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This paper compares legislative dynamics under all procedures in which the Council of Ministers votes by qualified majority (QMV). We make five major points. First, the EU governments have sought to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the powers of the European Parliament since 1987, whereas they have lessened the legislative influence of the Commission. Under the Amsterdam treaty's version of the codecision procedure, the Parliament is a co-equal legislator with the Council, whereas the Commission's influence is likely to be more informal than formal. Second, as long as the Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, policy outcomes under consultation, cooperation & the new codecision will be more integrationist than the QMV-pivot in the Council prefers. Third, the pace of European integration may slow down if MEPs become more responsive to the demands of their constituents. Fourth, the EU is evolving into a bicameral legislature with a heavy status quo bias. Not only does the Council use QMV but absolute majority voting requirements & high levels of absenteeism create a de facto supermajority threshold for Parliamentary decisions. Finally, if the differences between the Council & the Parliament concern regulation issues on a traditional left-right axis, the Commission is more likely to be the ally of the Council than the Parliament. 2 Figures, 36 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd.]

Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I develop the 'EU Exit Index' measuring the exit propensities of all European Union member states. The index highlights that the United Kingdom was an outlier and uniquely positioned to leave the European Union. While all other states are far behind the United Kingdom, the index still reveals substantial variation among them. Moreover, the index allows monitoring the development of exit propensities over time. It shows that the European Union is in better shape today than before the Brexit referendum and that, currently, no further exits are on the horizon. Still, this could change in the future and the EU Exit Index provides systematic and reproducible measurements to track this development.

This paper compares legislative dynamics under all procedures in which the Council of Ministers votes by qualified majority (QMV). We make five major points. First, the EU governments have sought to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the powers of the European Parliament since 1987, whereas they have lessened the legislative influence of the Commission. Under the Amsterdam treaty's version of the codecision procedure, the Parliament is a coequal legislator with the Council, whereas the Commission's influence is likely to be more informal than formal. Second, as long as the Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, policy outcomes under consultation, cooperation and the new codecision will be more integrationist than the QMV-pivot in the Council prefers. Third, the pace of European integration may slow down if MEPs become more responsive to the demands of their constituents. Fourth, the EU is evolving into a bicameral legislature with a heavy status quo bias. Not only does the Council use QMV but absolute majority voting requirements and high levels of absenteeism create a de facto supermajority threshold for Parliamentary decisions. Finally, if the differences between the Council and the Parliament concern regulation issues on a traditional left-right axis, the Commission is more likely to be the ally of the Council than the Parliament.

This paper challenges the assumption of separable preferences that has been applied throughout the existing empirical research on European Union (EU) legislative politics. Yet our analysis reveals that non-separable preferences are in fact a widespread phenomenon in EU politics. In many cases actors' spending preferences are conditional upon the expected policy outcome, but not vice versa. In order to appropriately model such non-reciprocity, we propose a simple modification to the standard Euclidean utility function. Applying simulation techniques, we demonstrate that overlooking non-separable preferences may have caused a substantial bias in the empirical evaluation of competing models of EU legislative politics. Specifically, models that constrain the set of feasible outcomes to either the Winset and/or the core must rely on a correct specification of actors' utility functions. Therefore, a false assumption of core separable preferences significantly disadvantages these models vis-a-vis unconstrained models. Moreover, our findings underline the agenda-setting power of the European Commission for proposals that involve either a spending decision or the delegation of power from the national to the European level. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This paper challenges the assumption of separable preferences that has been applied throughout the existing empirical research on European Union (EU) legislative politics. Yet our analysis reveals that non-separable preferences are in fact a widespread phenomenon in EU politics. In many cases actors' spending preferences are conditional upon the expected policy outcome, but not vice versa. In order to appropriately model such non-reciprocity, we propose a simple modification to the standard Euclidean utility function. Applying simulation techniques, we demonstrate that overlooking non-separable preferences may have caused a substantial bias in the empirical evaluation of competing models of EU legislative politics. Specifically, models that constrain the set of feasible outcomes to either the Winset and/or the core must rely on a correct specification of actors' utility functions. Therefore, a false assumption of core separable preferences significantly disadvantages these models vis-à-vis unconstrained models. Moreover, our findings underline the agenda-setting power of the European Commission for proposals that involve either a spending decision or the delegation of power from the national to the European level.

This article analyses the dimensionality and nature of political conflict in the European Union Council of Ministers between 1998 and 2007. By comparing policy platforms of member state governments, multidimensional scaling techniques are employed to make inferences about the dimensionality of the Council's political space. The dimensions are interpreted performing 1250 multiple regression analyses. The results largely corroborate the assumption that cleavages are structured along geographically defined clusters of states. After Eastern enlargement (2004), a North—South divide was replaced by an East—West cleavage. The analysis moreover suggests that there are two stable conflict dimensions within the Council's political space. The first is an integration dimension that represents the support for deepening European Union integration and the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational level. The second is a 'policy' dimension, manifested predominantly in disputes over redistributive policies.

The personalization of politics is a popular thesis but often challenged when it comes to media personalization. While previous research compared the prominence of different types of political actors across national political contexts, this article situates its research in the context of European Union (EU) politics and, thereby, studies similar reference points across countries. Its focus lies on the European Commission and its members. Personalization is conceptualized as individualization and presidentialization, respectively. The article proposes that the EU integration process provides journalists with the opportunity to report more often about individual politicians, while political developments should further incentivize journalists to personalize their news from Brussels. To test this argument, the article investigates personalization patterns in seven broadsheets from Ireland, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and Poland. In total, 119,070 articles are analyzed by automated content analysis over a period of twenty-five years. The article finds no pan-European trend toward greater personalization of politics with respect to news coverage of EU executive politics. The findings nonetheless provide important implications for future research. The article particularly discusses the universal applicability of the phenomenon, the time frame for analysis, and journalistic styles in covering European politics.

The personalization of politics is a popular thesis but often challenged when it comes to media personalization. While previous research compared the prominence of different types of political actors across national political contexts, this article situates its research in the context of European Union (EU) politics and, thereby, studies similar reference points across countries. Its focus lies on the European Commission and its members. Personalization is conceptualized as individualization and presidentialization, respectively. The article proposes that the EU integration process provides journalists with the opportunity to report more often about individual politicians, while political developments should further incentivize journalists to personalize their news from Brussels. To test this argument, the article investigates personalization patterns in seven broadsheets from Ireland, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and Poland. In total, 119,070 articles are analyzed by automated content analysis over a period of twenty-five years. The article finds no pan-European trend toward greater personalization of politics with respect to news coverage of EU executive politics. The findings nonetheless provide important implications for future research. The article particularly discusses the universal applicability of the phenomenon, the time frame for analysis, and journalistic styles in covering European politics.

Decades of liberalization have transformed the original structure of the EC common market, being a synonym of the validity of the Four Freedoms — free movement of persons, goods, services and capital — into an integral instrument for conducting EU economic policy, but not without many constraints, both formal and informal. The process of globalization of the world economy means, in the opinion of EU institutions, that currently the European Union more than ever needs a single market that would support reforms to boost growth and increase its competitiveness. The Single Market Acts of 2011 and 2012 suggest measures to further its development. It is treated as a continuous process. However, for many Member States the evolution of the single market is a kind of a perpetual transaction — a tender, in which a concession to EU group interests is expected equivalent of particular benefit. Quite often all concessions are treated by public authorities as downright harmful to the national interest, especially in times of economic and financial crisis. The aim of this paper is an attempt to answer the question why building consensus on further proceeding to the single market is seemingly more difficult to achieve than ever in the past? The problem looks even more serious, once we accept as a starting point the "bicycle theory", which shows that the halting of the evolution of the single market may cause the opposite process — the disintegration of the EU market.

Decades of liberalization have transformed the original structure of the EC common market, being a synonym of the validity of the Four Freedoms — free movement of persons, goods, services and capital — into an integral instrument for conducting EU economic policy, but not without many constraints, both formal and informal. The process of globalization of the world economy means, in the opinion of EU institutions, that currently the European Union more than ever needs a single market that would support reforms to boost growth and increase its competitiveness. The Single Market Acts of 2011 and 2012 suggest measures to further its development. It is treated as a continuous process. However, for many Member States the evolution of the single market is a kind of a perpetual transaction — a tender, in which a concession to EU group interests is expected equivalent of particular benefit. Quite often all concessions are treated by public authorities as downright harmful to the national interest, especially in times of economic and financial crisis. The aim of this paper is an attempt to answer the question why building consensus on further proceeding to the single market is seemingly more difficult to achieve than ever in the past? The problem looks even more serious, once we accept as a starting point the "bicycle theory", which shows that the halting of the evolution of the single market may cause the opposite process — the disintegration of the EU market.

The book provides the first comprehensive comparative analysis of the development of EU enlargement conditionality across four different enlargement waves - the first (2004) and the second (2007) phase of the Eastern enlargement, the EU enlargement to Croatia (2013), and the ongoing enlargement round involving Turkey and the Western Balkans