The aim of this paper is to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption level and development among European Union countries. Out of the estimated model in this paper one can conclude that the level of corruption can explain capital abundance differences among European Union countries. Also, explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance, meaning stronger relationship between corruption level and economic development than between corruption level and capital abundance. There is no doubt that reducing corruption would be beneficial for all countries. Since corruption is a wrongdoing, the rule of law enforcement is of utmost importance. However, root causes of corruption, namely the institutional and social environment: recruiting civil servants on a merit basis, salaries in public sector competitive to the ones in private sector, the role of international institutions in the fight against corruption, and some other corruption characteristics are very important to analyze in order to find effective ways to fight corruption. Further research should go into this direction.
The Lisbon Treaty has brought significant changes into the architecture of the European Union. The most important novelty, however, is the establishment of a full unity of the Union structure achieved by creating new and strengthening the existing elements. The new elements of this unity are the disappearance of the European Community, the 'independence' of the European Atomic Energy Community, constituting the European Union as a single entity and the introduction of EU values. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the existing elements of the common institutional mechanisms, rules on amending the founding treaties and EU membership. However, constituting the Union as a single entity which has replaced and succeeded the European Communities has not abolished the EU elements of diversity. In the areas that differed, even before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, from the community pillar, there remain significant differences in the nature and the scope of competences of the Union institutions. This mainly regards the common foreign and security policy, which now includes the defense policy, where the existing model of inter-state cooperation has been only slightly interfered with. In contrast, in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which has become part of a larger Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the inter-state model of cooperation has been abandoned in some of its most important elements. However, the implementation of some of the important elements of the supranational model has been postponed.
The paper analyzes military capabilities of the European Union, as an important element of the credibility of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It discusses the development of these capabilities, and main problems that go along with the operationalization of these capabilities, as well as the prospects of their further development. Is the intergovernmental approach to the area of the EU security and defense policy a barrier to the development of EU military capabilities? What is the extent of the harmonization between 'military' competences of the EU and national specificities? The paper aims to provide answers to these questions. The first section analyzes the institutionalization of the EU security and defense policy, which includes both the establishment of special political and military structures responsible for the decision-making process within the framework of this policy, and the adoption of specific goals for the development of EU military capabilities. The second section analyzes the main difficulties met in the operationalization of EU military capabilities, concerning the efficiency of decision-making procedures, lack of strategic capabilities, the discord of national reforms regarding the modernization of the armed forces, and duplication of national programs covering the military equipment. The third section discusses the prospects of the development of EU military capabilities in the light of EU member states' military budget cuts. It concludes that the gradual evolution of the EU security and defense policy can be seen as an incentive for coordinating the efforts of the member states in the development of EU military capabilities.
Analysis of efficiency of (judicial) mediation in Serbia and other European countries (Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark) illuminates the causes of poor representation of this legal institution in our country. Analysis of mediation in Italy, culturally most closely resembling country to Serbia, indicates that a legalistic approach to the promotion and implementation of mediation, especially if it is heterogeneous, is not efficient. On the other hand, countries that have implemented a bottom-up approach ('first applied, and then regulate'), such as the Netherlands and Denmark, have developed efficient mediation system. Switzerland, a country that relied on an approach based on the promotion of culture of mediation, has a mediation system that has not been developed to the extent to the developed system of conciliation. In any case, the Italian experience has taught us that the regulation of mediation is not a sure path to success in the implementation of this legal institution; Swiss experience highlights the importance of developing a culture of peaceful settlement of disputes; Dutch and Danish experience emphasizes pragmatism in the promotion and implementation of mediation. Since Serbia lacks an efficient regulatory framework of mediation, culture of peaceful dispute settlement and pragmatism in implementation of this legal institution, it seems that the experiences, for the purpose of analysis, observed countries are more than useful.
When in 2007, after the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands, European politicians defined their mandate to work on the Reform Treaty, they explicitly promised that 'the constitutional concept is . abandoned' and that 'the Treaty of European Union and Treaty on Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character.' In its Maastricht and Lisbon decisions, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the European Union did not have a constitution since it did not have demos. The main purpose of this article is to prove the opposite. Accepting Weiler's argumentation that the EU is a political messianic venture par excellence, the author claims that, in addition to pursuing messianic goals, Europe's political elite has for a long time been streaming to root Political Messianism into democracy and position the EU in the global world. The main vehicle to transform the Community/Union from an international to a constitutional legal order has been constitutionalism. Starting from the French revolutionary Declaration, which declared civil rights and in Article 16 proclaimed 'a society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all,' the author has showed that the Union has an antirevolutionary, uncodified and evolutive constitution, whose elements are to be found in the Lisbon Treaty and its related documents, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, and to some extent in the constitutional orders of the Member States. The European constitution does not mirror a national constitution in the sense that it is attributable to the people, nor it is a revolutionary product aimed at limiting the government in the name of individual freedom. It is a rule of law-oriented type of constitution, born in the process of constitutionalization and aimed at submitting public power to law on the Union level. From the perspective of modern constitutionalism, the quality of this constitution is a matter of concern, since it has managed to connect the rule of law with the protection of human rights, but has failed to do the same with regard to democracy. Despite some efforts to entrench the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty, the present crisis in the Union is to a great extent the result of this failure. The fact that democratic defects at the Union level appear less visible when pitted against the state of affairs in national constitutional systems cannot mitigate this failure. Yet, assuming that the EU will survive the present crisis and having in mind that the Union is 'work in progress', the issue which still remains open is whether the future efforts to eliminate the defects of the European Constitution should be tied to traditional ways of thinking about democratic accountability within nation states, or one should stop thinking in terms of a Westphalian nation-state, and accept that transnational systems can provide a cure for democratic failings in ways that differ from traditional postulates of democracy.
The basic problem that the process of Euro integrations faces today is the absence of the European identity. There are ideas how it could be built, on what it should be based, but the basic problem is the EU has give up in a great extent from the real European values - the ideals like freedom, equality, solidarity, social justice, etc. Human rights are the European achievement, but a distinctive, therefore identity difference between the European and the Anglo-American interpretation is that the European variant guaranteed social-economic rights, which was actually a concretization of the great ideal of solidarity. Today, with prevailing ideology of globalism, just this element of human rights has been brutally waded, a part of the European identity with it. A similar situation is with what the Europeans consider the greatest achievement of the EU - free movement of people, goods and capital. Free movement of people is questioned by building barbed wires and creation of a new ante murale christianitatis, even in Islamic states, far away from the Schengen Area that is proclaimed untouchable. Moreover, all those people swarming to the Europe actually have close connections with it - they originate from former European colonies, brutally exploited by their metropolises for decades and centuries. Not only that, but recently their new 'Europeanization' has been attempted through the initialization of the 'Arab Spring' , which resulted with increase of the Islamic fundamentalism, disintegration of certain Arab states and tribal war in them, increase of terrorism and, of course, migrants from those areas. Although it would be justified to try to return the evil gotten to them at least partly, by refusing to accept the miserable the Europe gives the mortal strike to some of the main values that are considered its identity characteristics - free movement of people and solidarity. All this, actually, indicates on the absence of the European identity consciousness. There is no clearly defined content of the idea of the Euroidentity, nor there is consciousness of it with the citizens of the EU. The citizens of the EU are still more French, Englishmen, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs rather than the Europeans. Their Europeanism exists only on the level of usefulness and efficacy, therefore, the prediction is that the model of the EU as an international organizations generis will be kept for a long time, while identities in future will be tied for (European) nations.
Harmonisation of the foreign policies of the Western Balkan states with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the Charter 31 of the pre-accession negotiations will be a significant obligation and challenge for most of them. Within this context, the author takes as a starting point the regular annual reports on the progress achieved by the states in the region. They show the degree of harmonisation of their foreign policies with this Union's mechanism (within four years in the 2011-2014 period). The author of the article particularly points to the real and substantial discrepancy between the normative framework of the EU CFSP and the specific activities taken by the Western Balkan states in the part concerning their position to the current crisis in Ukraine which, in a way, 'reflects' the geo-strategic interests of the 'West', on one hand, and those of the Russian Federation, on the other. At the same time, he points to the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance as a favourable framework for the acceleration of harmonisation of a country's foreign policy with the EU CFSP.
Već više od dve godine traje velika pan-evropska debata o Budućnosti evropske socijal-demokratije (2009-2011) kao pokušaj odgovora na izazove globalne krize, ali i na duboku i dugotrajnu krizu same socijal-demokratije. Dok su tokom 2000. godine socijal-demokrati bila na vlasti u većini evropskih zemalja (11 od 15 članica EU ), danas vladaju u samo nekoliko perifernih zemalja Evrope (4 od 27 članica EU u 2011). Iako u nekoliko velikih zemalja još uvek privlače 20-30% birača, odnosno poseduju koalicioni kapacitet i za osvajanje vlasti, ipak je marginalizacija ključni trend. U traganju za vlastitim identitetom, novom paradigmom, pan-evropska debata problematizuje ključne teme i izazove naše civilizacije, kao što su globalizacija, logika kapitalizma i njegove moguće reforme, smisao i značaj Evropske Unije. Ova debata ponovo vraća u javni diskurs i niz ključnih koncepata na kojima se gradi zamisao o 'dobrom društvu', kao što su društvene vrednosti, kultura, značaj srednje klase i ekološka i socijalna održivost. ; We are in the third year of the pan-european debate on the future of European Social Democracy (ESD). It is a response to the challenges of the global economic crisis, but also a response to the deep internal crisis within the ESD. While the social democrats were in power in the majority of European countries in the year 2000 (11 of 15 EU members), they are rulling parties in only few peripheral countries in 2011 (4 of 27 EU countries). Althouth they are still able to attact 20-30% of voters, and with toghether with their partners are even able to form goverments in some countries, their margananalization is a major trend. This is not only because of electoral defeats, but it is due to membership decline, shaken ties with trade unions, lack of an alternative program in a situation when neoliberalism is shaken and political actors have searching for new formulae. In a search of their own identity, new paradigm and attractive program, pan-european debate critically analyze key issues and challenges of our civilization, such as globalization, nature of capitalism and its possible reforms, meaning and importance of the EU , the role of government regarding markets. This debate has brouth back into public discourse many important concepts that constitute the idea of 'good society,' such as social values (equailty, solidarity, social justice), buth also importance of culture, middle class, and social and environmental sustainability.
This paper show why the standardization of administrative procedure is important for the state legal system that, in the last two decades, the administrative procedure codes were adopted in almost all of the European states. Afterwards author analyzed main driving forces for development of administrative procedural law at the level of the European Union and the Council of Europe. The most important legal sources of European administrative procedural law (basic standards, principles, recommendations and guidelines in this area) are concisely presented but it is clearly indicated that there are certain ambiguities, that these sources don't apply equally to all institutions of the Union, and that they still don't make finished, complete and forever given system that can be automatically transferred to jurisprudence of the member states and candidate countries. Moreover, often administrative process laws of the member states contain rules that are not existing in this kind of regulation at European Union level and that is why the process of adopting the first European Union general law on administrative procedure was initiated, which would further improve the standards of European administrative process in general. When it comes to the general administrative procedure of the Republic of Serbia it has been shown that in spite of the strategic orientation towards the reform of the Law on Administrative Procedure expressed in numerous strategies, our executive authorities in this area have not yet moved beyond the development of the third version of the Draft Law on General administrative Procedure which was afterward adopted by the Government as the Bill. In his final remarks the author concludes stating that the largest number of European standards of administrative process are included in the final version of the Draft, but without eliminating the shortcomings of the existing Law, and without normative adjusting to the circumstances in which the Serbian administration operates, and with unnecessary abandonment of some solutions that have proved to be right in the decades-long practice of administrative authorities.