Suchergebnisse

On May 2, U.S. law enforcement indicted Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas) on charges of taking at least $360,000 in bribes from companies controlled by the government of Azerbaijan. In exchange for money, Cuellar would attempt to shape the U.S. foreign policy towards Azerbaijan by spreading narratives favorable to that nation's interests through speeches and legislative measures.
While the challenge of undue foreign interference in U.S. politics is not new, the case of Azerbaijan highlights a particular vulnerability in U.S. foreign policy: Washington's fixation on inflexible alliances and enmities provides a fertile ground for foreign actors to exploit it to promote their own parochial agendas that have little to do with U.S. interests.
Azerbaijan has been an adept player on the Washington scene since the early 1990s when the country's abundant hydrocarbon riches boosted its claims to geostrategic relevance. As detailed in a Quincy Institute brief, since 2015 Azerbaijan spent over $7 million on lobbying efforts in Washington, according to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) records. And, as the indictment of Cuellar shows, that is likely only a tip of the iceberg: Azerbaijan has a long track record of illicit influence operations known as "caviar diplomacy" consisting of bribing politicians in the U.S. and Europe to promote its interests. In fact, in January 2024 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted to suspend Azerbaijan's membership due, in part, to those corrupt dealings.
Azerbaijan's efforts have to be seen in the context of its decades-long conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh — a historically Armenian-majority region but within the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan. To garner U.S. and EU support, Baku's lobbying machine, including PR firms, friendly politicians, pundits, and think tanks pitched the country as the West's geopolitical asset against Russia and Iran — Azerbaijan borders both. As a Washington insider, who requested not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter, familiar with Cuellar's case and Baku's broader lobbying schemes put it, playing up Russian and Iranian threats is an old trick used by Baku to "attract attention on the Hill."
The text of Cueller's indictment confirms that analysis: the section on the congressman's dealings with Azerbaijan includes an exchange with the nation's then-ambassador to the U.S. Elin Suleymanov, in which the diplomat tried to pin blame for the flare-up of tensions with Armenia in July 2020 on Russia's alleged attempts to disrupt the "pipelines and transportation routes" in the region by using Armenia, its formal security treaty ally, against Azerbaijan. That version of events never withstood even cursory scrutiny. In fact, in hindsight, the flare-up in July looks merely like a rehearsal before a much larger, and ultimately successful, military effort Azerbaijan launched a few months later in September of 2020. Significantly, Russia failed to intervene on behalf of its ally Armenia. Yet the manipulative invocation of the Russian threat was enough to spur Cuellar and other Baku lobbyists in the West to action.
Azerbaijan uses the same threat inflation tactics when it comes to Iran. In that case, Baku's lobbyists leverage the nation's close and highly beneficial relationship with Israel, one of the main sources of sophisticated weaponry that helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia militarily. The influential network of hawkish DC-based think tanks promoting the positions of Israel's Likud-led government, such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Hudson Institute, and the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), do Azerbaijan's bidding likely because it's in Israel's interests, and what is in the interests of Israel, in their view, must also be beneficial to the United States. In fact, JINSA's mission statement says that "Israel is the most capable and critical U.S. security partner in the 21st century and a strong America is the best guarantor of Western civilization."
It follows, then, that the U.S. must support Azerbaijan. In fact, in its report on a trip to Azerbaijan in March 2024, JINSA's experts called on the U.S. government to "block Iran's efforts to stymie the budding cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel." The report then concludes that "greater U.S. engagement with Azerbaijan is critical to building a coherent and comprehensive approach to addressing two of our key adversaries, Russia and Iran."
Yet JINSA and Baku's other supporters in Washington choose to disregard or downplay the booming relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. In fact, both countries signed a declaration on "allied interaction" in 2022, just a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then, the relationship has only grown stronger. In April 2024, Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev went so far as to say that Russia "will never leave the South Caucasus because it is in this region." Even Azerbaijan's much-touted role as a source of diversification of gas supplies to Europe to wean it off Russian imports can only be viable on the condition that Azerbaijan itself gets resupplied by Moscow.
Azerbaijan's relations with Iran are arguably more complicated as Iran, unlike Russia, borders Armenia and has opposed Azeri expansionism in the region. Yet Baku has also sought to moderate tensions with Tehran, by signing a raft of agreements to boost regional connectivity.
These examples show just how far detached the views of Baku lobbyists are of Azerbaijan from the realities on the ground. It's not an argument to pressure Azerbaijan to change its policies — as a sovereign state, it is entitled to make its own choices, all the more so when it comes to relations with powerful neighbors like Russia and Iran. Yet there is no reason why Washington's own policies should be based on false, manufactured premises. Rep. Cuellar's case highlights the pernicious effects of undue interference. But it should also serve for a broader reflection on how nearly unconditional attachments to some countries and equally rigid hostilities to others helped create space for corrupt foreign interests to exploit.

For the umpteenth time, the U.S. and Iran have come close to an open war neither side wants. The Israelis strike a building within the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, killing senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iranians, with unintended irony, protest this violation of diplomatic premises, and almost start a war with Israel by launching hundreds of drones and missiles that the U.S., given ample warning, helps to inter­cept. The Israelis launch a counterstrike to demonstrate its ability to evade Iran's defenses. That appears to end the exchange until the next round.Sooner or later, if the U.S. and the Islamic Republic are going to avoid such a lose-lose conflict, the two sides will need to stop shouting and start talking. Forty-five years of exchanging empty slogans, accusa­tions, threats, and denunci­a­tions have accomplished little beyond furthering a few political careers and feed­ing a sense of self-righteousness. For suc­cessive U.S. adminis­trations, Iran remains a problem that will not go away.To para­phrase Trotsky, "You may have no business with Iran; but Iran has business with you." For Iran, the U.S. remains an obsession. The more Iran's hated rulers denounce it, the more attractive it becomes — as both a role model and a destination — to a savvy popula­tion suffering from inflation, unemployment, and the stern, miso­gynistic dictates of an aging and ossified ruling elite.The Islamic Republic, despite the wishes of many Iranians and their friends, is probably not going away soon. In the first months after the fall of the monarchy, the most-asked question in Tehran was, "When are THEY leaving?" (Inhaa key mirand?). Forty-five years later THEY are still in charge and show no signs of packing their bags.Why should we talk to the Islamic Republic, when it has the appalling history that it does? Why should we talk when its overriding policy principle is, in the words of one Iranian official, "opposition to you"? We need to talk because talking (and listening) to an adversary means serving our national interests by communicating. Talking never means either approval of or affection for the Islamic Republic.Talking to the Islamic Republic is not going to bring down that government, persuade the ruling clerics to step aside, or persuade them to stop repressing its women, musicians, journalists, lawyers, students and academics. Talking is not going to end the ruling clerics' bizarre obsessions with con­trolling every trivial detail of Iranians' private lives. What talking does is allow each side to present its point of view and to correct the dangerous "mythperceptions" that have prevented the U.S. and Iran from breaking out of a 45-year downward spiral of futility.For what has happened when the two sides have not talked? What has happened, for example, when the Islamic Republic's representatives at meetings refuse face-to-face meetings with their American counterparts? What has happened when one side ignores, or rejects outright, proposals from the other to meet in at setting of mutual respect?Whenever two sides — neighbors, relatives, countries — for whatever reason, cannot talk, each side becomes, to the other, simul­taneously sub-human and super-human. "Superhuman" means the other is capable of anything. In this case, a superhuman Iran can build and deliver a nuclear weapon in weeks, manipulate proxies to do its will anywhere, and rebuild the mighty Persian Empires of Greek and Roman times. On the other side, a superhuman United States can guide events in Iran and subvert its young people through a powerful, hidden network of agents – journalists, intellectuals, writers, etc. – ready to obey instructions from Washington.As for being "subhuman," in this view neither side is constrained by any sense of morality or humanity. It will do (and since it is also super­human, can do) anything. In such a case, the superhuman we fear and the subhuman we despise. When such a powerful and evil adver­sary threatens us, we feel justified in taking any action against it, because that adver­sary will stop at nothing and has only one goal: to destroy us by any means possible.At one level, leaders in both Tehran and Washington seek to avoid an Iran-U.S. war. Although Tehran's ruling clerics care little for the lives of ordi­nary Iranians – who would be the victims of such a war – they do care about staying in power and continuing to enjoy their villas and foreign currency accounts. A war with the U.S. would threaten their good life. In Washington, both Democratic and Repub­lican presidents have known that "another stupid war" in the Middle East is a political loser. In 2016, Trump ran against such wars, and his message was powerful. Although he foolishly abandoned the Iran nuclear deal and made a bizarre threat to blow up "52 historical sites" in Iran, he clearly had no stomach for a war. He summarily fired his national security adviser, a paid shill for the cultists of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), when he pushed the president toward confrontation.Does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu want to drag the U.S. into a war with Iran? To all appearances he does, not only to rid Israel of a declared enemy, but, more important, to keep himself in power. The Israeli premier has used Iran to mani­pulate the U.S. and even to intervene directly in American domestic politics. The more extreme the rhetoric and actions from Tehran, the better for Netanyahu. It is said he went into mourning when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — notorious for his curious anti-Israeli rhetoric — left office in 2013. But he can usually depend on the Islamic Republic to help him both by overplaying its weak hand and by raising the volume on its tired slogans.Wars often begin with both sides saying they want peace. But miscalculations, underestimating or overestimating the other side, and third-party actions can push a country down a path it knows is self-destructive. Talking to the Islamic Republic will be hard, but it is worth doing if it can keep both sides off a road to disaster.

The government of Saudi Arabia has gone to extraordinary lengths to silence its critics, including brutally murdering journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Now the Saudi monarchy is hoping to silence its most powerful critic yet: the U.S. Senate.Tuesday afternoon, fireworks flew in a Senate committee room as consultants for the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) — Boston Consulting Group, Teneo, McKinsey & Company, and M. Klein — were called to explain why they and the PIF had done remarkably little to comply with a Senate inquiry into PIF's influence efforts in the U.S. The hearing got heated almost as quickly as it began with Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that was holding the hearing, exclaiming that, "It's outrageous the government of Saudi Arabia is threatening members of your companies with jail time if you provide the documents this Subcommittee has requested."The Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) also expressed disdain for the lack of transparency afforded by the PIF. "I have no sympathy for Saudi Arabia's claims of sovereign immunity," he said. "Any foreign entity wanting to do business in the U.S. must abide by U.S. laws."Sens. Blumenthal and Johnson's ire with the witnesses stems from these firms' and PIF's stubborn refusal to comply with the subcommittee's investigation of PIF's influence activities in the U.S., most notably PIF's bid to effectively take over the international game of golf via the proposed merger of the Saudi-backed LIV Golf tour with the U.S.-based PGA Tour and the DP World Tour. Last Monday, the two senators sent PIF a sternly worded letter, noting that PIF has even filed legal actions against each of the PIF consultants in Saudi court seeking to prevent the firms from giving the subcommittee any information that isn't approved by the Saudi government, thus essentially trying to censor the congressional investigation. At the hearing, the witnesses expressed the chilling impact this has had, with one of the firm's representatives noting its employees could face, "as much as 20 years imprisonment as well as monetary fines" in Saudi Arabia, if they comply with the subcommittee's subpoena. Silencing critics is nothing new for a Saudi regime that jails activists at home and murders them abroad. But, in this case, it's not a single Saudi critic that finds itself under attack; it's U.S. law. As Sen. Blumenthal made clear repeatedly at the hearing and in a letter sent to his colleagues on the subcommittee last Thursday, "The PIF Consultants' refusal to comply with Congressional oversight at the behest of a foreign government presents an existential risk to U.S. law." As Blumenthal further elaborated in his letter, if these firms ignore the subcommittee's subpoenas with impunity, it could create a dangerous precedent — "that American companies can shield commercial interactions with foreign governments that are directed towards the United States from oversight simply by choosing to have their contracts governed by foreign law." At the hearing, Blumenthal made clear that this was not acceptable, adding, "We are not going to sell our legal system to the highest bidder or the biggest bully."Some of the witnesses at the hearing also faced tough questions about their firms' compliance with another foreign influence law — the Foreign Agents Registration Act. There are currently five firms registered under FARA as agents of the Saudi Public Investment fund — USSA International, RF Binder Partners, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck, Akin, Gump and Teneo. Notably, this list does not include the Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey & Company, or M. Klein, whose representatives also testified at the hearing regarding work they had done for PIF. Asked to explain this, the witnesses argued they had sought outside counsel and were told that nothing they were doing required FARA registration. In that case, Blumenthal retorted, "One of the findings we're seeing from this inquiry is that FARA needs to be strengthened." While the Saudi PIF and its consultants have repeatedly tried to dismiss PIF's activities as being little more than economic investments — and thus not requiring FARA registration — there's ample evidence the kingdom's use of PIF and its larger sportswashing operations involve much more than money. PGA Tour officials, testifying before this same subcommittee last July, explained that the PIF-backed LIV Golf is "an irrational threat [to the PGA Tour] that's not concerned with a return on investment or true growth of the game." As I mentioned when I testified before the same subcommittee in September, and based on my extensive research into Saudi influence in the U.S., PIF's actions are "part of the Kingdom's much larger lobbying, public relations, and broader influence operation in the U.S." Just two weeks ago, women's tennis titans Chris Evert and Martina Navratalova raised alarms about Saudi Arabia's hosting of the Women's Tennis Association Finals given the country's human rights record. The pair questioned "whether staging a Saudi crown-jewel tournament would involve players in an act of sportswashing merely for the sake of a cash influx."What's perhaps most concerning about Saudi sportswashing and the kingdom's unprecedented attempts to stymie a congressional inquiry is that they're happening at the same time as the Biden administration is reportedly promoting a security pact with Riyadh as part of a larger agreement for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. In short, the Biden administration is considering asking U.S. troops to fight — and possibly even die — for a monarchy which, at the same time, is actively undermining U.S. law. Needless to say, this sends a deeply troubling message to America's enemies and even its so-called "friends," like Saudi Arabia, abroad: You can meddle in our domestic politics, and not only will you do so with impunity, but you can also be rewarded with U.S. military support.

The first session of the 118th Congress was one of the least productive in the body's history. Only 22 bills were signed into law this year by the president — by far the lowest total since at least 1993, the first year for which the National Archives have data. (For comparison, the next least productive year during this timespan was in 2013, when 72 bills became law.)Despite the slow year, members nonetheless found time to introduce an abundance of bills relating to the threat of China, which was the focus of hearings in committees ranging from Financial Services to the Judiciary committee, and of legislation concerning everything from fentanyl distribution to TikTok. In 2023, members introduced 616 pieces of legislation that contain a variation of the word "China" — more than 3.5 for every day that Congress was in session on average. That's already more than any two-year congressional session, except for the 117th Congress (2021-2022; 860 bills) and the 116th (2019-2020; 620 bills), according to a search of the congressional record. One of the few "accomplishments" in Congress this year was the formation of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party — which was almost instantly dubbed the "tough on China committee" — in January.From that starting point, bills targeting China's presence in economic, technological, military, and other fields were introduced. To be sure, in line with other issues, none of these bills became law. But here are the four broad types of anti-China legislation introduced in Congress in 2023.The legislation targeting foreign purchase of land in the U.S.Members of Congress introduced at least nine bills aimed at restricting foreign ownership of agricultural land in the United States. As RS has explained, these efforts are not always logical, even if there are some legitimate national security concerns over China or other nations buying up farmland.Some of the proposed legislation is more targeted and looks to tackle these concerns, but others chose a broader approach. The harshest measure was introduced by Sens. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Katie Britt (R-Ala.) in their "Not One More Inch or Acre Act," which directed the president to take the actions necessary to "to prohibit the purchase of public or private real estate located in the United States by citizens and entities of the People's Republic of China."The bills that discourage diplomacy …One of the clear themes to emerge from this session of Congress is that many China hawks interpret diplomacy as a sign of weakness. One example is the bill introduced by Reps. Tom Tiffany (R-Wisc.) and Lance Gooden (R-Texas) calling on Biden to take the necessary actions to close the Chinese consulate in New York City. As Cornell University professor Jessica Chen Weiss noted when the Trump administration closed a Chinese consulate in Houston over allegations of espionage, "losing the consulate does not appear to be part of a coherent strategy to deter or compel China to alter its behavior," and could rather be interpreted as part of an effort to bolster fears of Beijing being an existential threat.… And the ones that increase the chances of warRep. Andy Ogles (R-Tenn.) and five co-sponsors introduced the "Defund China's Allies Act" to "prohibit the availability of foreign assistance to certain countries that do not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan," aimed at 21 countries in Central America and the Caribbean. The bill argues that the "United States efforts to condemn these countries' willing diplomatic shift toward a genocidal government is undermined by an incomprehensible adherence to the so-called 'One China' policy, on terms dictated by the Chinese Communist Party," implicitly calling for an end to the policy that has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades.The bills that needlessly antagonize without accomplishing anything of substanceWhen it comes to relations with China, many members of Congress choose to "speak very loudly and carry no stick," as Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) explained to RS in an interview earlier this year. "The question is: how do we do things that will actually help Taiwan's security without unnecessarily escalating or antagonizing the PRC?," she added. "Not the silly things like renaming an embassy or just saying all this stuff rhetorically. That doesn't actually help Taiwan, but does escalate the conflict with China."
Jacobs was likely referring to the bills introduced by Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Reps. John Curtis (R-Utah), and Chris Pappas (D-N.H.) which would have renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, D.C. to the Taiwan Representative Office, because it "better reflects its status as Taiwan's de facto diplomatic mission to the United States."
That was only one of many bills that were purely symbolic and antagonizing, including one that demanded that Beijing "must be held financially liable for $16,000,000,000,000," because of its responsibility in the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and a resolution that declared China to be the biggest threat to freedom in the world.
"Whereas it is the opinion of Congress that the Chinese Communist Party is the greatest threat to freedom and to the free world," reads the text, introduced by Rep. George Santos (R-N.Y.). "Be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress agrees that the Chinese Communist Party is the greatest threat to freedom and to the free world." That's the entire resolution.
This year in Congress ended appropriately for a legislature that accomplished very little of substance: The Senate went home for the holidays without reaching an agreement on major legislation that seeks to fund Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and address border security, despite the spending package having the support of the White House and both party's leadership in the upper chamber.With 2024 being an election year in which partisan politics often take up an even larger role in Washington and Congress's two chambers still divided, the prospects for more legislation getting passed are not high. It is not realistic to expect much from Congress next year, but the overload of bills aimed at countering Beijing is one thing that is almost certain to continue.

On September 25, Mali's military government announced it will delay elections that were slated for February 2024. The authorities cited technical reasons for the postponement and did not name a replacement date.

Viewed against the backdrop of the junta's actions since taking power in 2020, the delay appears the latest in a series of maneuvers by the junta to extend its rule, even as the junta has failed egregiously in its promises to restore security. The United States has little influence over what happens in Bamako, but by taking a clear and public stand against open-ended military rule in Mali and other countries in the region, Washington can enhance its credibility in the long term.

A recent wave of coups in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa has involved officers who show no serious willingness to hand power back to civilians. Military officers have now seized power in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). Add to this the coups in Guinea (2021) and Sudan (2021) and one has a "coup belt" that evokes the dark days of the Cold War. Amid much talk of "coup contagion," each putsch has had its own, primarily domestic causes — but what has been contagious is coup-makers' playbooks.

Mali's Colonel Assimi Goita and associates have been key movers in elaborating this playbook, extending their "transition" time and again. Goita and company came to power in August 2020, appointed a civilian-led transition, overthrew their own civilian appointees in May 2021's "coup within a coup," defied sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), compromised on a transition for 2024, and have now begun to tamper with that timetable.

Mali's colonels have repeatedly exposed the weak hand of regional and Western diplomats. ECOWAS first sought to impose an 18-month timetable in August 2020 — meaning the February 2024 elections should have already occurred in February 2022. What happens in Mali has serious ramifications for how officers in the other countries — some of whom are in close contact with Mali's junta — will approach their own transition timetables.

The U.S. has few good options in Mali or elsewhere in the region. In Washington, there are concerns that criticizing and antagonizing juntas would diminish whatever influence the U.S. may command in the Sahel. Washington also prefers to take the region's countries and their coups case by case, frowning on those in Mali and Burkina Faso while showing a significantly more ambivalent and even lenient attitude towards those in Chad and Niger.

And certainly there are diplomatic costs to criticism, as France has learned in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where its soldiers and diplomats are effectively unwelcome.

Yet U.S. "influence" in the region is overstated — what is there to preserve? After 20 years of military training programs, the U.S. has no significant and enduring counterterrorism accomplishments to report. On the political side, if the U.S. has avoided the backlash that has greeted France, it has also not been able to convince soldiers to return to barracks, or even to temper the overreach of some of its favored civilian leaders (the decision by Senegalese President Macky Sall not to seek a third term in 2024 is one bright spot in the region, and may reflect behind-the-scenes international pressure, but Sall continues to crack down severely on the opposition).

Given that U.S. influence has not appreciably bent the curve of the region when it comes either to endemic insecurity or the militarization of politics, it would be better for the U.S. to be consistent, vocal, and clear when it comes to denouncing coups and distorted transition timetables. As of September 30, for example, there was no statement by the U.S. on the Malian junta's delay of the elections. Nor has the U.S. clarified, more than two months after the coup in Niger, whether it considers that takeover to be a coup in legal terms — a decision that would trigger a suspension of much assistance to Niger.

As one analyst recently commented, allowing ambiguity to fester when it comes to the U.S. stance on Niger is a recipe for exacerbating conspiracy theorizing about whether the U.S. and other Western powers actually support the coups in the region.

Speaking out at key moments would elicit rebukes from Bamako and Niamey, but it would also send vital signals to the actual people of the Sahel. The region's populations are Washington's most important audience at this point, because it is more important to shape positive perceptions of the U.S. over the long term than it is to tiptoe around generals and colonels who rule capitals by force.

Over the long term, moreover, it is in the U.S. interest to give moral support to genuine grassroots democratic culture in the region, which has been a serious force in Sahelian history time and again. At the moment, the U.S. should not materially support civilian organizations that seek to challenge the juntas politically, because doing so could pose profound risks to such civilians (of being arrested and/or tarred with the charge of being Western puppets) and could create unnecessary credibility risks for the U.S. itself.

But by being blunt and forthright that military rule is unacceptable, the U.S. can help set the expectation that norms, and not crass and misguided efforts at realpolitik, will guide Washington's and others' policies towards the Sahel.
Publicly criticizing and privately pressuring the region's military rulers does not mean that Washington will be loathed as much as Paris is. Washington does not have Paris's colonial baggage, and French officials, from President Emmanuel Macron down to individual ambassadors, have been particularly imperious and insensitive to Sahelian concerns, squandering numerous easy opportunities to appear flexible and humble.The U.S. can be a more friendly critic, clarifying that it disapproves of juntas' choices but leaving the door open to conversation

Senator Bob Menendez's indictment on federal corruption charges has rocked congressional politics and sent shockwaves through the foreign policy establishment. The New Jersey Democrat was, until recently, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a powerful role that has enabled the New Jersey Senator to wield outsized influence over a wide array of pressing foreign policy issues.Menendez has been a leading voice of congressional opposition to the pending U.S. sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. There is "nothing new," he said earlier this summer, reiterating his concerns over Turkey's hold on ratifying Sweden's NATO membership, Ankara's human rights record, and its hostilities with fellow NATO member Greece. "How does it work for us to have one NATO ally be belligerent to another and someone sell them F-16s?" he said. Menendez has remained steadfastly opposed to the F-16 deal even after President Joe Biden, to whom the senator has been an important even if occasionally eristic ally, signaled his readiness to move ahead with the transfer.Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made no attempt to conceal his pleasure over Menendez's ongoing political implosion. "One of our most important problems regarding the F-16s were the activities of U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez against our country," he said. "Menendez's exit gives us an advantage but the F-16 issue is not an issue that depends only on Menendez." Ankara has tried to exploit the issue of Sweden's NATO accession — which must be explicitly approved by every NATO member state before it can be formalized — as a source of leverage on the F-16 deal. Meanwhile, Menendez has insisted that Sweden's NATO membership is something that "should naturally occur" and not an object of barter between Erdogan and the West. "I've always said that the ratification of Sweden, which should naturally occur, is not the sine qua non of why I would lift the hold on F-16s," Menendez said. "There's bigger issues than just that alone."Menendez is accused of using his considerable influence over U.S. foreign policy to benefit the Egyptian government. The allegations have already spurred calls, endorsed by Menendez's fellow top Senate Democrat Chris Murphy, to dial back U.S. aid to Egypt."I would hope that our committee would consider using any ability it has to put a pause on those dollars, pending an inquiry into what Egypt was doing," Murphy said. "I have not talked to colleagues about this yet, but obviously this raises pretty serious questions about Egypt, Egypt's conduct." Questions of Egyptian involvement have rightfully received overwhelming public attention given the contents of the corruption charges leveled at Menendez, but there are other factors to consider. Though relations between Ankara and Cairo have been fraught since the 2013 ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, with the two sides only recently restoring full-fledged diplomatic ties, Menendez's signaling against Turkey might be better explained by concerns closer to home. The senator's home state boasts sizeable diaspora communities from Greece and Armenia, countries that have long been on a hostile footing with Erdogan's Turkey. Menendez has emerged as a forceful voice in support of Armenia, urging recognition of the 1915-1917 genocide of Armenians in the former Ottoman Empire and pushing for sanctions against Azerbaijan, Turkey's close ally, over allegations of human rights abuses against ethnic Armenians in the Azerbaijani enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Asked by Reuters in July 2023 about the conditions for lifting his ongoing hold on the F-16 transfer to Turkey, Menendez said, "If they [the Biden administration) can find a way to ensure that Turkey's aggression against its neighbors ceases, which there has been a lull the last several months, that's great but there has to be a permanent reality." As noted by Erdogan himself, Menendez's downfall does not necessarily guarantee the immediate passage of the F-16 deal long sought by Ankara. Indeed, there appears to be an emerging consensus in Congress around Menendez's position that Turkey must approve Sweden's NATO bid without preconditions for the F-16 negotiations to progress. "I'm reading the tea leaves, and he was one of the four that was still kind of holding out, so I think it's more likely it's going to be approved — but Sweden's got to be admitted to NATO," said representative Mike McCaul (R-TX). "We're saying we're not going to consider this if you're going to play hardball against Sweden."It is clear that Menendez's standing as a key congressional voice on foreign policy issues will be degraded whether or not he manages to weather this latest corruption scandal. His potential resignation from the senate would altogether remove one of the principal obstacles to the fighter jet deal. But Erdogan and his allies have reasons to rejoice beyond the F-16 issue; Menendez's plight will weaken the U.S. Armenian lobby, curb congressional opposition to the Aliyev government amid rising fears of "ethnic cleansing" in Nagorno-Karabakh, and dampen congressional voices urging the White House to take a tougher line on Ankara. Outside of Eurasia, the Menendez indictment is not without possible implications on this side of the Atlantic. The New Jersey senator has been a principled opponent of steps toward rapprochement with Cuba, particularly including efforts to roll back parts of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee shakeup opens the door for a rekindling of diplomatic dialogue between the White House and Cuba, promised by Joe Biden during the 2020 presidential campaign, but it remains to be seen if the White House will seize this opportunity. A program of engagement with Cuba has support from segments of the left, with New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) denouncing the embargo as "absurdly cruel," but could prompt a backlash from parts of the Cuban American community and will draw charges from some Republicans that the administration is soft on Havana.

One of those little things we hope not to see in a newspaper column:That story is recounted in Hell to Pay, a brilliant new book by Michael Lind about how the suppression of wages is driving economic, social and political crises in America. The idea that we are paid what we deserve – and that the decline in mid-skilled, mid-paid jobs simply reflects the high-tech, globalised economy in which we live – derives from free market theory. But it is, Lind argues, utter nonsense.Lind and "brilliant" isn't quite how we'd put it. For we always recall Paul Kurgman's comments upon the economic commentary of Michael Lind: One of America's new intellectual stars is a young writer named Michael Lind, whose contrarian essays on politics have given him a reputation as a brilliant enfant terrible. In 1994 Lind published an article in Harper's about international trade, which contained the following remarkable passage:"Many advocates of free trade claim that higher productivity growth in the United States will offset pressure on wages caused by the global sweatshop economy, but the appealing theory falls victim to an unpleasant fact. Productivity has been going up, without resulting wage gains for American workers. Between 1977 and 1992, the average productivity of American workers increased by more than 30 percent, while the average real wage fell by 13 percent. The logic is inescapable. No matter how much productivity increases, wages will fall if there is an abundance of workers competing for a scarcity of jobs -- an abundance of the sort created by the globalization of the labor pool for US-based corporations." (Lind 1994: )What is so remarkable about this passage? It is certainly a very abrupt, confident rejection of the case for free trade; it is also noticeable that the passage could almost have come out of a campaign speech by Patrick Buchanan. But the really striking thing, if you are an economist with any familiarity with this area, is that when Lind writes about how the beautiful theory of free trade is refuted by an unpleasant fact, the fact he cites is completely untrue.More specifically: the 30 percent productivity increase he cites was achieved only in the manufacturing sector; in the business sector as a whole the increase was only 13 percent. The 13 percent decline in real wages was true only for production workers, and ignores the increase in their benefits: total compensation of the average worker actually rose 2 percent. And even that remaining gap turns out to be a statistical quirk: it is entirely due to a difference in the price indexes used to deflate business output and consumption (probably reflecting overstatement of both productivity growth and consumer price inflation). When the same price index is used, the increases in productivity and compensation have been almost exactly equal. But then how could it be otherwise? Any difference in the rates of growth of productivity and compensation would necessarily show up as a fall in labor's share of national income -- and as everyone who is even slightly familiar with the numbers knows, the share of compensation in U.S. national income has been quite stable in recent decades, and actually rose slightly over the period Lind describes.The question here is not why Lind got these numbers wrong. It takes considerable experience to know where to look and what to worry about in economic statistics, and one should not expect someone who does not work in the field to be able to get it right without some guidance. The question is, instead, why Mr. Lind felt that it was a good idea to make sweeping pronouncements about this subject, when he clearly was unwilling to invest time and energy in actually understanding it. The short answer in this case is surely that Mr. Lind, who is always looking for ways to enhance his enfant terrible status, saw this as a perfect opportunity. Free trade is a sacred cow of economists, who are well-known to be boring, stuffy types; what could be a better way to reinforce one's credentials as a radical, innovative thinker than to skewer their most beloved doctrine? (It seems not to have occurred to him that there might be a reason other than ideological rigidity that the striking fact he thought he knew has not been noticed by economists).Matters have not improved over the decades.The most important point of ignorance here is though that no one really did go out and design or even build globalisation. Yes, obviously, there were spouting from politicians but when, and of what, isn't that true? Tariffs came down a bit. But the real drivers were cheap transport, cheap telecoms and cheap travel. Barriers to trade are not just the tariffs or quotas imposed by governments. They're also the barriers imposed by the physical cost of trading. All of which have collapsed in these past few decades. We saw this before in history too - after the Civil War the US raised tariffs considerably. The ocean going steamship lowered physical costs by more than the rise in tariffs - total trade costs fell and we can prove this by noting the falling differences in prices of tradeable goods between the US and Europe over this period.Everyone loves the gravity model of trade these days and very few note that it talks about economic distance, not geographic. Those plummeting transport, travel and telecoms costs meant that economic distance also plummeted over the past 50 years. Therefore everywhere was becoming closer in that economic distance and so trade should increase. QED.In order to stop this - if anyone wanted to be that stupid - tariffs would have to be raised, viciously and violently, to cover the reduction in those other costs. It isn't true that anyone went out and designed globalisation - they just didn't stop it. And thank the Lord Above for that one, eh? Oh, and, obviously, don't take Michael Lind seriously on the subject of trade.

David Boaz


Here we go again. Another "obituary" for libertarianism. While Salon Magazine declares that we all live in a "libertarian dystopia," and a new brand of big‐​government conservatives promise to free the Republican party and American government from their libertarian captivity, Barton Swaim declares in the Wall Street Journal that a new book "works as an obituary" for libertarianism. That's not a characterization that I think the authors—Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi—would accept of their book, The Individualists: Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism.
Swaim notes that the book surveys many different kinds of self‐​styled libertarians over the past two centuries, and that the authors lay out six "markers" that libertarians share: property rights, individualism, free markets, skepticism of authority, negative liberties, and a belief that people are best left to order themselves spontaneously. Not a bad list, significantly overlapping with the list of seven key libertarian ideas that I laid out in the first chapter of my own book, The Libertarian Mind.
He goes on to argue, following the authors, "In the 21st century, the movement in the U.S. has consisted in an assortment of competing, often disputatious intellectual cadres: anarchists, anarcho‐​capitalists, paleo‐​libertarians (right‐​wing), 'liberaltarians' (left‐​wing) and many others." Somehow he leaves out actual libertarians, such as those who populate the Cato Institute, Reason magazine, the Objectivist world, and much of the Libertarian Party. Indeed, a few lines later he cites the "diversity" of "the priestess of capitalism Ayn Rand, the politician Rand Paul and the billionaire philanthropist Charles Koch"—none of whom would fall into any of the esoteric categories that he suggests make up modern libertarianism and in fact belong to actual libertarianism or its penumbras.
The whole review is ahistorical. Swaim never mentions classical liberalism, the revolutionary movement that challenged monarchs, autocrats, mercantilism, caste society, and established churches beginning in the 18th century. Liberalism soon swept the United States and Western Europe and ushered in what economic historian Deirdre McCloskey calls the "Great Enrichment," the unprecedented rise in living standards that has made us moderns some 3,000 percent richer than our ancestors of 1800. The ideas of the classical liberals, including John Locke, Adam Smith, and the American Founders, are those that animate modern libertarianism: equal rights, constitutional government, free markets, tolerance, the rule of law. Zwolinski and Tomasi say that "what sets libertarians apart is the absolutism and systematicity" with which we advocate those ideas. Well, yes, after 200 years of historical observation and philosophical and economic debate, many of us do believe that a firmer adherence to liberal/​libertarian ideas would serve society well. We observe that the closer a society comes to consistent tolerance, free markets, and the rule of law, the more it will achieve widespread peace, prosperity, and freedom.
Swaim insists that libertarians do not engage "with ultimate questions—questions about the good life, morality, religious meaning, human purpose and so on." He's wrong about that. Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments. F. A. Hayek stressed the importance of morals and tradition. Ayn Rand set out a fairly strict code of personal ethics. Thomas Szasz's work challenged the reductionists and behaviorists with a commitment to the old ideas of good and bad, right and wrong, and responsibility for one's choices. Charles Murray emphasizes the value and indeed the necessity of community and responsibility. Libertarian philosophers of virtue ethics find the case for limited government to be based on the search for the good life. Swaim would be on more solid ground to say that libertarianism does not presume to tell individuals what to believe and how to live. Separation of church and state and all that. As I wrote in a letter to the Journal (not yet published), Swaim refers to the "studiously amoral philosophy of libertarianism." A popular summary of libertarianism, "don't hit other people, don't take their stuff, and keep your promises," is just the basic morality that allows human beings to live together in peace.
As for his claim that libertarianism is dead, that this book is an obituary, I refer Swaim again to all the people who complain that we're living in some sort of libertarian world. Libertarians often feel depressed; they believe the world is on "the road to serfdom." But in fact the world is far freer in this century than ever before in history. Free markets and free trade, an end to slavery and caste societies, representative government, and the rule of law now govern the Western world and much of the rest. Most of the Cato Institute's website comprises complaints about the malfeasance of the U.S. government. But in the bigger picture, libertarians have had much success. In the roughly 50 years since I started thinking about politics, one could point to such successes as:
the end of conscription in the United States
social, economic, and political equality for women
dramatically lower marginal tax rates
freer trade
deregulation of major industries such as airlines, trucking, communication, and finance
the almost total demise of communism
and the consequent discrediting of socialism and central planning
the reorientation of antitrust policy to a consumer welfare standard
expanded First Amendment protections
expanded Second Amendment protections
the progress of gay rights and gay marriage
growing opportunities for school choice
a slow erosion of the war on drugs
I could go on. None of these are total victories. No ideology achieves all of its sweeping vision, at least not without a military conquest of the government and the ability to rule by decree—and those experiments are nothing to emulate. In various parts of the world bad ideas are back—socialism, protectionism, ethnic nationalism, anti‐​Semitism, even industrial policy. The libertarian challenge is to join with other liberals—Reaganite conservatives, free‐​speech liberals, people who are "fiscally conservative and socially liberal"—to push back against these bad resurgent ideas. But this record of accomplishment is no obituary.

The United States Navy recently extended the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower while it patrols the shipping lanes of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden protecting commercial shipping from Houthi rebel attacks. The Eisenhower left its homeport at Norfolk on October 14, more than 200 days ago.The Ike's sailors aren't the only ones being forced to spend more time away from home. Many of the carrier's escort vessels have also seen their deployments extended.The Navy is struggling to meet some of its operational requirements in part because it simply doesn't have all the ships it expected. The current threat to navigation in the Red Sea is precisely the scenario for which the Navy invested so much time and resources building the Littoral Combat Ships. The LCS program was sold to the American people as a "networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals." The Houthi rebels launching missiles and drones from shore and hijacking commercial shipping in the confined waters of the Red Sea meets the textbook definition of an asymmetric threat in a littoral region. Yet the "little crappy ships," as they have come to be known, are nowhere to be seen inside the Red Sea. Rather, the Navy has to keep a carrier strike group composed of Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers on station longer than anticipated in an attempt to keep an important maritime choke point open.The Littoral Combat Ship is one of two major shipbuilding failures from the past 20 years. The other is the Zumwalt-class destroyer. Both programs began in earnest in the years after 9/11 and almost immediately ran into trouble. The Zumwalt program saw massive cost growth which forced Navy leaders to slash the planned fleet size from the originally planned 32 to 7 and finally to the three which were actually built. These three ships cost nearly $8 billion each while failing to deliver promised combat capabilities.The Littoral Combat Ship program cost $28 billion to build a fleet of 35 ships. According to the Government Accountability Office, the Navy expects to pay more than $60 billion to operate the fleet for its expected 25-year lifespan. Like the Zumwalt, the LCS program's combat functionality is far less than expected. The ships were designed to be modular with crews swapping out mission systems in port for different missions. Engineers could never get the mission modules to work properly, so the scheme was abandoned. The LCS program does excel in spectacular breakdowns. The USS Milwaukee famously broke down shortly after it had been commissioned and had to be towed into a Virginia port while its crew attempted to sail the ship to its intended San Diego home for the first time. Other ships suffered from saltwater corrosion, cracked hulls, and broken-down water jets. The Freedom-class variant LCS had trouble with the combining gear linking its diesel engine with the ship's turbines. The problems grew so bad that Navy leaders essentially threw up their hands and began retiring ships decades before they should have smelled mothballs. The Navy decommissioned the USS Sioux City after a single deployment and less than five years after the ship entered service.Navy leaders are now scrambling to develop the Constellation-class frigate to fill the capability gap that should have been filled by the Littoral Combat Ship. They decided upon a safer acquisition strategy with the new program by selecting the European multipurpose frigate, a proven design already in service with the French and Italian navies, rather than starting at the drawing board. The Navy awarded Fincantieri Marinette Marine the detail design and construction award for the first ship in April 2020.Of course, the Navy isn't simply purchasing a fully developed ship. Engineers began with the existing design and have spent the past several years "maturing" it. Like many such endeavors, changes to one shipboard system necessitated modifications to others and the entire process spiraled. Navy leaders had expected to have the first ship to be delivered in 2026, but they recently announced that because of design problems, supply chain issues, and a shortage of skilled workers will delay the first ship by an additional three years.The U.S. Navy's last successful comparable surface shipbuilding program was the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. The final ship of that class, the USS Ingraham, was commissioned in 1989.Herein lies the danger inherent with unrealistic acquisition programs. When service leaders convince themselves that a radical design will work before the concept is actually demonstrated in the real world, they commit themselves, potentially for decades, to a program that may fail. By spending so much time and money on the Littoral Combat Ship program, the U.S. Navy squandered 40 years of shipbuilding time. That is an enormous lost opportunity cost and now our hard-pressed sailors enduring extended deployments are paying the price.Service leaders, the civilians leading them, and members of Congress need to remember this case the next time a defense contractor presents them with a bunch of slick conceptual drawings and then fills their ears with promises of transformative capabilities they can deliver at rock-bottom prices. As the homesick sailors aboard the Ike understand well now, if it sounds too good to be true, it definitely is.

TikTok and its parent company ByteDance this week sued to block a new law banning the social media app, claiming it is unconstitutional because it infringes upon Americans' right to free speech and prevents access to lawful information. The law, passed in April, would ban TikTok in the U.S. if ByteDance does not liquidate its American assets within nine to 12 months — citing national security concerns about the app. National security has been at the forefront of U.S. bans on Chinese tech, such as the ban on selling telecom equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese providers. Another concern about TikTok — data privacy and security — is not entirely unfounded, as about 150 million Americans use it. However, China does not need apps like TikTok to collect that data. U.S. consumer data can be bought on the open market from data brokers, including precise location and financial transaction data. Even the U.S. National Security Agency has leveraged data brokers to collect Americans' data. Anonymized data is also not the fail-safe measure that it is touted to be, as it can be de-anonymized using data that is not considered personally identifiable, like sex, ZIP code, and birthdate. In some ways, TikTok even collects less private information than Meta. In short, TikTok is no more a unique threat to data privacy and security than are data brokers and other American social media sites.Banning TikTok or any other Chinese business in the U.S. won't protect U.S. citizens' data from exploitation. The sheer profitability of U.S. citizens' data for businesses — both buyers and sellers – is undergirded by the lack of protections for collecting data or compensating individuals for their data. Solving this problem eventually would require federal-level, comprehensive data privacy and protection regulations. Without such regulation, there is little incentive for social media companies — Chinese or not — to responsibly buy, sell, collect, or otherwise exploit user data. If the U.S. government's goal is to protect private American citizens' data to enhance national security, then it must legislate acceptable limits on the exploitation of Americans' data, perhaps even following a framework like the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. Some believe that banning TikTok and other Chinese apps in the United States could force China to provide more equitable access to the Chinese market and put pressure on China to change unfair business practices towards foreign firms, like intellectual property theft, opaque subsidization and preferential treatment, raids, and fines. These inequities have long been a major concern and subject of high-level conversations between U.S. and Chinese officials. However, the U.S. bans on Chinese businesses so far appear to have neither compelled Chinese businesses nor the Chinese government to change their behaviors, instead spurring them to reduce reliance on the U.S. market and focus on exploring alternative markets. Bringing China and the U.S. to a common point of view or set of rules on business practices is a challenge that is rooted fundamentally in a lack of trust. American businesses have been able to thrive in non-sensitive industries in China and vice versa. But selling Coca-Cola and unbranded consumer goods are not particularly high-trust or strategic endeavors. The U.S. understands what economic dominance in strategic sectors can do for power projection. U.S. power has often extended its grasp into strategic private businesses without those businesses having any mandate to do so. They achieved their unintended importance via the free market in pursuit of higher profits. Washington is likely concerned that Beijing will weaponize its burgeoning economic might in technology, much like the U.S. has in the past. For example, in the case of spy Xu Yanjun, the FBI was able to issue a warrant to collect information from his Gmail and iCloud accounts, which provided key information necessary to convict him. The SWIFT messaging system and dollar hegemony have also played major roles in enforcing U.S. sanctions, often used by the U.S. in pursuit of greater national security.Washington's penchant to pull these levers in the name of national security makes the U.S. harder to trust, as does the possibility of China pulling similar levers via apps and telecommunications equipment. Using "national security" as a sufficient reason to target Chinese businesses is unlikely to prompt China to see the U.S. as a responsible partner in high-trust industries like tech.History demonstrates that the Chinese government won't be pressured into changing its unfair business practices or initiating widespread pro-market economy reforms. However, economic reforms may be on the horizon in China, so the U.S. should try to maintain a base level of trust or understanding so that American businesses might benefit from those reforms.The U.S. and China should still seek to expand collaboration in less sensitive sectors of their economies like entertainment (movies, television, gaming), education, and tourism. A joint-venture public television channel in both countries, for example, like the Franco-German Arte channel could be mutually beneficial for stimulating tourism, fostering understanding between both cultures, and familiarizing both sides with the business practices and needs of the other.Ultimately, the willingness to use national security as a reason to ban Chinese apps like TikTok will neither improve American national security nor Chinese business practices. While data privacy and security are legitimate concerns, there are regulations the United States can enact that would avoid escalating tensions between the two countries. To foster trust and encourage more equitable economic relations, Washington should consider alternative approaches to build trust and pave the way for constructive dialogue and cooperation.

U.S. efforts to cobble together an international coalition to protect the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against attacks by the Yemeni Houthi militias who demand an immediate ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war are stoking tensions with European allies.On January 8, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown called his Spanish counterpart Teodoro Lopez Calderon to, according to the official U.S. readout, discuss the "ongoing illegal Houthi attacks on commercial vessels operating in international waters in the Red Sea." Pointedly, Brown "reiterated the U.S. desire to work with all nations who share an interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and ensuring safe passage for global shipping."But according to recent reporting by veteran Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, Washington has been pushing Spain a bit harder. U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro recently called the Spanish ambassador in Washington Santiago Cabanas to urge his government to join the U.S.-led anti-Houthi coalition, Operation Guardian Prosperity, and, according to Cembrero's reporting, even went so far as issuing a deadline to Madrid to deliver an answer by January 11. So far Madrid has refused to join the U.S.-led coalition and put its soldiers and ships under the command of Pentagon's CENTCOM in the Red Sea. During an announcement of the coalition's formation last month, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said Spain was among the members without, apparently, consulting with the Spanish government, causing considerable irritation in Madrid.To smooth the friction, President Biden called Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to emphasize the Houthi threat. If his intention was to nudge Madrid closer to the U.S. position, it clearly failed: Spain refused to join the U.S. and a number of allies in the joint statement they issued on January 3 warning the Houthis about the consequences of their continued attacks on the maritime freedom.The Spanish government's position did not go unnoticed in Sana'a: the Houthi vice minister for foreign affairs Hussein Al-Ezzi expressed appreciation for Madrid's "distancing from American and British lies on the freedom of navigation." Cembrero also reported that one unexpected collateral benefit of the Spanish government's stance was the release by Iran, the Houthis' chief external backer, of a Spanish citizen kept in captivity in Tehran for 15 months.Although the Spanish government never explained the precise motives of its refusal to join "Prosperity Guardian," Madrid, while having unequivocally condemned Hamas's attack on Israel, has also been vocal in denouncing Israel's "indiscriminate killings" in Gaza, which even provoked a diplomatic crisis between Spain and Israel. The protection of the maritime freedom in the Red Sea is indeed a legitimate concern: nearly 12% of the global trade and $1 trillion worth of goods each year passes through it. The disruption of this route forces the shipping companies to divert their itineraries which causes delays and adds costs. Yet the Houthis also made it clear that their attacks will end when Israel's halts its bombing campaign in Gaza. Indeed, there were no Houthi attacks on the international shipping prior to October 7, 2023.In this context, the Spanish government seems to have calculated that joining the anti-Houthi coalition would rather mean fighting the symptoms, and not the root cause of the worsening conflict in the Middle East, namely, Israel's pursuit of maximalist military goals in Gaza and its seeming attempts to expand the war to Lebanon.By any reasonable estimation, taking the fight to the Houthis would not result in a quick, swift military victory. The movement only emerged stronger after the nine years-long war Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition it led waged against it, with a lavish military, diplomatic and intelligence support from the U.S., UK and other Western nations. The Iran-backed Houthis have also developed considerable home-made drone and missile capabilities, with a proven capacity to hit Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Israel and Western military assets in the region. No war on the Houthis would, thus, be limited to some surgical strikes. With a predictable failure of such strikes to "neutralize" the militia, there is a high probability of a mission creep that would lead the coalition to attack targets onshore in Yemen, and that, in turn, could lead to an indirect collision with Iran. The Spanish government's reluctance to assume the risks of being embroiled in a likely pointless war against Houthis and their Iranian backers is understandable, particularly given that Madrid also wants a ceasefire in Gaza.While Spain may have been the most explicit in its reluctance to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Houthis, it is by no means the only U.S. ally harboring reservations. Notably, France, the EU's militarily most capable state, refused to join the White House-led January 3 statement. Italy, although signed that statement, is not committing itself to fighting under the U.S. command. Other NATO allies, like Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, only agreed to send token military personnel. In the end, the whole project looks more like a U.S.–UK undertaking than a real coalition of allies and like-minded partners.Instead of causing division and stoking tensions with its allies over the prospects of a highly questionable (to say the least) military operation, the Biden administration should deploy its leverage to get Israel to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and abandonment of any temptation to expand the war to Lebanon. If the Houthis continue their attacks in the Red Sea after a ceasefire, then the U.S. and its allies will have full legitimacy to strike back. For now, however, alienating allies like Spain and France by pandering to the most extreme Israeli government in history certainly isn't a price worth paying.

To punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Western governments froze the assets of the Russian Central Bank, Russian financial persons, and officials in the amount of approximately $330 billion. They are now seeking to use these funds to help pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine and help compensate for some of the enormous costs incurred by the West in this war.From the outset, the seizure of these assets has raised serious legal concerns that have made their use to fund reparations both difficult and controversial. The ensuing legal battles will no doubt last decades, while doing nothing to actually help people in Ukraine. Moreover, since most Russians find the idea of using their purloined assets to serve Western geopolitical objectives "highly offensive," it will add yet another body blow to a relationship already fraught with recriminations.I would therefore like to present an alternative approach that, while it may not satisfy the lust for vengeance, might actually serve to promote both reconstruction and reconciliation. Expanding on ideas that Ted Snider and I recently proposed for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, I suggest that seized Russian assets be restored to Russia, de jure. This would be an essential first step in restoring the faith of investors in the legal underpinnings of the international financial system. Beyond that, de facto, and as an essential part of healing the wounds of war as quickly as possible, Russia should then be invited to invest these resources in rebuilding Ukraine. Historically, Russia has always been Ukraine's largest investor, dwarfing the EU. Dmitry Medvedev, then Russia's prime minister, put the cumulative value of the tariff waivers, trade preferences, and gas subsidies that Ukraine received from Russia between 1991 and 2014 at roughly $250 billion. Over this same period, Western financial institutions promised Ukraine $62 billion in aid, but actually disbursed less than half this amount. The loss of Russian investment was thus a terrible blow to the Ukrainian economy, especially since comparable Western investments never materialized. Since 2014, Russia has committed significant resources to the reconstruction of Donbass and Crimea, and is making ambitious plans to do so again in the newly annexed territories of Ukraine — a strong indication of its interest in investing in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. Conversely, Russia is as unlikely to want to rebuild those regions of Ukraine that are openly antagonistic to it, as the West has been to rebuild Donbass and Crimea. But while Russia and the West already have plans to invest in their preferred parts of Ukraine, it has proven difficult to raise the enormous sums of money needed — by some estimates, as much as one trillion dollars. This problem would be much easier to solve if the task of reconstruction were regarded as a joint endeavor. Perhaps as part of a final and comprehensive peace settlement, a UN fund could be set up for the reconstruction of Ukraine as a whole, under which both Russian and Western aid and investments could be managed and coordinated — a good model, potentially, for post-war cooperation in other areas. A symbiotic division of labor might then ensue, whereby the West could use its funds to rebuild western and central Ukraine, while Russia could use its funds to rebuild eastern and southern Ukraine. This proposal stems from my conviction that any successful Ukrainian reconstruction program should conceive of assistance to Ukraine not as a vehicle for punishing or manipulating Russia, but rather for healing and reintegration. This approach should be applied first within Ukraine itself, to help heal its persistent regional divisions (which are still very deep, as President Zelensky himself recently acknowledged), and eventually expanded to encompass Ukraine, Russia, and all of Europe. Since Ukraine is, in any case, destined to remain an object of geopolitical competition, it is important to find creative ways for this competition to manifest itself in constructive, rather than destructive ways. If, as both sides claim, they are competing for the hearts and minds of the people, then let them compete in generosity.Some might object that such a division of labor would create mutually exclusive economic dependencies that could lead, ultimately, to Ukraine's partition. I would argue, however, that such a partition is far more likely under the current approach to post-war reconstruction, which envisages using Western funds to assist only those regions of Ukraine that are under Kyiv's control. By contrast, if cross-border trade is allowed to serve its natural function of encouraging mutual interaction, partition would become far less likely. It is worth recalling that it was Kyiv's refusal to resume full commercial and banking ties with Donbass, despite these being a key stipulation in the Minsk-2 Accords, that contributed to the grievances that led in turn to the present conflict. But the internal re-knitting of Ukraine through commerce would be only the first of many potential benefits. The positive impact of the restoration of trade ties would soon be felt over the entire European continent, especially if Ukraine (or at least its most damaged regions) were afforded a special economic status that allowed both EU and Russian/CIS goods to pass freely between Europe and Eurasia.Of course, extremists on both sides will immediately object to such a compromise. Those who say, "punish Russia, come what may," will argue that justice must triumph over all other considerations. Meanwhile, those who cry, "to Hell with the West, our cause is just," will argue that sovereignty must prevail at all costs. But those who can tolerate some untidiness in their world should welcome such a compromise, since it offers both immediate and tangible assistance to those who need it most—the long-suffering people of Ukraine.

On Tuesday, Polish President Andrzej Duda delivered an emphatic speech in support of Ukraine on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly.
"This brutal war must end, and not be converted into a frozen war," Duda declared from the rostrum. "This can only be done by restoring the full territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders!"
"If someone attacks your household, you have the right to defend it, and the neighbors should not stay indifferent," he continued. "Ukraine would not be able to resist the aggression and effectively stand for its independence if it were not for the assistance of other countries."
That tone, characteristic of Poland's approach to the war to date, changed quickly after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia of helping Russia by banning imports of Ukrainian grain in response to complaints by local farmers over unfair competition.
The comments led Poland to summon Ukraine's ambassador to Warsaw for a diplomatic dressing down, followed by a public version from the Polish president himself.
"Ukraine is behaving like a drowning person clinging to anything available," Duda told reporters later on Tuesday."A drowning person is extremely dangerous, capable of pulling you down to the depths."
Poland appeared to up the ante further on Wednesday when Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said, in response to a question about whether the grain dispute would affect Poland's support for Ukraine, that Warsaw is "no longer transferring weapons to Ukraine, because we are now arming Poland with more modern weapons."
It remains unclear whether the apparent policy shift is related to the dispute, but the timing of the comments has drawn significant concern from the West.
To some degree, the contours of this spat should come as no surprise. While European countries have shown a remarkable willingness to accept economic pain to support Ukraine, observers have long worried that this steadfastness would fade as the war drags on.
"[A]lways look at history, geography and interests as both sides see them," wrote Gerard Araud, a former French UN ambassador, on X. "International relations are anything but romantic. Poland and Ukraine are only united by the existence of a common enemy."
In this case, Polish leadership is more concerned with impressing voters ahead of elections next month when Duda's Law and Justice party hopes to stave off a challenge from the Civic Coalition, an increasingly popular center-right bloc. The Law and Justice party reportedly hopes to bolster support among farmers by responding decisively to their concerns about Ukrainian grain.
Though the agriculture ministers from Poland and Ukraine have said they will "work out an option to cooperate on export issues in the near future," it appears likely that grain issues will continue to create friction between the two countries.
Meanwhile, a larger challenge to Western unity is brewing in Slovakia, where leftist former Prime Minister Robert Fico looks poised to return to power in elections later this month. Fico has said that, if he wins, he would block arms shipments to Ukraine and prevent Kyiv from joining NATO.
"It's naive to think that Russia would leave Crimea," Fico recently told the Associated Press. "It's naive to think that Russia would ever abandon the territory it controls."
His position is, to a large extent, a reflection of Slovakia's ambivalence toward the causes of the conflict. While most Western countries firmly blame Russia for the war, fully 51 percent of Slovaks say Ukraine or the West are responsible.
With Slovakian elections set for September 30, the West will soon face far greater challenges in maintaining unity on Ukraine than at any time since the war began.
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— U.S. President Joe Biden called on world leaders to maintain pressure on Russia to end its war in Ukraine during a speech at the UN, according to the New York Times. "Russia believes that the world will grow weary and allow it to brutalize Ukraine without consequence," Biden said. "We have to stand up to this naked aggression today to deter other would-be aggressors tomorrow." In contrast, a number of Global South leaders, including Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva and Colombian President Gustavo Petro, used their General Assembly speeches to call for talks to end the war in Ukraine.
— Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Biden and a range of other top American officials during a trip to the United States for the UN General Assembly, according to AP News. But, as Blaise Malley recently wrote in RS, the visit was a far cry from the warm welcome Zelensky received in his previous U.S. trip. "Zelensky returns to a vastly changed landscape in Washington Thursday, as a growing number of GOP lawmakers have expressed their reluctance — or outright opposition — to continued funding for Ukraine," Malley reported.
— Mark Milley, Washington's top military official, told CNN that, while he remains hopeful about Ukraine's counteroffensive, the larger goal of expelling all Russian troops from the country is "a very high bar." "It's going to take a long time to do it," Milley argued. The comments come as the mood around the chances of Ukrainian military success continues to sour, with even mainstream outlets like the New York Times giving dour takes on the future of the war. "The currency of the counteroffensive is ammunition, vehicles and human lives," Times reporters Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Lauren Leatherby wrote on Wednesday. "This is what is certain: More people will die, more buildings will burn and the surrounding farmlands will be seeded with land mines [sic] and unexploded shells that probably will take decades to clear."
U.S. State Department news:The State Department did not hold a press briefing this week.

Foreign policy mandarins have spent years fighting over what to make of former President Donald Trump. At heart, is he a hawk or a dove? Does he hope to be a new Nixon, capable of seeking detente with enemies despite (or even because of) his mean streak? Or perhaps a new Reagan, focused on achieving "peace through strength"?I might ask it a different way: Who cares? New political science research suggests that Trump's personal views are not the most important part of the puzzle. In short, it's the advisers, stupid. This may sound like received wisdom, but its implications are profound. Researchers created an unprecedented dataset of minutes from presidential meetings related to foreign policy during the Cold War. Using complex statistical methods, they found that the relative hawkishness of a president's advisers is a remarkably good predictor of whether a leader will make "conflictual decisions" regarding an adversary.The differences can be stark. If you assemble the most hawkish group of presidential advisers from the Cold War, the model predicts they would make six times as many aggressive choices as the least hawkish group. Over the course of a presidency, that could mean hundreds of extra moves liable to spark new conflicts or escalate simmering disputes."Who dominates the room [...] does seem to have a systematic effect" on whether presidents choose hawkish or dovish paths, said Tyler Jost, a professor at Brown University who co-led the project.Now, Trump has a unique opportunity. The new research finds that hawkishness is surprisingly consistent from administration to administration; in fact, it varies more within administrations than between them — a statistical testament to the power of the so-called foreign policy "blob." Perhaps more than any president in recent memory, Trump has the chance to ditch advocates of global primacy and hire proponents of a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.Indeed, the former president is spoiled for choice. Most candidates for posts in a new Trump administration now agree that Washington should shift its focus to Asia by pursuing real retrenchment in Europe and the Middle East. Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) — a close Trump ally and top vice presidential candidate — has slammed U.S. military adventurism, called for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, and even voted in favor of removing U.S. troops from Syria in December.New think tanks have popped up to support this viewpoint, and some old conservative stalwarts have refashioned themselves as America Firsters who want to help shape a different, more populist vision of U.S. foreign policy. These groups are creating staffing pipelines for a new brand of conservative foreign policy, and the consequences of their investment could go far beyond 2024.The transition battleThe Heritage Foundation wants you to know that it's changed. Once a premier home for neocons and uber hawks, the eminence grise of conservative politics now loudly calls for the U.S. to pull back from the Middle East and Europe, all while railing against inefficient military spending.Heritage's shift reflects broader changes in the conservative movement dating back to Trump's first election in 2016. "The real America First foreign policy position recognizes that the last few decades were characterized by a series of blunders," argued Micah Meadowcroft, the research director at the conservative Center for Renewing America (CRA) and a former staffer in the Trump White House. "Our leadership class messed up badly" during the so-called unipolar moment by launching a global crusade against terrorism and ignoring China's rise, Meadowcroft told RS.Conservative realists hope that recognizing this shift will allow the U.S. to focus all of its attention on preparing for — and hopefully deterring — a war with China over Taiwan. "China remains the single greatest threat to American interests in the world today, and we just haven't been acting like it," said Alex Velez-Green, a former adviser to Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) now based at Heritage. "My view is that a new administration will really need to prioritize it."The key question is how to strike a balance between deterrence and provocation. Velez-Green draws on a "peace through strength" tradition exemplified by Elbridge Colby, a prominent China hawk who appears poised to get a major role in a new Trump administration. While all hope to avoid war, other realists have argued for a more conservative approach to Beijing's rise.Regardless of the reasons behind this broader shift, conservatives have made big investments in order to shape its path. The most influential effort is Heritage's Project 2025, an initiative that has raised millions of dollars to identify potential staffers for a second Trump administration and plan policies to help vault it back into the White House.For supporters of a more restrained foreign policy, Project 2025 has a lot to offer. While any Heritage program is bound to make up a big tent of conservative views, "the leadership of Project 2025 is a lot more aligned to a more Trumpian strain of America First, which is a more narrow, national-interest oriented idea," said Sumantra Maitra of the CRA, who has advised on the effort. Will Ruger, who Trump nominated as his ambassador to Afghanistan, welcomed Heritage's shift toward a "much more prudential approach to American foreign policy."But there are still some reasons to doubt Heritage's restraint bona fides. Project 2025's transition manifesto makes clear that the conservative tone setter is not quite ready to drop its commitment to fighting global terrorism and keeping down America's parochial enemies, however weak they may now be.Of course, Heritage is far from the only game in town. Its foreign policy team has often found common cause with the CRA, a right-wing think tank with restraint-oriented views on international affairs that Maitra said will be a "key player" in the planning for a second Trump term. Trump himself reportedly read and at least partially endorsed Maitra's CRA paper calling for a major down-sizing of the U.S. role in NATO.On the other side, traditional hawks at organizations like the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institute continue to hold sway in both mainstream and conservative media, as Meadowcroft pointed out. But many prominent hard-line hawks — like one-time Trump adviser John Bolton — have had a sufficiently large break with the MAGA movement to make them persona non grata in any future Trump White House.The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) appears determined to split the difference. Like Heritage, AFPI has questioned the wisdom of continued U.S. aid to Ukraine and pushed hard for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of its own defense. But the startup policy outfit — created as something of a White House in waiting — has a bit of a neocon streak when it comes to the Middle East, with a particular focus on countering Iranian influence and supporting Israel.There is no love lost between Heritage and AFPI, as journalist Sam Adler-Bell recently noted in the New York Times. "A.F.P.I. partisans see Heritage as a latecomer to the Trump train, establishment wolves in 'America First' clothing," Adler-Bell wrote. "Some at Heritage see A.F.P.I. as a redoubt of precisely those unreliable Trump appointees — grifters and RINOs — who trade on their relationships with the president to ensure they can continue to run the show." This antipathy helps to explain why AFPI has a separate Trump staffing effort, known as the America First Transition Project.One should note, however, that the two don't always disagree. They share some staff and have both kept strong ties to more traditional foreign policy shops. Part of this stems from the fact that even the more dovish members of the GOP national security world are more hawkish on, say, the Middle East and Venezuela than hard-line realists. But, on balance, restrainers are more skeptical of AFPI than their old foes at Heritage.It remains unclear which side has Trump's ear. AFPI associates — including Fred Fleitz, Keith Kellogg, and John Ratcliffe — often show up on lists of current and potential future Trump advisers. He also reportedly consults with former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), who rank among the most hawkish figures in American politics. (Pompeo's habit of calling himself a "realist" is a particular point of frustration for many America Firsters.)But, as efforts like Project 2025 demonstrate, Trump will no longer be stuck with old-school options on every front. There are no hardcore restrainers known to be in the running for major roles, but the former president is reportedly considering Richard Grenell and Kash Patel — both of whom have a somewhat less interventionist streak — for top jobs in his administration. And, as just about everyone I spoke with noted, there's still plenty of time for other potential nominees to gain ground before the election."The bench is deeper, and therefore there are more folks to turn to if a president wants to go in a restraint direction," said Ruger.Trump 2.0Much of the planning for a second Trump administration revolves around staffing. This laser focus is a response to his first term, in which advisers and officials often took steps to block the implementation of the president's preferred policies.Take Syria. When Trump ordered that U.S. troops be withdrawn from the country in 2019, the move sparked an uproar among policy experts who argued that it would leave our Kurdish allies in the lurch. Jim Jeffrey — then the special envoy to Syria — persuaded Trump to leave a token force in the country but later revealed that "we were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there."Trump world is looking to make sure that never happens again. Heritage wants a new administration to make sweeping personnel changes that would allow Trump to replace thousands of federal bureaucrats with more sympathetic cadres.This is both an opportunity and a challenge for restrainers. On the "challenge" side, Trump has increasingly signaled that he wants to use military force against Mexican cartels, a proposal that most realists reject as dangerous and counterproductive. And, as Jost of Brown University notes, presidents don't just select their advisers based on hawkishness. They have to make decisions about which advisers will appease which constituencies in their base, among other considerations. In Trump's case, loyalty to the president appears to be another key criterion.But loyalty to Trump doesn't get your nomination through Congress. For many top jobs, nominees will have to persuade the old-school hawks in the Senate that they won't change too much about the status quo. Restraint-oriented nominees will, however, get help from the growing group of young America Firsters on Capitol Hill, not to mention the changing of the guard symbolized by Sen. Mitch McConnell's (R-Ky.) decision to step down from leadership.It will be up to Trump to decide whether he picks less controversial candidates for these positions or simply relies on "acting" appointees, as he did at the end of his first term. The former president will have much more room to maneuver when it comes to the National Security Council, whose leaders don't require confirmation.These challenges aside, the decisions that Trump makes in a potential second term could have a massive, lasting impact on the direction of conservative foreign policy. To better understand how, a quick history lesson is in order.In 2007, Democratic foreign policy big wigs founded the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a hawkish center-left think tank first conceived as a government in waiting for Hillary Clinton. When Barack Obama beat Clinton in the primaries, he made the fateful decision to soften his stance on the Iraq War and staff up his team with CNAS acolytes.The CNAS crew — in addition to Clinton herself — earned powerful roles in Obama's administration that allowed them to steer the president away from his anti-war rhetoric on the campaign trail. The result was a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on where you stand. The more hawkish CNAS staffers got coveted government experience (and connections) that put weight behind their arguments. Once they left government, they took their place as the sages of liberal foreign policy, with many returning in 2020 to staff the Biden administration.Obama's decision may have been practical. The progressive foreign policy landscape was, and in many ways still is, short on funding and candidates for high-level jobs. But Trump has the virtue of a genuine choice. The former president probably won't reject staffers based on their hawkishness — but perhaps he should. Research suggests it just might prevent the next war before it happens.

In a December 8 story that seems to have received little attention in western press coverage of Israel's expanding military campaign in Gaza was this nugget of information: Israel's military expects combat operations to continue until the end of January, "followed by a three-to-nine-month lower grade insurgency." Reported by the Jerusalem Post, an English daily whose correspondents appear to have good ties to the Israel Defense Forces, this prediction likely rang alarm bells in the Biden administration. The White House is well aware of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's promise to do whatever it takes to "destroy" Hamas. But beyond doubting that this goal is feasible, US officials likely have concluded that Israel is not capable of pursuing its campaign in Gaza without killing many more Palestinian civilians, or is not ready to do so. With the threat of disease and starvation growing as Gazans flee to the south in a nearly hopeless search for safety, the prospect of a major crisis in US-Israel relations is growing. Thus while Israeli leaders applauded the White House's veto of last week's United Nations Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, they know that the Biden administration supports a wider political and diplomatic approach that Israel's current government—as Netanyahu has stated—totally rejects.On December 12, President Joe Biden showed clear dissatisfaction with the Israeli government and Netanyahu. In remarks to donors, Biden reportedly said that Israel is losing support around the world because of how it is conducting the Gaza war. He also reportedly said that Netanyahu "has to change" and that the Prime Minister rejects the two-state solution on which the president has staked his approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This gap between the US and Israeli positions on the Gaza crisis is partly a consequence of the contradictory signals that the White House sent Israel in the first weeks following Hamas's October 7 assault. In addition to Biden's "bear hug" of Netanyahu—a leader for whom he has little love—US officials, including the President, signaled a kind of muddled ambivalence when it came to pressing Israel to limit the ferocity of its bombing campaign.In addition to Biden's "bear hug" of Netanyahu—a leader for whom he has little love—US officials, including the President, signaled a kind of muddled ambivalence when it came to pressing Israel to limit the ferocity of its bombing campaign.Still, it seemed that the November 24-December 1 truce might open the door to a wider diplomatic initiative led by the United States and backed by its Arab allies. But the efforts of the White House to prevent the resumption of hostilities failed for many reasons, not least of which was Israel's determination to "finish the job." Fearing the worst, the White House secured a promise from Israel that it would take new measures to limit civilian casualties. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's December 7 statement, however, that "there does remain a gap between…the intent to protect civilians and the actual results that we're seeing on the ground" underscored the administration's unhappiness with Israel's ensuing assault on southern Gaza. And it pointed to a far bigger problem, namely the White House's failure so far to secure an Israeli approval of a postwar plan for Gaza that involves the Palestinian Authority. For Washington, Netanyahu's singular and relentless focus on military tactics represents a strategic nightmare.National Rage and Political EvasionThere are at least two related reasons why Netanyahu's government has steadfastly avoided any hint of an ultimate political strategy toward Gaza.First, there is the impact of the continuing hostage crisis on the Israeli public. The vivid testimonies coming from some of the 105 hostages who were freed during the humanitarian pause have filled Israel's media, magnifying the outrage generated by the October 7 atrocities. Shocking accounts of Hamas's use of sexual violence against women and men has steeled the resolve of Israelis to support the war. That it took some two months for UN agencies and other international groups to clearly condemn the reported assaults and to call for investigations has only reinforced Israelis' view that they should circle the wagons and defy international pressures for a ceasefire. With the furious public fixated on revenge, Israel's government has felt no pressure to articulate any agenda beyond destroying Hamas.Second, by creating a five-member war cabinet—including opposition leaders Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, a former general whose son was killed on December 7 in Gaza—Netanyahu has restricted decision-making to a small group that has only one game plan for which he, of course, is the chief spokesman. But while this arrangement may allow Netanyahu to survive another day or week, or perhaps months, it has not prevented ultra-hardline members of the larger cabinet to issue calls for expelling Palestinians from Gaza. The Prime Minister's spokesman has denied that Israel has any such intentions. But in light of the war cabinet's reluctance to address the "day after" question—not to mention the reality that some 1.8 million Gazans have fled their homes—Arab officials have expressed growing fears that Israel is pursuing a new Nakba. That Vice President Kamala Harris has warned that "under no circumstances" will the United States tolerate the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza suggests that the Biden administration shares these worries.Against the background of Israel's expanding operations in northern and southern Gaza, the administration has been trying to mobilize regional support for a plan to place postwar Gaza under the control of a "revitalized" Palestinian Authority.Indeed, against the background of Israel's expanding operations in northern and southern Gaza, the administration has been trying to mobilize regional support for a plan to place postwar Gaza under the control of a "revitalized" Palestinian Authority (PA) so that, in Blinken's words, "we can get on the path to a just, lasting and secure peace for Israelis and Palestinians." Seeing such an effort as a step toward some kind of Palestinian statehood (a goal that President Biden has repeatedly endorsed over the past six weeks), Netanyahu has categorically rejected any notion of putting Gaza under the PA's supervision. Yet his failure to clarify the ultimate goal of Israel's military campaign is feeding concerns in Israel that despite explicit reassurances of staunch US support for the military campaign—most recently telegraphed in the White House's decision to bypass Congress in resupplying Israel with 14,000 rounds of tank munitions—the United States and Israel are on a collision course.The Government Should "Stop Playing Politics" Concerns over such a clash have prompted calls from Israeli opinion leaders for Netanyahu's government to articulate a "day after" agenda. While as might be predicted, some of these calls have come from the left or center left, more conservative figures have chimed in. Writing in the Jerusalem Post on December 8, one such commentator, Yaakov Katz, reminded his readers that in addition to warnings from Harris and Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III cautioned Israel that by pursuing military operations killing thousands of civilians, Israel may drive Gazans into the hands of Hamas and thus courting "strategic defeat." According to Katz, such US statements demonstrate that "while the US has held off on calling for a comprehensive cease fire…there is no doubt in Jerusalem that such a call is growing closer"—and with it, a potential clash over the fundamental question of where Gaza will fit into a revived peace process. To avoid or at least minimize this clash, Katz argued that "Israel needs to put forward a plant for the 'day after' that "includes some sort of diplomatic engagement with the Palestinian Authority." At the same time, Katz contended that Americans need to undergo their own transformation by not creating unrealistic expectations about a two-state solution in the absence of "an Anwar Sadat-like leader on the Palestinian side."Katz apparently does not feel that Netanyahu can be trusted to prevent such a clash, as the Prime Minister is only "playing politics." But given the still-enormous gap between US and Israeli positions on the future of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank, it is difficult to imagine how the author's call for Israel to "coordinate with the US" on devising a common plan would amount to little more than an exercise in kicking the can down the road. This, of course, is what the author advocates. But it is far from clear that the Biden administration ultimately will be prepared to put a band aid on what is a deepening diplomatic wound between the United States and Israel.Despite or perhaps because of these clashing visions, it appears that Israel's war cabinet has concluded that it is time to begin fashioning some kind of diplomatic-political strategy. Commenting on the subject, one Israeli analyst noted that while Netanyahu recently has formed a committee to decide on strategies for postwar Gaza, "devising a feasible plan that can gain acceptance in this current government will be a significant challenge."For Israel, the United States, and the region, the other important "day after" could be on the morning following new elections and the subsequent formation of a new Israeli government. That is putting it mildly. Giving a committee the task of settling on strategies for Gaza after the war feels more like a bureaucratic evasion than a serious effort to come to grips with another fundamental strategic question at hand. It may well be that this Israeli government will not be able to seriously address this challenge. For Israel, the United States, and the region, the other important "day after" could be on the morning following new elections and the subsequent formation of a new Israeli government. But the lasting tremors of October 7 could produce a government that is as far right as the current one. Regardless of when this other day after happens, it is clear that the United States and Israel are at loggerheads.An Endless Insurgency?However real, the brewing conflict between the United States and Israel has been obscured by a basic contradiction in the Biden administration's approach to the Gaza conflict. On the one hand, it seems evident that the administration expects Israel to deal Hamas a decisive military blow that will make it possible, with the backing of Arab states and the international community, to pursue new efforts to broker Palestinian-Israeli peace. On the other hand, the calamitous effects of Israel's military campaign on Gaza's civilian population have created a diplomatic dilemma for the administration that it cannot tolerate much longer. Thus it is possible that sooner rather than later the White House will support a revised ceasefire plan at the United Nations.It is precisely this prospect that has impelled Israel to accelerate its military operations in the hope that it can dismantle Hamas's military and political infrastructure before US patience runs out. Yet, even if it achieves this goal, Israel may face a Hamas insurgency that could last months, if not years. It is hard to imagine how this expectation can be squared with any serious strategy for addressing the political future of Gaza. Moreover, as several analysts have argued, while Israeli leaders hope that Gazans will blame Hamas's leaders for the current catastrophe as much as if not more than they blame Israel, the continuing onslaught may spur many more young Gazans to join Hamas, thus spawning a guerilla campaign that could have Israeli soldiers fighting and dying in an endless battle. Such an outcome would represent a victory for Hamas or whatever group succeeds it, especially if it unfolds in the maelstrom of a wider regional war.While Israeli leaders hope that Gazans will blame Hamas's leaders for the current catastrophe as much as if not more than they blame Israel, the continuing onslaught may spur many more young Gazans to join Hamas.For the United States and its Arab allies, the possibility of this unwarranted scenario is as real as it is unacceptable. To avoid it, the Biden administration might try to fashion a diplomatic achievement, perhaps by brokering a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations. It may be that the prospect of normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia will shake up Israel's traumatized polity in ways that open the door for the kind of solutions not currently on the horizon. But if there is going to be an Abraham Accords Round Two—one that is about real peacemaking rather than the joys of celebrating Chanukah in Dubai—President Biden will have to back an Israeli-Palestinian game plan that may cause unprecedented tensions in the US-Israeli strategic partnership.This article has been republished with permission from Arab Center Washington DC.