The relations between Colombia and the European Union have taken place in the context of the Colombian armed conflict set by the idea of peace, as Colombia appears as scene for the promotion and strengthening of values and Human Rights, empowerment of communities, humanitarian and the idea of the transverse peace to the diverse programs of accompaniment for the country. This article focuses its analysis on this relationship and cooperation strategies that have the two actors. ; Las relaciones entre Colombia y la Unión Europea han tenido lugar en el contexto del conflicto armado colombiano marcadas por la idea de la paz, pues Colombia aparece como escenario para la promoción y fortalecimiento de valores y Derechos Humanos, empoderamiento de comunidades, ayuda humanitaria y dicha idea de la paz transversal a los diversos programas de acompañamiento para el país. Este artículo centra su análisis en esta relación y las estrategias de cooperación que poseen los dos actores.
The relations between Colombia and the European Union have taken place in the context of the Colombian armed conflict set by the idea of peace, as Colombia appears as scene for the promotion and strengthening of values and Human Rights, empowerment of communities, humanitarian and the idea of the transverse peace to the diverse programs of accompaniment for the country. This article focuses its analysis on this relationship and cooperation strategies that have the two actors. ; Las relaciones entre Colombia y la Unión Europea han tenido lugar en el contexto del conflicto armado colombiano marcadas por la idea de la paz, pues Colombia aparece como escenario para la promoción y fortalecimiento de valores y Derechos Humanos, empoderamiento de comunidades, ayuda humanitaria y dicha idea de la paz transversal a los diversos programas de acompañamiento para el país. Este artículo centra su análisis en esta relación y las estrategias de cooperación que poseen los dos actores.
Oriente Medio es una región de gran importancia estratégica para el resto del mundo. Dada su situación geoestratégica, Oriente Medio ha sido un cruce de caminos de importancia histórica y sigue siéndolo aún hoy. Además de su importancia estratégica, el magnetismo cultural de Oriente Medio ha atraído grandes potencias extrarregionales a la zona durante siglos. Hoy, como en el pasado, Oriente Medio desempeña un papel importante en la política exterior de la Unión Europea. Sin embargo, la Unión Europea no tiene un enfoque único y general para la conducción de sus relaciones con Oriente Medio. En cambio, tiene un conjunto de políticas entrelazadas hacia subregiones específicas, países y áreas problemáticas. Entre estas destacan las relaciones euromediterráneas; el conflicto palestino-israelí; el diálogo UE-CCG; la cuestión nuclear iraní; las relaciones con Turquía; la guerra en Siria, entre otras. Este estudio se centra en la política de la Unión Europea en estos espacios y cuestiones que, hoy, siguen siendo temas de máxima actualidad regional e internacional. ; The Middle East is a region of great strategic importance to the rest of the world. Given its geostrategic situation, the Middle East has been a crossroads of historical importance and remains so to this day. In addition to its strategic importance, the cultural magnetism of the Middle East has attracted great extraregional powers to the area for centuries. Today, as in the past, the Middle East plays an important role in eu foreign policy. However, the EU does not have a single and comprehensive approach to conducting its relations with the Middle East. Instead, it has a set of policies intertwined towards specific subregions, countries and problem areas. These include Euro-Mediterranean relations; The Israeli-Palestinian conflict; The EU-GCC dialogue; The Iranian nuclear issue; Relations with Turkey; The war in Syria, among others. This study focuses on EU policy in these areas and issues, which, to date, remain the most topical regional and international policy issues.
The beginning of modern history and the subsequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincide with the institutional beginnings of the European Union common foreign and security policy. At that time, Europe did not have a single position, nor could it have achieved a political consensus on any issue. In addition, it lacked appropriate instruments, as well as readiness and willingness to actively engage to put an end to war in BiH. The war in BiH was stopped, however, thanks to the efforts of the United States. This was a crucial moment for Europe to modify its common foreign and security policy. The European Union has passed a thorny path of establishing common foreign and security policy. On this path, however, the EU has experienced some progress and achieved good results, although not sufficient, just as BiH has made some progress in reforms. In order for BiH to joint the family of modern democratic countries, it will need a stronger engagement of the European Union and its more decisive common foreign and security policy, because only together we can cope with global challenges. Peace and prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina will also help build free and stable Europe.
En este artículo se discuten los desarrollos actuales en las políticas exteriores de la Unión Europea y sus aplicaciones en Latinoamérica, incluyendo las posibilidades de negociar una asociación estratégica birregional entre la Unión Europea y la Comunidad Andina de Naciones. Se analiza el camino desde un Acuerdo Asociativo hacia un Tratado de Libre Comercio y se presentan los diferentes puntos de vista de las partes negociadoras y las posibles diferencias ideológicas. Se presenta la teoría de espacio interregional Eurolatinoamericano y su aplicación en las integraciones birregionales. Como parte de las conclusiones se expresan las preocupaciones sobre el futuro de las negociaciones de asociaciones birregionales, especialmente entre integraciones con asimetrías. ; This article discusses current European Union foreign policy developments and their application in Latin America including the possibilityof negotiating a bi-regional partnership agreement between the European Union and the Andean Community. The way from an AssociationAgreement to a Free Trade Agreement is also analysed presenting thedifferent viewpoints of the negotiating parties and possible ideologicaldifferences. The Eurolatinamerican interregional space theory and itsapplication in the bi-regional integration process are also presented.In the conclusions concerns are expressed regarding the future of biregional partnership negotiations especially between integrations withasymmetries.
La Unión Europea es desde hace años el mayor financiador de la cooperación al desarrollo a los países más desfavorecidos. El tema de la condicionalidad de esta ayuda se ha visto circunscrito al respeto a los derechos humanos, sin embargo, con el impu
A raíz de las irregularidades en el suministro de gas a la UE en 2006 y 2009 procedente de Rusia se ha vuelto a plantear el papel de este país en el ámbito energético-gasista europeo. En el diseño de un marco para la política energética europea se ha ido reconociendo un papel singular a Rusia, aunque una de las formas de incorporar a ese país en el ámbito energético europeo ha sido a través de su consideración como un riesgo geopolítico. Este enfoque se sustenta en el gran volumen de hidrocarburos que la UE adquiere en Rusia, dependencia que puede suponer que ese país pueda influir unilateralmente en el establecimiento de cantidades y precios, así como en las formas de reorganización del sector gasista europeo. Sin embargo, este enfoque no considera la situación del mercado del gas ruso y, en especial, que las exportaciones de este hidrocarburo a la UE son estraté- gicas para Rusia. En este artículo se cuestiona que pueda realizarse una instrumentalización de las ventas de gas a la UE y, por tanto, el riesgo geopolítico tiene una importancia menor. Así pues, en el diseño de la política energética europea debería perder relevancia el mencionado riesgo y ganar prioridad la posibilidad de que no se realicen las inversiones suficientes en Rusia, que puedan garantizar la creciente demanda de gas ruso de la UE. ; The problems for the Russian gas supply to the EU in 2006 and 2009 raised the question on the relationship between these areas. The EU includes Russia in its energy policy, but as a geopolitical risk. The ground of this view is the big volume of hydrocarbons that the EU imports form Russia that implies a dependency of the former. It is assumed that Russia can influence the prices, the quantities, as well as the capability for restructuring the European gas sector. Nevertheless, this view doesn't consider the role of the gas in Russia and, in particular, the Russian gas export strategic value from the Russian view. This paper questions that Russia could use the gas export to EU as a political vector and, by ...
Satisfied with some important progress being made in health care reform on the home front, these past few days President Obama turned his full attention to foreign policy. In a week packed with international speeches, bilateral meetings and joint declarations, he succeeded in establishing a new ambitious agenda for international cooperation and wasted no time in getting started. In his speech to the UN, he outlined his main foreign policy goals based on four pillars: non-proliferation, climate change, Middle East peace and economic stability. He spoke clearly about his determination to put an end to the international skepticism and distrust the United States faced during the Bush years and enumerated the changes already made: banning the use of torture, closing the Guantánamo base, drawing down forces in Iraq, renewing efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict by naming a special envoy, seriously addressing climate change and abandoning plans for a land-based missile defense in Eastern Europe. He challenged other leaders to respond in kind by joining US efforts at non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, taking measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combating poverty. A day later in Pittsburgh for the G-20 summit, the President, flanked by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Sarkozy, revealed a new nuclear facility built by Iran in the city of Qum and called for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This well-timed revelation is supposed to give the administration some more leverage when talks with the Iranians start later this week. As it happens, the US had known about this new uranium enriching plant for more than a year but had kept the information secret for later use. In Pittsburgh, with France and Britain safely on his side, the President had further opportunity to press the other two members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to cooperate with the new sanctions regime that will most likely include imports of refined oil into Iran. While Russia appears to be leaning towards cooperation (perhaps as a quid pro quo of Obama's decision not to deploy the anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic), it is not as yet clear whether the Chinese will too. This week has been a good one for China, which seems to be coming of age as an international player both in climate change and as a partner for economic stability in the G-20. But the revelation at Qum was certainly a pre-emptive coup that put the Iranians on the defensive, and gave Obama an opportunity to publicly test the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to prove their commitment to non-proliferation.As the United States moves aggressively to engage with the rest of the world and vows to renew its pledge to international law and institutions, the expectation is that others will take their share of responsibility and respond to global challenges. Obama's moral authority flows not only from what he says, and how he says it, but also by virtue of who he is: in his case, the man is the message and the intended drastic cut with his predecessor could not be more apparent. However, as Realists constantly remind us, foreign policy is about national interest defined as power, and while the change of tone and of emissary is well-noted, we are likely to see some change, but also a lot of continuity in US foreign policy. Barack Obama's first speech at the United Nations General Assembly was well-received around the world but had less impact on a home audience whose main concerns are unemployment, health care reform and economic recovery. Inevitably, the usual suspects accused him of treason for recognizing America's past mistakes in public and for socializing with tyrants. Others denounced his narcissistic impulses, for trying to portray American foreign policy as "all about Obama". While it is easy to dismiss the extreme critics, it is important for the rest of the world to realize how much the United Nations' legitimacy and prestige has suffered in the United States during the last ten years, and not only due to derisions by Bolton and Bush. TV images of the UN headquarters in New York seem distant and irrelevant to most Americans, who view the organization as an anachronistic shibboleth that embodies all fluff and no substance and whose activities are hard to take seriously in most cases, be it when it deals with Rwanda, Darfur or with Iranian sanctions. At this year's opening session, the General Assembly room, with a badly lit podium and a very unbecoming blue-greenish background, was showing its age in spite of a 2002 facelift (it was built in 1952). And while Obama was as dynamic and articulate as usual, his televised speech was followed by that of Mohammad Khadafy from Libya, which lasted one hour and a half and included bizarre statements and phrases that can only be accounted for by a serious onset of senility. Besides calling for a UN investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination, and surreally complaining about how far most of those present had had to travel to get to New York (was jetlag his excuse to explain away his own state of mental confusion?), he repeatedly called President Obama "my son" (I cringed at imagining the right wing blogs reaction to that) and referred to the UN Security Council as the "Terror Council". His difficulty to find a place in New York where he would be allowed to pitch his tent was followed with amusement by the media and further added to his own oddity, and by extension, to the inadequacy of the UN as a serious forum. While later Prime Minister Netanyahu's excellent, Churchill-like speech brought the audience back to the 21st century and restored some respectability to the venue, the UN lost credibility again when Iranian president Ahmadinejad went on a new rant later in the day and again and proceeded once more to deny the Holocaust's existence. In addition to this rarified atmosphere, the main foreign policy topic that is of concern for the American public, and the one that would have made them pay attention, namely, the war in Afghanistan was hardly mentioned by Obama in this occasion. After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the effort seems to be unraveling on all fronts. European NATO members, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, are unwilling or unable to commit more troops; the Taliban has renewed its offensives with new intensity in the south and the east of the country, and the Afghan election was plagued with corruption, proving what many already suspected, that President Hamid Karzai is an extremely unreliable partner and a corrupt leader who will not be able to hold the country together. At the same time, Al Qaeda has found refuge in neighboring Pakistan so the US initial counterterrorist mission, namely to hunt down and exterminate Al Qaeda, has mutated into one of counterinsurgency against an indigenous group, the Taliban, fighting against the government and the foreign forces to regain its power. All this in a country that has never been a nation, a narco-state whose economic base is the production and trafficking of opium, and where several empires, from the Macedonians to the British and the Soviets were once defeated. The President's plan so far has been to train the Afghan army so that it can hold off the Taliban, support government institutions, gain the trust of villagers and create structures of governance in rural areas so that Al Qaeda won't be able to move in again. This week a Pentagon memo by General Crystal was leaked by Bob Woodward of Watergate fame. Published in the Washington Post on September 21st, it presents a grim picture of the war and warns that success is uncertain. It calls for new resources and a new counterinsurgency campaign. While the number of troops requested is not specified, it warns that "under-resourcing" the effort could be fatal. Woodward, never one to sell himself short, has called his leaked memo the equivalent of the 1971 Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in the New York Times, which revealed the expansion of the Vietnam War from 1965 on, that had been kept secret from the American public. Of course the memo is not the equivalent of Ellsberg and Russo's revelations, but still, it refocused attention on the intractability of this war. The President's response has been that after the Afghan election, the White House is re-assessing its strategy and that until he is satisfied with a new strategy he will not send more troops. It is clear that the administration is having doubts about a conflict it once called a war of necessity. Public opinion is also turning against what will soon be the longest war in American history, as casualties continue to increase and there is no end in sight. As the term "military surge" is being increasingly used to denote McCrystal's new demands, comparisons with the war in Iraq are inevitable. Similarly to the Iraq war, elections have represented a turning point. But the surge in Iraq began with the so-called Sunni awakening, when the Iraqis themselves decided they had had enough of the violence and organized against those that insisted on it (mainly outsiders, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq). Also, in Iraq's leader Al-Maliki, the US found a relatively reliable and legitimate partner, one who instigated the political class to resolve their differences by political means. Finally, Iraq had an economic base that could be restored to produce substantial national wealth, and a mostly urban, well-educated population with some institutional experience. In contrast, Afghanistan is a mainly rural country, a tribal society which repudiates any attempts at centralization and profoundly distrusts the government in Kabul more, in some cases, than the foreign troops. The central government is rotten and weak, Karzai an unreliable leader who stole the election and whose brother is the head of the drug mafia. Can more US troops make up for all these weaknesses?Obama is thus in a delicate situation: he can't be "at war" with his own generals (indeed, General McCrystal was appointed by Obama only in March, after he dismissed the previous general in charge). On the other hand, if he allows more troops to be deployed, there is danger that Afghanistan may become his Vietnam. He therefore needs to choose between continuing a counterinsurgency operation, training more Afghan forces, protecting the local populations, getting into their villages and gaining their trust, or withdrawing ground troops and focusing on counter-terrorism, using drones and other off-shore means and special forces to go after the terrorist bases. Vice-President Biden is advocating a middle ground strategy: leaving enough troops on the ground to prevent Al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, but redefining the mission as one of narrow counter-terrorism and move away from nation-building and a protracted counter-insurgency operation that would signify more US casualties and more discontent at home. After all, the main reason why the US went to Afghanistan was to confront and eliminate Al Qaeda, which has since then moved across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As several domestic arrests have demonstrated this week, Al Qaeda threats are just as likely to come from Springfield Illinois, Queens New York or Dallas Texas as from abroad or from the virtual Al Qaeda organizing through the worldwide web. Recalibrating his approach to Afghanistan is thus imperative, and it must be done for the right reasons, regardless of personal gain or saving face.Obama has had a very successful September, but his ambitious agenda both at home and abroad faces many pitfalls ahead. A youthful president, brimming with self-confidence, with a huge electoral mandate and with the best team of experts in history, can still be thwarted by unsolvable problems, domestic and foreign enemies and by serendipity itself. As a student of history and a John F Kennedy admirer, Obama knows this, and he should measure his decisions and temper his ambitions accordingly. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
The purpose of the article is to identify the systemic interconnections of the main elements of the policy of financing green transformation and eco-innovation in the European Union EU, highlighting the main challenges and further strategic directions of development. EU policy in the field of green economy and innovation has been studied. Identified core economic systems for «green» finance. The policy of stimulation of eco-innovative activity in the EU and primary financing programs are considered. A scheme of the system of sustainable finance and eco-innovation in the EU has been elaborated, and the direct relations between the elements of this system have been clarified. The methodological basis of the article are the fundamental provisions of economic science, the theory of green finance and innovative development. Dialectical, systematic, logical and historical methods of scientific knowledge were used. The conclusions demonstrate the urgent need for a green transformation and the importance of developing a policy for financing eco-innovation activities in the EU.
The rise of Colombian's relative power capacities and the perception of a national government in search of activating the country's participation in the international scene, allows to confirm what many analysts have called as a spin in the Colombian foreign policy. The pursuit of privileging dialog over ideological confrontation, to brake with the traditional position of bandwagoning with the United States, the separation of the foreign policy from internal affairs, specially in the subject of war against the guerrillas, the recomposition of relations with neighboring countries and the country's return to the Latin American region, are some of the elements that confirm such spin. The foreign policy of Colombia towards the European Union has not been indifferent to this new viewpoint, although some continuities can be perceived, the truth is that the country is aiming for the mutual interest elements to be the ones that lead to a strengthening between the parts. That is how, taking into account the critical moment that the European bloc is going through in economical and financial terms and the country's good mining environment, Colombia mainly focuses, in the commercial bond and investment impetus. ; El aumento de las capacidades de poder relativo de Colombia y la percepción de un gobierno nacional que busca activar la participación del país en la escena internacional permiten confirmar lo que muchos analistas han denominado como un giro de la política exterior colombiana. La búsqueda por privilegiar el diálogo sobre la confrontación ideológica; romper con la posición tradicional de Bandwagoning con Estados Unidos; el desligue de la política exterior de los problemas internos, especialmente en el tema de guerra contra las guerrillas y la recomposición de las relaciones con los países vecinos y el retorno del país a la región latinoamericana son algunos de los elementos que lo comprueban. La política exterior de Colombia hacia la Unión Europea no ha sido ajena a esta nueva visión, aunque se pueden percibir algunas continuidades. Lo cierto es que el país busca que sean los elementos de mutuo interés los que lleven a un estrechamiento entre las partes. Es así como, teniendo en cuenta el momento crítico por el que atraviesa el bloque europeo en términos económicos y financieros y el buen ambiente minero energético del país, Colombia se centra, principalmente, en el impulso de loslazos comerciales y de inversión.
The double purpose of this article is first to clarify the concept of citizenship as intended in the European Union and, second, to encourage society in our country -particularly the segment of society involved in education- to carry out a serious reflection on it, made in an objective manner and in a constructive focus, far away from stereotypes which support vested interests that could occasionally cause social divisions. ; La intención del presente artículo es clarificar el concepto de "ciudadanía" que se pretende en la Unión Europea, e invitar a una reflexión del conjunto social de nuestro país, y de la comunidad educativa, en particular, desde un enfoque objetivo y constructivo alejado de los estereotipos que propician intereses partidistas, en ocasiones, opuestos a la cohesión social.
El objeto de esta investigación es la realización de un estudio sobre la cohesión económica y social en la Unión Europea, su evolución a lo largo del tiempo, los objetivos que persigue y los instrumentos de financiación de los que dispone, que son los fondos estructurales y el Fondo de Cohesión. La cohesión económica y social es una política que beneficia del 33% del presupuesto de la Unión Europea. La cohesión tiene como objetivo reducir las desigualdades sociales y económicas entre las regiones, apoyar la competitividad, el empleo, la educación y el medio ambiente. Se apoya en el principio básico de solidaridad, mediante el cual, la mayor parte de los presupuestos se destinan a los Estados y regiones menos desarrolladas para intentar generar un equilibrio entre los países europeos. The purpose of this research is the image of a study on economic and social cohesion in the European Union, their evolution over time, the objectives pursued and the angels have, which are the structural funds and the Cohesion Fund. Economic and social cohesion is a policy that benefits 33% of the budget of the European Union. Cohesion aims to reduce social and economic inequalities between regions, support competitiveness, employment, education and the environment. It is based on the basic principle of solidarity, whereby most of the budgets allocated to less developed states and regions to try to create a balance between European countries.
