Suchergebnisse

Rapid unification of Europe is apparent in the econ sphere, but the European community lacks the necessary spiritual quality for unification which would be demonstrated in the merging of pol'al or cultural nat'l goals. Europe has undergone in one generation a transformation from which it has not altogether recovered. Formerly, Europe was at the center of world power. This was upset, & Europe became largely dependent on US policy & power to take over the responsibilities it could no longer meet. The 1950 decade brought European leaders to the recognition that no European nation alone was able to guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. Only by accepting the difficult condition of dependency were European leaders able to move beyond nat'lism toward new forms of transnat'l responsibility. This eptailed the quest for merged nat'l goals & for ways of expressing them in instit's & in practices. There has been a steady growth of commitment to the European idea,& of readiness to sacrifice nat'l interests & controls in order to maintain & strengthen the European community. There is a commitment to NATO & to US leadership, but this is not as strong in France as elsewhere. De Gaulle's successes have influenced European elite opinion, &, for the period immediately ahead, the nat'l goals of European leaders appear to be diverging rather than merging. The burden of European union obviously is on the European leaders, but it must be shared intellectually, morally, & pol'ly by the US. AA.

Rapid unification of Europe is apparent in the economic sphere, but the European community lacks the neces sary spiritual quality for unification which would be demon strated in the merging of political or cultural national goals. Europe has undergone in one generation a transformation from which it has not altogether recovered. Formerly, Europe was at the center of world power. This was upset, and Europe became largely dependent on American policy and American power to take over the responsibilities it could no longer meet. The 1950 decade brought European leaders to the recognition that no European nation alone was able to guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. Only by accepting the difficult condition of dependency were European leaders able to move beyond nationalism toward new forms of transna tional responsibility. This entailed the quest for merged national goals and for ways of expressing them in institutions and in practices. There has been a steady growth of commit ment to the European idea and of readiness to sacrifice national interests and controls in order to maintain and strengthen the European community. There is a commitment to NATO and to United States leadership, but this is not as strong in France as elsewhere. De Gaulle's successes have influenced European elite opinion, and, for the period immediately ahead, the national goals of European leaders appear to be diverging rather than merging. The burden of European union obvi ously is on the European leaders, but it must be shared intellectually, morally, and politically by the United States. —Ed.

On January 17, representatives of the seven signatories of the Western European Union (WEU) met in Paris to consider French proposals for the creation of a European arms control agency, commonly called an arms pool. According to press reports, the French plan envisaged the creation of an arms community whose functions would extend to standardization of arms, establishment of programs of production and placing of orders for arms in member countries, carrying into force of the programs, and planning and coordination of investments to develop production. It was understood that no extension of productive capacity could take place within the community without the permission of a central authority and that agreements would be made with the United States and Canada to integrate military aid programs and offshore procurement policies into the over-all program. The new organization would come into operation in two stages: the first, to extend to the end of 1956, would be a transitional stage in which decisions would be taken unanimously by representatives of governments choosing to belong to a military standardization committee and an armaments production committee; in the second stage, from the beginning of 1957, a definitive regime of an arms community would come into action, composed of a director and a permanent committee of ministers of defense under the authority of the WEU Council. Decisions of the permanent body would require the consent of two-thirds of its members, except on questions of standardization which would require unanimity. An alternative to the permanent committee envisaged in the second phase of the program would be the appointment of commissioners, independent of governments, by the WEU Council which would make decisions by a majority vote.