Suchergebnisse

A world government based on democratic principles would be ideal, but this is unlikely to come about any time soon. However, the mere impossibility of immediately implementing an idea does not make that idea wrong. Meanwhile one can work through existing institutions such as the UN and European Union to improve accountability in the arena of world politics. Adapted from the source document.

Twenty percent of the Swedish laws & amendments are directly governed by binding EC decisions, directives & regulations. Another 10 percent are connected with the EU or the EC. That is the result of a study examining all new laws & amendments passed by the Swedish Parliament during the years 1998-2003. By investigating the government bills behind the 3,449 acts, the researcher has analyzed to what extent the bills are designed to implement binding EC legislation or remove obstacles & conflicts between national & EC law, & to what extent the legislation is in any way influenced by the EU membership. This is one of few studies that make a quantitative survey of the power that the European Union wields over Swedish democratic institutions. After ten years of EU membership, the "power transferred from Stockholm to Brussels" is still a big issue in the domestic debate concerning the European Union. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with the allez and retour provisions (Claes 2005: 84 f) of the Swedish constitution in relation to IU membership. What are the rules governing the transfer of sovereignty to the Union? And what are the provisions for assessing the constitutionality of the incoming tide of Union law into the domestic legal order? I have three objects in this essay. First, to describe how these two groups of constitutional rules were actually modified in the 2010 revision of the 1974 Instrument of Government. 1 find that neither was changed in any material way. Second, to try to explain the apparent reluctance of the parties involved to clarify the constitutional implications of EU membership. I find that this reluctance is rooted in a belief that European integration is not furthered if the rules contained in the allez and retour provisions are made stricter and more precise. Third, to confront a question conspicuously omitted by the parties in their revision: namely, by what criterion should the allez. and retour provisions be intertwined, if an optimum of hi-level constitutionalism is to be achieved? I argue that, in the end, the underlying issue is whether Swedish citizens want to see the principle of free movement applied as widely as possible. Do they want this principle to be applied across the board? Or would they prefer instead to restrict its application to the case of capital and goods, thus leaving them free to structure the labour market and welfare state as they themselves see fit? Adapted from the source document.