Suchergebnisse

This article examines the main features of the Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) that member states have presented to access NextGenerationEU (NGEU) funds, and it explores the relationship between NGEU and the European Semester. Relying on a dataset collected for this purpose, which coded all RRPs and all recommendations received by the member states in the years preceding NGEU, we explore quantitatively the variation in the countries' resource allocation and reform agendas and the congruence between RRPs and the recommendations issued in the European Semester. Our analysis reveals three key findings. First, substantial variation exists across member states, reflecting the diverse economic and political contexts shaped by a decade of crises. Second, by disaggregating RRPs into the six policy pillars indicated by the Commission, we show differences in the member states' patterns of intervention. Third, we offer insights into the extent to which member states address the Semester recommendations. The data we present is a relevant tool for understanding NGEU and generating research questions aimed at exploring its nature and its implementation in the years to come.

Cet article analyse la manière dont les institutions européennes ont tenté de résoudre les problèmes de légitimité du Semestre européen depuis sa première itération. L'article montre que depuis 2010 le Semestre a connu plusieurs adaptations tant de iure (suite à l'adoption du Two et Six Pack) que de facto, à travers des interactions et accords interinstitutionnels. L'article est organisé en trois temps : la première section présente le Semestre européen, mettant en exergue ses caractéristiques et les acteurs impliqués. La deuxième section passe en revue les problèmes de légitimité, alors que la troisième et dernière partie se penche sur l'évolution institutionnelle du Semestre comme résultat de l'évolution de sa base légale et des processus d'apprentissage, de négociation et de compromis entre les institutions européennes.

The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in planning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across 35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.

The European Semester, launched in 2011, enhances the coordination of macroeconomic policies among European Union member states. This article contributes to the lively scholarly debate on whether this policy-making cycle has empowered more the European supranational or intergovernmental institutions. Drawing on a new dataset covering all pension-related country-specific recommendations between 2011 and 2016, and employing an original quantitative method, we show that the Commission mainly follows a 'technocratic' approach in drafting its recommendations, which are grounded in objective indicators. As the Council refrains from systematically altering the recommendations' logic, we conclude that, at least in pension policy, the Commission's role in macroeconomic surveillance has been significantly strengthened in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Does domestic contestation of European Union legitimacy affect the behaviour of the European Commission as an economic and fiscal supervisor? We draw on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness and employ multilevel and topic modelling to examine the extent to which the politicisation of European integration affects the outputs of the European Semester: the Country-Specific Recommendations. We develop two competing sets of hypotheses and test these on an original large-N data set on Commission behaviour with observations covering the period 2011–2017. We detect a twofold effect on the Commission's recommendations: member states that experience greater politicisation receive recommendations that are larger in scope but whose substance is less oriented towards social investment. We argue that this effect is best explained as an outcome of the Commission's institutional risk management strategy of regulatory 'entrenchment'. The supranational agent issues additional recommendations while simultaneously entrenching on a stronger mandate substantively, which allows it to maintain its regulatory reputation and signal regulatory resolve to observing audiences.