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The article aims to determine criteria for allocation of international responsibility between the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Firstly, rules on responsibility of the international organizations presented in the Draft articles of the International Law Commission are discussed. Further, the article examines how judicial bodies decide cases related to international responsibility of the EU in different areas of law. Finally, possible formation of lex specialis in case of the EU is assessed and the following three criteria for attribution of conduct and allocation of international responsibility between EU and its Member States are identified: i) nature of EU competence, ii) actors, and iii) remedies. It is concluded that in the areas of exclusive competence, a conduct of EU organs or agents is always attributable to the EU. Whereas in areas of shared competence, a decisive factor is an actor who performs specific conduct. In order to decide on attribution of conduct to the EU or its Member States, the effective control criteria should be followed. Furthermore, especially in the area of human rights, the existence of remedies and their nature prevailing in the particular legal regime are significant factors. Therefore in order to ensure the proper protection of rights of third parties and proper functioning of the specific legal regime, courts may apply international responsibility to the EU Member States even in cases when they are implementing EU law.

There are 27 Member States in European Union (EU), and all of them are based on separate legislative, executive and judiciary power. EU is a unique union, which Member States established common institutions, for which they transfer a part of their sovereignty, for the purpose that common questions would be usefully solved at European level. Moreover, there are also separate judiciary system. Actually, EU legal system is not independent, formally EU and its legal system is based on national constitutions and depends on national institutions in creation of EU law, and also depends on realizing of already legislated EU law. Assorting legal systems of Member States is useful, because it helps to see their differences and similarities and also the impact of them to EU legal system. Firstly, dividing legal systems to common law and continental law groups. Latter is divided into French, German and Scandinavian law groups. Basic differences between common law and continental law are: making the decisions, the language of laws, civil process, methods of interpreting law. Similarity is that, nevertheless there are not in continental Europe states officially established principle for lower courts to follow the decision of higher court, but in practice this principle is acknowledged. Another similarity is that in common law there are obvious purpose to unify law with the help of legislator. As to the Scandinavian law, so for this unity of law there were favourable circumstances: common historical development, similar languages, similar number of residents, geographical place and so on. Roman law and German law differ in legal terminology, in style of the decisions of courts, in type of jurist, and also in historical development. The similarities and differences of legal systems of EU Member States have positive and negative influence on EU legal system, as unifying the law of Member States their differences interfere, and similarities help.

There are 27 Member States in European Union (EU), and all of them are based on separate legislative, executive and judiciary power. EU is a unique union, which Member States established common institutions, for which they transfer a part of their sovereignty, for the purpose that common questions would be usefully solved at European level. Moreover, there are also separate judiciary system. Actually, EU legal system is not independent, formally EU and its legal system is based on national constitutions and depends on national institutions in creation of EU law, and also depends on realizing of already legislated EU law. Assorting legal systems of Member States is useful, because it helps to see their differences and similarities and also the impact of them to EU legal system. Firstly, dividing legal systems to common law and continental law groups. Latter is divided into French, German and Scandinavian law groups. Basic differences between common law and continental law are: making the decisions, the language of laws, civil process, methods of interpreting law. Similarity is that, nevertheless there are not in continental Europe states officially established principle for lower courts to follow the decision of higher court, but in practice this principle is acknowledged. Another similarity is that in common law there are obvious purpose to unify law with the help of legislator. As to the Scandinavian law, so for this unity of law there were favourable circumstances: common historical development, similar languages, similar number of residents, geographical place and so on. Roman law and German law differ in legal terminology, in style of the decisions of courts, in type of jurist, and also in historical development. The similarities and differences of legal systems of EU Member States have positive and negative influence on EU legal system, as unifying the law of Member States their differences interfere, and similarities help.

There are 27 Member States in European Union (EU), and all of them are based on separate legislative, executive and judiciary power. EU is a unique union, which Member States established common institutions, for which they transfer a part of their sovereignty, for the purpose that common questions would be usefully solved at European level. Moreover, there are also separate judiciary system. Actually, EU legal system is not independent, formally EU and its legal system is based on national constitutions and depends on national institutions in creation of EU law, and also depends on realizing of already legislated EU law. Assorting legal systems of Member States is useful, because it helps to see their differences and similarities and also the impact of them to EU legal system. Firstly, dividing legal systems to common law and continental law groups. Latter is divided into French, German and Scandinavian law groups. Basic differences between common law and continental law are: making the decisions, the language of laws, civil process, methods of interpreting law. Similarity is that, nevertheless there are not in continental Europe states officially established principle for lower courts to follow the decision of higher court, but in practice this principle is acknowledged. Another similarity is that in common law there are obvious purpose to unify law with the help of legislator. As to the Scandinavian law, so for this unity of law there were favourable circumstances: common historical development, similar languages, similar number of residents, geographical place and so on. Roman law and German law differ in legal terminology, in style of the decisions of courts, in type of jurist, and also in historical development. The similarities and differences of legal systems of EU Member States have positive and negative influence on EU legal system, as unifying the law of Member States their differences interfere, and similarities help.

There are 27 Member States in European Union (EU), and all of them are based on separate legislative, executive and judiciary power. EU is a unique union, which Member States established common institutions, for which they transfer a part of their sovereignty, for the purpose that common questions would be usefully solved at European level. Moreover, there are also separate judiciary system. Actually, EU legal system is not independent, formally EU and its legal system is based on national constitutions and depends on national institutions in creation of EU law, and also depends on realizing of already legislated EU law. Assorting legal systems of Member States is useful, because it helps to see their differences and similarities and also the impact of them to EU legal system. Firstly, dividing legal systems to common law and continental law groups. Latter is divided into French, German and Scandinavian law groups. Basic differences between common law and continental law are: making the decisions, the language of laws, civil process, methods of interpreting law. Similarity is that, nevertheless there are not in continental Europe states officially established principle for lower courts to follow the decision of higher court, but in practice this principle is acknowledged. Another similarity is that in common law there are obvious purpose to unify law with the help of legislator. As to the Scandinavian law, so for this unity of law there were favourable circumstances: common historical development, similar languages, similar number of residents, geographical place and so on. Roman law and German law differ in legal terminology, in style of the decisions of courts, in type of jurist, and also in historical development. The similarities and differences of legal systems of EU Member States have positive and negative influence on EU legal system, as unifying the law of Member States their differences interfere, and similarities help.

In the last decades international migration has become one of the most salient issues on the European Union (EU) policy agenda. Increasing numbers of immigrants have challenged the capabilities of the Member states to implement effective national immigration policies. Therefore in 1999 the Member states began to develop a common EU immigration policy. However, after almost ten years a progress achieved in this field remains very limited. Especially difficult is to reach an agreement on a common policy in the field of the legal immigration. This paper by employing an institutional approach seeks to find out the most important factors restraining the shaping of common EU legal immigration policy. Veto players theory created by George Tsebelis is used as the theoretical background of the research. This theory explains how different institutional settings influence policy stability. According to the theory the most important feature of political institutions is veto players, i.e. decision makers whose agreement is required for the change of policy. The main argument of the veto players theory is that the higher number of veto players and the greater distances among their preferences lead to a higher level of policy stability. Following this theoretical framework the paper tests two hypotheses. After the first one the limited common EU immigration policy is a result of the high number of veto players in the immigration field. After the second one the limited common EU immigration policy is a result of the considerable discrepancy between veto players' preferences in the immigration field. The paper is organized in the following way. In the first part the process of shaping common EU immigration policy is described. The second part presents veto players theory: its conception, main ideas and arguments. The third part applies theoretical concepts of veto players theory to the analysis of common EU immigration policy. First of all the methodology of the application of the veto players theory is presented in detail. The results of spatial analysis of common EU immigration policy are given and interpreted in the last section of the paper. They let to evaluate how the number of veto players, the distances between their preferences and the agenda setters influence a common EU immigration policy. The analysis has revealed that the number of veto players is not significant factor of the limitations of the common EU immigration policy. Its impact depends on the preferences of veto players. Because of the relative similarity the preferences of veto players are also not an obstacle to develop a truly common EU immigration policy. The main conclusion of the paper is that the most important factor of limited common EU immigration policy is the discrepancy between the preferences of the European Commission and the Member states. The Commission as the institutional agenda setter presents proposals which are very liberal and therefore unacceptable to the Member states. The only one way to adopt common supranational rules in the field of legal immigration is then to modify the proposal of the Commission significantly. Thus the Commission limits the shaping of the common EU immigration policy. The results of the research indicate that considering the preferences of the Commission and the Member States the possibility to adopt common rules on regulating the entry of immigrants into the EU is much greater than to create a common policy of the immigrants' integration. In order to boost the development of common EU immigration policy the Commission should to cease advocating liberalisation of immigrants' integration. Instead of that the Commission as well as the Member States should try to reach an agreement on the common rules of the admission of third-country nationals. That is the most direct way to create a truly common EU immigration policy at the present conditions.

In the last decades international migration has become one of the most salient issues on the European Union (EU) policy agenda. Increasing numbers of immigrants have challenged the capabilities of the Member states to implement effective national immigration policies. Therefore in 1999 the Member states began to develop a common EU immigration policy. However, after almost ten years a progress achieved in this field remains very limited. Especially difficult is to reach an agreement on a common policy in the field of the legal immigration. This paper by employing an institutional approach seeks to find out the most important factors restraining the shaping of common EU legal immigration policy. Veto players theory created by George Tsebelis is used as the theoretical background of the research. This theory explains how different institutional settings influence policy stability. According to the theory the most important feature of political institutions is veto players, i.e. decision makers whose agreement is required for the change of policy. The main argument of the veto players theory is that the higher number of veto players and the greater distances among their preferences lead to a higher level of policy stability. Following this theoretical framework the paper tests two hypotheses. After the first one the limited common EU immigration policy is a result of the high number of veto players in the immigration field. After the second one the limited common EU immigration policy is a result of the considerable discrepancy between veto players' preferences in the immigration field. The paper is organized in the following way. In the first part the process of shaping common EU immigration policy is described. The second part presents veto players theory: its conception, main ideas and arguments. The third part applies theoretical concepts of veto players theory to the analysis of common EU immigration policy. First of all the methodology of the application of the veto players theory is presented in detail. The results of spatial analysis of common EU immigration policy are given and interpreted in the last section of the paper. They let to evaluate how the number of veto players, the distances between their preferences and the agenda setters influence a common EU immigration policy. The analysis has revealed that the number of veto players is not significant factor of the limitations of the common EU immigration policy. Its impact depends on the preferences of veto players. Because of the relative similarity the preferences of veto players are also not an obstacle to develop a truly common EU immigration policy. The main conclusion of the paper is that the most important factor of limited common EU immigration policy is the discrepancy between the preferences of the European Commission and the Member states. The Commission as the institutional agenda setter presents proposals which are very liberal and therefore unacceptable to the Member states. The only one way to adopt common supranational rules in the field of legal immigration is then to modify the proposal of the Commission significantly. Thus the Commission limits the shaping of the common EU immigration policy. The results of the research indicate that considering the preferences of the Commission and the Member States the possibility to adopt common rules on regulating the entry of immigrants into the EU is much greater than to create a common policy of the immigrants' integration. In order to boost the development of common EU immigration policy the Commission should to cease advocating liberalisation of immigrants' integration. Instead of that the Commission as well as the Member States should try to reach an agreement on the common rules of the admission of third-country nationals. That is the most direct way to create a truly common EU immigration policy at the present conditions.

During the crisis in 2008, EU institutions and leaders of member states understood, that existing deposit insurance system is inefficient and that it required necessary changes. In order to prevent unreasonable expenditures of EU member states, burden of debt and irresponsibility of banks, the deposit insurance system directive was adopted in 1994; it had been renewed several times in 2009 and 2014, however no significant changes on financial market had happened. The main reason for that were the emerged economic and cultural differences between EU member states, which depreciated depositor's trust in banks and deposit insurance system itself. The object of research: the decision making process of deposit insurance directive, changes to directive by EU institutions and execution models in European Union. The objective of the study: to analyze the reasons for emergence of deposit insurance directive, improvement steps and processes, that influence the financial sector; and to name mutual barriers between EU institution after analysis of models. Tasks of the study: a) to define the concept of European deposit insurance and evaluate its influence to banking union; b) to research the decision making process of deposit insurance directive and the impact EU institutions had on it; c) to review the impact Germany had on decision making process of deposit insurance directive; d) to analyze the models of deposit insurance and political abilities to adopt them in Europe. Various research methods are used in the study: analytical, descriptive and comparative as well as document and statistical analysis methods. They helped to research the relations between EU institutions, adopting deposit insurance directive and it`s improvements. At the same time summarized results for reasons of directive's inefficiency are given. After the analysis of the EU documents, the conclusion is made, that in order to create a common deposit insurance system in all Europe, the possibility to improve political decision making process should be considered.

During the crisis in 2008, EU institutions and leaders of member states understood, that existing deposit insurance system is inefficient and that it required necessary changes. In order to prevent unreasonable expenditures of EU member states, burden of debt and irresponsibility of banks, the deposit insurance system directive was adopted in 1994; it had been renewed several times in 2009 and 2014, however no significant changes on financial market had happened. The main reason for that were the emerged economic and cultural differences between EU member states, which depreciated depositor's trust in banks and deposit insurance system itself. The object of research: the decision making process of deposit insurance directive, changes to directive by EU institutions and execution models in European Union. The objective of the study: to analyze the reasons for emergence of deposit insurance directive, improvement steps and processes, that influence the financial sector; and to name mutual barriers between EU institution after analysis of models. Tasks of the study: a) to define the concept of European deposit insurance and evaluate its influence to banking union; b) to research the decision making process of deposit insurance directive and the impact EU institutions had on it; c) to review the impact Germany had on decision making process of deposit insurance directive; d) to analyze the models of deposit insurance and political abilities to adopt them in Europe. Various research methods are used in the study: analytical, descriptive and comparative as well as document and statistical analysis methods. They helped to research the relations between EU institutions, adopting deposit insurance directive and it`s improvements. At the same time summarized results for reasons of directive's inefficiency are given. After the analysis of the EU documents, the conclusion is made, that in order to create a common deposit insurance system in all Europe, the possibility to improve political decision making process should be considered.

Adapted from the source document.

Nanotechnology regulation in the EU and the U.S. has common features in disclosure requirements and recognizing the need for risk assessment; however, significant differences emerge when it comes to informing the consumers and the public (labelling requirements). The article is ended with a summary on prospects and suggested principles for advancing nanotechnology regulation. International regulation is identified as the preferred approach, while liberal national regulation may be a beneficial initial approach in countries like Lithuania. Non-governmental and self-regulatory initiatives may be a valuable aid to the governmental regulation, since they are more adapted to changes, as it is demonstrated by the experience in regulating other emerging technologies.

Nanotechnology regulation in the EU and the U.S. has common features in disclosure requirements and recognizing the need for risk assessment; however, significant differences emerge when it comes to informing the consumers and the public (labelling requirements). The article is ended with a summary on prospects and suggested principles for advancing nanotechnology regulation. International regulation is identified as the preferred approach, while liberal national regulation may be a beneficial initial approach in countries like Lithuania. Non-governmental and self-regulatory initiatives may be a valuable aid to the governmental regulation, since they are more adapted to changes, as it is demonstrated by the experience in regulating other emerging technologies.

With reference to strategic documents of the European Union (EU) on forestry development and based on the analysis of experience of some EU states, also results of recent researches conducted in Lithuania and materials from expert discussions, this article analyses the forestry development trends in the EU and discusses possible variants for optimization of the Lithuanian forestry management system. The impact of Forestry Strategy for the European Union and the EU Forest Action Plan adopted by the Council of the European Union on the development of further forestry development of EU member states is discussed and it is emphasized that within the EU until now there is no uniform forestry management model and therefore national models are developed according to the local conditions, existing traditions and general trends of EU forestry development. It is shown that Lithuania is still in the search for ways to optimize its forestry management by looking for solutions to the dilemma of public-private forests ratio and to expediency of structural reforms of existing forestry districts. ; a Remiantis Europos Sąjungos (ES) strateginiais dokumentais dėl miškininkystės vystymo, straipsnyje analizuojamos miškininkystės raidos ES tendencijos ir, remiantis kai kurių ES šalių patirties analize bei pastaraisiais metais Lietuvoje atliktų tyrimų ir svarstymų medžiaga, aptariami galimi Lietuvos miškų ūkio sistemos valdymo optimizavimo variantai. Akcentuojama, kad tolimesnei ES valstybių narių miškų ūkio raidai turi įtakos Europos Sąjungos Tarybos patvirtinta Europos Sąjungos miškininkystės strategija bei jos įgyvendinimo veiksmų planas, tačiau iki šiol ES nėra bendro miškų ūkio valdymo modelio, ir todėl nacionaliniai modeliai kuriami atsižvelgiant į vietines sąlygas, susiklosčiusias tradicijas ir bendrąsias ES miškų ūkio vystymosi tendencijas. Parodyta, kad Lietuvoje iki šiol vyksta miškų ūkio valdymo optimizavimo kelių paieškos, sprendžiant valstybinių ir privačių miškų santykio dilemą bei esamų urėdijų struktūrinių pertvarkymų tikslingumo klausimus.

First introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and subsequently revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, European Union (EU) citizenship long remained an empty promise. Even if it did not offer much in terms of new rights at first, EU citizenship has now become a key element of the rising European polity. Recently, indeed, and thanks primarily to the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) case-law and its codification in Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of movement and residence of EU citizens and their family, things have started to change. European citizenship is slowly becoming a direct source of rights outside the economic context. This academic master work explores the right of economically inactive EU citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of European Union. The main purpose of this work is to review the existing and potential extension as well as challenges to the principle of free movement of economically inactive EU citizens. Part I of this work highlights the principle of EU citizenship as an independent source of rights of economically inactive people. This part explores the material scope of free movement rights concentrating on the added value of Articles 17-18 EC: whether the new provisions introduce an autonomous and directly effective right to move and reside in a Member State; whether Article 17 and 18 change the law as it relates to 'wholly internal situations'; whether Articles 17 and 18 contribute to the creation of new substantive rights for EU nationals who are neither economically active nor economically self-sufficient; what are the limits and tendencies of these rights. It is also analyzed what the impact of the recent legal developments in the freedom of movement dimension, such as the ECJ case law and the new Directive 2004/38/EC, is. Part II focuses on the tension between freedom of movement for economically inactive people and the principle of social solidarity. Three categories of economically inactive people are examined, the first concerning access to social assistance for non-workers, the second concerning access to social or educational assistance for students, and the third concerning access to various kinds of job-seeker's allowance for persons seeking work. Here the principle of non-discrimination is highlighted as having huge impact to social rights of economically inactive EU citizens. Separate section is taken for the exploration of potentialities and limits of social citizenship.