Artiklen ser nærmere på de forhold, som er blevet beskrevet i analyser af interventionen i Afghanistan, der kan forklare den udvikling, som den amerikanske præsiden, Joe Biden, forsikrede ikke ville finde sted i 2021. Tre forhold står frem i tidligere analyser af årene, der gik, i Afghanistan. For det første, at der var løbende udfordringer med kapacitetsopbygningen. Udfordringer, der ligeledes løbende var blevet påpeget internationalt af analytikere, forskere og i krigens mange evalueringsrapporter og erfaringsopsamlinger. For det andet, at formålet med krigen fra de allieredes side skiftede karakter, som tiden gik. Fra at det fælles formål var lettere at få øje på i starten af krigen, så blev interventionsindsatserne til et formålstæt delta, hvor de involverede lande med skiftende regeringer balancerede hensyn til alliancer, en hjemlig vælgerskare, nationale sikkerhedsinteresser og værdipolitiske rettighedsdagsordner. For det tredje, at Taleban gradvist – og ikke fra den ene dag til den anden – havde opbygget styrke og kontrol, og samtidig havde været involveret i en politisk proces via deres repræsentationskontor i Doha, der var med til at bane vejen for deres overtagelse. Abstract in English20 Years in Afghanistan: What Do We Know About What We Learned?This article takes a closer look at various analyses of the international intervention in Afghanistan, which point at different reasons for the developments that took take place in August 2021. Developments that the American president Biden shortly before the Taliban takeover assured the world would not take place. Three factors stand out in previous analyses of the years that passed by in Afghanistan. First, that there were ongoing challenges with capacity-building. Challenges that had been pointed out by analysts, researchers and in the many evaluation and lessons-learned reports from the war. Secondly, that the purpose of the war on the part of the allied forces changed character as time went on. The common purpose was easier to see in the beginning of the war, but the intervention efforts turned into a purpose-dense delta, where the countries involved and their successive governments balanced considerations to alliances, domestic support, national security interests and value political agendas. Third, that the Taliban seemingly had gradually – and not overnight – built up strength and control, and at the same time been involved in a political process through their exile office in Doha that helped pave the way for their takeover.
Det er gått en generasjon siden krigen i Bosnia-Hercegovina var over. Likevel lever landets innbyggere fortsatt i fattigdom og frustrasjon. Det kan virke som et mysterium at Bosnias stabile politiske elite holder seg ved makten i valgperiode etter valgperiode, uten å bli alvorlig utfordret. Dette på tross av at de jevnlig er involvert i korrupsjonsskandaler som tapper staten for ressurser, hindrer en velfungerende administrasjon og ødelegger tilliten mellom borgerne. Hva er det politikerne gir sine velgere, når de ikke kan gi dem fremskritt og velstand? En viktig del av svaret er: ideen om «etnisk rene» stater. Denne ideen betinger fortsatt mye av politikken i Bosnia-Hercegovina så vel som i flere av de andre jugoslaviske etterfølgerstatene. Aktører utenfra utnytter dette for å oppnå egne mål. Spesielt ser det ut som om Republika Srpskas sterke mann, Milorad Dodik, får russisk hjelp i stadige forsøk på å ytterligere sementere etniske skillelinjer i Bosnias statsordning. Men like lite som på 1990-tallet gir ideen om etnisk separasjon svar på hvordan landene i regionen kan oppnå velstand og leve i fred med naboene.
Abstract in English:«Isto sranje, novo pakovanje». 25 Years after Srebrenica: The Idea of Ethnically Pure States Still Influential in Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 years have passed since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of this, the citizens live in poverty and frustration. It is hard to grasp how Bosnia's enduring political elite can stay in power without being seriously challenged. Even though they regularly figure in corruption scandals that drain the state's resources, hobble the administration and institutions and destroy mutual trust within the population. What, then, do the politicians offer their voters, when they cannot deliver progress and prosperity? A key part of the answer is: the idea of an 'ethnically pure' state. This idea still has a large impact on politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in the other Yugoslav successor states. External actors are exploiting the idea for their own purposes; in particular it seems the Republika Srpska strongman, Milorad Dodik, is getting Russian help in his continuing endeavour to further cement ethnic divisions in Bosnia. But just like in the 1990s, the idea of ethnic separation fails to offer solutions as to how the region's countries can become prosperous and live in peace with their neighbours.
De siste ti årene har enkelte avgjørelser i norsk barnevern skapt sterke internasjonale reaksjoner. Våren 2016 demonstrerte over 8000 personer i elleve land i forbindelse med en sak som angikk en norsk-rumensk familie. Denne artikkelen undersøker tre saker som har gitt Norge betydelige diplomatiske utfordringer (India 2011, Russland 2014 og Romania 2016). Artikkelen ser på hvorfor sakene utløste så sterke reaksjoner, og redegjør for hvordan norske myndigheter håndterte sakene. Vi beskriver også gjeldende norsk lovverk og prosedyrer på feltet. Et viktig funn i vår undersøkelse er at alle sakene kan knyttes til andre sterke drivkrefter i det aktuelle landet. Det er kombinasjonen av en dramatisk familiehistorie i møte med en større politisk agenda som gjør sakene så kraftfulle og betente i de enkelte landene. I materialet vi legger frem, finner vi også tegn til læring og forbedring i Utenriksdepartementets (UD) håndtering, og også utvikling og forbedring i måten UD har samarbeidet med andre deler av embetsverket på. Samtidig stiller artikkelen spørsmål ved hvorfor et sentralt verktøy i arbeidet med å håndtere denne type saker (ratifiseringen av Haagkonvensjonen), kom på plass så sent.
Abstract in EnglishDiplomatic Controversies Sparked by Decisions of the Norwegian Child Welfare Service: A Preliminary AssessmentDecisions taken by the Norwegian child welfare services have in the past decade, in some cases, created strong international reactions. In the spring of 2016, over 8,000 people in eleven countries demonstrated in connection with a case involving a Norwegian-Romanian family. This article examines three issues that have presented significant diplomatic challenges to Norway (India 2011, Russia 2014 and Romania 2016). The article looks at why the cases triggered such strong reactions and explains how the Norwegian authorities handled these cases. It also outlines the relevant Norwegian legislation and judicial procedures in the field. The paper finds that the three controversial cases assessed linked with other strong driving forces or national political issues in the country in question. In the material we present, there is also evidence of learning and improvement in the way the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled these challenges, and there also seems to have been improvement in the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with other parts of the civil service. At the same time, the article questions why a key tool in dealing with these types of cases (The 1996 Hague Convention) was ratified so late in Norway.
Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønsker vi å belyse et annet aspekt ved avskrekking, nemlig samspillet mellom sosiale og tekniske faktorer ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet. I denne artikkelen vil vi diskutere hvordan avskrekking som strategi i cyberdomenet vil påvirkes av den spesifikke strategiske kulturen i et land. For å belyse argumentet vil vi benytte Kina som en casestudie. Motsetninger mellom kinesisk og «vestlig» strategisk kultur resulterer i konkrete forskjeller i hvordan Kina og vestlige land agerer i cyberdomenet. Ved å benytte fire komponenter av avskrekkingsteori (nektelse, gjengjeldelse, gjensidig avhengighet og normer) ønsker vi å vise hvordan en dyptgående innsikt i en stats sikkerhetspolitikk og strategiske kultur kan anvendes til å skreddersy en mer effektiv avskrekkingsstrategi og styrke evnen til å forhindre uønsket aktivitet.
Abstract in English
There is an ongoing debate in academia about if and how deterrence theory may be used in cyberspace. Deterrence was originally a theory developed for avoiding conventional and nuclear war. In the current discussion on cyber security, there has been pointed out a range of technical problems of transferring a theory about the physical world to cyberspace. We recognize these challenges of deterrence in cyberspace, but in this article we want to shed light on a different aspect of deterrence. That is the interplay between social and technical factors of deterrence in cyberspace. In this article we will discuss how deterrence as a strategy in cyberspace is influenced by the specific strategic culture of a country. We will use China as a case study to showcase our argument. Contrasts between Chinese and "Western" strategic culture results in concrete differences in how Chinese and Western countries act in cyberspace. By utilizing four components of deterrence theory (denial, punishment, entanglement and norms), we will show how an in-depth knowledge of a state's security policy and strategic culture may be used to tailor a more effective deterrence and enforce the capacity of hindering unwanted activity.
The conflict environment is changing, and—after almost two decades of continuous COIN, stabilisation and counterterrorism missions—government and public opinion in western and allied countries are unlikely to support continued large-scale or long-duration missions of this type. Yet history demonstrates that such missions are, and are likely to remain, some of the most frequent and geographically widespread. Likewise, ground forces are critical for success in COIN and stabilisation missions, due to the need to interact closely with local government and populations, which implies the need to establish and maintain a physical presence in the area of operations, which in turn implies the need to survive and prevail in a close combat environment, which only ground forces can do. Thus, despite their unpopularity, ground forces can expect (and must be prepared) to continue engaging in these types of operations. However, the same factors that have enhanced the threat in recent decades—in particular, connectivity and the ability to conduct collaborative and remote engagement— also create opportunities for new operating methods for ground forces conducting COIN and stabilisation. These include the ability to deploy only a small element forward on the ground, conducting SFA and FID tasks, while supporting it with a QRF and other enablers that remain offshore in a sea-base or in regionally-deployed FOBs. In such a scenario the main force might be withheld from the theatre of operations and either deploy for a brief initial period only, or not at all. For a force operating in this manner, protected mobility and communications would remain essential, as would the ability to access and deliver precision fire support when required. Deployed forces would probably be modular to a very low level, operating in a mesh of multi-role, semi-autonomous small teams supporting each other and swapping roles as needed. Traditional intelligence, engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations and military governance capabilities would remain essential, but might be called forward as needed. Ultimately, however, while ground forces will almost certainly continue to play a central role in counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations, the way they perform this role, the organisation and equipment with which they do so, and the environment in which they conduct such missions is likely to change, and keep changing, into the foreseeable future.
Bærekraftsmålene har gitt klassiske spørsmål innenfor utviklingspolitikken ny relevans: Hvem skal betale for globale fellesgoder? Kan man bruke bistand til dette formålet, eller bør den reserveres for innsats i spesifikke fattige land? I denne artikkelen undersøker vi hvordan DAC-landene, som kollektiv og hver for seg, forholder seg til disse temaene. Vi finner at de sliter med å følge en konsistent linje. Vi mener norske myndigheter kan tjene på å konseptualisere internasjonale fellesgoder bedre. Da blir det for det første enklere å ha en prinsipiell holdning til finansieringen av dem. For det andre kan en slik forståelse gi grunnlag for en strategisk tilnærming til nye initiativer. Det er liten grunn til å tro at man vil ha mye større budsjetter til rådighet fremover. Teorien viser dessuten at man må forvente at det er optimalt å bruke skreddersøm for å fremskaffe ulike fellesgoder. Det krever detaljkunnskap. Vi trenger større forståelse av hvordan eksisterende multilaterale organisasjoner og mekanismer som håndterer både bistand og globale fellesgoder virker. Vi trenger dessuten mer innsikt i hvordan dagens multilaterale system fungerer på ulike felt. Norge kan og bør bidra til det globale fellesgodet som denne typen kunnskap utgjør. Abstract in EnglishBetween Politics and Statistics: Global Collective Goods and Development PolicyThe adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals has revived some classical issues in development policy: Who should pay for global collective goods? Can foreign aid be used for this purpose, or should such financing be reserved for efforts in specific poor countries? In this article we investigate how the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, collectively as well as individually, approach these questions. We find that they struggle to be consistent. In our opinion, the Norwegian government could gain from developing a better conceptualisation of global collective goods. This will first of all make it easier to have a consistent policy with respect to financing them. Secondly, such a conceptualisation will allow for a more strategic approach to new initiatives. Going forward, aid budgets are unlikely to grow much. Moreover, theory demonstrates that it is in general optimal to tailor the provision of different collective goods to the peculiarities of each case. This implies that expertise is essential. We need a better understanding of the functioning of existing multilateral organisations and mechanisms that manage both aid and global collective goods. In addition, more knowledge about the workings of the current multilateral system in different fields is required. Such knowledge is a global collective good and Norway could and should contribute to its provision.
Danmark har konsekvent været blandt de lande i NATO, som anvender den laveste andel af BNP på forsvar. Artiklen behandler, hvordan amerikanske og danske beslutningstagere har italesat dansk forsvarspolitik i forbindelse med den igangværende byrdedelingsdebat i NATO og alliancens seneste byrdedelingsdebat, der fandt sted i slutningen 1970'erne og første halvdel af 1980'erne. Der argumenteres i artiklen for, at der er kontinuitet i de argumenter, der fremføres fra amerikansk side i forsøg på at påvirke dansk forsvarspolitik, og som danske aktører anvender for at retfærdiggøre, hvorfor Danmark ikke lever op til NATO's byrdedelingsmålsætninger. Amerikanske aktører forsøger således konsekvent i byrdedelingsdebatterne at påvirke dansk forsvarspolitik ved at påpege, at politikken er usolidarisk, at opfyldelse af målsætningerne er i dansk egeninteresse, og ved at skabe usikkerhed om udsigten til amerikanske forstærkninger, mens danske aktører dels anvender de gældende forsvarsforlig som værn mod kortsigtede ændringer, dels argumenterer for, at mindre end opfyldelse af byrdedelingsmålsætningerne også er acceptabelt. En konsekvens af den manglende målopfyldelse kan vise sig at blive, at Danmark mister sin position i det gode selskab i NATO. Dette gælder ikke mindst i en tid, hvor der er mindre efterspørgsel efter styrkebidrag til internationale operationer.
Abstract in English:Burden-sharing Debates in NATO and Danish Defence PolicyDenmark has consistently been among the countries in NATO that spend the lowest share of GDP on defence. This article explores how American and Danish decision-makers have articulated Danish defence policy in relation to the ongoing burden-sharing debate in NATO and the Alliance's most recent burden-sharing debate, which took place in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s. The article argues that there is continuity in the arguments put forward by the United States in attempts to influence Danish defence policy and by Danish actors to justify why Denmark does not live up to NATO's burden-sharing guidelines. In the burden-sharing debates American actors thus consistently try to influence Danish defence policy by pointing out that the policy is an expression of a lack of solidarity, that fulfilment of the objectives is in Danish self-interest, and by creating uncertainty about the prospect of American reinforcements. Danish actors, on the other hand, use existing defence agreements as a bulwark against short-term changes and argue that not meeting the burden-sharing objectives is acceptable. A consequence of not meeting the guidelines may result in Denmark losing its position as part of the good company in NATO. In times where force contributions to international operations are in less demand this is even more likely.
Den islamske republikken Iran har bygd et transnasjonalt nettverk av sjiamilitser siden 1979, ofte referert til som dens asymmetriske krigføringsstyrke og 'strategiske dybde'. Mens det er velkjent at Iran har mobilisert disse aktørene for å styrke sin regionale posisjon, har hvordan den har gjort det blitt viet lite vitenskapelig oppmerksomhet. Denne artikkelen forsøker derfor å forklare dette fenomenet ved å undersøke hvordan Iran har mobilisert irakiske sjiamilitser siden 1979. De utvalgte analyseenhetene representerer de mest innflytelsesrike sjiamilitsene med tilknytning til Iran i Irak i dag: Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq og Kata'ib Hizbullah. Selv om variasjon eksisterer mellom dem, er alle del av et transnasjonalt nettverk som har hjulpet Iran med å delta i skjult og/eller indirekte konfliktintervensjon i Midtøsten i flere tiår. Den komparative casestudien har blitt benyttet som forskningsdesign, med prosessporing og semi-strukturerte intervjuer som metode for datainnsamling. Den empiriske analysen har blitt rettledet av et teoretisk rammeverk som har forsøkt å bygge en bro mellom contentious politics og eksisterende litteratur om dynamikken mellom stater og væpnede opprørere. De empiriske funnene antyder at Iran har opptrådt som en sekterisk entreprenør som på pragmatisk vis har kombinert sine materielle og ikke-materielle ressurser for å mobilisere likesinnede militser til å delta i kollektiv vold og fremme felles krav.
Abstract in English:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been building a transnational network of Shi'a militias since 1979, commonly referred to as its asymmetric warfare capability and 'strategic depth'. While it is a known fact that Iran has mobilised Shi'a militias in other countries to strengthen its regional position, how they have done it has not received much scholarly attention. The objective of this paper is to explain this phenomenon by examining how Iran has mobilised Iraqi Shi'a militias since 1979. The selected cases are the mobilisation processes of three most prominent Shi'a militias in Iraq today: Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hizbullah. Although variation exists between them, they are all cases of Iran's network of armed resistance groups, which have allowed it to engage in covert or indirect conflict intervention in the Middle East. To logically connect the empirical data with the study's research question, I have used a case study research design, with process tracing and the semi-structured interview as methods for data collection. Furthermore, the empirical analysis has been guided by a theoretical framework that has attempted to build a bridge between the existing literatures on state-militia dynamics and contentious politics.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
In: Vestenskov , D (red.) 2014 ' 10 YEARS AFTER NATO MEMBERSHIP : An anniversary in the shadow of a crisis ' Forsvarsakademiets Forlag , FAK , s. 1-112 .
"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.
Svalbard og vernesonen rundt øygruppen står sentralt i det bilaterale forholdet mellom Norge og Russland, både økonomisk og sikkerhetspolitisk. Siden 1977 har en konflikt mellom landene omhandlet Norges rett til myndighetsutøvelse i disse farvannene. Hva er russiske persepsjoner av norsk politikk i vernesonen? Hvordan har persepsjoner og reaksjoner utviklet seg siden årtusenskiftet? Hvilke endringer – om noen – ser vi i forbindelse med forverringen i det bilaterale forholdet etter 2014? Og hva betyr dette for faren for en eventuell konflikt i dette området? Oppsummert finner vi at 2014 ikke fremstår som noe vannskille med hensyn til forholdet mellom Norge og Russland i vernesonen. Den store endringen kom da de russiske føderale myndighetene fra og med «Elektron»-saken i 2005 gikk over fra protest til dialog. Siden har Russland lagt seg på en relativt forsonlig linje. Unntaket er en kort periode etter arrestasjonen av den russiske tråleren «Sapfir-2» i etterkant av delelinjeavtalen mellom Norge og Russland fra 2010, da store deler av rederinæringen og andre i det russiske nord var i harnisk og krevde handling angående vernesonen. Etter 2011 har hendelser i vernesonen blitt håndtert uten ytterligere eskalering. Dette er derimot ikke en naturtilstand, men en situasjon underbygd av en rekke spesifikke faktorer som kan komme til å endre seg.
Abstract in EnglishSafeguarding Norwegian Rights around Svalbard: Russian Perceptions and ReactionsSvalbard and the maritime zone around the Arctic Archipelago are central to the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia, both in terms of economic and security concerns. Since 1977, a dispute between the countries has concerned Norway's right to assert sovereignty in these waters. What are Russian perceptions of Norwegian sovereignty enforcement in the Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ)? How have perceptions and reactions evolved since the turn of the millennium? What changes – if any – do we see in connection with the deterioration in the bilateral relationship after 2014? And what does this mean for the danger of a possible conflict in this area? In summary, we find that 2014 does not appear to be a watershed with respect to the relationship between Norway and Russia in the FPZ around Svalbard. The change came when Russian central authorities after the Elektron-case in 2005 switched from protest to dialogue. Since then, a relatively conciliatory line has been emphasized regarding this dispute. The exception is a short period after the arrest of the Russian trawler Sapfir-2 following the 2010 Norway-Russia Delimitation Agreement, when large parts of the fishing industry and other regional actors in the Russian north were in harness and demanded action. After 2011, incidents in the FPZ have been handled without further escalation, although this is by no means a state of nature, but a situation underpinned by a number of specific factors that could be subject to change.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.