Suchergebnisse

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

L'article évalue la réponse de l'Union européenne aux soulèvements arabes, en mettant l'accent sur la dimension méridionale de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage (PEV). Il montre que la vision de l'UE pour la Méditerranée a décliné et qu'elle s'est perdue dans la transition que les pays arabes ont connue. Deux aspects sont analysés. Tout d'abord, l'article montre le déclin lent mais continu du régionalisme comme objectif de politique étrangère de l'UE. Cette tendance a commencé avant les soulèvements arabes et, en fait, avec le lancement de la PEV, mais l'appui sur le bilatéralisme a fini par réduire le rôle de l'Europe en même temps que le Printemps arabe menait à une plus grande fragmentation de la région. Deuxièmement, l'article aborde l'aide extérieure de l'UE aux pays arabes méditerranéens et montre que depuis le début du Printemps arabe, même si l'UE a nominalement engagé plus de fonds, elle a en fait déboursé moins en raison de la distance croissante entre les conditions pour les dépenses des fonds et les conditions réelles d'application.

International audience ; Since the end of the Cold War (1990), the enlargements of NATO and the European Union have not been zero-sum games. The integration of new Member States partially modifies the European Union and its relation to NATO. France is redefining its posture within NATO, hoping to put a brake on the development of the Europe of defense that it must first present. It will then be necessary to characterize relations between the United States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This will give full meaning to the question of the return of France to the integrated command of NATO. Finally, we must ask ourselves whether the Lisbon Treaty is capable of building the foundations of a powerful Europe. ; Depuis la fin de la Guerre froide (1990), les élargissements de l'Otan et de l'Union européenne ne sont pas des jeux à somme nulle. L'intégration de nouveaux États membres modifie partiel-lement l'Union européenne et sa relation à l'Otan. La France redéfinit sa posture au sein de l'Otan, dans l'espoir de lever un frein au développement de l'Europe de la défense qu'il con-vient d'abord de présenter. Il sera nécessaire, ensuite, de caractériser les relations entre les États-Unis et les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. Ce qui donnera tout son sens à la question du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l'Otan. Enfin, il convient de se de-mander si le traité de Lisbonne est à même de construire les bases d'une Europe puissance.

International audience ; Since the end of the Cold War (1990), the enlargements of NATO and the European Union have not been zero-sum games. The integration of new Member States partially modifies the European Union and its relation to NATO. France is redefining its posture within NATO, hoping to put a brake on the development of the Europe of defense that it must first present. It will then be necessary to characterize relations between the United States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This will give full meaning to the question of the return of France to the integrated command of NATO. Finally, we must ask ourselves whether the Lisbon Treaty is capable of building the foundations of a powerful Europe. ; Depuis la fin de la Guerre froide (1990), les élargissements de l'Otan et de l'Union européenne ne sont pas des jeux à somme nulle. L'intégration de nouveaux États membres modifie partiel-lement l'Union européenne et sa relation à l'Otan. La France redéfinit sa posture au sein de l'Otan, dans l'espoir de lever un frein au développement de l'Europe de la défense qu'il con-vient d'abord de présenter. Il sera nécessaire, ensuite, de caractériser les relations entre les États-Unis et les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. Ce qui donnera tout son sens à la question du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l'Otan. Enfin, il convient de se de-mander si le traité de Lisbonne est à même de construire les bases d'une Europe puissance.

States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu's terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.