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Ukraine has played an extremely important role in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries over the years, mainly due to its position as a transit state. Past energy crises (2006, 2009) have affected the perception of the country in Europe and led to Russian-German energy projects that reduce the level of regional security (e.g., Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2). In Poland, various political parties (Law and Justice, Civic Platform, the Left Party, Polish People's Party) have referred differently to regional cooperation and the function Ukraine might offer in this type of process. In this context, the aim of the article was to analyse the political thought of selected Polish parliamentary parties regarding the importance of Ukraine in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries during Russia's armed attack on Ukraine in 2022. The starting point of the analyses was the general thesis that political parties in Poland treated Ukraine as a key state in efforts to limit the negatively perceived energy policy of the Russian Federation in the region.

The anticipation of security threats is one of the key elements in the determination of objectives and the main direction for the functioning of states or organizations. It constitutes a fundamental basis for building capacity, aimed at counteracting the identified threats or limiting the emergence of new ones. This is also applicable to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in their security documents identify threats that may have an impact on their existence and future development. The purpose of this article is to identify common threats to EU and NATO security, as well as to demonstrate their impact on the security of the countries of the Eastern flank. The analyses, comparisons and generalizations are based on strategic documents concerning the sphere of EU and NATO security (the EU security strategies and the NATO strategic concepts). The analyzed timeline covered the period from the end of the Cold War until the publication of the strategic documents in question. The perception of threats to the external security of the EU and NATO was contrasted with the results of public opinion polls from the member states of both organizations. The general result leads to the conclusion that the perception of security threats, contained in the strategic documents of the above-mentioned entities, is essentially identical; however, the priorities in the scope of reducing the risks associated with the occurrence of specific threats are perceived differently, including the Eastern flank countries.

The aim of this article is to analyse the international legal and political process of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo in terms of its impact on the scope of development directions and strategies of the European Union countries as well as Russia and the USA. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of these issues in the light of the activities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. The main theses assumed for the purposes of this article are as follows: firstly, that the policy of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo is multidimensional, including the necessity of the process of international criminal liability for the crimes committed by both states, while at the same time influencing the dilemmas of the development directions of individual European countries, but also of the European Union and the United States. In addition, the legal and political stabilization of the Balkan region, especially in the context of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the possibility of cooperation with these states as part of intergovernmental international organizations, is strategically extremely important for the EU, the USA, as well as for Russia. The Author critically analyses issues using polemics with the standpoint presented in the doctrine of the subject as well as interpreting selected instruments of international law and Kosovo's national law. The deliberations resulted in conclusions as to the determinants in terms of the directions of the legal and political development of the EU and Russia resulting from the complicated process of reconciliation and mutual settlement of sins by Serbia and Kosovo.

The subject of the article is the assessment of the impact of international
corporations' activities on the development of Polish commodity
exports against the background of Central European countries in 2004–2018. The detailed analysis covers changes in the value, dynamics, product and geographical structure of exports, the importance of foreign subsidiaries of international corporations in creating export potential and the share of foreign value added in gross exports. The conducted analysis showed a high degree of dependence of Polish exports, as well as those of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia on the operations of foreign subsidiaries of international corporations. Their share in
the total exports exceeded 50% during the analyzed period, and 85% in the exports of cars and trucks, pharmaceuticals, tobacco products, computers, electronic and optical devices. An important factor in the development of exports is the phenomenon of international fragmentation of production processes. It causes an increase in
trade turnover in subassemblies and intermediate goods. We can estimate the scale of production fragmentation by measuring the share of foreign value added in gross exports. The highest share of foreign value added occurred in the exports of Hungary and Slovakia and exceeded 40%. In Poland, foreign value added accounted for around 27% of gross exports. In all analyzed countries, foreign value added came mainly from the European Union countries, especially from Germany. In recent years, the share of intermediate goods imported from China has also been growing.

Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.

This concise paper explores the intricate relationship between thedynamics of the European Union and Russia's interests in Europe, emphasizingthe advantages perceived by Russia in a weakened EU. The paper is comprisedof three sections: firstly, it examines the collapse of the Soviet Unionand its impact on newly independent states, establishing the geopoliticallandscape. The subsequent section traces Russia's foreign policy leading tothe 2022 conflict with Ukraine, with a focus on Ukraine's pivotal role as a geopoliticalflashpoint. The final section explores the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war, specifically addressing the European Union's role in security.The paper concludes by addressing the 2022 escalation, marked by Russia'sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the imperative of understandingUkraine's status as a geopolitical flashpoint. Overall, the paper contributes toa nuanced comprehension of the evolving geopolitical landscape, its implicationsfor regional stability, and international relations.

This article seeks to investigate the birth and evolution of the European Political Community – a pan-European multilateral coordination format that has emerged at the initiative of France and in reaction to the Russian full-scale military aggression in Ukraine. The analysis draws on official speeches, think-tank briefs, and the Author's participatory observation conducted during international expert meetings held in early 2023. It is argued that the EPC is still a "moving target" in the early stage of development, where both its objectives and structure are not yet fully defined. From a Polish perspective, it has so far sent a key strategic message to Russia and can serve as a vehicle to re-engage with the United Kingdom or Turkey. But it should not be used as yet another ENP-style waiting room for candidates seeking EU membership.

Cohesion policy has a significant influence on the form of investments in cities. This refers, in particular, to states that participate in cohesion policy and those that do not have a significant own development policy. The paper presents the results of the analysis of the possibilities to support towns and cities and their functional areas in the 2021-2027 financial framework in the context of the previous approach of the European Union to the development of urban areas and solving their problems. It is worth noting that the Euro-pean Union has wide experience in this area, dating back to the URBAN Pilot Projects and URBAN initiatives. The author also analyses the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine on the potential support for cities in the 2021-2027 perspective. The proposed conditions and instruments were also referred to the needs of towns and cities and the challenges that they are currently facing.

Podstawowym celem artykułu jest przybliżenie dwóch wzajemnie powiązanych koncepcji istotnych z perspektywy zarządzania publicznego w ramach polityki wobec starzenia się społeczeństwa na poziomie lokalnym. Pierwsza koncepcja to "inteligentne miasta", która dotyczy wykorzystania nowych technologii informacyjno-komunikacyjnych do poprawy zarządzania miastami oraz dostarczania obywatelom innowacyjnych usług publicznych. Druga koncepcja to "miasta przyjazne starzeniu się", która obejmuje optymalizację wszystkich funkcji miejskich do potrzeb wszystkich grup wiekowych oraz wykorzystanie szerokiego zaangażowania interesariuszy na rzecz poprawy jakości życia w okresie starości. Drugim celem jest wskazanie prób praktycznego wdrażania tych koncepcji w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, które w odróżnieniu od omawianych zazwyczaj w literaturze przykładów z Europy Zachodniej charakteryzują się nie tylko szybkim starzeniem się populacji, ale też niedostatkami infrastruktury. W podsumowaniu przybliżono wnioski z przeprowadzonej analizy oraz potencjalne dalsze kierunki badań.

This article aims to explain the phenomena of incredibly broad consensus among the Scottish political elites around European integration. All relevant political forces (present in the 2016-2021 term in the Scottish Parliament) have unequivocally supported further membership. European integration and the EU are specifically defined in public debate to carry out certain functions from the perspective of the Scottish political elite. These interpretations in this text are divided into three categories, serving three basic functions: facilitation of the process of increasing the competences of Scottish institutions (through independence or decentralisation), support for social development based on left-wing values and strengthening the distinctiveness of Scotland's national identity. They were distinguished through in-depth analysis of scientifi c literature, documents of public institutions and political parties and statements of Scottish politicians. Author concludes that the distinction between the three basic functions of European integration from the perspective of the Scottish political elite is justified, although it is not always possible to draw a precise line between them. It is also easy to see that there are interrelationships between the different elements of these functions.

The article is devoted to a critical review of the European Parliament Resolution of February 16, 2017 on the regulations in the field of robotics. The authors analyze the approaches of the creators of the law in terms of perception of autonomous robots as subjects of law and pay attention to the legal liability for damage caused by robots. The authors conclude that the concept of robots as the subject of law and the possibility of endowing robots with artificial intelligence with the qualities of a legal or electronic entity are arguable. First of all, the legal personality of robots raises the problem of responsibility and protection of the rights of potential victims. The resolution of the European Parliament emphasizes the need for such a legal structure that will ensure the harmonization of the interests of developers and sellers of autonomous robots, users and victims – the imposition of liability on the manufacturer or liability insurance.

The European Union undertakes numerous activities to implement a common energy policy for all Member States. However, since the countries in question have different energy resources, geographical location and terrain, unification of national policies at EU level is a particularly
arduous and difficult process. This article focuses on the analysis of energy sectors in Austria, Germany, Poland and Sweden. These countries were chosen because they offer considerable diversity, having different energy resources, geographical location, climatic conditions, as well as a different genesis of shaping their energy policy over the years. The analysis showed that the energy sectors in Poland, Germany, Austria and Sweden operate completely differently and rely on different energy resources. In Sweden, electricity mainly comes from hydropower and
nuclear energy, while energy from coal is not produced at all. In Austria, coal is also not extracted, and the production of electricity is based mainly on renewable sources, and above all on hydropower. Germany is one of the countries with the highest level of coal mining in
the world, therefore electricity is obtained mainly from this source, butalso from nuclear energy and increasingly from renewable sources, mainly wind, biofuel and solar energy. Poland is among the world's leading producers of coal, and obtaining electricity from this source accounts for as much as 80% in Poland; the rest comes from renewable sources, mainly
wind energy, then biofuels, hydro energy and natural gas.

The aim of the article is to analyse the possibility of establishing a regional gas transmission and trade center in Poland, the so-called gas hub. The gas hub is described in many strategic documents adopted by the Polish authorities in recent years. For its creation, several key elements must be met. First of all, a strong, competitive, and diversified (energy sector, heating sector, industry, individual customers) natural gas market should be established in Poland. The natural gas distribution and transmission network should be able to balance supply and demand. Domestic production of natural gas should be supplemented by stable and diversified supplies. The domestic gas markets in the region should be integrated and the connection between the systems (interconnectors) should enable the gas transmission in both directions (import/export). The purpose of this article is to verify the possibility of establishing a regional natural gas transmission and trade center in Poland and to define the potential for cooperation with selected countries of our region. Keywords: natural gas, gas hub, gas infrastructure, regional cooperation Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest analiza możliwości utworzenia w Polsce regionalnego centrum przesyłu i handlu gazem ziemnym, tak zwanego hubu gazowego. Aby koncepcja, która opisana jest w szeregu strategicznych dokumentów przyjmowanych przez polskie władze w ostatnich latach, mogła zostać zrealizowana, musi wystąpić kilka kluczowych elementów. Przede wszystkim powinien powstać w Polsce silny, konkurencyjny, zróżnicowany (energetyka zawodowa, sektor ciepłownictwa, przemysł, klienci indywidualni) rynek handlu gazem ziemnym. Sieć dystrybucji i przesyłu surowca powinna móc równoważyć popyt z podażą surowca. Krajowe wydobycie gazu ziemnego powinno być uzupełnione przez stabilne i zdywersyfikowane dostawy. Krajowe rynki gazu w regionie powinny być zintegrowane, a połączenia między systemami (interkonektory) powinny umożliwić przesył surowca w obie strony (import/export).

Since January 2017, when Donald Trump assumed the post of US president, there has been a visible intensification of relations between the United States and the countries from Central Europe, aimed at, for example, counteracting challenges and threats faced by the allies. The objective of the article is to analyze challenges and threats to Central Europe, identified by Donald Trump. He points to the necessity: 1) to strengthen NATO and increase the engagement of European allies; 2) to ensure energy security; 3) to counteract threats from two superpowers – Russia and China. The text addresses how important the challenges and threats identified by the American president have been for individual Visegrad states. The article begins by presenting characteristic features of the foreign policy conducted by Donald Trump's administration which influence relations between the US and the Visegrad countries. It then analyzes the relations between the US and individual states regarding the previously presented challenges and threats. The article's thesis is that Poland is the only Visegrad country to perceive all three challenges and threats in a way similar to the US, and thus cooperates with the US in this matter. The work is a comparative analysis based on content and narrative analysis.