Suchergebnisse

This publication describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can access finance on commercial terms, without sovereign guarantees. Doing so can create fiscal space for governments and new sources of finance for needed investment. Under Strategy 2030, the Asian Development Bank is committed to SOE reform that supports access to commercial finance in its developing member countries. The publication confirms the rise of commercial finance for SOEs and details steps to enhance the bankability of SOEs. This includes practical guidance on how to improve governance and increase financial viability. The publication also explains how the risks of such borrowing, including defaults and moral hazards created by implicit guarantees, can be managed.

The overall aim of this book is to set forth debate on alternative practices for land use management in urban development and public infrastructure projects in Asia. Land use laws are the most powerful tools that governments have to implement public projects with large social and economic gains. While there are numerous books that have examined specific methods of land assembly for development and financing of public infrastructure, there is a gap in the literature on a comprehensive treatise that looks at the whole range of methods from their institutional context, suitability for purpose, and equity considerations. It is hoped that this volume will go some way toward filling that gap by presenting the basis and approaches for land use management that have been used in Asia, and suggesting key principles and components of equitable land use management practices for development and financing of infrastructure. It may be emphasized here that this volume does not examine the expropriation or confiscation of inherited and private property for land reform or other social transformative purposes, which while important, are out of scope of this book.

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled with finality in April 10, 2019 on the motions for reconsideration of its initial decision promulgated in July 3, 2018 on the petitions filed by separately by Mandanas et al. and Garcia regarding what petitioners perceived to be errors in the computation of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) or the LGUs' share in national internal revenue taxes (NIRTs) as mandated under Section 284 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC). As a result, the IRA in 2022 will increase by P225.3 billion relative to what it would have been prior to promulgation of the said ruling to reach PhP 1,102.7 billion. This study proposes that said increase in the IRA be sourced by unfunding PAPs in the budgets of some national government agencies that are actually intended to deliver functions that are assigned to LGUs under the LGC with the end in view of ensuring sustainability of the national government's fiscal position. It then proceeds to these PAPs on the basis of the 2020 General Appropriations Act. It also evaluates the impact that this manner of financing the increase in the IRA has on the vertical fiscal balance across different levels of local government and horizontal fiscal balance across individual LGUs within each level of local government.

Development Research News is a quarterly publication of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). It highlights the findings and recommendations of PIDS research projects and important policy issues discussed during PIDS seminars. PIDS is a nonstock, nonprofit government research institution engaged in long-term, policy oriented research.

Georgia has an impressive growth record but social vulnerabilities persist. The current government has therefore made spending on social sectors and agriculture a high priority and has launched a decentralization reform to support regional inclusive growth. It remains a challenge to tackle social vulnerabilities within a sustained macroeconomic framework. The government has intensified its efforts to reduce social vulnerability, as evidenced by the increase in social spending from 7.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, to 9.6 percent in 2014. As a result, the fiscal deficit widened from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2012 to 3.0 percent in 2014. This public expenditure review (PER) analyzes the impact of recent reforms including the social programs that were either introduced or scaled up in 2013. It gives an overview of the recent macroeconomic and fiscal developments, including the fiscal implications of the social programs in chapter one. As requested by the government, it addresses three questions in the rest of the report: (1) has the realignment of spending toward social sectors resulted in better distributional outcomes; (2) have the agriculture support programs been targeted at productivity growth to support real incomes in poor rural regions; and (3) what is the fiscal and equity impact of the ongoing decentralization process? The first question is addressed by combining micro household survey data with administrative fiscal data to analyze the distributional impact of both taxes and government spending on poverty and inequality in Georgia in chapter two. The second question is addressed by comparing the cost of new agriculture programs with their estimated impact on agricultural productivity in chapter three. Finally, the issue of regional inequalities is partially addressed in this report by discussing three different aspects of the current decentralization process: the expected fiscal impact of decentralization, the need to rationalize current capital grant programs to make public investment more effective, and the implications of introducing free preschool education administered at the local government level in chapter four.

This paper keeps an eye on the big picture and follows the long‐lived virtuous circle that, beginning in the mid‐1990s, led to the very successful setting up of a modern macroeconomic policy framework in Brazil, after a decade‐long effort involving four presidential terms. It is an eventful and far from linear history that calls attention to the role of leadership and the complex learning processes that may be involved in the improvement of the quality of economic policy.

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8231 Security Council Seventy-third year 8231st meeting Friday, 13 April 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10728 (E) *1810728* S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 2/22 18-10728 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: The situation in the Middle East is in chaos to such an extent it has become a threat to international peace and security. The region is facing a true Gordian knot — different fault lines crossing each other and creating a highly volatile situation with risks of escalation, fragmentation and division as far as the eye can see, with profound regional and global ramifications. We see a multiplicity of divides. The first is the memory of the Cold War. But, to be precise, it is more than a simple memory: the Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present. Secondly, there is the Palestinian-Israeli divide. Thirdly, there is the Sunni-Shia divide, evident from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. It is important to note that apparent religious divides are normally the result of political or geostrategic manipulation. Finally, there is a wide range of different factors — from opposing attitudes in relation to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood or the status of the Kurds, to the dramatic threats to communities that have been living in the region for millenniums and are part of the rich diversity of Middle Eastern societies. Those numerous divisions are reflected in a multiplicity of conflicts with different degrees of interconnection, several of which are clearly linked to the threat of global terrorism. Many forms of escalation are possible. We see the wounds of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continuing to fester. The recent violence in Gaza resulted in many needless deaths and injuries. I repeat my call for an independent and transparent investigation into those incidents. I also appeal to those concerned to refrain from any act that could lead to further casualties, in particular any measures that could place civilians in harm's way. That tragedy underlines the urgency of revitalizing the peace process for a two- State solution that will allow Palestinians and Israelis to live side by side in peace in two democratic States within secure and recognized borders. I reaffirm the readiness of the United Nations to support those efforts. In Yemen, we are witnessing the worst humanitarian disaster in today's world. There is only one pathway to ending the Yemeni conflict and to addressing the humanitarian crisis: a negotiated political settlement through inclusive intra-Yemeni dialogue. My Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, is doing everything possible to facilitate that political settlement. He will brief the Council next week. In Libya, I encourage all parties to continue to work with my Special Representative, Ghassan Salamé, as he engages in the political process with a broad range of Libyan interlocutors across the country in order to implement the United Nations action plan. It is high time to end the Libyan conflict. The case of Iraq demonstrates that progress is possible with concerted local, regional and global commitment. With the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, having overcome the risk of fragmentation, the Government of Iraq must now focus on reconstruction, reforms and reconciliation. I hope that the upcoming elections will consolidate that progress. At the recent Paris and Rome conferences, the international community reaffirmed its support for Lebanon's sovereignty, stability and State security institutions. It is absolutely essential to prevent a new Israel-Hizbullah conflict, which could inevitably result in many more victims and much greater destruction than the last war. I reiterate the critical importance to act on key principles and commitments on Lebanon, including the Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 1701 (2006), and the policy of disassociation. The dangers of the links to the Syrian conflict are 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 3/22 evident in the recent confrontations between Iran and Israel in Syria.Syria today indeed represents the most serious threat to international peace and security. We see there confrontations and proxy wars, involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militia, foreign fighters from everywhere in the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law, in general, in utter disregard for the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. I reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict. The solution must be political through the Geneva intra-Syrian talks, as stipulated in resolution 2254 (2015), and in line with the consistent efforts of my Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. Syrians have lived through a litany of horrors: atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on.In a moment of hope, the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay for a durable humanitarian pause. Unfortunately, no such cessation of hostilities ever really took place. That is the bleak panorama of Syria today.In that panorama, I am outraged by the continued reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I reiterate my strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party to the conflict under any circumstances. Their use is abhorrent and a clear violation of international law. The seriousness of the recent allegations requires a thorough investigation, using impartial, independent and professional expertise.In that regard, I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Fact-finding Mission in undertaking the required investigation into those allegations. The mission should be granted full access, without any restrictions or impediments, to perform its activities. I take note that the Syrian Government has requested that and is committed to facilitating it. The first OPCW team is already in Syria; a second team is expected today or tomorrow.However, we need to go further. In a letter to the Council two days ago, I expressed, following the end of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,"my deep disappointment that the Security Council was unable to agree upon a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria".I want to repeat today that the norms against chemical weapons must be upheld. As I wrote in the same letter:"[e]nsuring accountability for a confirmed use of chemical weapons is our responsibility, not least to the victims of such attacks. A lack of accountability emboldens those who would use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity. This, in turn, further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons and the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. I urge all Member States to act responsibly in these dangerous circumstances;"I appeal to the Security Council to fulfil its duties and not to give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism for attributing responsibility with regard to the use of chemical weapons. I stand ready to support such efforts."The increasing tensions and the inability to reach a compromise in the establishment of an accountability mechanism threaten to lead to a full-blown military escalation. In my contacts with the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, I have reiterated my deep concerns about the risks of the current impasse and stressed the need to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control.That is exactly the risk that we face today — that things spiral out of control. It is our common duty to stop it.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing.I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 4/22 18-10728 Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are greatful to the Secretary-General for his briefing. His participation, his assessments and his authoritative words about the situation that has developed are very significant. We agree with him that there are many wounds in the Middle East. However, most important, currently the deepest wound is the situation in Syria, insofar as any negative repercussions would have major global implications.Two days ago, news of a threat by the United States to launch missile strikes against the Syrian Arab Republic ricocheted around the world. The Russian Federation was also warned to prepare for strikes. Let me point out that our military is in Syria at the invitation of its legitimate Government in order to combat international terrorism. We continue to see dangerous military preparations for an illegal act of force against a sovereign State in violation of the norms of international law. It is not just the use of force but even the threat of it that flies in the face of the Charter of the United Nations, and that is precisely what we are seeing in the most recent statements and actions of Washington and its allies. The bellicose rhetoric is being ratcheted up at every level, including at the very top. Additional forces and assets of the United States military and its allies are bearing down on the Syrian coast. It feels as though Washington is singlemindedly heading towards unleashing a military scenario against Syria. That cannot be permitted. Such developments would be fraught with terrible consequences for global security, especially considering that a Russian military contingent is deployed in Syria.There are also those who have been observing these risky preparations with tacit approval, declaring that they understand Washington's motives or engaging in direct incitement, thereby becoming potential accomplices in an act of reckless military adventurism. There are people in the Security Council who love to talk about preventive diplomacy. Right now, for some reason, they are nowhere to be seen or heard. The guilty parties have been speedily identified not just before any investigation has been conducted but even before it has been established whether the incident in question took place at all, but evidently they must still be punished. Someone will have to answer for these unfortunate developments and for the previous interventions that have engulfed many countries in years of crisis with untold casualties.Witness the recent experience of Iraq and Libya, which, among other things, shows that the attitude of America's leaders to the Security Council is largely one of convenience. They need it as cover for their Iraqi test tubes and Libyan no-fly zones. What they are presenting us with now is another virtual test tube, and an empty one. The reckless behaviour of the United States as it tramples on international law and State sovereignty is unworthy of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council, which presupposes the highest possible degree of responsibility and certainly not a right to sabre rattling, a right that is unknown in international law.Why does the United States continue to torture the Middle East, provoking one conflict after another and pitting the States of the region against one another? Who will benefit from a potential strike against the Syrian military, which is taking the brunt of the fight against terrorism and achieving major victories in it? We know for sure that the ringleaders of the Syrian armed groups were given orders to launch an offensive after a possible military action. Is this latest wave of chaos really being unleashed just for that?The excuse is the alleged use of toxic substances in the Syrian town of Douma on 7 April, for which there has been no reliable confirmation. Our specialists found no trace of the use of toxic substances. The residents of Douma know of no such attack. All the evidence of the alleged attack has been provided by anti-Government forces for whom this development is in their interests. We have good reason — indeed, we have information — leading us to believe that what took place was a provocation with the participation of various countries' intelligence services. We have been issuing warnings about this for a long time. It is a repeat of the Khan Shaykhun scenario in April of last year.The Syrian Government, for which this is clearly the last thing it needs, has said that it was not involved and has sent a request for an immediate inspection by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the location of the alleged incident. It has offered security guarantees jointly with the Russian military. The mission is already getting started on its work in Syria and we hope that it will be able to conduct a truly independent and impartial investigation.Only the Security Council has the authority at the international level to decide what measures to take and against whom in connection with the use of chemical 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 5/22 weapons in Syria. Russia will continue to work diligently and systematically to de-escalate the recent tensions in international relations. We proposed adopting a brief resolution in support of the OPCW inspection mission in Douma that the United States, Britain and France irresponsibly blocked, thereby demonstrating their lack of interest in an investigation. The only thing they care about is overthrowing the Syrian Government and, more broadly, deterring the Russian Federation. This has been clearly visible in other international and domestic political events built on unfounded hoaxes and conspiracy theories that always centre around the Russian Federation.What is the United States trying to achieve? After many years of internecine strife in Syria, significant areas of the country have been stabilized. The political process is reviving and indicators of national reconciliation are emerging. The terrorists have been dealt a significant blow. We have never denied that the United States has also made a certain contribution to achieving that shared goal, but it has always kept certain types of terrorists in reserve for its fight against the so-called regime and for advancing its geopolitical priorities in the region.My British colleague is always asking me what Russia is doing to implement resolution 2401 (2018). My answer is that my country is practically the only one that is doing anything about it. Over the course of the Astana process, peace has been restored in more than 2,500 towns and villages. That does not mean that they have become victims of the regime, as the United States calls it, merely that with the help of Russia and other guarantors they have established normal relations with the central authorities in Damascus. With the support of the United Nations, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held successfully in Sochi. How many towns and villages has the United States brought peace to? How many groups has it persuaded to join the ceasefire agreements?In order to break the deadlock in the situation in eastern Ghouta after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of armed groups, with Russian assistance. The militias and their family members were safely evacuated from the district, and civilians were finally given the opportunity to shake off years of terror. Film of their genuine joy exists, but the Western media is not showing it. The United States does not care about the fate of the prisoners of the militias in eastern Ghouta who had been supporters of the Syrian Government. When they were bargaining with the Syrian authorities to exchange prisoners, the militias claimed that they were holding between 2,000 and 4,000 people. Now it turns out that there are far fewer. People died from harsh treatment and hard labour digging huge tunnels for their torturers.Some members have grieved to see their bearded pilgrims setting off for Syria on free tourist tickets. They lost no opportunity to shriek from every street corner about the plight of the hundreds of thousands of people in besieged eastern Ghouta. Now those people need help in rebuilding normal lives, but these Council members have already lost interest because the area is under Government control. Now there will have to be unpleasant discussions about the blockade of Fo'ah and Kefraya. When was the last time a humanitarian convoy was there? When was the last time Council members even asked about it? Someone must answer for the coalition's destruction of Raqqa.These are dangerous developments, with far-reaching ramifications for global security. In this instance, responsibility lies entirely with the United States and its allies. It is a pity that Old Europe continues to lose face. We call on the leaders of these States to immediately reconsider, return to the international legal fold and not to lead the world to the dangerous brink. We urgently need to find a peaceful way out through a collective effort. The Russian Federation is ready to cooperate equitably with all partners and to solve the problems that may arise through dialogue. We will continue to focus on finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Syria based on established international law. We will continue to work actively to that end, and we call on all our partners to do the same.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I started to listen to my Russian friend so as to respond to him, but instead I am truly in awe of his ability to say what he said with a straight face.Today's meeting of the Security Council has been convened under truly strange circumstances. The Russian Federation has asked us to discuss what it calls unilateral threats related to Syria. What is strange is that Russia is ignoring the real threat to international peace and security that has brought us all here. It is ignoring its own unilateral responsibility for all of it. What we should discuss today is the use of deadly chemical weapons to murder innocent Syrian S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 6/22 18-10728 civilians. That is one of the most blatant and grotesque violations of international law in the world today. It is a violation of all standards of morality. It violates the long-standing international consensus that chemical weapons represent a unique evil. Chlorine, mustard gas and other chemical weapons killed 90,000 people and injured more than 1 million during the First World War. In the history Canada in the Great World War, the Canadian soldier A.T. Hunter described it this way."The gas cloud gathered itself like a wave and ponderously lapped over into the trenches. Then passive curiosity turned to active torment — a burning sensation in the head, red-hot needles in the lungs, the throat seized by a strangler. Many fell and died on the spot. The others, gasping, stumbling with faces contorted, hands widely gesticulating and uttering hoarse cries of pain, fled madly through the villages and farms and through the city itself, carrying panic to the remnants of the civilian population and filling the roads with fugitives of both sexes and all ages".Chemical weapons did not produce the most casualties in the First World War, but they were the most feared. In the Second World War chemical weapons were employed on an industrial scale against civilians, resulting in the worst genocide in human history, which the United States recalled just yesterday on Holocaust Remembrance Day. That is what brings us here today. That is what chemical weapons are all about. That is why we must not stay silent in the face of the horrible use of chemical weapons in our own time.The first response to all of this death and injury was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical weapons and more. Later, in 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed. It obligates all of its parties to never under any circumstances"develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone".It also prohibits all parties from helping anyone to engage in such activities. The United States is a party to the Convention. Russia is a party to the Convention. Every country that is currently a member of the Security Council is a party to the Convention. Even the Al-Assad regime has pledged to abide by the Convention, so in theory all of us agree on the core principle at stake today. No country can by allowed to use chemical weapons with impunity. Now that we have established what we all agree on, let us ask ourselves what we should be condemning today. We should be discussing the actions that truly brought us to this moment in time. We should not be condemning the country or group of countries that might have the courage to stand up in defence of our common principle against the use of chemical weapons. Instead, we should be condemning the country that has unilaterally prevented the Security Council from upholding it.Which member of the Council most exhibits unilateralism with regard to chemical weapons? It is Russia alone that has stopped at nothing to defend the Syrian regime's multiple instances of the use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that killed the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which enabled the world to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is Russia alone that has used its veto six times to prevent the condemnation of Al-Assad's use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that has used its veto 12 times to protect the Al-Assad regime. To make matters worse, it was Russia alone that agreed to be the guarantor of the removal of all chemical weapons in Syria. If Russia had lived up to its commitment, there would be no chemical weapons in Syria and we would not be here today. That is the Russian record of unilateralism. It is a record that has led to the trashing of all international standards against the use of chemical weapons. This meeting should not be about so-called unilateral threats, but rather about the multiple actions that Russia has taken to bring us to this point.Our President has not yet made a decision about possible actions in Syria, but should the United States and its allies decide to act in Syria, it will be in defence of a principle on which we all agree. It will be in defence of a bedrock international norm that benefits all nations. Let us be clear. Al-Assad's most recent use of poison gas against the people of Douma was not his first, second, third or even forty-ninth use of chemical weapons. The United States estimates that Al-Assad has used chemical weapons in the Syrian war at least 50 times. Public estimates are as high as 200.In the weeks after Al-Assad's sarin-gas attack last April, which killed nearly 100 people, including many children, the regime used chlorine gas at least once and possibly as many as three times in the same area. Last November, just as the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism expired, the regime again attacked its people with sarin in the Damascus suburbs.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 7/22 In January, Al-Assad used at least four chlorine-filled rockets in Douma, and then he struck again last weekend. Thanks to Russia, there was no United Nations body to determine blame. But we know who did this; our allies know who did this. Russia can complain all it wants about fake news, but no one is buying its lies and its coverups. Russia was supposed to guarantee that Al-Assad would not use chemical weapons, and Russia did the opposite.The world must not passively accept the use of chemical weapons after almost a century of their prohibition. Everything the United Nations stands for is being blatantly defied in Syria, with the help of a permanent member of the Council. All nations and all peoples will be harmed if we allow Al-Assad to normalize the use of chemical weapons. It is those who act to violate the prohibition of chemical weapons who deserve our condemnation. Those who act to defend it deserve our support. The United States and its allies will continue to stand up for truth, accountability, justice and an end to the use of chemical weapons.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing and deeply appreciate his tireless efforts on the issue of the Middle East and that of Syria.The current situation in Syria is perilous. The country is at the crossroads of war and peace, and China is following the developments there with great concern. The possibility of an escalation of tensions worries us deeply. The pressing priority of the moment is to launch a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the relevant incidents in order to arrive at authoritative conclusions.China has consistently stood in favour of the peaceful settlement of disputes and opposed the routine use or threat of force in international relations. To take unilateral military action by circumventing the Security Council is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and runs counter to the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations.Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be fully respected. We call on the parties concerned to remain calm, exercise restraint, refrain from any move that could lead to further escalation of the situation and resolve the issue peacefully through consultation and dialogue. China is convinced that there can be no military solution to the Syrian issue; the only way out is a political settlement. China supports the United Nations in playing an active role in safeguarding the authority and standing of the Organization and its Security Council.China calls on the international community to steadfastly continue its diplomatic efforts, tirelessly stay the course so as to settle the Syrian issue politically, give full play to the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and resolve without delay the Syrian issue comprehensively, justly and adequately, in keeping with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions.The people of the world yearn for peace and oppose war. The situation in Syria has ramifications for peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, as well as for the credibility and authority of the Council. At this critical juncture, the Council must rightfully discharge its sacred responsibility emanating from the Charter of the United Nations; act in line with the dictates of our times; build unity and consensus and do its utmost to maintain peace; leave no stone unturned in its efforts to prevent war; and live up to the trust and expectations of the international community.China is and has always been a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development and a defender of the international order. China stands ready to continue its unflagging efforts to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, in a spirit of responsibility to history and to the peoples of the world.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.We are meeting today to address the threats to international peace and security that have arisen as a result of the situation in Syria, six days after the latest chemical-weapons carnage, on 7 April in Douma.For seven years, the situation in Syria has without a doubt constituted a grave threat to international peace and security as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council itself characterized this as such unanimously on 27 September 2013, when resolution 2118 (2013) was adopted in the wake of the appalling chemical-weapons attacks that had taken place in eastern Ghouta. The world then learned for the first time and with horror of the symptoms of large-scale chemical-weapons-related deaths in Syria.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 8/22 18-10728 To counter those who are seeking to sow confusion, going so far as to accuse the Syrian people of having gassed themselves; those who are suggesting conspiracy theories; those who are endeavouring methodically to destroy our mechanisms for action on chemical weapons in Syria, we must come back to simple facts. Yes, the Syrian crisis represents a threat to international peace and security. This threat is related to the repeated, organized and systematic use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime, which once again reached new levels of horror with the two attacks perpetrated in Douma on 7 April last. Those attacks claimed the lives of at least several dozen people and wounded hundreds of others. Many of the injured will continue to suffer throughout their lives from the serious respiratory and neurological aftereffects of the chemicals used.There is no doubt once again as to the responsibility of Damascus for this attack. The facts collected on the ground, the symptoms of the victims, the complexity of handling of the substances used, and the determination of the regime's forces to subjugate the last pockets of resistance in Douma as expeditiously as possible and using every means at their disposal, all point to this.This is a well-known and documented modus operandi, given that an independent mechanism, created at the initiative of the Security Council, had already established at least four times since 2015 that chemical weapons had been used by the Damascus regime in Sarmin, Talmenes, Qmenas and Khan Shaykun — an investigative mechanism that a permanent member of the Security Council decided last November to force into silence.The chemical-weapons policy of the Bashar Al-Assad regime is among the most serious violations of all the norms that guarantee our collective security. It is first and foremost a violation of all international obligations relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a party.Secondly, it constitutes a violation of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality.Thirdly, it constitutes a breach of successive Security Council resolutions: resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and therefore a breach of the obligations incumbent upon Syria under the Charter of the United Nations.Lastly, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was banned in 1925 under the Geneva Protocol, constitutes a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Secretary-General in August 2013 called the use of chemical weapons a crime against humanity. That chemical war is a tool to accelerate a deliberate policy of submission by terror, which, in seven years, has caused the deaths of 400,000 people, the deliberate destruction of civilian and health infrastructure in entire regions, a massive exodus of refugees and displaced persons and has fuelled international terrorism. This frightening picture is that of one of the most blatant threats to international peace and security in the contemporary era. It is also the record of those who, against all odds, continue to support it.I will once again have to state the obvious: if Syria has continued to use toxic substances for military purposes, it is because it has retained the capacity to use and manufacture them, in contravention of its international commitments, of the guarantees provided by Russia in the framework of the 2013 Russian-American agreement and of Security Council resolutions.It has already been several years since the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) informed us of the major remaining doubts about the sincerity of Syria's initial declaration to the organization in 2013. Many of the OPCW's questions and requests for documents have gone unanswered. Syria has never provided a satisfactory explanation for the inspectors' discovery of substances and capabilities that Syria had never declared. We saw those capabilities again in action on 7 April, used to kill as many civilians as possible and terrorize the survivors to consolidate the definitive takeover of Douma by the Syrian regime.Beyond Syria, the prevailing impunity since 2013 affects the entire chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it the entire security system that we have collectively built since the Second World War. It is that collective security legacy, built to protect future generations from the outbreaks of violence in the two global conflicts, that the members of the Security Council have been mandated to protect. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without reacting is to let the genie out of the bottle. That would be a terrible setback to international order, for which we would all pay the price.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 9/22 The Security Council, to which the Charter of the United Nations entrusts the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the entire international community, is therefore more than justified in meeting today. It is more than justified for the Council to note, once again, the violation of international law and its own resolutions, and the persistence of a proven threat to international peace and security. It is more than justified to urgently re-establish a mechanism for attributing responsibility for chemical attacks — that opportunity was given to the Council in vain, once again, on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228) with the American draft resolution (S/2018/321).The Council is more than justified in doing what it has committed itself to do, that is, to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. But in the face of the mass atrocities committed in Syria, the Council's action has been paralysed for several years by successive Russian vetoes. Russia vetoed 12 draft resolutions on Syria, including six on the chemical issue alone. Those vetoes had no other objective than to protect the Syrian authorities — to guarantee a regime of impunity, in defiance of all international standards. To allow the indefensible, Russia has deliberately chosen to sacrifice the ability of the Council to act, the most important tool of our collective security. We had proof of that again last Tuesday.On 7 April, Douma joined Ypres, Halabja and Khan Shaykhun in the litany of chemical massacres. I solemnly say that, in deciding to once again use chemical weapons, the regime reached a point of no return on 7 April. France will assume its responsibility to put an end to an intolerable threat to our collective security and to finally ensure respect for international law and the measures taken for years by the Security Council.A chemical attack like that of Douma, which consists in gassing the last inhabitants of a besieged enclave — even when it is about to fall, even when the last fighters are negotiating their surrender — is the height of cynicism. That is where we are after seven years of the regime's war against its people. This is the situation to which the world must provide a firm, united and resolute response. That is our responsibility today.It will also be essential to combat impunity for those responsible for the use of such weapons and, more broadly, for those who are responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Syria. France is fully committed to that endeavour. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we initiated last January. We will also continue to support and assist all international mechanisms in their work to investigate the most serious crimes committed against civilians in Syria.In addition to the chemical issue, continuing violations of international humanitarian law must cease without delay. We ourselves demanded it by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018) — thwarted the day after its adoption by the resumption of bombardments by the regime with the active support of its allies, including those within the Council who had subscribed to the truce. Resolution 2401 (2018) has lost none of its relevance, quite the contrary — full and unhindered humanitarian access to help populations in distress must be implemented throughout the territory. It is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys can reach eastern Ghouta safely and that civilians fleeing hostilities or in need of medical treatment can be protected.Finally, we can only sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis within the framework of a political solution and on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). Only under those conditions can put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people, eradicate terrorism and work together for the stability of the Middle East. We have been calling for a political solution for seven years. May those who join us today in their concern about the consequences of the Syrian crisis finally force the regime to accept negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations.We cannot allow the most fundamental values and standards of humanity, such as those emanating from the Charter of the United Nations, be thwarted and flouted in front of our eyes without reacting. Those values and standards must be defended and protected. That is the reason behind our commitment — to restore the complete ban on chemical weapons set in stone within international conventions, and thereby consolidate the rule of law. It is the responsibility of those who believe, like France, in effective multilateralism led by a respected United Nations.We must stop the Syrian chemical escalation. We cannot allow a country to simultaneously defy the Council and international law. The ability of Damascus to violate all our norms constitutes a threat to international security. Let us put an end to it.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 10/22 18-10728 Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): The Secretary-General has presented a catalogue of danger in the Middle East, including Gaza, Yemen and Iraq. It is no disrespect to those issues that today, like other speakers, I will concentrate on Syria. The United Kingdom will be ready to put its shoulder to the wheel on those other issues when the time comes.The situation we face today and the reason we are in the Security Council today arise wholly and solely from the use of chemical weapons on the Syrian people, most probably by the Syrian regime — not just once, but consistently and persistently over the past five years. The highest degree of responsibility, to quote the Russian Ambassador, is indeed what the Council, and in particular its five permanent members, are for, and it is our duty to uphold.The British Cabinet met recently and concluded that the Al-Assad regime has a track record of the use of chemical weapons and that it is highly likely the regime is responsible for Saturday's attack. This is a further example of the erosion of international law in relation to the use of chemical weapons, as my French and American colleagues have set out, and it is deeply concerning. But more important than that, the use of chemical weapons cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. The British Cabinet has agreed on the need to take action to alleviate humanitarian distress and to deter the further use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime. To that end, we will continue to work with our friends and allies to coordinate an international response.The Secretary-General mentioned the Cold War. Of course, the Cold War was bracketed by East-West cooperation. We have been on the same side as Russia. In April 1945, Russia liberated Vienna as part of our joint efforts to bring peace to Europe. In 1995, it passed the Dayton Accords at part of our joint efforts to bring peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in 2018 the Russians refuse to work with us to bring peace to Syria.Instead, since the first attack on Ghouta and chemical-weapons use, in 2013, the Joint Investigative Mechanism has ascribed two uses of mustard gas to Da'esh, three uses of chlorine to the Syrian regime and one use of sarin to the Syrian regime before the latest attack. As my French colleague has set out, the United Kingdom, the United States and France are members in good standing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are members and supporters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission. In the debates in the Security Council earlier this week, we would have dispatched an investigative mission, had Russia and Bolivia not blocked that effort (see S/PV.8228).Syria is the latest pernicious chronology of Russia's disregard for international law and disrespect for the international institutions we have built together to keep us collectively safe. This is revealed in actions over Georgia 10 years ago, over Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 and over the attack in Salisbury, which we will return to next week.Let me repeat what I said in the Security Council last week. My Government and the British people are not Russophobic. We have no quarrel with the Russian people. We respect Russia as a country. We prefer a productive relationship with Russia, but it is Russia's own actions that have led to this situation.What has taken place in Syria to date is in itself a violation of the United Nations Charter. No purpose or principle of the Charter is upheld or served by the use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians. On the contrary: to stand by and ignore the requirements of justice, accountability and the preservation of the non-proliferation regime is to place all our security — not just that of the Syrian people — at the mercy of a Russian veto. We will not sacrifice the international order we have collectively built to the Russian desire to protect its ally at all costs.The Russian Ambassador set out what Russia is doing on the ground in Syria. He thought that might be inconvenient for me to hear. However, it is not inconvenient for me to point out that Russia has given $5.5 million to the United Nations appeal. The United Kingdom has given a $160 million, and this is part of a contribution totalling $3.5 billion in all. It is not inconvenient for me to say that; it may be inconvenient for the Russian Ambassador to hear it.The Russian Ambassador also asked why we were not joining in and trying to stabilize actions in Syria and bring about peace. We have tried. Indeed, we have tried very hard to support Staffan de Mistura in getting the Geneva political process under way, and we shall continue to so. But we do not join Russia, because, sadly, its efforts have not been to try and restart the Geneva process. Instead, their efforts have been to support Syria in the use of chemical weapons and the 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 11/22 bombardment of the Syrian people. In the area known as T-4, they helped the regime liberate this area but they took their eye off the ball and Da'esh took it back. They took it again, but, sadly, foreign fighters have been able to re-establish themselves there. This is not de-escalation. This is not political progress. This is a gross distortion by Russia of what is actually happening on the ground.The circumstances that we face today are truly exceptional. My colleagues from the United States and France have set out in great detail the catalogue of awful things that are happening to the Syrian people. That catalogue goes to the heart of what the Geneva Conventions, the non-proliferation regime, the United Nations and the Security Council are for. It is not only dangerous what Russia is doing in vetoing our resolutions and in supporting the Syrian regime's actions against its own people. It is ultimately prejudicial to our security. Indeed, it will let Da'esh re-establish itself. It is something that we believe we need to take action to defend.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today, for his efforts and for his good offices.Last weekend, reports once again began to emerge of horrifying allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, this time in Douma, with reports of a large number of civilian casualties. Like many others, we were alarmed by these extremely serious allegations, and we called for an immediate, impartial and thorough investigation to establish the facts. In that regard, we welcome the fact that the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which we fully support, has been deployed to Syria. Full access and cooperation by all parties must now be ensured.I want to reiterate once more that Sweden will spare no effort to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law, it constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and their use in armed conflict is a war crime. The international disarmament and non-proliferation regime must be safeguarded, which is best achieved through true multilateralism and broad international consensus.We share the outrage and the frustration of many in this Chamber about chemical-weapons use in Syria. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year, and we are at a dangerous moment. We fully share the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General about the risks of the current impasse and the need to avoid the situation escalating and spiralling out of control and to pay further attention to the divides, tensions and fault lines in the region, as described again by the Secretary-General this morning.We remain deeply disappointed that the Security Council has been unable to agree and move forward on a substantial, swift, and unified response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We deeply regret that Russia once again used its veto and blocked the Council from taking action this week (see S/PV.8228). Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond have seriously been considered. We are working tirelessly to ensure that no stone is left unturned in efforts to find a way forward in the Security Council. The Secretary-General offered to support such efforts through his good offices, which is an opportunity that should be seized. That is why yesterday we circulated yet another proposal that asks for four things.First, it condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in Syria and expresses alarm at the alleged incident in Douma last weekend, because the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law.Secondly, it demands full access and cooperation for the OPCW Fact-finding Mission, because we need facts and evidence about what happened in Douma last weekend.Thirdly, it expresses the Council's determination to establish a new impartial, objective and independent attribution mechanism based on a proposal by the Secretary-General, because the perpetrators of chemical-weapons attacks must be identified and held to account, and, to that end, we need a new mechanism.Fourthly, it requests the Secretary-General to dispatch immediately a high-level disarmament mission to Syria because we need to resolve all outstanding issues on chemical weapons and rid Syria once and for all possible chemical weapons that might still exist in S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 12/22 18-10728 the country. Such a mission would add political and diplomatic leverage to the necessary technical and professional work of the OPCW. We therefore call on all members of the Council to muster the political will and respond to the appeal by the Secretary-General so as to come together and move forward.The use of chemical weapons is a grave threat to international peace and security. It is indeed deplorable that the Council has not yet been able to come together and agree on a timely and firm response. Even though the use of chemical weapons in itself violates international law, any response must comply with international law and respect the Charter of the United Nations. The time has now come to urgently revert to a political process under United Nations auspices for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015), and for Syria and the Astana guarantors to move forward without further delay and live up to their commitments so that resolution 2401 (2018), which demands the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access, can be fully and urgently implemented. That is the only way to end to the suffering of the Syrian people and end the brutal seven-year-long conflict.We firmly believe that there is a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibilities under the Charter. We believe that there continues to be a way for the Council to come together. We believe that we need to ensure that we have exhausted every peaceful effort and every diplomatic option to stop further atrocities from being carried out in Syria, hold those responsible to account, come to terms once with the chemical-weapons issue in Syria, cease hostilities and find a political solution.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): First of all, on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I thank Secretary-General António Guterres for having illustrated for us the chaotic and dangerous situation currently prevailing in the Middle East by providing a detailed overview of every one of the conflicts in that vulnerable region, from Libya to the desolate and devastating crisis in Syria, which, as all evidence suggests, runs the imminent risk of dramatically deteriorating.In line with the statement of the Secretary-General, we reaffirm Equatorial Guinea's firm belief that in confronting such situations we must always have recourse to dialogue and establish and respect mechanisms intended for achieving the peaceful settlement of conflicts until such options are exhausted. A unilateral military response could be counterproductive, and, far from solving the problem, it would lead to more suffering and chaos than already present, as the Secretary-General indicated — and additional disorder as in case of Libya, with which we are well familiar in Africa, and the consequences of which affect the entire Sahel region and part of Central Africa. We stand categorically against the use of force with the sole exception that it be justified under the conditions set forth under the Charter of the United Nations Charter and that it be used as a last resort after all other means have been exhausted.We are concerned about the rhetoric that is being used. It sounds dangerously familiar to us, and we do not like where it might lead us. We appeal to Governments' sense of responsibility, and in particular to the permanent members of the Security Council, as we believe that they have the additional responsibility of defending the relevance of the Council.We would like to ask the following questions. Who benefits from the inability of the Security Council to make decisions? Are we contributing to delegitimizing the Council? Are we actively eroding the Council's relevance in the international political arena? If the Council is unable to take action, how long will it take before the international community withdraws its faith, hope and trust in the Council?There is no military solution to the Syrian issue. We must therefore continue to look for ways to solve the problem through diplomatic channels. All Council members must act responsibly and agree to establish an independent and impartial monitoring mechanism to ascertain what took place in Douma and ensure accountability and that the perpetrators are brought to justice.The Secretary-General stated his disappointment with the Council's failure to establish a mechanism that would identify and attribute responsibility to those using chemical weapons. We could not agree more with that statement. Only a few days ago, our delegation stated its frustration when the Council failed to adopt three draft resolution put to the vote (see S/PV.8228). The Secretary-General's offer concerning his good offices must be considered, and we must provide him with that opportunity.In conclusion, we reiterate the position of Equatorial Guinea in arguing against and condemning 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 13/22 the use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction regardless of who uses them.Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I thank you, Sir, for having convened this meeting. We welcome the presence of the Secretary-General among us. His assessments are always very precise and useful, and we thank him for the intensive work that he is doing for the benefit of upholding the purposes and principles of the Organization.For some reason, some members of the Security Council are avoiding addressing the main reason for convening this meeting, which is that one State Member has threatened the unilateral use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Much has been said about the use of chemical weapons, and Bolivia would like to make clear its total and absolute condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical agents as weapons as unjustifiable and criminal acts wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed. For their use is a grave crime under international law and against the interests of international peace and security. Those responsible for committing those terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished. We demand a transparent and impartial investigation that must identify those responsible for any act of the use of chemical weapons.Needless to say, it is essential that the Security Council ensures an independent, impartial, complete, conclusive and, above all, depoliticized investigation. We regret that the Security Council has as yet failed to achieve that objective. Nonetheless, we will support all work intended to accomplish that goal. It is crucial that the Council continue to discuss the issue of the use of chemical weapons, but I reiterate that what has brought us together at this meeting is the threat of one State Member' illegal use of force.Over the past 72 years, humankind has built a framework that is not only physical or institutional, but also juridical. Humankind has setup instruments of international law intended precisely to prevent the most powerful from attacking the weakest with impunity so as to establish a balance in the world and prevent grave violations to international peace and security. We have built an international system — the Security Council is clear evidence of it — based on rules. It is the duty of the Council and of all the organs of the United Nations to respect those rules and defend multilateralism. The Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits unilateral action, must be upheld.Another key detail to remember is that the Security Council is not representative of the five permanent members it comprises, nor of its 15 members seated around this table; rather, it represents the entire membership of 193 States, both the nations and their peoples. The Security Council must not be utilized as a sounding board for war propaganda nor interventionism. It should also not be made into a pawn to be sacrificed on the chessboard of war, geopolitics and petty interests.We have heard many stories from history about the prohibition of chemical weapons, and Bolivia is an active participant in that system, but I would like to talk about the story of our Charter. When one is unsure about how to act under certain circumstances, I read that the best way to settle such uncertainty is to recall the principles of the French Revolution and reflect on where the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are upheld. Those principles form part of the genesis of the Charter. Another part comes from the Magna Carta, of course, which, for the first time in history, limited the exercise of power precisely to defend the weakest.Another antecedent to the Charter is the Yalta Conference. I read that the Conference established the system of control and checks and balances, which is the Security Council with its five permanent members. Bolivia did not attend the Conference. As I understand it, just Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were present. The outcome of the Conference was ratified at the San Francisco Conference a few months later in 1945. That is the system that we have agreed to uphold, which is why I believe that is essential to understand the principles of our Charter. Our Charter is not words on page, meant to hand out to tourists visiting the United Nations Headquarters, but rather a set of norms that we have agreed to comply with and uphold. Article 2 states that"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles."Principle 4 of Article 2 reads,"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 14/22 18-10728 any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."That is to say that any use of force must be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter. Any form of unilateral action therefore contravenes international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.Another point worth mentioning is that we have listened, with due respect, to our colleagues speak about the criminal use of chemical weapons, and we completely agree with them on that. However, it would be very dangerous to fight an alleged violation of international law with another violation of international law and the Charter. That is why, in this specific case, we hope that there is an independent, impartial, comprehensive and conclusive investigation.Allow me to offer a clarification to my dear colleague from the United Kingdom. While Bolivia voted against one draft resolution, it voted in favour of two others. It voted against the one because, regrettably, this platform was being exploited for political motives. Draft resolutions are presented for nothing more than the spectacle of it, for the television cameras. Draft resolutions are presented knowing that they will be vetoed, and not all efforts are put forth to reach consensus, though that is what we normally do for resolutions.We believe that this meeting is very important because we not only discussing an attack on a Member State, or the threat of a military strike against a Member State of the United Nations, whichever it may be, but rather because we are living at a time of constant attacks on multilateralism. Let us recall that the achievements in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change have been undermined. Let us recall that the gains reached with the Global Compact for Migration have been eroded. Let us recall that there is a clear policy and mindset of multilateralism subversion. What happens is that for some the discourse on human rights is used until it no longer serves their interests, and then they violate those rights.My region is a witness to that. We endured Operation Condor, as it was called, during the 1970s, which was planned by the intelligence services of some Member States. When democracy did not suit them, they financed coups d'etat. When they were unhappy with the discourse on human rights, they infringed human rights. When the discourse of democracy was no longer enough, they were ready to finance coups d'etat. The use of unilateral practices leaves behind unhealed wounds, despite the passage of time.Some of the members of the Council have spoken on the situation in Iraq and Libya, which I believe are some of the worst crimes that have been committed this century. The invasion of Iraq, with its dire consequences, left more than 1 million dead. The effects of the strikes against Libya and the regime-change policies imposed on it, which, as my colleague from Equatorial Guinea aptly said, they still feel, suffer and endure throughout the entire region of the Sahel and Central Africa. But no one wants to talk about the root causes of those conflicts, and no one will talk about the impunity enjoyed for those serious crimes. It warrants repeating. Those are the most serious crimes committed this century. We hope that all the members of the Security Council, given the high degree of responsibility we have — 10 of us elected by the membership and five enjoy the privilege to have a permanent seat on the Council with the power of veto — must lead by example for the rest of the membership on the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter.By way of conclusion, I would like to reiterate what former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a similar situation in 2013: "The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". That is my appeal. Everything must be addressed within the framework of the Charter. The use of force is legal only in the exercise of the right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the Charter, or when the Security Council approves such action. That was the reason for the meeting, and Bolivia's position is to categorically condemn any threat or use of unilateral force.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would very much like to thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing today. We share his concern about the fact that the Middle East is experiencing crises and challenges that unquestionably represent threats to international peace and security. The situation will undoubtedly deteriorate if the Security Council resolutions are not implemented by the relevant parties.The question of Palestine, the practices of the Israeli occupation there and its continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 15/22 are testament to that. The most recent is its repression of peaceful protests in Gaza and the use of excessive force. That led to the deaths of dozens of civilians and injuries to hundreds as they exercised their legitimate right to demonstrate peacefully in support of the March of Return. Kuwait condemns those Israeli practices in the strongest terms. We regret that the Security Council has not taken action to condemn such acts of repression or to call on the Israeli occupation forces to end them. The Israeli occupying Power should not be an exception. Everyone should respect and abide by international law and the Charter of the United Nations and should implement the relevant Security Council resolutions with the aim of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace that can fulfil the Palestinian people's legitimate political right to establish their own State on their own land, with East Jerusalem as its capital.We have had a number of meetings over the past few days. Today's meeting would not have taken place if we had been able to agree on a new mechanism to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This disagreement has led to deep divisions among the members of the Security Council. We must step up our efforts to advance the stalled political process in Syria. We have been concerned about escalating tensions among all parties since the beginning of the year. Through the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which primarily calls for a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days, we tried to improve the humanitarian situation. Unfortunately, however, it has not been implemented and has in fact been violated in flagrant disregard for the will of the international community.We share the concern and disappointment of the Secretary-General about the deteriorating situation in Syria and the ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons, and support his call for an agreement on a new mechanism to ensure accountability and end impunity in Syria. We reiterate our support for the efforts of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and emphasize that there must be accountability for the perpetrators of those crimes, if they are confirmed.In view of our responsibility as members of the Council, we should do our utmost and not lose hope, and we should continue our efforts to agree on the establishment of an independent, impartial and professional mechanism for attributing responsibility and ensuring accountability. The continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2118 (2013), by the warring parties in Syria further convince us that, in the case of grave violations of human rights or crimes that amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, there should be a moratorium on the use of the veto as a procedural matter, so that such tragedies for innocent civilians are not repeated.The State of Kuwait takes a principled and firm position, in line with that of the League of Arab States. We call for preserving the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria, as well as for a cessation of the violence and hostilities in order to put an end to bloodshed, protect the Syrian people and achieve a peaceful settlement. This would be done under the auspices of the United Nations and through the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Syria, based on the Geneva communiqué of 2012 (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015), with the aim of achieving a political transition agreed on by all sectors of Syrian society and of meeting their legitimate aspirations.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We join others in expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his insightful briefing and personal presence at today's meeting. In our view, since his appointment as steward of this world Organization, he has ceaselessly promoted a very important approach, which is the use of amicable and preventive diplomacy.Following an alert to the world, the Security Council underlined in its first presidential statement of 2018, on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace (S/PRST/2018/1), adopted during Kazakhstan's presidency of the Security Council, that the ways to address conflict may include measures to rebuild trust by bringing Member States together around common goals. That has been particularly important in situations where international relations have featured confrontations and tension behind which the contours of a global war are increasingly apparent. We are right now in a moment when we must exercise special caution and vigilance in making decisions about our actions, especially in the Middle East. We believe that it is time to tap into all the tools available for a comprehensive strategy of preventive diplomacy in order to avoid the very serious consequences of any S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 16/22 18-10728 military action that could have repercussions for global security and stability.The recent escalation of the rhetoric on Syria and the threat of the use of unilateral actions has left the delegation of Kazakhstan deeply concerned about the unfolding situation, which has the potential to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. We all bear a responsibility for complying with international law and order, and none of our countries has the right to violate the Charter of the United Nations or to act or threaten to act unilaterally with respect to a sovereign nation under any pretext, unless that is decided by the Security Council. The Security Council is a collective body and is designed to take balanced decisions with regard to the issues of peace and security. We can agree or disagree, but we are mandated to work together to achieve a decision for which we have to bear a collective responsibility.Kazakhstan believes that the most effective way to prevent conflicts is to use diplomacy and mediation, not military means. We look forward to the next round of talks to be held in Geneva and in our capital, Astana, when the parties will address the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of their respective agreements, among other issues.In addressing the disputes over the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma in Syria, which has provoked the most recent tension in international relations, we consider it necessary to state the following. Kazakhstan strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed. Impunity is not permissible. We should act resolutely to stop any further use of such inhuman weapons, but we should act on the basis of proven facts. In this particular case, where there are doubts about the actual use of a poisonous substance, Kazakhstan calls on the members of the Council to be patient, at least until the expert group of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to Syria is deployed to the site of the alleged attack and can report on the findings of its investigation, particularly given that yesterday we learned that the Syrian Government has granted visas for the OPCW investigators and pledged to facilitate access to the sites of the alleged chemical attack. We should first establish and understand the scientifically and professionally ascertained facts, after which the Council should decide on the appropriate line of action to take.At this stage, any military action or threat of it without the prior approval of the Security Council is undesirable. It could have a long-lasting negative impact that would be very difficult to overcome and could result in unprecedented and unanticipated complications. Kazakhstan remains committed to the Charter of the United Nations and to all Security Council resolutions aimed at resolving the political and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict. We believe it is crucial to exercise restraint and refrain from any rhetoric that might exacerbate the already fragile and volatile situation. Such a pause for reflection on the consequences is essential to preserving international peace and security.In the light of the prevailing circumstances, it is more critical than ever that all Council members implement resolution 2401 (2018). The crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and the relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Lastly, we fully endorse the views articulated by the Secretary-General on 11 April about the risks of the current impasse that we are witnessing today (see SG/SM/18984). We must at all costs avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Our ultimate goal should be to put an end to the horrific suffering of the Syrian people and to help them to move forward on a path of peace and progress.Once again, this is an alarming moment, and we need to work together to restore unity and effectiveness in the Security Council by rebuilding trust and consensus in order to preserve global peace and security. We need cooperation within the Council to establish a workable attribution mechanism, which we passionately advocated today in this Chamber. Let us make it happen and transform our words into real deeds. The delegation of Kazakhstan is ready for that and calls on its colleagues to go the extra mile in that direction.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and deeply appreciate his efforts to weigh in on the grave challenge that we are facing, in order to ensure that what should and must be avoided will not happen because of miscalculation or a lack of thoughtfulness or of appreciation for the tremendous responsibility that the Security Council, especially its permanent members, bears. The Cold War is back with a vengeance, the Secretary-General said, but this time, he went on to tell us, in a less managed 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 17/22 manner. It is difficult to quarrel with him. His approach was quite comprehensive, focusing, as he said, on the multiplicity of dangerous conflicts that the Middle East is facing. While his approach may be better, I choose to focus on Syria because it is the current flashpoint.Following the alleged chemical attacks in Douma, it is regrettable that the Council was not able to adopt a resolution to create an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism for identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This is a problem that has been with us for some time and a reality that sadly reflects the lack of unity in the Council even on matters that are manifestly in the common interest of all. We certainly welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission to Syria to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemicals as weapons. We have repeatedly stated that using chemicals as weapons is inhumane, and we condemn their use by any actor under any circumstances. One matter remains, and that is establishing a mechanism for attribution. We hope that will be done as soon as possible, but that does not mean that in the meantime we should cease to exercise maximum restraint in the interests of peace.Right now, pragmatic considerations and simple rational calculation suggest that we must get our priorities right. We need to continue to live if we are to be able to fight evil. We have continued to express our deep concern about the current dynamics in Syria and their devastating implications for regional and international peace and security. We fully concur with the Secretary-General, who stressed in his statement of 11 April that it is vital to ensure that the situation does not spiral out of control (see SG/SM/18984). He stressed that legitimate concern again today. The Security Council, as the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should not and cannot allow that to happen. At a time when we are talking about preventive diplomacy — as well as after appointing a Secretary-General who told us, in his maiden speech to the Council (see S/PV.7857), that prevention is not merely a priority, but the priority — now is the time for the United Nations to undertake the search for diplomacy for peace in earnest. If we are seriously committed to moving our Organization from a culture of reaction to one of prevention, now is the time to stand firm, speak with one voice and take proactive and collective action that can be respected by all major stakeholders.That requires the Council to be united for global peace and security. We know that is difficult, but we believe that we have no other sane option. This is the time for the Security Council to stand up and be counted. The Security Council is the custodian of the Charter of the United Nations, which, growing out of the devastation of the Second World War, promised to save succeeding generations from that scourge. That is a clarion call the Council should heed and act on. The situation should not be allowed to spiral out of control. The Secretary-General is right and the Council should listen to him.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and insightful briefing. His statement rightly focused on the broader Middle East. However, I will focus on the most pressing issue at hand, the use of chemical weapons in Syria.The Charter of the United Nations starts with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations", and while the Russian Federation is blocking the Council from taking effective action on the crimes of Russia's ally Syria, all peoples of every nation are outraged by the continued unrestrained violence that the Syrian regime has unleashed against its own people. As the Secretary-General just said, the people of Syria have lived through a litany of horrors. No responsible Government can ignore the universal outrage that those horrors have provoked.Our collective incapacity in the Council to stop the crimes in Syria should weigh heavily on the conscience of all our members, but on the conscience of one permanent member in particular. It was our collective conscience that created the Charter of the United Nations. It was our collective conscience that created the Chemical Weapons Convention. The use of chemical weapons is unlawful in and of itself. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity.We strongly believe that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. As the Secretary-General just said, the norm against the use of chemical weapons must be upheld. The non-proliferation regime must be upheld. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria is therefore neither optional S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 18/22 18-10728 nor negotiable. The images of last weekend's attack in Douma are appalling. Atrocities have once again been inflicted on Syria's civilian population. Once again, dozens of innocent civilians have been killed and hundreds injured. The Kingdom of the Netherlands believes that it is highly likely that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack. It has a proven history of such attacks, having used chemicals as a weapon against its own people in 2014, 2015 and 2017. It is unacceptable that four years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, its declarations can still not be verified as accurate or complete.The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a long-time supporter of fighting impunity when it comes to chemical weapons. Regrettably, all attempts to achieve accountability in the Council have failed. Referral to the International Criminal Court was vetoed. The renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was also vetoed. This week, accountability was again vetoed. With its vetoes, the Russian Federation has assumed much responsibility for the crimes committed by the Syrian regime. The draft resolution for a new accountability mechanism that was vetoed this week remains the bare minimum of what is acceptable to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism that can ensure that the culprits of that vicious attack will be identified and held accountable.No veto can wipe from our memory the clear findings presented by the JIM on the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime and Da'esh. No veto can stop our compassion for the victims of the chemical-weapon attack last weekend. No veto can end our determination to achieve justice for the victims and for the people of Syria as a whole.In conclusion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands remains committed to fighting impunity. We reiterate our strong support for an international, impartial and independent mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice. At the heart of our policy on Syria is a deep desire for peace and justice for its people. Impunity cannot and will not prevail.Let me end with warm words of appreciation to the Secretary-General and his tireless efforts for justice and the international legal order.Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive briefing and to assure him of our full support in finding a political solution to all conflicts, not just the one in Syria.Since we are discussing the situation in the Middle East and in particular the current situation in Syria, let me begin with a very sad observation. Even with our unanimously adopted resolutions, such as resolution 2401 (2018), we are still not seeing any substantial change on the ground. The fighting is far from being over and the human suffering is tremendous. Taking into consideration the current situation and the growing risk of the loss of human life owing simply to a lack of food or medicine, we should try to do our utmost to find possible ways to ensure that life-saving aid convoys can reach those in need. Unfortunately, that applies not only to eastern Ghouta but also to Idlib and Aleppo provinces. We must find a way to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Syrians. The civilian population in Syria has already suffered too much.International public opinion is watching our meetings and sees our lack of agreement on the most basic principles under international humanitarian law. The Council bears enormous responsibility and will be held accountable for its actions. We therefore call on the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that all the parties to the conflict, especially the regime and its allies, implement the ceasefire, enable humanitarian access and medical evacuations and fully engage in the United Nations-led talks in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), which represent the best path to peace.With regard to the issue of chemical weapons, a century ago that was a normal way to wage war. Just recently we commemorated the hundredth anniversary of the first use of chemical weapons, on the Western and Eastern fronts of the First World War alike. French, British, American and other Allied soldiers were targeted with chlorine in Ypres, while Russian soldiers were dying from the same gruesome weapons in Bolimów, now part of Polish territory. Now, a century later, we are being challenged by these ghastly weapons yet again. Our nations are seeing the effects of the same 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 19/22 toxic gas through the images of civilians who sought refuge in basements in Ghouta and other areas in Syria.Chemical weapons were banned when the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) cam into effect in 1997. We had begun a new chapter in the history of non-proliferation and disarmament. All of us in this Chamber agree that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere is deplorable and unacceptable. Can we really allow the success story of the CWC to be reversed? Will the Security Council allow the vision of a world free of chemical weapons to be destroyed? It is regrettable that the establishment of an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria was vetoed on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228), thereby enabling those responsible for chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law and is central to achieving durable peace in Syria. As members of the Security Council, we must find a way to reach agreement on how to properly respond to chemical attacks in Syria. We hope to see the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) deployed to Douma as soon as possible. We reiterate our appreciation to the Director-General and staff of the OPCW for their commitment to its goals and work, often in particularly challenging circumstances.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire thanks Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing on new developments in the critical situation in several countries in the Middle East, in particular Syria, since the Security Council considered the issue on 9 and 10 April (see S/PV. 8225 and S/PV. 8228).Despite the relative lull in the fighting in Syria, the humanitarian situation remains troubling in the light of the allegations of the recurring use of chemical weapons by parties to the conflict. As a result of its internal divisions, despite our goodwill, the Council has failed to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need. In the light of the continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, the Council was unable to reach an agreement on a statement that at the very least would have conveyed our solidarity to the Syrian people at this difficult time. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire remains concerned by the current impasse in the Security Council, which has, unfortunately, prevented it from reaching agreement on a mechanism to combat impunity vis-à-vis the use of chemical weapons in Syria.In this context, we reiterate our support for the impartial, transparent, independent investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with the aim of shedding light on allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta.Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of any use of chemical weapons, by any party, during peacetime or during wartime. Once again we beseech members of the Council to unite so as to set aside their differences and successfully set up an accountability mechanism to ensure that those who use chemical weapons are held accountable.We remain alarmed by the tensions stemming from the current political impasse, and we encourage the Secretary-General to make use of his good offices with stakeholders to restore peace and calm, in order to prevent any further escalation of the situation. To that end, my country invites all parties to exercise restraint so as to peacefully resolve this issue and in so doing safeguard international peace and security, which is our shared legacy.Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms our conviction and our principled position that there can be no military response to the crisis in Syria. The solution needs to be sought through dialogue and an inclusive political process, as stipulated in the road map set out by resolution 2254 (2015). My country remains convinced that dialogue alone will lead us to an equitable settlement of the conflict in Syria.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru.We would like to express our gratitude for the briefing by Secretary-General António Guterres and to thank him for his willingness to help to achieve a solution to the impasse in which the Security Council currently finds itself. We encourage him to continue to spare no effort in this respect, in line with the prerogatives conferred upon him by the Charter of the United Nations.Peru expresses its deep-rooted concern at the divisions that have emerged in the Council, in particular between its permanent members, and at the regrettable use of the veto, which limits our capacity to maintain S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 20/22 18-10728 international peace and security and to resolve the humanitarian conflicts and crises that form our agenda.We note with alarm the fact that the conflict in Syria continues to involve atrocity crimes committed with impunity and that it has deteriorated into a serious threat to regional and global stability, to the point where it is giving rise to serious tensions.With respect to reports of the further use of chemical weapons in Douma, we believe it necessary to resume, as a matter of urgency and in a renewed spirit of compromise, negotiations that will lead to ensuring full access, as required, for the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is being deployed in Syria to determine what happened; and to create a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial mechanism to attribute responsibility.On that understanding, we believe it important to recall once again that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that any response to the barbaric events taking place in that country must be in keeping with the norms of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.We recall also that in its resolution 2401 (2018), the Council ordered a humanitarian ceasefire throughout the entire Syrian territory, and that it is urgent to make headway in the political process in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). As the Secretary-General himself said, of particular concern is the potential threat posed by the current deadlock. We must at all costs prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. This must not occur given that our duty is to put an end to the suffering of millions of people and to impunity for atrocity crimes.Peru reiterates its commitment to living up to the lofty responsibility that the maintenance of international peace and security entails. My delegation will continue to work towards a solution to the conflict and protect the Syrian people, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.I would like to recall the statement by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2017/507, on the length of interventions.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): First, I should like, on behalf of my Government, to express our condolences to the people and the Government of Algeria in connection with the tragic military plane crash that claimed the lives of 247 passengers.Secondly, I welcome the participation of the Secretary-General in this very important meeting. I thank him for his comprehensive and accurate briefing, which made clear that he and others in the Council did in fact understand this meeting's agenda item. He spoke in a manner commensurate with the threats to international peace and security posed by the allegations and accusations against my country and its allies.My colleague the Ambassador of Sweden said that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime. This is true. I agree with him, as does my Government. However, I would ask him whether he believes that war in itself is a crime and needs to be stopped and prevented. Perhaps this would be a very good title for a book by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and perhaps this would make clear to Member States that war in itself is a crime.My colleague the representative of the United States said that the Syrian chemical weapons that killed civilians had been used 50 times; that is what she said. Chemical weapons were used 50 times and killed 200 civilians. Imagine that — the Syrian Government reversed the course of the global terrorist war against my country by killing only 200 civilians after having used chemical weapons 50 times. Are these not the words of amateurs? This is a scenario for DC Comics' Superman series. Is that how the White House strategists think — that a certain Government has used chemical weapons 50 times to kill 200 civilians? How is that logical?My American colleague overlooked one important detail — that her country, on board the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the Syrian chemical stockpiles in the Mediterranean, along with ships from Denmark and Norway. How could it be that the experts in the United States delegation did not tell her that Ms. Sigrid Kaag told the Security Council in June 2014 that there were no more chemical stockpiles in Syria. Could they have simply forgotten all of that?Some believe that the massive western military forces in the eastern Mediterranean are due to a Sufi Western affection for a handful of terrorist yobs in 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 21/22 Douma. By the way, those yobs were chased out to the North, as the Council is aware. They are now on their way to Saudi Arabia and thence to Yemen. They will be recycled and used on other fronts, including Yemen. No, the massive military forces in the Mediterranean do not target that handful of terrorists. They target the State of Syria and its allies. That should be the topic discussed today in this meeting.My colleague the American Ambassador was not horrified that her country used 20 million gallons of Agent Orange in Viet Nam in 1961, killing and injuring 3 million Vietnamese. Four hundred thousand children are born with deformities every year due to the use of Agent Orange at that time. She was not horrified by her country's forces killing thousands of Syrians in Raqqa and thousands of Iraqis in Fallujah and Mosul through the use of white phosphorus, which is a chemical weapon. I ask my colleague, the Ambassador of Sweden: Is that not a war crime?I would like to read a remark of the former Defence Minister of Britain, Mr. Doug Henderson. He spoke of the use by his country and the United States of white phosphorus in Iraq. I would ask my friend the British Ambassador to listen to this. Mr. Henderson said that it was unbelievable that the United Kingdom would occupy a country — meaning Iraq — to look for chemical weapons and at the same time use chemical weapons against that very same country.George Orwell, the well-respected and ethical Western author said: "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act". The truth that needs to be told today is that three permanent members of the Security Council are dragging the entire world once again towards the abyss of war and aggression. They seek to obstruct the Council's work in maintaining international peace and security, which is the main principle agreed upon and endorsed by our founding fathers when they adopted the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco on 26 June, 1945. Even though my colleague, the Ambassador of Bolivia has already read it out, I would like to once again remind the Council of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter:"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".The truth that needs to be told today is that those three States have a legacy based on fallacies and fabricated narratives in order to launch wars, occupy States, control their resources and change their governing systems. The truth that needs to be told today is that the entire world and the Council stand witnesses to the invasion, occupation and destruction of Iraq based on a United States lie in this very Chamber 14 years ago. They stand witnesses to France's exploitation of the Council to destroy Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians while ending the future of an entire people for the very simple reason that its President at the time, Mr. Sarkozy, wanted a cover up for his financial corruption. This is an ongoing case, of which members are all aware. However, some countries still fall for those lies promoted by those very same States in order to attack my country, Syria.God bless the days when France the policies of Charles de Gaulle in the Council followed and repudiated the aggression of the United States and Britain against Iraq. We yearn for those days. France no longer respects the policies of Charles de Gaulle and is now one of the countries that launch attacks against other countries.The truth that needs to be told today is that the international community has not sought to rein in those who are reckless and undermine international relations, subjecting them to disaster time and again since the establishment of this international Organization. Our biggest fear is that if the international community does not come together to end the abuse of those who are reckless, then the Organization will die in circumstances very similar to that which led to the death of the League of Nations.The truth that needs to be told today is that after the failure of the United States, Britain, France and their proxies in our region to achieve their objectives in Syria through providing all forms of support to the armed terrorist groups, we see them today tweeting and bragging about their nice, new and smart rockets, and defying international legitimacy from the Council Chamber. They dispatch war planes and fleets to achieve what their terrorists have failed to achieve over the past seven years.The truth that needs to be told today is that the Syrian Government liberated hundreds of thousands of civilians in eastern Ghouta from the practices of armed terrorist groups that used them as human shields, held S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 22/22 18-10728 them hostage for years and prevented any medical or food assistance from reaching them. The terrorist groups used the schools, homes and hospitals of those civilians as military bases to launch attacks on 8 million civilians in Damascus.The truth that needs to be told today is that some reckless people are pushing international relations towards the abyss based on a fake video prepared by the terrorist White Helmets, pursuant to instructions by Western intelligence.The truth that needs to be told today is that the so-called international alliance used its war planes to serve Da'esh in order to block the victory of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against that terrorist organization. That international alliance made the White Helmets its media division to fabricate and falsify incidents in order to benefit the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.The government of my country took the initiative to invite the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to dispatch its Fact-finding Mission to visit Syria and the alleged site of the incident in Douma. The Government of my country has provided all the facilitation needed for the team to work in a transparent and accurate manner. The team is supposed to start its work in a few hours. This invitation was issued out of strength, confidence and diplomatic experience, not because we are weak or afraid and giving in to bullying or threats.The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms the Governments of these three States for launching their threats to use power in a flagrant violation of Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which identifies the primary purpose of the United Nations as the maintenance of international peace and security and the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches to peace.With the exception of the United States, Britain and France, we all understand that the Security Council is the organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security and should stand against attempts to impose the law of the jungle and the rule of the powerful. However, some Member States think that the United Nations is just a private business company that works on the basis of pecuniary interests, market rules and the principle of supply and demand to determine the fate of peoples and States, and that use it as a platform for cheap theatrics and the dissemination of lies. This is the truth that disappoints the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world.I am not reinventing the wheel in this Chamber. The history of our relations with those States is filled with agony, pain and bitterness as a result of their very well-known policies of aggression. Another more important and shocking truth that should be told today is that the silence of the majority with respect to those aggressive policies does not constitute collusion with these States, but it does arise from fear of their arrogance and political blackmail, economic pressure and aggressive record. Those States do not blink when they go after anyone who is telling the truth.In conclusion, if those three States — the United States, Britain and France — think they can attack us and undermine our sovereignty and set out to do so, we would have no other choice but to apply Article 51 of the Charter, which gives us the legitimate right to defend ourselves. This is not a threat the way they do; it is a promise. This is a promise. We will not let anyone attack our sovereignty.Why do I say that this is a promise? I say this because a thought commonly ascribed to the great United States leader George Washington, who lived more than 200 years ago comes to mind — the sound that is louder than that of the cannons is the sound of the truth that emanates from the heart of a united nation that wants to live free. We in Syria also have leaders and prominent figures as great as George Washington. They are doing the same thing for Syria — protecting the unity and sovereignty of their country.The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

Abstract: In the 1st and 2nd millenniums B.C. there were numerous fortified centers in Mesopotamia. These were large, occupying several dozen acres in the forms of independent city-states, mid-sized urban centers, and smaller, specialized settlements. They were usually located on important transport routes, such as the two main rivers of the region, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and their numerous tributaries. The defensive walls were constructed to demonstrate the influence of a given center and its military strength, and to protect against floods or enemy invasions. The defensive brick architecture in Mesopotamia dates back from the end of the Early Bronze Age to the end of the Early Iron Age. On the basis of the available information from archaeological research, we don't have enough evidence to make conclusive judgements. Studies arranged by archeologists who worked there, found the remains of fortifications. By chance, scientists found fortifications that date from the Middle Bronze period, which they did not study carefully. That's why we do not have enough information about the details of fortifications systems, especially those from the first millennium B.C, especially Assyrian and Babylonian fortifications. However, based on the available information, I have been able to put forward an outline about fortification. It is worthy of mentioning that no known summary currently exists within publications about Mesopotamian brick defensive architecture, so I have been inspired to follow and analyze the fortified systems in each of the cities in Mesopotamia during the aforementioned time period. The principal aim of my doctoral thesis is to analyze the fortifications systems, their functionality and usefulness during military conflicts in all the fortificated settlements in Mesopotamia from the end of the Early Bronze Age to the end of the Early Iron Age. With a dual focus upon the concept of defensive systems, and the practical matters of implementing these kinds of defensive projects. I intend to Calculate the amount (brick burnt, dried bricks, and stone), labor resources and time necessary to build this kind of construction. As a result, I have endeavoured to create one a thesis that contains both the information and accurate descriptions of all defensive systems in Mesopotamia in one document. There is no similar thesis about defense fortification systems of all Mesopotamians cities from the end of Early Bronze Age to the end of the Early Iron Age. The analysis is based on a working hypothesis which pursues the idea that fortification architecture consists of a wide range of social and cultural elements, which have influenced those in society who created them and drawn from the historical context when they appeared. Straight-lined defenses are simple and useful functionally as an architectural genre. We should note that in architectural projects some elements were created as a psychological deterrent. However military architecture also has functional purposes. Meaning that not only are they the result of military needs, but also of local geographical, environmental factors and available technology. Factors such as the variability of fortifications can be explained by a more complex interaction of factors related to the character of fasteners within a manmade environment. As such, the environment can be fasteners have a wide range of functions and meanings, for example in the organization of space for defense purposes and in accordance with the principles, needs, values and desires of its builders, as well as in the organization of time and building materials. My PhD thesis is based on nine analytical chapters, which present the whole issue of brick architecture and defensive systems - from making brick materials to importing rare materials from other places and meanwhile descriptions of archeological side to make an analysis of the whole building process of defensive walls and elements strengthening the fortifications within the defensive system. In my study, I would like to convey a point raised which was not take from a long time. At the same time, I want to present a general outline of all fortified cities in Mesopotamia, basing on the available information and my own interpretation regarding each of the mentioned walls in this work. Another issue is the dating of discovered fortifications, detailed analysis of the structure, also contains information on how to build systems of this type, what type of material was used, what brick dimensions can be found, whether additional elements were strengthening the construction; what system the foundation was erected. I would also like to present my interpretation based on an analysis of the entire defense system in a way that outlines the defensive architecture of each fortified city during the period under review. The next step will be to analyze the structure and the techniques of construction of the gate or gates located in the defensive walls, and the last point is the calculation of the amount of brick and stone, with the number of workers, to determine how much time is needed to build one spatial meter. One more aspect should be noted which determined the way fortifications were built. They were, next to the military force, a symbol of the economic power of the state or city. The epicenter was not able to secure its territory with a massive wall. So construction was also dependent upon considerable economic resources. We derive our information from the transport records of 370 burnt bricks from the places where they were produced - this took place outside the city due to the use of manure in the production process. The price of 370 piece is about 1 shigel which corresponds to 8.5 grams of silver. I think that it is possible to roughly Calculation of the amount of material, the number of workers and the amount of time in which the size of one cubic meter of wall could be built. This estimation is because there is no complete archaeological information giving the exact dimensions of the fortification walls (height, width and length). At the same time, we know that within the fortification buildings there were also rooms about which we have no information. Considering such significant deficiencies in information, I adopted one cubic meter for conversion. We know that the fortification systems included various elements; along with the walls there were ramparts, moats and escarpments. In addition, there were buttresses, retaining walls, shafts and reinforcing walls. As we know, defensive walls or moats often turned out to be insufficient. At that time, additional solutions were included in the system to raise security standards, effective defense, and to facilitate transport and communication. These took the form of towers and gates. Techniques for building defense systems differed from each other depending on the time of creation and location, or rather the ground of a given geographical region. We note that the walls may have stone foundations, burnt brick, or not have them at all - erected only on level ground. For example, in the city of Assur, several types of bricks were used to construct one wall, or in Niniveh a space filled with clay and stones were preserved between its parallel walls. In the construction at Tell Rijim the technique of pisé was used, consisting of laying thin plates of compacted clay. The appearance of fortifications in the Middle East, especially in Mesopotamia, did not only fulfill the military functions but they had other functions, in order to protect the city from the flood because these towns were located in the lower part of Mari, and also had the function of protecting a given city from wild animals, and also to protect the city from thefts and control the cities and find out who was leaving the city and who was entering the city. From the point of view of my dissertation, the main topic is the strategic nature of these defences. The goal is to clarify the functions of fortified cities, to analyze the strength of resistance and to what extent they were effective in protecting against the enemy. We already know from archeological sources that various types of tools were placed on the defensive walls. They are characterized by their diversity, depending on the location on the walls but also upon the city being researched, and at what period. Based on the information from the descriptions, we can determine the types of tools, as well as the width of the walls - about 1.5 to 2 metres and a height of 3 to 4 m - based on the description of the reference point where the archers shot their arrows from. Common swords and spears were used in direct contact. The subject of military equipment is quite an extensive area, so I have decided to deal strictly with the topic of tools used for defence. I will trace their types and usage throughout the different periods of Mesopotamian culture. In the chronological part I did not deal with the analysis of the dates of creation of given archaeological sites. The organization requires designing a table for each defense system, separately for individual archaeological sites. Looking at the cross-section of the subject, we note the differences in dating north and south of the Mesopotamian areas. They are particularly noticeable between the ancient periods in OldBabylon and Old-Assyrian, Middle-Babylon and Middle-Assyrian, and the Neo-Babylonian period and Neo- Assyrian. In my work, there are descriptions and analsys of all known archeological research, which were conducted on the area of ancient Mesopotamia, in places where fortifications systems were discovered. While creating descriptions of fortifications, I have tried to present the most comprehensive range of usefulness of these types of structures. I traced the process of creating fortifications, the processes of their improvement and the changes that have occurred in their structure, since the appearance of the first buildings with the character of fortifications in the 6th millennium B.C. At this time, we date fortifications in Tell Es Sawwan, located in the middle part of the Tigris river. Fortified sites arose in the time of Samarra, around 5300 B.C. They took the form of a massive shaft surrounded by a rectangular settlement measuring 220x110 m. We estimate the appearance of fortified cities at between fifth millennium - and fourth millennium B.C. They were admittedly still single, but in third millennium B.C., the fortifications became the norm in centers of social life. We note the existence of more than 40 fortified cities in the areas of northern Mesopotamia. Southern Mesopotamia was developing in this direction at the beginning of third millennium B.C., as demonstrated by the example of the Khaburu Valley. The exception here is the wall surrounding the citadel of Tell Chuera, which dates from an earlier period - fourth millennium B.C. If we look at analyse of individual technical solutions, the type material which was used in the Early Jazirah we can see that it is a period of defensive sollutions so called granary settlements (Tell Atij,) and fortification from the Kranzhugel tribute group. In the era of around third millennium B.C. we have already observed numerous cities with fortification systems created using the latest construction techniques and building materials of the era. The use of brick and stone testify to the economic power of individual centers, but also to the growth of defensive architecture. Interpretations of the Mesopotamian inscriptions found on the walls of fortification systems are of key importance to us. Thanks to their understanding, we have obtained information about the dates of construction of those defensive walls, and thus bringing significant knowledge about entire systems and their structures. Attention should be paid to the comarchaeological site of these texts - they often start with the worship of the deity, then the introduction which always contains the royal name. We know that the introduction may have various elements, for example the royal genealogy, praiseworthy epithets, and sometimes the king's important deeds and achievements and his campaigns are mentioned. In the next part - which is crucial to our topic - we can find fragments detailing reports of the construction, usually referring to specific buildings. This type of record was intended primarily for subsequent rulers - so that they could rebuild the given building - while being an invaluable source for modern researchers. Through analysis of the iconography of the Mesopotamian fortifications, images of fortifications are also found on seals. They usually capture the attack and defense scenes of a fortified city. The images are different - some present the walls only as an outline, others show details - which include even individual panels, from which the gates were made. The defensive walls are accompanied by images of people. The people in question are usually defenders or invaders. We can also distinguish between them women and children - often as hostages. We are able to distinguish types of weapons, usually these are bows, missiles, chariots and siege engines. Due to the general availability and thus low cost, mud was the basic building material. We find it in virtually every type of architecture in ancient Mesopotamia. Depending on the function and nature of the buildings, pure clay or clay mixtures with other materials such as straw were used. But it was also used as raw brick or as a material for creating finishing elements. The importance of this type of material cannot be understated due to its durability and the strength of constructions built from it, therefore, I will also address this topic in my work. I will analyze the brick itself and its variations according to appearance, shape and the production process. Treating this topic broadly, I intend to refer to the changes and evolution of this type of building material over various periods in the area of work. In this dissertation, I also wish to address the issue of transport in ancient Mesopotamia. The main means of transportation here is by river due to the presence of large rivers - the Tigris and Euphrates. Their course covers three important countries in this part of the world - Turkey, Syria and the areas of current Iraq to the shores of the Persian Gulf - creating an ideal transport channel for goods and people. It should be noted that river transport was a convenient, cheap and easy way of moving goods. It also became a means of communication. Probably its biggest role was in trade - for example - building materials transported from north to south Mesopotamia, where resources such as stones and wood didn't exist, or for the transportation of ready goods from the place of production to the destination. It is impossible to ignore the fact that various types of ship began to be built depending on their purpose, as discussed later in the dissertation. After my considerations I would like to cover the problem holistically. Because the subject matter of my thesis is very large, it has forced me to produce detailed conclusions for each chapter through interpretation and analysis, and at the end of my work I shall present a general conclusion about the whole thesis. The difficulty of thoroughly analyzing the topic boils down to the problem of information scarcity. The fact that archeological strata is not available, that is why constructors did not undertake full reconstruction of fortification walls. They were found many times by accident and the research was carried out only on a small fragment of the uncovered wall, which currently makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the subject and address the issue from a fully informed perspective. Resumen: En los milenios I y II a.C. existían numerosos centros fortificados en Mesopotamia. Éstos eran grandes, ocupando varias docenas de acres en forma de ciudades-estado independientes, centros urbanos de tamaño medio y asentamientos más pequeños y especializados. Normalmente estaban situados en importantes rutas de transporte, como los dos principales ríos de la región, el Tigris y el Éufrates, y sus numerosos afluentes. Las murallas defensivas se construyeron para demostrar la influencia de un determinado centro y su fuerza militar, y para protegerse contra las inundaciones o las invasiones enemigas. La arquitectura defensiva de ladrillos en Mesopotamia se data desde finales de la Edad de Bronce hasta el final de la Primera Edad de Hierro no ha sido suficientemente estudiada en base a la información disponible de la investigación arqueológica. Los estudios realizados por los arqueólogos que trabajaron allí descubrieron los restos de fortificaciones y ocasionalmente, los científicos encontraron fortificaciones que datan del periodo del Bronce Medio, pero que no estudiaron cuidadosamente. Por eso no tenemos suficiente información sobre los deTelles de los sistemas de fortificaciones, especialmente los del primer milenio a.C., sobre todo las fortificaciones asirias y babilónicas. Sin embargo, en base a la información disponible he podido presentar una propuesta sobre el tema de las fortificaciones. Me gustaría mencionar, que no existe actualmente ninguna síntesis conocida dentro de las publicaciones sobre la arquitectura defensiva mesopotámica en ladrillo, por lo que me he basado en el seguimiento y análisis de los sistemas fortificados en cada una de las ciudades de Mesopotamia durante el período de tiempo mencionado El objetivo principal de mi tesis doctoral es analizar los sistemas de fortificaciones, su funcionalidad y utilidad durante los conflictos militares en todos los asentamientos fortificados de Mesopotamia desde el final de la temprana Edad del Bronce hasta el final de la temprana Edad del Hierro. Con un doble enfoque en el concepto de sistemas defensivos, y en los aspectos prácticos de la implementación de estos proyectos defensivos. Pretendo calcular la suma de materiales (ladrillos cocidos, ladrillos secos y piedra), los recursos de mano de obra y el tiempo necesario para construir este tipo de construcción. Como resultado, me he esforzado en crear una síntesis que contenga tanto la información como las descripciones precisas de todos los sistemas defensivos en Mesopotamia en un solo documento. No existe una publicación similar sobre los sistemas de defensa y fortificación de las ciudades de Mesopotamia desde el final de la temprana Edad del Bronce hasta el final de la temprana Edad del Hierro. El análisis se basa en una hipótesis de trabajo que persigue la idea de que la arquitectura de fortificación está compuesta por un amplio abanico de elementos sociales y culturales, que han influido en aquellos que la han creado en la sociedad y que han sido extraídos del contexto histórico en el que aparecieron. Las defensas de línea recta son sencillas y útiles funcionalmente como género arquitectónico. Debemos notar que en los proyectos arquitectónicos algunos elementos fueron creados como un disuasivo psicológico. Sin embargo, la arquitectura militar también tiene propósitos funcionales. Esto significa que no sólo son el resultado de las necesidades militares, sino también de factores geográficos y ambientales locales y de la tecnología disponible. Factores como la variabilidad de las fortificaciones pueden explicarse por una interacción más compleja de factores relacionados con el carácter de los elementos de fijación dentro de un entorno creado por el hombre. Como tal, el entorno puede ser que los elementos de fijación tengan una amplia gama de funciones y significados, por ejemplo, en la organización del espacio para fines de defensa y de acuerdo con los principios, necesidades, valores y deseos de sus constructores, así como en la organización del tiempo y los materiales de construcción. Mi tesis doctoral se basa en nueve capítulos analíticos, que presentan toda la problemática de la arquitectura del ladrillo y los sistemas defensivos -desde la fabricación de materiales de construcción hasta la importación de materiales raros de otros lugares y al mismo tiempo, descripciones del aspecto arqueológico para hacer un análisis de todo el proceso de construcción de muros y elementos defensivos que refuerzan las fortificaciones dentro del sistema defensivo. En mi tratado quiero transmitir un punto planteado que no se ha tardado mucho tiempo. Al mismo tiempo, quiero presentar un esquema general de todas las ciudades fortificadas de Mesopotamia, basándome en la información disponible y en mi propia interpretación de cada una de las murallas mencionadas en este trabajo. Otro tema es la datación de las fortificaciones descubiertas, el análisis deTellado de la estructura, que también contiene información sobre cómo construir sistemas de este tipo; qué tipo de material se utilizó, qué dimensiones de los ladrillos pueden encontrarse; si los elementos adicionales estaban reforzando la construcción; qué sistema de cimentación fue erigido. También me gustaría presentar mi interpretación basada en un análisis de todo el sistema de defensa, de manera que se esboce la arquitectura defensiva de cada ciudad fortificada durante el período en cuestión. El siguiente paso será analizar la estructura y las técnicas de construcción de la puerta o puertas situadas en las murallas defensivas, y el último punto es el cálculo de la cantidad de ladrillo y piedra, con el número de trabajadores empleados, para determinar cuánto tiempo se necesita para construir un metro de longitud. Hay que señalar un aspecto más que determinó la forma en que se construyeron las fortificaciones. Eran, junto a la fuerza militar, un símbolo del poder económico del estado o la ciudad. El centro no podía asegurar su territorio con una masiva muralla. Por lo tanto, la construcción dependía también de considerables recursos económicos. La información la obtenemos de los registros de transporte de 370 ladrillos cocidos de los lugares donde se producían -esto se produjo fuera de la ciudad debido al uso de estiércol en el proceso de producción. El precio de 370 piezas es de aproximadamente 1 shigel, lo que corresponde a 8,5 gramos de plata. Creo que es posible calcular aproximadamente la cantidad de material, el número de trabajadores y el tiempo en que se podría construir un fragmento del tamaño de un metro cúbico de muralla. Esta estimación se debe a que no existe una información arqueológica completa que proporcione las dimensiones exactas de los muros de fortificación (altura, anchura y longitud). Al mismo tiempo, sabemos que dentro de los edificios de la fortificación también había habitaciones sobre las que no tenemos información. Teniendo en cuenta estas importantes deficiencias en la información, adopté un metro cúbico para la conversión. Sabemos que los sistemas de fortificación incluían varios elementos; junto con las paredes había murallas, fosos y escarpas. Además, había contrafuertes, muros de contención, fustes y muros de refuerzo. Como sabemos, los muros defensivos o fosos a menudo resultaron ser insuficientes. En ese momento, se incluyeron en el sistema soluciones adicionales para elevar los estándares de seguridad, la defensa efectiva y para facilitar el transporte y la comunicación. Éstas tomaron la forma de torres y puertas. Las técnicas de construcción de los sistemas de defensa se diferenciaban entre sí en función del momento de su creación y del lugar en que se encontraban o mejor dicho, del terreno de una región geográfica determinada. Observamos que los muros pueden tener cimientos de piedra, ladrillo cocido, o no tenerlos en absoluto -sólo se erigen en un terreno llano. Por ejemplo, en la ciudad de Assur, se utilizaron varios tipos de ladrillos para construir la muralla o en Nínive, un espacio lleno de arcilla y piedras se conservaron entre sus muros paralelos. En la construcción de Tell Rijim se utilizó la técnica del pisé, o tapial, que consiste en colocar finas placas de arcilla compactada. La aparición de fortificaciones en el Medio Oriente, especialmente en Mesopotamia, no sólo cumplía las funciones militares sino que tenían otras funciones, a fin de proteger la ciudad de las inundaciones porque estos pueblos estaban ubicados en la parte baja de Mari, y también tenían la función de proteger una ciudad determinada de los animales salvajes, y también proteger la ciudad de los robos y controlar las ciudades y averiguar quién salía y quién entraba en la ciudad. Desde el punto de vista de mi tesis, el tema principal es el carácter estratégico de estas defensas. El objetivo es aclarar las funciones de las ciudades fortificadas, analizar la fuerza de la resistencia y en qué medida fueron eficaces para protegerse del enemigo. Ya sabemos por fuentes arqueológicas que se colocaron varios tipos de herramientas en las murallas defensivas. Se caracterizan por su diversidad, dependiendo de la ubicación en las murallas pero también de la ciudad que se investiga y en qué periodo de tiempo. A partir de la información de las descripciones, podemos determinar los tipos de herramientas, así como la anchura de las murallas -alrededor de 1,5 a 2 metros y una altura de 3 a 4 metros- a partir de la descripción del punto de referencia desde el que los arqueros disparaban sus flechas. Se utilizaron espadas y lanzas comunes en contacto directo. El tema del equipamiento militar es bastante extenso, por lo que he decidido tratar estrictamente el tema de los instrumentos utilizados para la defensa. Trazaré sus tipos y usos a lo largo de los diferentes períodos de la cultura mesopotámica. En la parte cronológica no me he ocupado del análisis de las fechas de creación de determinados yacimientos arqueológicos. La organización requiere el diseño de una tabla para cada sistema de defensa, por separado para cada posición. Al observar transversalmente el tema, observamos las diferencias en la datación del norte y el sur de las áreas mesopotámicas. Son particularmente notables entre los períodos antiguos en el Viejo Babilonia y el Viejo Asirio, el Medio Babilonia y el Medio Asirio, y el período Neo Babilónico y Neo Asirio. En mi contribución, hay descripciones y análisis de toda la investigación arqueológica en el área de la antigua Mesopotamia. Al tiempo que hacía descripciones de las fortificaciones he intentado presentar la gama más completa de utilidad de este tipo de estructuras. He rastreado el proceso de creación de fortificaciones, los procesos de su mejora y los cambios que se han producido en su estructura, desde la aparición de los primeros edificios con carácter de fortificaciones en el VI milenio a.C. En esta época, fechamos las fortificaciones en Tell Es Sawwan, situada en la parte media del río Tigris. Los sitios fortificados surgieron en la época de Samarra, alrededor del 5300 a.C. Tomaron la forma de un enorme eje rodeado por un asentamiento rectangular de 220x110 m. Estimamos la aparición de las ciudades fortificadas entre el V y el IV milenios a.C. Es cierto que todavía eran únicas, pero en el III milenio a.C. las fortificaciones se convirtieron en la norma en los centros de la vida social. Observamos la existencia de más de 40 ciudades fortificadas en las zonas del norte de Mesopotamia. El sur de Mesopotamia se estaba desarrollando en esta dirección a principios del tercer milenio a.C., como lo demuestra el ejemplo del Valle de Khaburu. La excepción aquí es la muralla que rodea la ciudadela de Tell Chuera, que data de un período anterior, el IV milenio a. C. Al profundizar en el análisis de las soluciones técnicas individuales, el material utilizado o incluso su producto, vemos que en el período de Jazirah temprano las soluciones defensivas denominados asentamientos granero (Tell Atij) y fortificaciones del grupo de Kranzhugel. En la época de alrededor del tercer milenio a. C. ya se observan numerosas ciudades con sistemas de fortificación creados con las últimas técnicas de construcción y materiales de construcción de la época. El uso del ladrillo y de la piedra atestigua el poder económico de los centros individuales, pero también el crecimiento de la arquitectura defensiva. Las interpretaciones de las inscripciones mesopotámicas que se encuentran en las murallas de los sistemas de fortificación son de gran importancia para nosotros. Gracias a su comprensión, hemos obtenido información sobre las fechas de construcción de esas murallas defensivas, aportando así un conocimiento significativo sobre sistemas completos y sus estructuras. Hay que prestar atención a la composición de estos textos, que a menudo comienzan con el culto a la deidad, luego la introducción que siempre contiene el nombre real. Sabemos que la Introducción puede tener varios elementos, por ejemplo, la genealogía real, epítetos elogiosos, y a veces se mencionan las hazañas y logros importantes del rey y sus campañas. En la siguiente parte -que es crucial para nuestro tema- podemos encontrar fragmentos que deTellan los informes de la construcción, generalmente referidos a edificios específicos. Este tipo de registro estaba destinado principalmente a los gobernantes posteriores -para que pudieran reconstruir el edificio en cuestión-, a la vez que constituía una fuente inestimable para los investigadores modernos. A través del análisis de la iconografía de las fortificaciones mesopotámicas, las imágenes de las fortificaciones también se encuentran en los sellos. Por lo general, captan las escenas de ataque y defensa de una ciudad fortificada. Las imágenes son diferentes algunas presentan las murallas sólo como un bosquejo, otras muestran deTelles- que incluyen incluso paneles individuales, a partir de los cuales se hicieron las puertas. Las murallas defensivas van acompañadas de imágenes de personas. Las personas en cuestión suelen ser defensores o invasores. También podemos distinguir entre ellos a mujeres y niños -a menudo como rehenes-. Podemos distinguir los tipos de armas, normalmente son arcos, proyectiles, carros y máquinas de asedio. Debido a la disponibilidad general y por lo tanto a su bajo costo, el barro era el material de construcción básico. Lo encontramos en prácticamente todos los tipos de arquitectura de la antigua Mesopotamia. Según la función y la naturaleza de los edificios, se utilizaba arcilla pura o mezclas de arcilla con otros materiales como la paja. Pero también se utilizaba como ladrillo crudo o como material para crear elementos de acabado. La importancia de este tipo de material no puede ser subestimada debido a su durabilidad y a la resistencia de las construcciones realizadas con él, por lo tanto, también abordaré este tema en mi trabajo. Analizaré el propio ladrillo y sus variaciones según el aspecto, la forma y el proceso de producción. Tratando este tema de forma amplia, pretendo referirme a los cambios y evolución de este tipo de material de construcción en diversos períodos en el área de trabajo. En esta tesis también deseo abordar el tema del transporte en la antigua Mesopotamia. El principal medio de transporte aquí es el fluvial debido a la presencia de grandes ríos -el Tigris y el Éufrates-. Su curso cubre tres países importantes en esta parte del mundo -Turquía, Siria y las áreas del actual Irak hasta las costas del Golfo Pérsico- creando un canal de transporte ideal para bienes y personas. Hay que señalar que el transporte fluvial era una forma cómoda, barata y fácil de transportar mercancías. También se convirtió en un medio de comunicación. Probablemente su papel más importante fue en el comercio -por ejemplo- de materiales de construcción transportados del norte al sur de Mesopotamia, donde no existían recursos como piedras y madera; o para el transporte de mercancías preparadas desde el lugar de producción hasta el destino. Es imposible ignorar el hecho de que se empezaron a construir varios tipos de barcos dependiendo de su propósito, como se discute más adelante en la tesis. Después de mis consideraciones me gustaría abordar el problema de forma holística. Debido a que el tema de mi tesis es muy amplio, ello me ha obligado a proponer conclusiones deTelladas para cada capítulo a través de la interpretación y el análisis, y al final de mi trabajo presentaré unas conclusiones generales sobre toda la tesis. La dificultad de analizar a fondo el tema se reduce al problema de la escasez de información. El hecho de que los estratos arqueológicos no estén accesibles y que pocos artesanos se dedicaron a la construcción de las murallas defensivas y de que las murallas fueran encontradas muchas veces por accidente hizo que la investigación se realizara sólo en un pequeño fragmento de la muralla descubierta, lo que actualmente dificulta el análisis exhaustivo del tema y la orientación de la cuestión desde una perspectiva plenamente documentada.

Background The main instrument on EU level to control industrial releases is the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), particularly through the publication of BAT reference documents (BREFs) and related BAT Conclusions, which is the reference for setting the permit conditions throughout EU for IED installations. However, the BREFs published so far do not contain adequate information on specific hazardous chemicals used and released from industry which makes the control difficult for the industry and the permitting and supervising authorities. One of the case sectors in the HAZBREF project is the surface treatment of metals and plastics (STM). This sector was chosen due to the use of chemicals, potential emissions, the wide range of products as well as technological processes and the upcoming STM BREF review. The other HAZBREF case sectors are textile industry and chemical industry which are addressed in separate reports. The lack of knowledge on the use and flow of specific hazardous chemicals in the industrial processes makes chemical control and reduction measures difficult. The problem is that often neither plant operators nor authorities know which substances are relevant to be treated and which handling measures are needed. Surface treatment of metals and plastics is covered by the STM BREF document, published in 2006. According to the last work programme of the EIPPCB the review of the EU STM BREF is planned to start in 2021. Purpose of the document This sectoral guidance contains information on uses of hazardous chemicals, the best practices in chemical management and recommendations on enhancing the permitting process in the STM sector. This document sums up the findings from HAZBREF project and is based on industrial case studies, interviews with authorities and expert judgment. The aim is to describe good practices in chemical management to be utilized by STM installations as well as environmental and chemical authorities. These include technical, organisational and management aspects and concrete tools supporting chemical management. The report addresses the STM sector as a whole in Europe, although the main part of the findings is generated from HAZBREF case installation and other experiences in the Baltic Sea Region. The document provides also general descriptions of BAT proposals related to management of hazardous chemicals and substances. These findings of the guidance will feed into in the forthcoming revision of the STM BREF. They are also to be used for HELCOM recommendations on how to reduce the discharge of hazardous substances into the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the document provides an overview of applicable legal requirements, procedures and other obligations of installation operators regarding use of chemicals and releases of hazardous substances. This includes guidance for tools to identify and assess relevant hazardous substances used and released from the STM installations. Main findings and proposals Improvement of chemical management system A Chemical Management System provides a systematic way of managing chemicals through the whole process on the site. Most of the companies have implemented quality management standards such as ISO 9000, ISO 14000, EMAS and integrated EHS programs which also address certain aspects of chemical management. The quality of chemical management systems in the companies differs depending on the scale of operation, ownership and awareness. Integration of good practices of chemical management within already implemented management systems strengthens the ability to reduce environmental risks. HAZBREF project strongly recommends the establishment and regular use of a chemical management system at IED installations. Development of a chemical inventory The establishment and maintenance of a chemical inventory is an importantprerequisite for effective and responsible chemicals management in the STMsector. All chemicals and raw materials along with information on their propertiesused in all processes and activities at the site should be listed in a database. Such adatabase is a key part of chemical management allowing for systematic riskassessment, management of chemicals flows and their storage. The information in the chemical list/database must be searchable and should be updated regularly. Most of the information needed is available in the safety datasheets (SDS). If some information is missing from the SDS, the supplier should be asked to provide this. Good routines to handle new and updated SDSs are crucial to have an up to date and reliable chemical database. These routines should involve on-site handling and updates as well as communication with suppliers on how SDSs are delivered. Well-managed chemical inventories can significantly simplify the environmental permit application process both for the operators and the permitting authorities. Better use of Chemical Management Tools and training of staf Numerous references and tools are available to support STM companies and competent authorities in implementing the good chemical management required in the IED. HAZBREF recommends that operators use proper tools for risk assessment and evaluation of the efficiency of chemical management. Use and improvement of risk assessment tools such as extended SDS and material flow analysis should be promoted among installation operators in this respect. The HAZBREF project has developed a comprehensive tool that helps the operators to identify the site-specific hazardous substances that should be considered in strategic and operational decisions. Awareness raising and training of staff in the use of chemical management tools and systems is crucial for implementation of good chemical management practices at the installations. Substitution A regular check aiming at identifying potentially new available and safer alternatives to the hazardous chemicals used is an important measure to minimise chemical risks at the installation. A successful substitution work can be performed in four stages: - Identification of hazardous substances - Screening for possible alternatives - Evaluation and choice of alternatives and Development of new alternatives. Substitution can be aimed for any hazardous chemical used at installation level where it is needed in order to protect environment or human health. However, regrettable substitution (i.e. move to use new chemical that is equally or more hazardous than the substituted chemical or results in cross-media effects) must be avoided. Assessment and improvement of SDS Efficient chemicals management requires high quality of the Safety Data Sheets (SDS). The SDS should sufficiently describe the chemical properties and include information about exposure (including use and emissions), eco-toxicology and proper storage and handling. A SDS must also contain information on whether the chemical product contains substances on the SVHC list, priority substances under the Water Framework Directive WFD and the POPs convention. In case a chemical supplier fails to provide a SDS of sufficient quality, it is the duty of both the operator and the competent authority to demand the missing information. This is already required by law in some countries, e.g. Germany. It is also important that the operators know how to extract and consolidate the relevant information from the SDS to their permit applications and verify the quality of different information sources. The development of an extended SDS including exposure scenarios and improved data on environmental effects would facilitate better risk assessment of individual chemicals used in specific processes. This would lead to more efficient monitoring and help focusing on substances of concern. Improved SDSs for raw materials with information on impurities or additives would facilitate more complete chemical inventories. Continuous improvement of BAT implementation The implementation of BAT needs to be continuously monitored and improved at the installation considering site specific technological, economical and environmental aspects. The findings from Polish HAZBREF case studies is that fulfilment of BAT requirements can be challenging if all improvements need to be done in a short time period. For example, closed-loop systems are considered necessary additional process-integrated techniques that it is important to implementstep by step in the installations. Circular economy The STM sector is a significant user of non-renewable resources (metals), and recycling of recovered metal containing materials such as metal substrates orelectrolytes back to the process is good practice. Such recovery processes are widely used for basic metals, such as zinc, copper and nickel, which are used as valuable secondary raw materials SRM. High costs of recovery processes and high energy consumption as well as the variety of chemicals and metals used in STM processes often hinders recycling. In cases where recycling is not feasible, pretreatment of contaminated waste water on site and subsequent off-site treatment of generated metal containing sludges is standard practice. Permitting process Beside best practices in chemical management, the project also elaborated recommendations on enhancing the permitting process in the STM sector. It can be concluded that the existing general structure and content of the permit application procedures are as such sufficient to deal with hazardous substances and chemicals. Nevertheless, in practice the permit process could be improved with more communication between the applicant and the permitting authority during the application phase. More co-operation between chemical, environmental and occupational health authorities is suggested to achieve a smooth information flow and reduce double work regarding requirements under different legislations concerning chemicals and hazardous substances. In some countries, for example in Finland, the supervising practices in different parts of a given country need harmonising so that all installations are treated equally. This requires more and better communication between the respective environmental and chemical authorities within the country. The improved exchange of information and examples of good experiences between Member States would also, in the long run, contribute to more harmonised and better practices on European level. ; Bakgrund Det huvudsakliga instrumentet på EU-nivå för att kontrollera utsläpp från industrin är industriutsläppsdirektivet (IED), särskilt genom publicering av BATreferensdokument (BREF) och relaterade BAT-slutsatser, som är referensen för att fastställa tillståndsvillkoren i hela EU för IED-verksamheter. De hittills publicerade BREF-dokumenten innehåller emellertid inte tillräckligt med information om specifika farliga kemikalier som används och släpps ut från industrin vilket gör kontrollen svår för industrin och tillstånds- och tillsynsmyndigheterna. En av sektorerna som valts ut i HAZBREF-projektet är ytbehandling av metaller och plast (STM). Denna sektor valdes på grund av användningen av kemikalier, potentiella utsläpp, det breda utbudet av produkter samt tekniska processer och den kommande STM BREF-revideringen. De andra sektorerna HAZBREF har fokuserat på är textilindustri och kemisk industri, som behandlas i separata rapporter. Bristen på kunskap om användning och flöde av specifika farliga kemikalier i de industriella processerna gör det svårt att kontrollera och minska kemikalierna. Problemet är ofta att varken verksamhetsutövare eller myndigheter vet vilka ämnen som är relevanta att åtgärda och vilka skyddsåtgärder som behöver vidtas. Ytbehandling av metaller och plast omfattas av STM BREF-dokumentet, som publicerades 2006. Enligt EIPPCB: s senaste arbetsprogram planeras revideringen av STM BREF att börja 2021. Dokumentets syfte Denna vägledning innehåller information om användning av farliga kemikalier, bästa praxis inom kemikaliehantering och rekommendationer för att förbättra tillståndsprocessen inom STM-sektorn. Detta dokument sammanfattar resultaten från HAZBREF-projektet och baseras på fallstudier, intervjuer med myndigheter och expertbedömning. Syftet är att beskriva god praxis inom kemikaliehantering som ska användas av STM-verksamheter samt miljö- och kemikaliemyndigheter. Dessa inkluderar tekniska, organisatoriska och hanteringsaspekter och konkreta verktyg som stöder kemikaliehantering. Rapporten behandlar STM-sektorn som helhet i Europa, även om huvuddelen av resultaten härrör från verksamheter som har deltagit i fallstudierna och andra erfarenheter i Östersjöregionen. Dokumentet innehåller också allmänna beskrivningar av BAT-förslag relaterade till hantering av farliga kemikalier och ämnen. Dessa resultat i vägledningen kommer att ingå i den kommande revideringen av STM BREF. De kan vidare användas för HELCOMrekommendationer om hur man kan minska utsläppen av farliga ämnen i Östersjön Dessutom ger dokumentet en översikt över tillämpliga lagkrav, förfaranden och andra skyldigheter för verksamhetsutövare beträffande användning av kemikalier och utsläpp av farliga ämnen. Detta inkluderar vägledning för hur man kan identifiera och bedöma relevanta farliga ämnen som används och släpps ut från STM-anläggningarna. Huvudsakliga resultat och förslag Förbättring av kemikaliehanteringssystemet Ett kemikaliehanteringssystem ger ett systematiskt sätt att hantera kemikalier genom hela processen på anläggningen. De flesta av företagen har implementerat olika standarder som ISO 9000, ISO 14000, EMAS och integrerade EHS-program som också behandlar vissa aspekter av kemikaliehantering. Kvaliteten på kemikaliehanteringssystem i företagen varierar beroende på deras storlek, ägarförhållanden och medvetenhet. Integrering av god praxis för kemikaliehantering i redan implementerade ledningssystem stärker förmågan att minska miljörisker. HAZBREF-projektet rekommenderar upprättande och regelbunden användning av ett kemikaliehanteringssystem vid IED-verksamheter. Utveckling av en kemikalieinventering Att upprätta och underhålla en kemikalieinventering är en viktig förutsättning för en effektiv och ansvarsfull kemikaliehantering inom STM-sektorn. Alla kemikalier och råvaror som används i alla processer och aktiviteter på anläggningen bör, tillsammans med information om deras egenskaper, listas i en databas. En sådan databas är en viktig del av kemikaliehanteringen och möjliggör systematisk riskbedömning, hantering av kemikalieflöden och lagring. Informationen i kemikalielistan/databasen måste vara sökbar och bör uppdateras regelbundet. Merparten av den information som behövs finns i säkerhetsdatabladet (SDS). Om viss information saknas i säkerhetsdatabladet bör leverantören uppmanas att lämna denna. Bra rutiner för att hantera nya och uppdaterade säkerhetsdatablad är avgörande för att ha en uppdaterad och pålitlig kemikaliedatabas. Dessa rutiner bör omfatta hantering och uppdateringar på plats samt kommunikation med leverantörer om hur säkerhetsdatablad levereras. Välskötta kemikalielistor/databaser kan avsevärt förenkla ansökan om miljötillstånd för både verksamhetsutövare och tillståndsmyndigheter. Bättre användning av verktyg för kemikaliehantering och utbildning av personal Många referenser och verktyg finns tillgängliga för att stödja STM-företag och behöriga myndigheter i genomförandet av den goda kemikaliehanteringen som krävs i IED. HAZBREF rekommenderar verksamhetsutövare att använda lämpliga verktyg för riskbedömning och utvärdering av kemikaliehanteringens effektivitet. Användning och förbättring av riskbedömningsverktyg som utökade säkerhetsdatablad och analys av materialflöden bör främjas bland verksamhetsutövare i detta avseende. HAZBREF-projektet har utvecklat ett omfattande verktyg som hjälper verksamhetsutövarna att identifiera platsspecifika farliga ämnen som bör beaktas i strategiska och operativa beslut. Att öka medvetenheten och att utbilda personal i användningen av verktyg för kemikaliehantering och kemikaliehanteringssystem är avgörande för genomförandet av god kemikaliehanteringspraxis vid verksamheterna. Substitution En regelbunden kontroll som syftar till att identifiera potentiellt nya tillgängliga och säkrare alternativ till de farliga kemikalier som används är en viktig åtgärd för att minimera kemiska risker vid verksamheten. Ett framgångsrikt substitutionsarbete kan utföras i fyra steg: - Identifiering av farliga ämnen - Screening efter möjliga alternativ - Utvärdering och val av alternativ och Utveckling av nya alternativ. Substitution kan riktas mot alla farliga kemikalier som används på verksamheten där det behövs för att skydda miljön eller människors hälsa. Substitution som senare ångras (dvs. byta till att använda en ny kemikalie som är lika eller mer farlig än den substituerade kemikalien eller som resulterar i tvärmedieeffekter) måste undvikas. Bedömning och förbättring av säkerhetsdatablad Effektiv kemikaliehantering kräver hög kvalitet på säkerhetsdatablad (SDS). Säkerhetsdatabladet bör beskriva de kemiska egenskaperna tillräckligt och innehålla information om exponering (inklusive användning och utsläpp), ekotoxikologi och korrekt lagring och hantering. Ett SDS måste också innehålla information om huruvida den kemiska produkten innehåller SVHC-ämnen, prioriterade ämnen enligt vattendirektivet WFD och POPs-konventionen. Om en kemikalieleverantör inte tillhandahåller ett säkerhetsdatablad av tillräcklig kvalitet är det både verksamhetsutövaren och den behöriga myndighetens skyldighet att kräva informationen som saknas. Detta krävs redan enligt lag i vissa länder, t.ex. i Tyskland. Det är också viktigt att verksamhetsutövarna vet hur man tar fram och sammanfattar relevant information från säkerhetsdatabladet till sina tillståndsansökningar och verifierar kvaliteten på olika informationskällor. För att förbättra riskbedömning av enskilda kemikalier, som används i specifika processer, kan ett utökat säkerhetsdatablad inklusive exponeringsscenarier och förbättrade data om miljöeffekter underlätta. Detta skulle leda till effektivare övervakning och hjälp med att fokusera på ämnen som är farliga. För att få mer fullständiga kemikalieinventeringar kan förbättrade säkerhetsdatablad för råvaror med information om föroreningar eller tillsatser underlätta. Kontinuerlig förbättring av implementeringen av BAT Implementeringen av BAT måste kontinuerligt övervakas och förbättras vid verksamheten med beaktande av platsspecifika tekniska, ekonomiska och miljöaspekter. Resultaten från de polska HAZBREF-fallstudierna är att uppfyllandet av BAT-kraven kan vara utmanande om alla förbättringar behöver göras på kort tid. Till exempel anses slutna system vara nödvändiga ytterligare processintegrerade tekniker som det är viktigt att implementera steg för steg i verksamheten. Cirkulär ekonomi STM-sektorn är en betydande användare av icke förnybara resurser (metaller), och återvinning av återvunna metallinnehållande material såsom metallsubstrat eller elektrolyter tillbaka till processen är god praxis. Sådana återvinningsprocesser används ofta för basiska metaller, såsom zink, koppar och nickel, som används som värdefulla sekundära råvaror (SRM). Höga kostnader för återvinningsprocesser och hög energianvändning samt de många olika kemikalier och metaller som används i STM-processer hindrar ofta återvinning. I de fall återvinning inte är möjlig är förbehandling av förorenat avloppsvatten på plats och efterföljande behandling av genererat metallhaltigt slam praxis. Tillståndsprocessen Förutom bästa praxis inom kemikaliehantering utarbetades även rekommendationer för att förbättra tillståndsprocessen inom STM-sektorn. Man kan dra slutsatsen att den befintliga allmänna strukturen och innehållet i tillståndsansökningsförfarandena som sådana är tillräckliga för att hantera farliga ämnen och kemikalier. I praktiken kan tillståndsprocessen ändå förbättras med mer kommunikation mellan den sökande och tillståndsmyndigheten under ansökningsfasen. Mer samarbete mellan kemikalie-, miljö- och arbetsmiljömyndigheterna föreslås för att uppnå ett smidigt informationsflöde och minska dubbelarbete avseende krav enligt olika lagstiftning om kemikalier och farliga ämnen. I vissa länder, till exempel i Finland, måste praxis för tillsyn och övervakning i olika delar av landet harmoniseras så att alla verksamheter behandlas lika. Detta kräver mer och bättre kommunikation mellan miljö- och kemikaliemyndigheter i landet. Det förbättrade informationsutbytet och exempel på goda erfarenheter mellan medlemsstaterna skulle också på sikt bidra till mer harmoniserad och bättre praxis på europeisk nivå.

At all times, people had to adapt to processes of ecological change. But the strategies and mechanisms of the adapting of livelihoods to those processes have certainly gained more and more global attention since the effects of climate change are said to be one of the most crucial topics (not only) in the field of development studies and development practice in the 21st century; even though there always has been critique on the accuracy and the underlying methodological approaches of the estimated dramatic consequences of global warming and its alleged implications for adaptation measures (e.g. Dessai et al. 2009) or its interference with certain political agendas, respectively (e.g. Lomborg 2007). However, the worldwide substantial growth rates of industrialization, motorization and urbanization within the last decades and centuries have (at least) contributed to a global process of climate change, which is expected to become a fundamental challenge of mankind in the 21st century. Its assumed short-term consequences in form of natural disasters, such as floods, droughts or cyclones, as well as its long-term consequences like dramatic shifts of rainfall patterns, rising temperatures, desertification or rising sea levels, have the potential to significantly affect agricultural production worldwide. In particular the livelihoods of millions of agricultural small-scale producers in the developing countries in the tropics and sub-tropics are considered to be endangered by environmental degradation and its effects, which are not necessarily and solely caused by results of climate change. Especially for the poor rural population in these countries, processes of ecological degradation are a predicted threat to their livelihoods, which manifests itself in the form of rising levels of poverty and food insecurity. Within the last two decades, the international debate concerning the main challenge of the alleged consequences of global environmental change shifted from attempts of mitigation these changes to finding means and ways of adapting to them. Wide parts of the literature mainly perceive the adaptation of livelihoods in rural areas of the developing world as a procedure which is or has to be initiated by NGOs, governmental organizations or international donor agencies (e.g. Agrawal 2008; Reid and Vogel 2006). However, this 'mediating' perception on adaptation does not address processes which are solely based on the initiative of local people and pushed forward by them, respectively. In the following, these local developments will be understood as activities where individuals or communities on site generate adaptive measures that are spread without the mediation or interference of donors or agencies. This study will prove that local processes of livelihoods adaptation can be mainly based on existing local knowledge, local institutional settings and local patterns of social organisation. In contrast to that, the mediating perception on livelihood adaptation aims at establishing new regimes for adaptation related resources. Secondly, this thesis wants to deal with the adaptation of livelihoods in a holistic perspective. This means that it does not only cover climate or other ecological parameters since several studies on farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ponte 2002; Bryceson 2002) underline that within the last decades, besides climate change, also many political, demographic or economic processes like the structural adjustment programmes in Sub-Sahara Africa during the 1980s have severely affected peasant livelihoods and have 'called into play a multitude of diverse and dynamic activities geared towards making a secured livelihood' (Yaro 2006: 126). Although many authors from the mid 1990s onwards have diagnosed a trend towards deagrarianisation in Sub-Saharan Africa , subsistence farming is still the central element of a large majority of African rural people's livelihood portfolios. At the same time, peasant or small-scale agriculture is increasingly being perceived as a future rather than a phase-out model for the agricultural development in Africa in times of severe ecological, political and economic changes and challenges - contrary to the traditional modernization theory driven view on small-scale agriculture (Toulmin and Guèye 2005). This thesis has been written in the framework of the GLOWA Volta Project (GVP). The German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) has launched several research projects, whose foci are on global climate change and its interference with local hydrological and socio-economic conditions. The GLOWA Volta project was initiated as one of these projects. The overall objective of this project is the analysis of the socio-economic and physical determinants of the hydrological cycle in the West-African Volta Basin in the face of global environmental change. The project's main aim is the establishment of a scientifically sound Decision Support System (DSS) for all relevant stakeholders and actors in the area of water resource management. Particularly, the availability and the management of water under changing environmental conditions is one of the most important objectives of the GLOWA Volta Project. Within the overall project, different types of irrigation and their livelihood-adaptive potential were studied from the beginning of the project onwards. The specific hydrological and socio-economic impacts of different irrigation systems represented an important element in the research agenda of the project. In order to understand the impacts and drivers of the expansion of irrigation farming, also the expansion of shallow groundwater irrigation (hereafter SGI) in Ghana's Upper East Region - a purely farmer driven expansion process - became one of the project's research focuses. SGI can be perceived as an income earning strategy to reduce vulnerability: besides other ecological changes, the Upper East Region, Ghana's second-poorest region, is expected to be affected by processes of climate change like enhanced rainfall variability leading to an increased vulnerability of the local peasant population towards harvest insecurity and thus also towards food insecurity. These predicted effects of ecological change are no longer 'still up in the air' but can be already felt at present by many small-scale farmers. SGI is an irrigation form that is based on the use of near-surface groundwater close to small riversides, which usually fall completely dry during dry seasons in Northern Ghana. The groundwater is either pulled up with buckets out of wells on riverside plots or it is pumped out of dugouts in the riverbeds via motor pumps. This small-scale irrigation kind is practiced during the dry season to an increasing degree in several places in North-Eastern Ghana. Where until the early 1990s this irrigation form was practiced by only a few farmers, a heavy boom of dry season SGI farming could be observed in the last one-and-a-half decades. There are several driving forces for that: SGI is not hard to learn for the local farmers and this knowledge can be easily shared among the farmers. Furthermore, the initial investment costs - at least for the farmers who do not use an irrigation pump - are comparatively low. Usually, there is no problem in accessing the necessary farm land and additional labour due to a high degree of local solidarity. Finally, infrastructural improvements have contributed to more attractive market channels for SGI farmers in the study region, where many of them cultivate tomatoes during the dry season. It can therefore be assumed that currently several thousand farmers in Ghana's North have adopted this cultivation method. On the other hand, labour migration, which - although highly interlinked with patterns of regional underdevelopment - traditionally has been the most important way for peasant households in Northern Ghana to cope with natural disasters like floods or droughts but also to mitigate the consequences of food shortages or epidemics, is on the decline. Initially forced by the British colonial administration and later on a voluntary basis, many young 'Northerners' left in the dry season, where in the North no rain-fed cultivation is possible, to the Southern part of (pre-independent) Ghana to work in the goldmines or on cocoa farms. The peasant communities in the North started to appreciate this form of migration to an increasing degree as it did not only reduce the pressure on the home households' food stocks when one or more of its members went to the South to work during the dry season. But also cultural implications play an important role. Travelling to the south rose in the Northern population's esteem because it introduced their young men to concepts of modernity. Furthermore, the experiences and knowledge migrants could gain during their labour migration stays were widely regarded as very valuable for the home communities. Migration, also in its more permanent forms, has thus become a daily routine for wide parts of the North-Ghanaian population. But especially in the areas where dry season farming has become more important within the last years, migration flows have decreased. At this point, the question is: why has SGI developed into such an attractive livelihood (adaptation) strategy in Ghana's North within the last years whereas seasonal migration as a strategy to mitigate the consequences of events threatening small scale farmers' livelihoods dropped significantly despite its traditionally high economic and cultural appreciation? Or to be more precisely: what are the underlying social, political, cultural or economic factors leading to an increase in SGI and to a decrease in seasonal migration? This question will be the central research question for this thesis whereas not the decision making process on both livelihood strategies - SGI and seasonal migration - will be in the focus of the analysis but rather the specific developments of both adaptive processes in their historical, political, cultural and economic contexts. The complexity of households and further social structures which form livelihoods and their specific compositions make the adapting or non-adapting of certain strategies to more than just a simple 'either-or' decision as the title of this thesis - irrigate or migrate - involuntarily might imply. Seasonal migration and SGI can both be regarded as livelihood strategies as well as livelihood adaptations at the same time. Based on the findings and suggestions of the relevant recent literature, a livelihood strategy can be understood as a process in which people access necessary assets via a complex setting of institutions, social relations or organisations. Therefore, an adaptation of a livelihood strategy is an adjustment or modification of the whole process, which is usually caused by certain triggers in the context of the livelihood system, e.g. changing ecological patterns affecting farming outcomes or changes in the economic framework conditions. Livelihood adaptation and livelihood strategy thus constitute a close nexus. To operationalize the central research questions, the theoretical construct of livelihood strategy/ adaptation and its theoretical and causal implications are the base for the analysis framework. The developed framework is the starting point for the further analysis of this thesis. In a second step, the region the study is covering will be introduced. Particularly, the current processes of ecological change and the traditional adaptive economic and cultural meaning of migration patterns as well as the interference of labour migration with regional underdevelopment will be described. Furthermore, the description of the local patterns of social organisation will be an important part of this thesis due to their crucial importance in the adaptation context. Based on that, an empirical part analyzes the processes of irrigation farming and seasonal migration within the described framework. Based on that, the research questions will be answered in the conclusion part.

The thirteenth government of the Palestinian Authority (PA) presented in August 2009 a program entitled Palestine: ending the occupation, establishing the state (hereafter referred to as the program) that lays out the vision, foundational principles, and national goals for the future Palestinian state, as well as institution-building and sector priorities. This report will therefore begin by discussing recent trends in the economic restrictions imposed by the Government of Israel (GoI) on West Bank and Gaza (WB&G). The next section will focus on an analysis of economic and fiscal developments, highlighting the fact that WB&G experienced in 2009 a third consecutive year of economic growth and rising per capita GDP, driven by large inflows of external assistance and a relatively stable security situation. Despite the growth, however, the recurrent deficit rose from roughly US$1.3 billion in 2008 to US$1.6 billion on a commitment basis in 2009, mostly as a result of emergency spending in Gaza in the aftermath of Israel s military operation (operation cast lead, December 27, 2008, January 18, 2009) as well as arrears brought forward from 2008 and recognized as commitments in 2009. Given this finding, the discussion in remainder of the report is particularly relevant, focusing on the reform areas of fiscal strengthening and improved public financial management and the important role played by local governments in this regard.

eFörvaltning ses som ett medel för att göra kommunalt förvaltningsarbete mer effektivt och interoperabelt. Dock begränsas kommuner av oförmåga att uppnå det vilket försvårar genomförandet av deras uppdrag. En orsak till varför införandet av eFörvaltning inte ger de systematiska fördelar som efterfrågas beror på att införandet av informations och kommunikations teknologier (IKT) inte är tillräckligt. Förändringen som krävs kan inte ske över en natt utan är en gradvis förändring över tid som även kräver nya sätt att arbeta på. Kommuner behöver hantera sin eFörvaltningsutveckling på ett mer strukturerat sätt för att öka möjligheterna att förverkliga de fördelarna som sägs kunna erhållas. Enterprise Architecture (EA) har på senare tid kommit att ses som en möjlig lösning för att komma tillrätta med denna problematik. Genom att arbeta mot en EA skapas möjligheten att brygga IKT system med affärsprocesser och därigenom leda till effektivitet och interoperabilitet. Dock är EA inom offentlig sektor ifrågasatt. Forskare menar att EA saknar tydlig definierad omfattning och begreppsvärld, vilket gör användningen av EA inom förvaltningsarbete svår. De omfattande logiska EA ramverk som finns idag saknar innehåll som är specifikt relaterade till offentlig sektor. Vari det blir problematiskt att arbeta mot en EA inom offentlig sektor. Denna licentiatavhandling lägger följande forskningsfråga: "Vilken roll har EA för införandet av eFörvaltning inom Svenska kommuner?" Samt följande underfrågor "Vilka förutsättningar finns för att använda EA vid eFörvaltningsutveckling?" "Vad har Örebro kommun uppnått genom att arbete mot en EA i deras eFörvaltningsutveckling?" Och "Vilka problem har Örebro kommun upplevt av att arbeta mot en EA vid eFörvaltningsutvecklingen?". En longitudinell fallstudie av ett eFörvaltningsutvecklingsprojekt i Örebrokommun genomfördes mellan 2007 och 2009 med syfte att utröna dessa frågor och för att skapa insikt om EAs roll för eFörvaltningsutveckling. Förutsättningar, resultat och upplevda problem vid eFörvaltningsutvecklingen studerades. I anslutning till detta empiriska arbete genomfördes även en jämförandestudie av eFörvaltningsmål såsom de anges i officiella statliga dokument inom så väl Sverige som i EU gentemot förmodade fördelarna med EA som diskuteras i samtida EA-litteratur. Studien visar att EA som fenomen ses som en förutsättning för att lyckas med eFörvaltning. 7 viktiga aspekter gällande förutsättningen för att lyckas med kommuners eFörvaltningsutveckling identifierades: Skillnaden mellan administrativa och politiska ansvaret, Politiskt mandat, Politisk timing, Resursfördelning, Samordning under NPM, Leverantörsberoende, Val av standard och bäst praxis. För att förbättra möjligheten att röna framgång i eFörvaltningsutveckling behöver dessa aspekter aktualiseras och hanteras. New Public Management (NPM) som styrmodell utgör ett strukturellt hinder för eFörvaltningsutveckling som förhindrar en mer explicit användning av EA-ramverk, vilket påverkar möjligheten att uppnå uppsatta mål negativt. Trots den strukturella problematik som föreligger, kan stöd erhållas genom att arbeta utifrån ett "EA-tänk". Ett "EAtänk" kan här ses som ett medel för att påbörja förändringen mot en EA utan att för den delen explicit använda sig av ett EA-ramverk, eller -metod. Dock är det viktigt skapa en förståelse för att "EA-tänk" som fenomen i sin tur ger upphov till strukturer och således kan leda till problem som även de måste hanteras för att eFörvaltningsutveckling skall lyckas. eFörvaltning, NPM och ett "EA-tänk" skapar en strukturell triad där olika strukturella egenskaper i vissa fall sammanfaller med varandra vari de kan stödja kommuner i dess arbete och således bidra till positiv utveckling. Medan det i andra fall leder till negativ utveckling där administrationen upplever problem att ta till sig av de rekommendationer eFörvaltningsprojektet kan tänkas ge till organisationen som helhet. Paradoxalt nog skapar denna strukturella triad en situation där kommuner måste arbete runt sig själv för att komma framåt. Normer och befintliga strukturer i kommuner förhindrar effektiv samarbete både internt mellan olika förvaltningar och externt gentemot andra kommuner och landsting vilket leder till fragmentariska framsteg mot projektmålen och i slutänden även kommunens övergripande mål gällande eFörvaltningsutveckling. Givet de i många fall motstridiga strukturella egenskaper som finns mellan NPM och eFörvaltning innebär att det initiala arbetet mot EA i eFörvaltningsutveckling är ett ytterst komplext fenomen. För att öka möjligheten att eFörvaltningsutvecklingen blir lyckad krävs det att kommuner känner till och hantera den negativa inverkan NPM har på eFörvaltningsutveckling. Samtidigt behöver de känna till och hanterar problematiken som uppstår av att arbeta mot en EA genom ett "EA-tänk", Samt att som studien visat, EA ger inget stöd för mer politiseras mål, vari kommuner behöver annat sätt och andra strategier för sådant arbete. Detta är viktigt att beakta, speciellt med tanke på att mer politiserade mål i mångt och mycket är de mål som kommer premieras av politiker. Av just den enkla orsaken att politiker inte blir omvalda på grund av "effektiva IKT integrerade interna processer" utan blir omvalda utifrån förbättringar som är synliga och som gagnar medborgare positivt. Avhandlingen bidrar till forsknings genom att öka förståelse för och behovet av att hantera både positiva och negativa faktorer som påverkar möjligheten att lyckas med eFörvaltningsutveckling inom kommunalt arbete. Vilket inkluderar de 7 identifierade kritiska faktorer måste aktualiseras och hanteras för att öka möjligheten att lyckas. Den negativa effekt NPM har på eFörvaltningsutveckling och hur ett "EA-tänk" kan leda till positiv utveckling, även om det som denna studie visat inte kan bidra till mer politiserade mål. Vad gäller denna licentiatavhandlings bidrag till praktiken så bidrar den med att belysa den problematiska situation som föreligger av att institutionaliserade strukturer i många fall verkar som ett hinder mot förändring. Studien möjliggör även till att kommuner kan skapa en förståelse för sin egna eFörvaltningsutveckling och möjligtvis kan verka för att inte uppleva samma problematik som identifierats i Örebros eFörvaltningsutveckling samt visa på hur en kommun kan arbeta för att hantera den problematik som inte kan förhindras alternativ som uppstår trots denna kunskap. ; Governments struggle with inefficiencies and an inability to achieve interoperable information communication technology (ICT) systems. Apparent issues include a failure of local government to realize the benefits of electronic government (eGov) initiatives, high project failure rates, administrations hampered with inefficiencies, and a lack of interoperability between systems within the local government. Thus, local governments need to address their eGov initiatives in a structured way to improve their chances of providing the benefits that are sought after. Sweden's eGov model is decentralized, following a strict new public management (NPM) model. Whilst eGov ought to bring benefits to local government, Sweden is still hampered by inefficiencies and an inability to achieve interoperable ICT systems. This has been the case for quite some time. One reason why systemic gains from adopting eGov have not reached the levels sought after could be that, in many cases, ICT implementations are not enough. The transformation needed for eGov is not instantaneous; it requires various new ways of working. Enterprise Architecture (EA) has come to be seen as a possible solution to the apparent issues of developing, adopting and managing eGov successfully. By utilizing EA, it is argued that it is possible to bridge ICT systems and business processes, thus making the organization more efficient. However EA's usefulness for eGov development and adoption is the subject of debate. Some researchers argue that EA lacks clearly defined scopes and concepts, which makes the use of EA in government difficult. Whereas other argues that although EA frameworks are comprehensive logical frameworks, they lack content that is related specifically to government organizations. The thesis posits the following research questions: What is the role of EA in eGov adoption in Swedish local government? together with three sub questions: What are the prerequisites for using EA in Swedish local eGov adoption? What has the Swedish local government in Örebro achieved with its use of EA in eGov adoption? And What problems have the Swedish local government in Örebro experienced in its use of EA when adopting eGov? To explore the role of EA in eGov adoption a longitudinal case study is carried out on the municipality of Örebro's eGov project MovIT, a project launched in 2007 that ended in 2009. I study the prerequisites, results and problems associated with using EA in Swedish local government as part of eGov adoption. A comparative study is conducted of the goals of eGov, as stated in official eGov documents at EU and Swedish governmental levels will attest as to the supposed benefits of EA in contemporary EA-literature. From the study, it can be concluded that EA, as a phenomenon, is thought to be, if not a silverbullet, then at least a prerequisite to eGov success. In term of prerequisites, EA use cannot assist Swedish local government where there are more politicized objectives; in this situation, local government is required to look elsewhere to find support for its work. The study identify several critical issues from the empirical study of the prerequisites: distinction between administrative and political responsibilities; political mandate; political timing; resource allocation; coordination under NPM; dependence on providers; and choosing among standards and best practices. These issues need to be acknowledged and handled appropriately by Swedish local government in order to improve the chances for success in eGov adoption. The study also showed that NPM as governance model becomes a hindrance in eGov adoption, preventing the project from a more explicit use of an EA-framework and negatively affecting the projects possibility to adopt eGov. However, despite this structural problem, it is still possible – as observed – for a project that is based on EA-thinking to begin working. EGov, NPM and EA-thinking form a triad, with structural properties that, in some instances, correlate. In such cases, this can lead to positive changes. However, in other situations, they are contradictory, resulting in Swedish local government having a difficult time in adhering to the suggestions endorsed by the eGov project. This lead to incoherent progressions towards requested results. The existing structures hindered effective cooperation, both internally between different departments and externally with other local governments. This licentiate thesis has shown that the initial use of EA in local government eGov adoption is complex. Given the contradictory nature of NPM and eGov, local government has to acknowledge the negative impacts of NPM on eGov adoption. As well as acknowledging the issues that arise from EA use, a key area is a lack of support of local government in an area that is most likely to be endorsed by politicians. Politicians do not get re-elected based on efficient internal processes with a highly integrated ICT; rather, changes must be visible to citizens and businesses. This licentiate thesis has also shown that 'EA-thinking', as a means for local government, can move towards an EA without the explicit use of an EA framework or EA method. However, 'EA-thinking' may give rise to other issues that need to be acknowledged and dealt with. This licentiate thesis contributes to research by improving our understanding of the nature and importance of promoting and inhibiting different factors. Including critical issues for succeeding with eGov adoption, the negative effects of NPM and how EA-thinking can lead to positive changes, even though it cannot assist local government in all aspects deemed important to eGov adoption. In terms of practice, this thesis contributes by highlighting the problematic nature of institutionalized structures and the effect that this has on eGov adoption. It also contributes by enabling local governments to acknowledge the problems identified. This allows them to better understand their own development and possibly avoid similar problems or at least have a better understanding of how to handle the issues that arise.

External events have dominated economic developments for Indonesia over the past quarter. The outlook for global growth has weakened and the euro zone sovereign debt crisis has intensified. International risk aversion and market volatility have increased, although they remain well below levels seen in late 2008. Equity markets have fallen and emerging markets have seen capital outflows, putting downward pressure on their currencies. Indonesia's domestic economic performance has continued to be strong but, as in other countries in the region, its financial markets have not been immune from this turbulence. Indonesia's domestic drivers of growth, its solid fiscal position, accumulation of reserves, and strengthened financial sector performance make it relatively well-placed to deal with shocks arising from the above scenarios. This improved resilience to external shocks, and a strong policy response, was seen during the 2008- 09 crisis. The final piece looks at the core development challenge of how to make growth more inclusive, as well as higher, focusing on an analysis of the province of East java.

This paper analyzes how investment incentives may or may not be used to foster private investment, particularly in developing countries. As practitioners and policymakers can attest, political economy exerts a powerful influence on incentives. Many incentives especially generous ones have persisted because of lobbying by special interests and politicians' need to curry favor. Yet little research has been done on how political economy affects incentive policy. Second, the paper sheds light on the role that political economy plays in the popularity of incentives and the related shortcomings. Incentives are sometimes used to dole out favors to investors, so investors who benefit from incentives resist attempts to eliminate them. This paper suggests a way to tackle such problems. Third, the paper compiles good practices on managing and administering incentives in developing countries, drawing on government and private sector experiences. Finally, the paper provides policymakers with a framework for analyzing the efficacy of investment incentives based on the sector and level of development involved, and suggests reforms for moving toward best practice.

1.1\xNote continued: 5.6. Climate Change Impacts on Dams Projects in Transboundary River Basins. The Case of the Mesta/Nestos River Basin, Greece / Jacques Ganoulis -- 5.6.1. Introduction -- 5.6.2. Numerical Models and Tools -- 5.6.2.1. Modsur-Neige Runoff Model -- 5.6.2.2. Dams Simulation Model -- 5.6.2.3. CLM Climate Model -- 5.6.3. Simulation Results -- 5.6.3.1. Reference Climate (RF) -- 5.6.3.2. Climate Scenario A1B -- 5.6.3.3. Climate Scenario B1 -- 5.6.4. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 5.7. Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in the Vjosa Basin / Eglantina Demiraj -- 5.7.1. Introduction -- 5.7.2. Surface Water Assessment -- 5.7.3. Vulnerability Assessment of Surface Water -- 5.7.3.1. Evaluation of Impact of Climate Change on the Mean Annual River Runoff -- 5.7.3.2. Evaluation of Impact of Climate Change on the Seasonal River Runoff -- 5.7.4. Conclusions -- References -- 5.8. Identification and Typology of River Water Bodies in the Hellenic Part of the Strymonas River Basin, as a Transboundary Case Study / Nikolaos Tsotsolis -- 5.8.1. Introduction -- 5.8.1.1. Study Area -- 5.8.2. Methodology -- 5.8.3. Results -- 5.8.4. Conclusions and Discussion -- References -- Further Reading -- 5.9. Calculation of Sediment Reduction at the Outlet of the Mesta/Nestos River Basin caused by the Dams / Nikolaos Kotsovinos -- 5.9.1. Introduction -- 5.9.2. Description of the Simulation Model -- 5.9.3. Application of the Simulation Model -- 5.9.4. Model Testing -- 5.9.5. Main Computations -- 5.9.6. Conclusion -- References -- 5.10. Methodologies of Estimation of Periodicities of River Flow and its Long-Range Forecast: The Case of the Transboundary Danube River / Alexey V. Babkin -- 5.10.1. Introduction -- 5.10.2. Methodology for Presenting Periodicities in Time Series of River Runoff -- 5.10.3. Long-Range Forecast of Runoff from the Danube River -- 5.10.4. Conclusion -- References -- pt. Three Legal, Socio-Economic and Institutional Approaches -- 6. Legal Approaches -- 6.1. The Law of Transboundary Aquifers: Scope and Rippling Effects / Lilian Del Castillo-Laborde -- 6.1.1. Introduction -- 6.1.2. Legal Principles for Transboundary Aquifers -- 6.1.3. The Scope of the Draft Adopted by the UN General Assembly -- 6.1.4. Provisions Concerning Access -- 6.1.5. Provisions Concerning Utilization -- 6.1.6. Provisions Concerning Protection, Preservation and Management -- 6.1.6.1. Provisions on Duties -- 6.1.6.2. Provisions on Implementation Mechanisms -- 6.1.7. Provisions Concerning Technical Cooperation, Emergency Situations and Armed Conflict -- 6.1.8. Other Rules Applicable to Transboundary Shared Resources -- 6.1.9. Case study: The Guarani Aquifer System -- 6.1.10. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 6.2. Water Management Policies to Reduce over Allocation of Water Rights in the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin / Rebecca L. Teasley -- 6.2.1. Introduction -- 6.2.2. Buying Back of Water Rights -- 6.2.3. Scenarios -- 6.2.4. Simulation Model -- 6.2.5. Performance Criteria -- 6.2.6. Results -- 6.2.7. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 6.3. Interstate Collaboration in the Aral Sea Basin -- Successes and Problems / Galina Stulina -- 6.3.1. Introduction -- 6.3.2. Achievement of Collaboration -- 6.3.3. Future of the Region -- 6.4. Kidron Valley/Wadi Nar International Master Plan / Richard Laster -- 6.4.1. Introduction -- 6.4.2. Development of the Master Plan -- 6.4.3. Descriptions of the Master Plan and its Effectiveness -- 6.4.4. Conclusions -- Further Reading -- 6.5. The Development of Transboundary Cooperation in the Prespa Lakes Basin / Miltos Gletsos -- 6.5.1. Introduction -- 6.5.2. Prespa Park: The Early Years of Transboundary Cooperation -- 6.5.3. Advances on Integrated Water Management -- 6.5.4. The Prespa Park International Agreement -- 6.5.5. Supporting Trilateral Cooperation: Other Actors -- 6.5.6. Conclusion -- References -- 6.6. International Relations and Environmental Security: Conflict or Cooperation? Contrasting the Cases of the Maritza-Evros-Meric and Mekong Transboundary Rivers / Anastasios Valvis -- 6.6.1. Introduction -- Conflict or Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins? -- 6.6.2. The Maritza-Evros-Meric Case -- 6.6.2.1. The Evros River and its Importance -- 6.6.2.2. International Management of the Evros River -- 6.6.2.3. Main Issues in Managing the Evros River -- 6.6.3. The Mekong-Lancang River Case -- 6.6.3.1. The Mekong River and its Importance -- 6.6.3.2. International Management of the Mekong River -- 6.6.3.3. Main Issues on Managing the Mekong River -- 6.6.4.Comparing the two Regions -- 6.6.5. Conclusion -- References -- Further Reading -- 6.7. Delineation of Water Resources Regions to Promote Integrated Water Resources Management and Facilitate Transboundary Water Conflicts Resolution / Rodrigo Maia -- 6.7.1. Introduction -- 6.7.2. IWRM and Water Resources Regions -- 6.7.3.Comparative Analysis: Water Resources Regions in Europe and America -- 6.7.4. Recognition of More Comprehensive Aspects -- 6.7.5. Conclusion -- References -- 6.8. Transboundary Water Resources and Determination of Hydrologic Prefectures in Greece / Evangelos A. Baltas -- 6.8.1. Introduction -- 6.8.2. Difficulties in Implementing the Directive -- 6.8.3. Determination of the Hydrologic Prefectures -- 6.8.4. Conclusions -- References -- 7. Socio-Economic and Institutional Approaches -- 7.1. Social-Ecological Resilience of Transboundary Watershed Management: Institutional Design and Social Learning / Barbara J. Morehouse -- 7.1.1. Introduction -- 7.1.2. Issues for Transboundary Institutional Mechanisms -- 7.1.3. Social Learning -- 7.1.4. Conclusion: Potential for Transboundary Collaboration -- References -- Further Reading -- 7.2. How Stakeholder Participation and Partnerships Could Reduce Water Insecurities in Shared River Basins / Bach Tan Sinh -- 7.2.1. Introduction -- 7.2.2. Stakeholder Engagement -- 7.2.3. Stakeholder Roles and Participation -- 7.2.4. Stakeholder Coordination and Partnerships -- 7.2.5. International-Domestic Linkages -- 7.2.6. Conclusion -- References -- Further Reading -- 7.3. Transboundary Stakeholder Analysis to Develop the Navigational Sector of the Parana River / Andre Hernandes -- 7.3.1. Introduction -- 7.3.2. Objectives -- 7.3.2.1. Home Organization -- 7.3.2.2. The Transboundary Context -- 7.3.3. Key Stakeholder Analysis -- 7.3.3.1. Methodology -- 7.3.3.2. Results -- 7.3.4. The Way Forward: Suggested Actions for Improvements -- References -- 7.4. Cooperation in the Navigable Course of the Sava River / Milana Pantelic -- 7.4.1. Introduction -- 7.4.2. Navigable Course and Cooperation -- 7.4.3. Proposal for Further Actions -- 7.4.4. Conclusion -- References -- 7.5. Transboundary Cooperation through the Management of Shared Natural Resources: The Case of the Shkoder/Skadar Lake / Brilanda Bushati -- 7.5.1. Introduction -- 7.5.1.1. Ecological Values of the Lake Shkodra/Skadar -- 7.5.2. Working Method -- 7.5.3. Conclusions -- References -- 7.6. How Far is the Current Status of the Transboundary Shkodra Lake from Requirements for Integrated River Basin Management? / Sotir Mali -- 7.6.1. Introduction -- 7.6.2. Survey Methods -- 7.6.3. Results and Discussion -- 7.6.4. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 7.7. Economic Governance and Common Pool Management of Transboundary Water Resources / Bo Appelgren -- 7.7.1. Introduction -- 7.7.2. Economic Governance of Transboundary Water Management Systems -- 7.7.3. Economic Governance Approaches to Transboundary Water Management -- 7.7.4. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 7.8. Water Resources Management in the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin Using Cooperative Game Theory / Daene C. McKinney -- 7.8.1. Introduction -- 7.8.2. The Water Demand Reduction Cooperative Game -- 7.8.3. Results -- 7.8.4. Conclusions -- References -- 7.9. Conflict Resolution in Transboundary Waters: Incorporating Water Quality in Negotiations / Yannis Mylopoulos -- 7.9.1. Introduction -- 7.9.2. Game Theory in Water Resources -- 7.9.3. Methodology -- 7.9.4. Results -- 7.9.5. Conclusions -- References -- 7.10. The Johnston Plan in a Negotiated Solution for the Jordan Basin / Julio Sanchez Choliz -- 7.10.1. Introduction -- 7.10.2. Key Elements of the Negotiation Game and Fairness Criteria -- 7.10.2.1. Utility or Payment Functions for Arabs and Israelis -- 7.10.2.2. Negotiation Set -- 7.10.2.3. Fairness Criteria -- 7.10.2.4. Johnston Plan (1953-1955) -- 7.10.3. Three Significant Game Solutions between Israel and the Arabs -- 7.10.3.1. Regular Nash Solution without Lateral Payments and Break-off at (0; 0) -- 7.10.3.2. Nash Solution with Lateral Payments and Break-off at (0; 0) -- 7.10.3.3. Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution with Break-off at (0; 0) -- 7.10.3.4. Other Solutions -- 7.10.4. Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- pt. Four Bridging the Gaps -- 8. Capacity Building and Sharing the Risks/Benefits for Conflict Resolution -- 8.1. Capacity Building and Training for Transboundary Groundwater Management: The Contribution of UNESCO / Jean Fried -- 8.1.1. Field Experience or Specific Training? -- 8.1.1.1. Training Objectives -- 8.1.2. Training Target Groups -- 8.1.3.Communication as a Basis of a Transboundary Groundwater Curriculum -- 8.1.4. Experimenting Transboundary Groundwater Curricula and Pedagogy: Two Pilot Courses -- 8.1.5. An Instrument for Training: a Manual Gathering the Contributions to the Pilot Courses -- 8.2.A Risk-Based Integrated Framework for Conflict Resolution in Transboundary Water Resources Management / Lena Salame -- 8.2.1. Managing Transboundary Water Resources: Quantity and Quality -- 8.2.2. The Risk Analysis Framework in TWRM -- 8.2.2.1. Aleatory Uncertainties or Randomnes -- 8.2.2.2. Epistemic or Man-Induced Uncertainties -- 8.2.2.3. Risk Assessment and Management -- 8.2.2.4. Institutional and Social Issues -- 8.2.3. Towards an Integrated Risk-Based Sustainable TWRM Approach -- 8.2.4. Modelling Transbound