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The year 1989 was both in Poland and in many other European countries, which were in the sphere of the Soviet influences, the beginning of revolutionary changes: political, economie, social and cultural ones. They also influenced the Polish language of politics which has changed radically for the last 20 years. An important reason for a variety of styles and registers is the instability of the Polish political scene, the abundance of political parties, constantly forming new parliamentary groups and government coalitions, and the disappearance of the others. In the language of the contemporary politics the lexis is particularly extensive and includes thousands of words referring to the public life of the Poles. The major point of the article is the claim that the language of contemporary politics is getting poorer, loses its elegance and becomes more and more primitive. The author sees the reasons for this pauperization in the trends of contemporary culture. He shows the main features of the phenomenon: a turn towards commonness and informality, an emotionality of expressions, a hermetic vision of the world, an impossibility of a dialogue and an increase in populist attitudes.

After regaining independence in 1918, the Polish state, apart from the necessity of building a state apparatus, was forced to fight for its borders and then for their recognition on the international arena. Another extremely important task of Polish diplomacy was the issue of creating a system of alliances that would give Poland and the newly revived states of the subregion security guarantees. To this end, in the first years after the end of the war, Warsaw intensively sought to create a permanent form of political and military cooperation within the Central and Eastern Europe subregion and the Baltic Sea. In Warsaw, on March 17, 1922, an agreement was signed by Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland, which in the far-reaching plans of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to be a step towards establishing the so-called of the Baltic Union. The problem, however, was that in Finland at the time, the tendency to strengthen cooperation with the Scandinavian countries and the desire to adopt a policy of neutrality played a large role. Lithuania, however, was not willing to further strengthen relations with Poland, with which it remained in conflict after the occupation of Vilnius in April 1919 by the troops of General Lucjan Żeligowski. The fact that Vilnius was captured by Polish troops aroused waves of criticism in Western Europe towards Warsaw. The opportunity to improve the image came in January 1923, when Lithuania removed the French garrison and annexed the so-called Klaipeda country. Warsaw's balanced and calm reaction to Lithuanian moves was positively assessed by the Western powers. Although none of the concepts of building an alliance capable of opposing Soviet Russia and thus ensuring the security of itself and its allies has not been implemented, their analysis today allows us to put forward the thesis that the fate of this part of Europe has never been indifferent to Poland and it has always been associated with security of the entire subregion, as evidenced by the current political and military commitment in the form of battalion battle groups under the NATO initiative known as enhanced forward presence (eFP). ; Państwo polskie po odzyskaniu niepodległości w 1918 r. poza koniecznością budowania aparatu państwowego zmuszone zostało do walki o swoje granice a następnie o ich uznanie na arenie międzynarodowej. Kolejnym niezwykle istotnym zadaniem dyplomacji polskiej stała się kwestia stworzenia systemu sojuszy, które dałyby Polsce i nowo odrodzonym państwom subregionu gwarancje bezpieczeństwa. W tym celu Warszawa w pierwszych latach po zakończeniu wojny intensywnie zabiegała o stworzenie stałej formy współpracy polityczno-militarnej w obrębie subregionu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz Morza Bałtyckiego. W Warszawie 17 marca 1922 r. doszło do podpisania przez Polskę, Łotwę, Litwę, Estonię i Finlandię układu, który w dalekosiężnych planach polskiego MSZ miał być krokiem ku powołaniu do życia tzw. związku bałtyckiego. Problem polegał jednak na tym, że w Finlandii w tym czasie dużą role odgrywały tendencje zacieśnienia współpracy z państwami skandynawskimi oraz chęć obrania polityki neutralności. Litwa zaś nie była skłonna do dalszego zacieśniania relacji z Polską, z którą pozostawała w konflikcie po zajęciu Wilna w kwietniu 1919 r. przez oddziały gen. Lucjana Żeligowskiego. Fakt ten wzbudził w Europie Zachodniej fale krytyki względem Warszawy. Okazja do poprawy wizerunku nadarzyła się w styczniu 1923 r, kiedy to Litwa usunęła garnizon francuski i dokonała aneksji tzw. Kraju Kłajpedy. Wyważona i spokojna reakcja Warszawy na posunięcia Litwinów została pozytywnie oceniona przez mocarstwa zachodnie. Chociaż żadna z koncepcji zbudowania sojuszu zdolnego przeciwstawić się Rosji Radzieckiej a tym samym zapewnić bezpieczeństwo sobie oraz sojusznikom, nie została zrealizowana, jednak ich analiza pozwala nam dzisiaj wysunąć tezę, że losy tej części Europy nigdy nie były Polsce obojętne i zawsze wiązały się one z bezpieczeństwem całego subregionu, czego dowodem jest obecne zaangażowanie polityczne i militarne w postaci batalionowych grup bojowych w ramach inicjatywy NATO znanej, jako wzmocniona Wysunięta Obecność (ang. enhanced Forward Presence – eFP). ; Після відновлення незалежності в 1918 році польська держава, крім необхідності побудови державного апарату, була змушена боротися за свої кордони, а потім і за їх визнання на міжнародній арені. Ще одним надзвичайно важливим завданням польської дипломатії було питання створення системи союзів, яка би дала Польщі та нововідродженим державам гарантії безпеки субрегіону. Із цією метою у перші роки після закінчення війни Варшава посилено прагнула створити постійну форму політичного та військового співробітництва в межах субрегіону Центрально-Східної Європи та Балтійського моря. У Варшаві 17 березня 1922 р. Польща, Латвія, Литва, Естонія та Фінляндія навіть підписали угоду, яка в далекосяжних планах польського Міністерства закордонних справ повинна стати кроком до створення т. зв. Балтійського союзу. Однак проблема полягала в тому, що в той час у Фінляндії велику роль відігравала тенденція до зміцнення співпраці зі скандинавськими країнами та бажання прийняти політику нейтралітету. Литва, однак, не бажала надалі зміцнювати відносини з Польщею, з якою вона залишалася в конфлікті після окупації Вільнюса у квітні 1919 р. військами генерала Лучана Желіговського. Цей факт викликав хвилі критики щодо Варшави у Західній Європі. Можливість покращити імідж з'явилася у січні 1923 року, коли Литва усунула французький гарнізон та анексувала т. зв. Клайпедський край. Урівноважена та спокійна реакція Варшави на литовські кроки була позитивно оцінена західними державами. Хоча жодна з концепцій побудови альянсу, здатного протистояти Радянській Росії і таким чином запевнити безпеку собі та своїм союзникам, не була втілена в життя, однак їх аналіз сьогодні дозволяє висунути тезу про те, що доля цієї частини Європи ніколи не була байдужою для Польщі. Вона завжди була пов'язана з безпекою усього субрегіону, про що свідчить нинішня політична та військова прихильність у формі бойових груп батальйонів як частини ініціативи НАТО, як посилена Розширена Присутність.

Autor analizuje proces europeizacji w polityce publicznej. Definiuje go jako systematyczne przenikanie, a także transfer oraz konwergencję unijnych i zachodnich wzorców działania publicznego oraz pomysłów i rozwiązań problemów. Wskazuje, że europeizacja – niejako sama z siebie – nie zapewnia bezpośrednio mechanizmu podnoszenia efektywności działań publicznych w danym państwie (w sensie podnoszenia zdolności do uzyskiwania większych korzyści z wydanych środków). Unijna polityka publiczna – rozumiana jako działania inicjowane przez instytucje unijne – ma bowiem inną konstrukcję niż polityka krajowa, a tym samym oddziałuje na nią w dość selektywny sposób. Przede wszystkim instytucje unijne nie posiadają znaczącego wpływu na ten etap kształtowania polityki, jakim jest implementacja (poza kwestiami zgodności krajowego porządku prawnego z unijnym prawodawstwem).

THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS THE BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 50s OF THE 20TH CENTURYFollowing the II World War, Italy and Yugoslavia occupied a special place in the foreign policy of the United States. The border dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia which dated back to the turn of the 40s and the beginning of the 50s of the 20th c., was yet another example of the international crisis in Europe at the time of the cold war. The article presents the activities of the American politicians undertaken towards Italy and Yugoslavia which aimed at incorporating these countries into the structures of Western European democracy. In the case of Italy, the above initiative of the American diplomacy proved to be successful and it led to the entry of the Italian republic into NATO, as well as the European economic and political structures. In the case of the other party participating in the dispute over Triest, i.e. Yugoslavia, the American presidents Truman and Eisenhower tried to take advantage of the crisis in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations, so as to win over marshal Tito and make him cooperate. Having decided to make concessions towards Yugoslavia with regard to the territorial claims made by marshal Tito, the Americans wished to achieve the superior goal: namely that of weakening the Socialist bloc by detaching Yugoslavia from it and making it join the West. The author evaluates the American policy towards Italy and Yugoslavia whose background was a territorial dispute over borderline territories. The main actors on the American political scene were forced to make some very difficult and delicate choices with regard to both parties participating in the above conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to examine human rights issues through the prism of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council. The Polish Presidency of the EU Council started with high expectations on the part of other Member States and EU officials. Poland took over the EU Council Presidency on 1 July 2011. Assuming the EU Presidency for the first time since its accession in 2004, Poland was well prepared for this challenge. At the same time, all actions of the Polish Presidency were very closely watched in other EU capitals as it was the first Presidency held by Warsaw. Even more so, as the previous Presidencies held by Member States that had joined the EU after 2004, had not been considered as terribly successful. Both the Czech Republic, because of the collapse of the government, and Hungary, because of the adoption of the controversial act on the media, were remembered as weak presidencies whose achievements had been overshadowed by negative internal developments. The Poles were aware of the fact that the standards were set high and of the challenges they would have to face. They also knew that even well prepared Presidencies were often hampered by unexpected turns of events. In a very difficult atmosphere marked by discussions on the need to deal more decisively with the economic crisis and the expectations of strong action on behalf of Europe's leaders, the Polish Presidency pushed the European Agenda forward and achieved some significant results. The main task of the Presidency was to lead the EU on a path to faster economic growth and an enhanced political community. In order to follow these targets, this article has been concentrated on some aspects of the three basic presidency's priorities: "European integration as the source of growth", a "Secure Europe" and a "Europe benefiting from openness". Special emphasis has been put on the development of expanding the area of European values and regulations, including further EU enlargement and the development of cooperation with neighboring countries. The initial objective of the Presidency, adopted by the Council of Ministers in May 2011, was to implement effectively the Stockholm programme. Thus, activities were engaged to protect EU citizens and facilitate their access to justice. Poland fully implemented the priority of the Presidency concerning the strengthening of collaboration in combating drug-related crime. The European Pact against synthetic drugs was adopted, along with the conclusions of the Council concerning the cooperation between the EU and Eastern Europe concerning drugs and conclusions concerning combating of new psychoactive substances. Taking into consideration the EU human rights policy, this paper aims at providing a general, and at the same time, comprehensive picture of the Polish Presidency activities in the field of the EU support for the protection of fundamental rights, as well as enhancing mechanisms for the prevention against any kind of discrimination. One of the key elements, in that respect, has been the EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As a part of its Presidency, Poland took a major step forward in the process of the negotiations for the accession.

The article aims at describing the regional differentiation of the turnout and of the support for major political parties in the parliamentary elections of 19 September 1994. Having analysed the aforesaid differentiation, one may note voividships with a consistently high (Wielkopolska, Małopolska) and consistently low electoral turnouts. Compared to the elections of 1991, the support for the Democratic Left Alliance has grown considerably throughout the whole country except the Zamosc voivodship, whereas the support for the Democratic Union has increased only in 7 voivodships (including the Poznań voivodship). One of the principal axes of competition was between peasant parties (PSL, PSL-PL) and townspeople parties (the Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Congress, the Labour Union). ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016

The political relationship between the United States of America and the USSR determined the international relations during the period of the "cold war". The election of Mikhail Gorbachev to general secretary of the Communist Party was a turning point in international relations. Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement to disband the Soviet Union, which according to legal regulations was then transformed into Russia. B. Clinton, who accepted all of the decisions of Russian president, and also supported financially a number of new initiatives from B. Yeltsin, continued the good relationship between Russia and the USA instigated by G. Bush. The election of W. Putin to the Russian presidency was followed by a new strategy from Russia towards western countries, particularly towards the USA. Instead of following the strategy of partnership Putin tried to limit the influence of the USA on Russian policy. The situation changed after the terrorist attack on 11th Sept. when W. Putin, President of Russia, was one of the first world leaders to assure G. Bush in an official phone call that Russia intended to support all military action taken by the USAagainst the perpetrators. If Russia intends to have a great influence on the international political relations and take part in international policy it should change its position towards USA into one of partnership and co-operation.

The aim of the present article is to outline the characteristics of Polish and German policy towards East, especially towards Russia. The author indicates the areas of common and different interests as well as objectives in the Polish and German policy towards East, particularly at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. In spite of observing fewer differences between Poland and Germany in their present policy towards Russia, the article aims to emphasize the discrepancies that still exist and are visible in the bilateral as well as multilateral relations. At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the Polish and German positions towards Russia and post‑soviet countries are noticeably more coherent than before. One of the main reasons is the modification of Polish Eastern policy by introducing pragmatic thinking (so‑called positive realism), implemented at the end of 2007 by the Polish government run by the Civic Platform (PO) and Polish People's Party (PSL). At the same time, the Angela's Merkel government introduced more critical attitude towards Russia. Nonetheless, in spite of growing convergence of interests in Polish and German policy towards Russia, there have been significant discrepancies. The main differences have been related to the role of Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the European security system. Therefore, Poland and Germany have had different opinion on the role of Russia: should it be a partner or a threat? To what extend the process of Europeanization of Russia should be introduced? There is also a discrepancy between Poland and Germany related to the following question: which relations among the post‑soviet countries should be prioritized, should it be relations with Ukraine or with Russia?