frameworks) but from grassroots level upwards, in seeking to understand whether, how and to what extent Court decisions influence grassroots level actors' conceptions of their rights in the domain of religion and education and their efforts to secure new rights vis-à-vis their states.

Although the concept of human dignity is absent from the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is mentioned in more than 2100 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The judges at the Court have used dignity to develop the scope of Convention rights, but also to signal to respondent states just how serious a violation is and to nudge them towards better compliance. However, these strategies reach dead ends when the Court is faced with government submissions that are based on a conception of dignity that is different from the notion of human dignity relied on by the Court. Through empirical analysis and by focusing on Russia, the country against which the term dignity is used most frequently, the paper maps out situations of conceptual contestation and overlap. We reveal how the Court strategically uses mirroring, substitutes dignity for other Convention values, or altogether avoids confrontation. In such situations, the Court's use (and non-use) of dignity becomes less about persuading states to comply with the Convention and more about preserving its authority and managing its relationship with states.

Article 36 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enables third parties to intervene in cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Access to justice is a very important principle which has been developed both in international law and in the context of the ECHR. There is, however, no clear answer regarding the question of how legal aid is accessible for third persons who are affected by proceedings without being a party to them. Taking the example of German law introducing Legal Aid for affected third parties, the authors ask if such a national act is necessary from the perspective of the access to justice. The law described here adds an additional national layer to internationalized proceedings and the authors seek to answer the question how helpful the enacted law could be in practice. In light of recent controversies concerning permits for major infrastructure projects in Germany the question of legal aid is also of importance for corporate applicants before the European Court of Human Rights because affected third persons who may be eligible for legal aid under the new law can also be those who had, in Administrative Law courts, challenged permits issued to the person who then is the applicant in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights. The authors also look at the right to legal aid for affected third parties under the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights and the potential divergence between the Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights against the backdrop of the potential accession of the European Union to the Convention and conclude that, notwithstanding some small shortcomings, the new law is necessary and should be sufficiently effective in assistance of third persons intervening before the ECHR.

This article examines the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its judgments associated with women's rights in the areas of reproduction, religious, and refugee expression. As an international court, the ECtHR seeks to resolve disputes related to violations of human rights between an individual and a member state. Although the introduction of the court has been perceived as progressive for global human rights, the ECtHR's recent judicial recommendationsindicate an absence of recognition or limited advocacy for women's rights. In addition to analyzing how women's reproduction, refugee, and religious expression rights have received inadequate support from the ECtHR, this article will also suggest five possible influences underlying the court's decisions: namely, the ECtHR's definition of rights as exclusive of women-specific liberties; hesitancy to override national sovereignty; the minority of female judges serving on the ECtHR's Strasbourg bench; the court's consideration of external conservative bodies such as the Catholic church; and finally, that the international court, which relies on member states' cooperation, is susceptible to politicization and the rising far right. This article concludes with policy recommendations for the ECtHR, describing how the court might be able to move forward with increasing women's representation inside the courtroom and formulating gender-sensitive case law. By pursuing a more progressive and inclusive mission, the court will likely benefit from increased international legitimacy while re-establishing itself as a distinguished defender of women's basic liberties in Europe.