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AbstractEurope 2020 and the European Semester signal a major change of direction in EU social policy with new governance arrangements, policy orientations and politics. This paper analyses 290 Country Specific Recommendations and 29 interviews to answer two questions: 1) What type of social policy is being advanced by the EU at present? 2) How are EU social actors able to advance EU social policy under current conditions? It argues that the degree of progress in EU social policy in the European Semester (2011–15) has been conditional and contingent. EU social policy is more oriented to supporting market development than it is to correcting for market failures. We explain these developments by a combination of factors including the strong agency exerted by some social actors in a context of constraint, the moderation of expectations and the adoption of strategic practices by key actors, and political divisions among the Member States.

The focus of this article is on EU social policy-making since 2010 in the context of new governance arrangements and changing policy orientations and politics under the European Semester and Europe 2020. Analysis of these developments can tell us something very important about the consensus around social policy in the EU, and in the member states more broadly, given the potentially important role to be played by social policy in adjusting to the financial crisis. The last five years have been especially momentous in an EU context. The European Semester was introduced in 2011, inaugurating a significant new annual governance cycle to monitor and enforce compliance with stringent budgetary and structural reforms (European Commission, 2010). A key part of the Semester - and the strongest mechanism available to the EU institutions to influence social policy developments at member state level - is the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to member states in areas of perceived weakness. Europe 2020, the ten-year programme of economic, employment and social policy goals and priorities of the EU, introduced ten integrated guidelines to be taken forward by five headline targets and seven flagship initiatives. Social policy has an explicit place in Europe 2020, especially in terms of poverty and social inclusion, employment, pensions, health and social care. For example, one of the five targets aims to lift some 20 million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020.

We study whether and to what extent EU countries implement recommendations on macroeconomic imbalances given by the EU in the so-called European Semester. We assess how recommendations have evolved since 2013, based on a new database. We also study how EU recommendations on addressing macroeconomic imbalances compare to recommendations given by the International Monetary Fund. Overall implementation of recommendations by EU countries has worsened in the last few years, in particular when it comes to recommendations addressed to countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances. The policy content of the recommendations is broadly aligned with economic priorities emphasised by their corresponding legal bases, but to our surprise a sizable share of recommendations, such as on childcare, are also labelled as relevant for resolving macroeconomic imbalances. Moreover, for countries with macroeconomic imbalances, the IMF tends to emphasise financial imbalances more frequently than the EU. We also note that the EU makes significant political choices about which imbalances are judged to be excessive and which are judged not excessive. Low implementation is likely a result of the fundamental dilemma facing the EU. National policies have major cross-border implications making coordination important, but countries take sovereign decisions mostly based on national considerations. We therefore argue that recommendations given in the context of macroeconomic imbalances should be focused on key issues of macroeconomic and cross-border relevance. Moreover, we note a significant gap between analyses as described in the recitals of recommendations and the actual recommendations, and would urge greater consistency. Finally, the European Semester exercise is very difficult to digest and communication of key analyses and recommendations could be significantly improved to make them more accessible to national policymakers.

The purpose of this note is to present economic governance in the European Union, its 2017 cycle and its main tools for the coordination of economic and fiscal policies of the 28 member states through a list of parallel procedures and processes.

In this contribution to the symposium "What's the problem? Multilevel governance and problem‐solving," we discuss possible reasons that make difficult for the European Semester to achieve the goals of developing mutual learning and the acquisition of "ownership" over fiscal restraint, budgetary coordination and structural reforms. We underscore the uneasy coupling of a "soft" multilevel governance mode with "hard" forms of governance associated with power politics and domination. We claim that four major problems undermine the Semester's credibility and effectiveness: (1) a democratic deficit resulting from executive dominance, the relative sidelining of parliaments and the marginalization of the public, which confine learning to governmental and administrative circles; (2) the constitutionalization of budgetary policy choices, which constrains the available policy options and preempts reflection and discussion; (3) the "disciplinary logic" imposed through asymmetric intergovernmentalism, which invites noncompliance or bargaining, and (4) the "tough" treatment of debtor Eurozone members outside the Semester.

Do parliamentary parties politicize compliance within the European Semester? If so, which conflict lines organize parliamentary debates? In order to address these questions, this discussion paper analyses national parliamentary participation in two budgetary cycles of the European Semester (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland. While in France and Germany, compliance within the European Semester has been subject to strong politicization, this has not been the case in Austria and Ireland. Moreover, strong politicization coincided with the contestation of country-specific recommendations among the parliamentary parties. The empirical analysis established that strong formal powers in budgetary matters constitute an important prerequisite allowing parliamentary parties to articulate their contestation. However, the willingness to comply depends most directly on whether the content of country-specific recommendations is coherent with the economic preferences of a political party, not the government-opposition cleavage. ; Wird compliance im Rahmen des Europäischen Semesters durch nationale Parteien politisiert? Falls ja, entlang welcher Konfliktlinien orientieren sich parlamentarische Debatten? Um diese Fragen anzugehen, analysiert dieser Artikel die Beteiligung nationaler Parlamente in zwei Budgetzyklen des Europäischen Semesters (2014 und 2015) in Österreich, Deutschland, Frankreich und Irland. Während in Deutschland und Frankreich compliance im Rahmen des Europäischen Semesters verstärkt Gegenstand von Politisierung war, trifft dies in Irland und Österreich nicht zu. Darüber hinaus wurden in den Fällen mit starker Politisierung verstärkt auch Anfechtungen der länderspezifischen Empfehlungen durch die parlamentarischen Parteien festgestellt. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass starke formale Befugnisse in Budgetangelegenheiten eine wichtige Voraussetzung für Parlamente darstellen, länderspezifische Empfehlungen anzufechten. Allerdings hängt die Bereitschaft, den länderspezifischen Empfehlungen zu folgen, in großem Ausmaß davon ab, ob diese inhaltlich mit der zugrunde liegenden ökonomischen Haltung der Partei übereinstimmt und nicht von der Kluft zwischen Regierung und Opposition.

This article conceptualises and illustrates hardening and softening trends in country-specific recommendations (CSRs) that are part of the European Semester. It proposes an analytical framework that meets the specific characteristics of CSRs: its adaptable and non-uniform norms, which are co-determined by actors operating across governance levels. It proposes three elements to analyse hardening and softening of CSRs, adding the degree of 'centralisation' to the often used elements of 'obligation' and 'enforcement'. Then it illustrates the framework with trends in CSRs given to Belgium and the Netherlands on pensions and wages. Both countries and topics show hardening as well as softening trends regarding the degree of obligation, enforcement and centralisation. The article suggests that a complete analysis of hardening and softening of CSRs requires assessing the degree of centralisation as well. Looking at obligation and enforcement alone could misinterpret the hardness or softness of CSRs.

Which factors explain domestic consent or contestation of European Union (EU) policy guidance issued within the framework of the European Semester (ES)? To address this question, this article analyses national parliamentary party positions on EU policy guidance in two cycles of the ES (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany and Ireland. Whereas parliamentary parties in Austria and Ireland expressed their consent to EU policy guidance, parliamentary parties in Germany and France were polarised. The empirical analysis presented in this article establishes that strong formal powers in budgetary matters are a prerequisite for parties to contest EU policy guidance. However, parliamentary party positions depend most on whether the content of EU policy guidance reflects a party's economic interests.

The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's 'aggregate fiscal stance' is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management.The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council's recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area's aggregate fiscal stance.