Suchergebnisse

Zsfassung in Romani

Euroopan komissio luotiin jotta se voisi ajaa yhteisöjen intressiä. Sen vuoksi siitä päätettiin tehdä itsenäinen. Mutta koska Euroopan Unionin vaikutus jäsenmaissaan on hyvin vahvaa, myös talouden kannalta, haluavat jäsenmaat vaikuttaa komissioon mahdollisimman paljon. Tämän vuoksi komission itsenäisyys vaarantuu. Perustamissopimukset koettavat hoitaa ongelman luomalla komissiolle joita-kin suojamekanismeja. Mutta ovatko ne riittäviä? Vaikuttaa siltä, että komissioon pystytään vaikuttamaan liikaa sen jokapäiväisessä työssä. Tämä vaikuttaminen alkaa jo komission nimittämisvaiheessa ja jatkuu koko ajan komission pohtiessa uuden lainsäädännön tarvetta ja komission valmistellessa uutta lainsäädäntöä. Komission lakiehdotelman sisältöön vaikuttavat usein paljonkin muut instituutiot, jäsenvaltiot sekä intressiryhmät. Tämä johtaa siihen, että komissio ei täysin pysty toteuttamaan yhteisöjen in-tressiä. Monin eri tavoin komission päätöksiin voivat vaikuttaa yksittäisten tai use-ampien jäsenmaiden edut, vaikka tarkoitus olisi ajaa yhteisöjen etua. The European Commission was created so that it could work to fulfil the Community Interest. Therefore it was decided to be an independent institution. But because the European Union affects its Member States very deeply, not least in budgetary ways, the Member States seem to want to influence the Commission as much as possible. Therefore the independence of the Commission is at stake. The Treaties try to deal with the problem by setting some protective mecha-nisms on the Commission. But is it enough? It seems that the Commission gets in-fluenced too much in its everyday work. This influencing starts already at the nomi-nation of the Commissioners, continues all the while when the Commission is decid-ing if new Community legislation is needed and while it drafts new legislation. The substance of the drafts are often influenced very much by the other institutions, Member States and interest groups. What this means is that the Commission can't fulfil its task at seeking the best of the Communities. In many different ways the decisions of the Commission may further the good of one or some interested parties instead of the Community In-terest.

Turkey first applied for EU membership in 1987 and started negotiations for full membership in October 2005 after lengthy and challenging negotiations between EU member states. This master's thesis attempts to examine the relationship between the negotiations for EU membership that are going on between Turkey and the EU Commission and the public discussion on the subject. The research material consists of selected posts on the Financial Times discussion forum and the Acquis communautaire and Copenhagen criteria. By comparing the research material this thesis attempts to investigate if the public deliberation and official negotiations focus on the same issues and requirements for membership. The theoretical background for this analysis is deliberative democracy, according to which public debate should be a prerequisite for agenda setting and decision making. The findings of the thesis reveal that the public discussion does touch on the acquis communautaire and Copenhagen criteria to some degree, but the public is also concerned with non-acquis issues such as the culture and history. A unique feature of the accession negotiations is also the amount of commentary from heads of state regarding the negotiations, which was also noted in the research material. In the light of deliberative democratic theory it can be noted that the public may take part in the discussion over Turkey's membership, but it has little or no chances of setting the agenda for the negotiations.