Suchergebnisse

This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.

This article is an attempt to overview the state of the theory of European integration and it's development perspectives. Distinct and divergent "broad" and "narrow" definitions of integration theory, as well as various understandings of it's meaning and purpose should be regarded as symptoms of it's disintegration and fragmentation. In the absence of the broader theoretical paradigm "mosaic" picture of integration unfolds and gains dominance, thus preventing the understanding of deep and long-term tendencies of the integration process. The reconstruction and renewal of the theoretical paradigm of European integration research through the reflective restoration of the equilibrium between theoretical "explanation" and "understanding" is the necessary prerequisite for the development and progress in this research. Adapted from the source document.

Aus chinesischer Sicht

There are two important differences in the outcomes of postsocialist transformation of the Baltic countries: (1) Due to the inclusive citizenship laws the liberal democracy in Lithuania is more consolidated than in other Baltic countries. (2) However, in the economy Estonia has established reputation of "a shining star from the Baltics," while Lithuania during first decade of market transition acquired the reputation of a pupil that although made the homework asked by the international institutions, but always a bit too late & never with excellent marks. While the explanation of the first difference is relatively uncontroversial, the opinions clash around the explanation of the differences in the economic performance. The article analyzes how can the reemergence of the difference between Baltic South & North be explained after the levels of socio-economic development between Baltic states had converged during the Soviet time? Did better initial economic conditions, peculiarities in the political process (eg., exclusion of significant part of non-ethnical Estonian population that could be potential electorate for postcommunist party like the Lithuanian "Labourists"), Protestant cultural legacy, better public relation work -- or what? -- make Estonia "a shining star from the Baltics"? The paper closes with the discussion of the further difficulties of the culturalist explanation (including the Latvian riddle again) & possible solutions, & presents some proposals of further research relevant for the progress in the testing of conflicting explanations. Adapted from the source document.

Contemporary political science has long been focused less on the policy content than on "polity" & "politics," in particular. In the middle of the last century, many political scientists decided that such a self-restraint poses certain difficulties, deciding to launch discussions on how the social scientists can & should examine policy. Harold Lasswell's 1951 essay "The Policy Orientation" has launched the discussions. Here, Lasswell claimed that policy research should be separated from a traditional research, ie., focusing on theory, the subject & descriptive in terms of the style it pursues. An essay may, beyond doubt, be described as one of the political science's classics. Not because Lasswell in the space he had, managed to think with subtlety & in depth from a theoretical point of view, but for the reason that he clarified the parameters that later became decisive in analyzing the content of what politics is: analysis must focus on problems; it must be multi-subject & clearly normative. Thus, these three parameters become the part of the fundamental criteria the European Association of Public Administration Accreditation, founded in 1999, uses in accrediting European public education systems. In spite of the fact that many had agreed on the requirements Lasswell posed with regard to public policy as the focus of the social sciences, there was still a lack of common understanding on how these requirements should be implement. To the contrary, they have become the object of unresolved vigorous discussions. Some might interpret this as a weakness of policy analysis, yet some would see this as a proof of healthiness, ie., that the public policy analysts develop the subject of their expertise. Adapted from the source document.

The paper seeks to explain the differences as to how successfully the three Baltic countries managed the economic crisis between 2008 and the first half of 2010. More specifically, it analyzes investors' confidence, Estonia being the most successful country in this regard, Latvia the least (the only country that applied for aid from the International Monetary Fund), while Lithuania staying in between. The paper aims to take into account the differences (and similarities) between the Baltic countries as well as emphasize the importance of political-institutional factors in explaining investors' confidence. The importance of investors' confidence as is discussed and different ways of measuring it are reviewed. Moreover, the relevance of political-institutional factors in explaining investors' confidence is established from the theoretical point of view. Based on existing literature, a number of explanatory factors are distinguished, namely electoral processes, non-electoral pressures on government, government stability as well as the quality of informal institutions. The paper argues that Latvia was indeed in a significantly worse situation in terms of economic pre-crisis vulnerabilities than Lithuania and Estonia, both of which had certain, albeit different, economic advantages. The main difference between Lithuania and Estonia emerges comparing political-institutional, rather than purely economic, factors: Estonia was better placed in terms of electoral cycles, the extent of non-electoral pressures, and -- most importantly -- better institutions (governance quality, corruption level, trust in political institutions). Both Latvia and Lithuania found themselves in a significantly worse situation regarding political-institutional factors. Adapted from the source document.

The article presents analysis and typological classification of legal regulation of lobbying in other countries and looks for the reasons of failure to legitimize lobbying activities in Lithuania which would serve as important preventive measure against corruption. It discusses the reasons why lobbying regulation is usually ineffective. In Lithuania, institutionalization of legitimate lobbying faces problems of effectiveness of legal regulation, of integrity and of the legitimacy of legal regulations. The current institutional, socio-cultural and legal regulative factors are not favorable to regulation of lobbying in Lithuania. That, however, should not mean that there should be no effort to implement effective, fair and democratic regulations on the. Adapted from the source document.

Drawing upon the work by C. Buchen & M. Feldmann, the author argues that among postcommunist countries Slovenia approximates most closely the ideal type of liberal market economy, while Estonia comes most closely to its antipode -- liberal market economy in the sense of P. A. Hall & D. Soskice. While Lithuania together with Estonia lean toward liberal type, postcommunist liberal capitalism displays some unique features, their list including underdeveloped financial sector, strong position of foreign capital, "cocktail" quality of many institutions due to their eclectic import. Lack of institutional complementarity between different institutional spheres is considered as driving force behind recent attempts to reform pension & education systems in Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the principle of responsible governance as a basic principle, upon which the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has relied in explication of the peculiarities of constitutional status of Member of Parliament. On the basis of analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court, made on 1 July 2004, this article seeks to reveal the specifics of argumentation of the decisions of Constitutional Court, as well as their impact on legislation. Institutions of constitutional supervision in two post-communist countries (Hungary & Lithuania) are compared with a focus on the causes & reasons of their activism & the legitimacy of such activism. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

Among the so-called post-industrial countries Japan is exceptional with regard to immigration policy. Despite the supply of foreigners who would like to live and work in Japan, as well as the demand for their labour, the government succeeds to maintain its restrictive policy and construct a discourse which conceals the nature of labour migration to Japan. Based on academic literature on migration to Japan, as well as on qualitative research in Tokyo, conducted during the two-month-long fieldwork, this paper argues that the patterns in which the official discourse and the legal framework conceals labour migration push foreigners to craft their identities accordingly, and engage in "performative" migration, which, in turn, is met with suspicion from the government. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.