Suchergebnisse

This article examines the main features of the Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) that member states have presented to access NextGenerationEU (NGEU) funds, and it explores the relationship between NGEU and the European Semester. Relying on a dataset collected for this purpose, which coded all RRPs and all recommendations received by the member states in the years preceding NGEU, we explore quantitatively the variation in the countries' resource allocation and reform agendas and the congruence between RRPs and the recommendations issued in the European Semester. Our analysis reveals three key findings. First, substantial variation exists across member states, reflecting the diverse economic and political contexts shaped by a decade of crises. Second, by disaggregating RRPs into the six policy pillars indicated by the Commission, we show differences in the member states' patterns of intervention. Third, we offer insights into the extent to which member states address the Semester recommendations. The data we present is a relevant tool for understanding NGEU and generating research questions aimed at exploring its nature and its implementation in the years to come.

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.

Does domestic contestation of European Union legitimacy affect the behaviour of the European Commission as an economic and fiscal supervisor? We draw on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness and employ multilevel and topic modelling to examine the extent to which the politicisation of European integration affects the outputs of the European Semester: the Country-Specific Recommendations. We develop two competing sets of hypotheses and test these on an original large-N data set on Commission behaviour with observations covering the period 2011–2017. We detect a twofold effect on the Commission's recommendations: member states that experience greater politicisation receive recommendations that are larger in scope but whose substance is less oriented towards social investment. We argue that this effect is best explained as an outcome of the Commission's institutional risk management strategy of regulatory 'entrenchment'. The supranational agent issues additional recommendations while simultaneously entrenching on a stronger mandate substantively, which allows it to maintain its regulatory reputation and signal regulatory resolve to observing audiences.

Cet article analyse la manière dont les institutions européennes ont tenté de résoudre les problèmes de légitimité du Semestre européen depuis sa première itération. L'article montre que depuis 2010 le Semestre a connu plusieurs adaptations tant de iure (suite à l'adoption du Two et Six Pack) que de facto, à travers des interactions et accords interinstitutionnels. L'article est organisé en trois temps : la première section présente le Semestre européen, mettant en exergue ses caractéristiques et les acteurs impliqués. La deuxième section passe en revue les problèmes de légitimité, alors que la troisième et dernière partie se penche sur l'évolution institutionnelle du Semestre comme résultat de l'évolution de sa base légale et des processus d'apprentissage, de négociation et de compromis entre les institutions européennes.

The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in planning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across 35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.

The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in planning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across 35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.

The aim of this OSE Research paper is to ascertain to what extent the social partners in Sweden are involved in the different stages of the European Semester: what do they expect (if anything) to gain from this involvement, and do they perceive that they have an influence on the outputs and outcomes of the process? By studying available written documents and conducting interviews with representatives of the trade union confederations, employer organizations and civil servants from the government's office, we have reconstructed the involvement of the national-level social partners in the European Semester. The Swedish case is characterized by a strong institutional framework for national social dialogue as well as weak EU pressure to adapt to the European Union's (EU) Country-specific Recommendations (CSR) or other policy recommendations emanating from the Semester. Sweden is not part of the Eurozone and the economic recovery after the great recession has been comparatively good. In terms of the geographical typology for industrial relations used in the INVOTUNES project, Sweden is one of the 'Northern countries', together with Denmark, Finland and Norway. Fundamental components of the Swedish model for industrial relations, together with the high unionisation rate and broad membership, are the strong status of collective agreements, workplace representatives with a mandate to negotiate, as well as the independence of the social partners from central government. The labour market is regulated by a number of principal agreements reached at the central level between employers' organizations and trade unions. These central agreements regulate aspects including negotiation procedures, dispute procedures and development issues. In contrast to many other countries, there are no state-administered minimum wage levels in Sweden, since the social partners negotiate these key aspects. The political situation in Sweden at the time of writing is characterised by a minority government, composed of the Social Democrats and the Green party, supported by the Liberals and the Centre party (two liberal parties). The Swedish case illustrates how a strong national social dialogue and low degree of EU pressure mean that, on the one hand, the social partners have moderate to good access to the policy process and possess considerable resources which can be used to impact the European Semester. Regardless, they ultimately have limited incentives to use these tools to influence the outputs and outcomes of the policy process. So far, the outputs from the European Semester have not pushed for concrete reforms in the areas for which the social partners are mainly responsible, thus they have had few reasons to be involved in the process. Moreover, as the national social dialogue functions well, they have no interest in using the Commission to put pressure on the national government. Instead, the social partners wish to raise the awareness of the European Commission and others regarding how industrial relations function in Sweden and how beneficial this model is. The long-term goal of the social partners is to preserve their autonomy and the model of wage formation in Sweden, namely the freedom of the social partners to reach agreements through negotiations. Reaching this goal includes protecting the wage formation model from reforms at European level. Therefore, this study suggests that the social partners monitor the work related to the Semester and take action if the CSRs concern issues that are important to them. So far this has rarely been the case. When the social partners choose to become involved in the Semester, they use insider strategies, i.e. they turn to national rather than European-level actors. The Swedish government has created formal institutions for ensuring the involvement of the social partners in the Semester work. The partners have meetings with the government regularly during the Semester, while unions and employer organizations together write an annex to the National Reform Programme (NRP). For Sweden, the policy recommendations for meaningful involvement would probably call for a more focused dialogue between local and central levels within the social partner organisations. In trying to strengthen positive incentives for such dialogue, the unions would most likely need to involve the various members more actively than they do today.

The European Semester, launched in 2011, enhances the coordination of macroeconomic policies among European Union member states. This article contributes to the lively scholarly debate on whether this policy-making cycle has empowered more the European supranational or intergovernmental institutions. Drawing on a new dataset covering all pension-related country-specific recommendations between 2011 and 2016, and employing an original quantitative method, we show that the Commission mainly follows a 'technocratic' approach in drafting its recommendations, which are grounded in objective indicators. As the Council refrains from systematically altering the recommendations' logic, we conclude that, at least in pension policy, the Commission's role in macroeconomic surveillance has been significantly strengthened in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Does domestic contestation of European Union legitimacy affect the behaviour of the European Commission as an economic and fiscal supervisor? We draw on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness and employ multilevel and topic modelling to examine the extent to which the politicisation of European integration affects the outputs of the European Semester: the Country-Specific Recommendations. We develop two competing sets of hypotheses and test these on an original large-N data set on Commission behaviour with observations covering the period 2011–2017. We detect a twofold effect on the Commission's recommendations: member states that experience greater politicisation receive recommendations that are larger in scope but whose substance is less oriented towards social investment. We argue that this effect is best explained as an outcome of the Commission's institutional risk management strategy of regulatory 'entrenchment'. The supranational agent issues additional recommendations while simultaneously entrenching on a stronger mandate substantively, which allows it to maintain its regulatory reputation and signal regulatory resolve to observing audiences.

The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides EU member states with ex-ante guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The Semester's goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the new EU economic governance framework. We find that member states are only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the Semester has so far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments and the lack of transparency of the process at some stages. Finally, there remains room to clarify the implications from a unified legal text. In fact, diluting the legal separation of recommendations on National Reform Programmes and Council opinions on Stability and Convergence Programmes may compromise effective surveillance and governance. The European Parliament has an important role to play. It needs hold the Commission and the Council accountable. This and the overall objective of enhancing the new procedure's effectiveness and legitimacy can be done by means of a regular Economic Dialogue on the Semester.

As a result of the euro crisis, EU economic governance has been reformed and EU institutions have gained new competences regarding national budgets, with the European Semester (the annual cycle of economic surveillance of the member states) being the most prominent example. With the Commission and the Council being the main actors, and the European Parliament playing only a minor role, a debate about the democratic legitimacy of the Semester and the role of national parliaments (NPs) in this regard has unfolded. This thematic issue, therefore, addresses the question of how parliamentary accountability of the European Semester has evolved: Have NPs met the challenge by adapting to the new situation in a way that allows them to hold the executive accountable? While the contributions to this thematic issue show significant variation across NPs, overall they reveal a rather pessimistic picture: Despite several institutional innovations concerning the reforms of internal rules and procedures, the rise of independent fiscal institutions, inter-parliamentary cooperation, and hearings with the European Commissioners, NPs have remained rather weak actors in EU economic governance also ten years after the Semester's introduction. Whether recent changes linked to the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility introduced in response to the Covid-19 crisis will change the picture significantly remains to be examined.

Does domestic contestation of European Union legitimacy affect the behaviour of the European Commission as an economic and fiscal supervisor? We draw on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness and employ multilevel and topic modelling to examine the extent to which the politicisation of European integration affects the outputs of the European Semester: the Country-Specific Recommendations. We develop two competing sets of hypotheses and test these on an original large-N data set on Commission behaviour with observations covering the period 2011–2017. We detect a twofold effect on the Commission's recommendations: member states that experience greater politicisation receive recommendations that are larger in scope but whose substance is less oriented towards social investment. We argue that this effect is best explained as an outcome of the Commission's institutional risk management strategy of regulatory 'entrenchment'. The supranational agent issues additional recommendations while simultaneously entrenching on a stronger mandate substantively, which allows it to maintain its regulatory reputation and signal regulatory resolve to observing audiences.