Suchergebnisse

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

While Member States retain direct tax sovereignity and determine the tax, its base, rate, taxable subjects discretionary, fundamental differencies occur, resulting in market fragmentation and big obstacles for effective functioning of Community internal market. These differencies and the gap between harmonization in direct taxes and other spheres stipulate the need of harmonization and pressure for the Member States. However, the sole harmonization base requires the Council to act unanimously (starting from year 2004 – by consent of 27 states). This de facto blocks the law-making of compulsory acts and leads to stagnation of political decisions. Contrary to positive integration, negative integration (mostly founded on prohibitions to restrict free movement) proceeds rapidly, while in the meantime the number of cases solved by European Court of Justice (ECJ) and infringement procedures initiated by Commision which ensure the spread of ECJ cases' ratio decidendi is constantly growing. ECJ when providing the decisions applies overall approach: evaluation of one Member State's laws means taking into account the whole situation, including the laws of other related Member State and their inter-tax treaties. Therefore the same law is liable to be restrictive in relation to the laws of Member State A, but not restrictive in relation with the laws of Member State B. This doctrine is based under the Cassis de Dijon principle of mutual recognition: Member State is obliged to consider the laws of other Member State. This notwithstanding, in direct taxation this principle is not reasonable: it seriously breaks Member States' sovereignity (makes direct tax systems dependant on each other) and in practice leads nowhere thus creates destabilization. The fact accepted by ECJ in Kerckhaert Morres that international double taxation does not contradict to EC law is too separate to compare with the whole doctine that it would be able to deny the tendency of application of the principle of mutual recognition in direct taxation. Even more – it expressly shows the conflicts in doctrine of ECJ itself. ECJ ad hoc rapid and chaotic activity in the field of direct taxation not even becomes the potential background for positive integration (Commision in its proposals for laws expressly agrees with ECJ ratio decidendi without any doubt), but in principle pursues positive integration itself: new rules not encompassed by even broadly interpreted boundaries of the EC law prohibitions are created. The sole active strategic aim starting from 2001 to establish common consolidated corporate tax base is ultima ratio measure which is difficult to evaluate: even if a part of Member States would agree on basic principles, enhanced cooperation de facto would be a pressure for sovereignity of other Member States. Thus it is probably that they will submit it due to negative consequences to be experienced in case of refusal. Or, as an alternative, Europe à la carte fiscale will be created, which in the essence is contradictory to the whole nature of the internal market. However, following the position of the ECJ expressed to integration, this initiative is possible to defend de jure.

While Member States retain direct tax sovereignity and determine the tax, its base, rate, taxable subjects discretionary, fundamental differencies occur, resulting in market fragmentation and big obstacles for effective functioning of Community internal market. These differencies and the gap between harmonization in direct taxes and other spheres stipulate the need of harmonization and pressure for the Member States. However, the sole harmonization base requires the Council to act unanimously (starting from year 2004 – by consent of 27 states). This de facto blocks the law-making of compulsory acts and leads to stagnation of political decisions. Contrary to positive integration, negative integration (mostly founded on prohibitions to restrict free movement) proceeds rapidly, while in the meantime the number of cases solved by European Court of Justice (ECJ) and infringement procedures initiated by Commision which ensure the spread of ECJ cases' ratio decidendi is constantly growing. ECJ when providing the decisions applies overall approach: evaluation of one Member State's laws means taking into account the whole situation, including the laws of other related Member State and their inter-tax treaties. Therefore the same law is liable to be restrictive in relation to the laws of Member State A, but not restrictive in relation with the laws of Member State B. This doctrine is based under the Cassis de Dijon principle of mutual recognition: Member State is obliged to consider the laws of other Member State. This notwithstanding, in direct taxation this principle is not reasonable: it seriously breaks Member States' sovereignity (makes direct tax systems dependant on each other) and in practice leads nowhere thus creates destabilization. The fact accepted by ECJ in Kerckhaert Morres that international double taxation does not contradict to EC law is too separate to compare with the whole doctine that it would be able to deny the tendency of application of the principle of mutual recognition in direct taxation. Even more – it expressly shows the conflicts in doctrine of ECJ itself. ECJ ad hoc rapid and chaotic activity in the field of direct taxation not even becomes the potential background for positive integration (Commision in its proposals for laws expressly agrees with ECJ ratio decidendi without any doubt), but in principle pursues positive integration itself: new rules not encompassed by even broadly interpreted boundaries of the EC law prohibitions are created. The sole active strategic aim starting from 2001 to establish common consolidated corporate tax base is ultima ratio measure which is difficult to evaluate: even if a part of Member States would agree on basic principles, enhanced cooperation de facto would be a pressure for sovereignity of other Member States. Thus it is probably that they will submit it due to negative consequences to be experienced in case of refusal. Or, as an alternative, Europe à la carte fiscale will be created, which in the essence is contradictory to the whole nature of the internal market. However, following the position of the ECJ expressed to integration, this initiative is possible to defend de jure.

The article covers the foundation, historical development, current situation and future of the European Parliament. The scientific analysis is based on a multidisciplinary approach with emphasis on the political role of the institution as it is starting to play a central role in the European integration. The future of the EU parliament is a key question for the future of the Union and is addressed by different proposals developed in this article.

The article covers the foundation, historical development, current situation and future of the European Parliament. The scientific analysis is based on a multidisciplinary approach with emphasis on the political role of the institution as it is starting to play a central role in the European integration. The future of the EU parliament is a key question for the future of the Union and is addressed by different proposals developed in this article.

The article covers the foundation, historical development, current situation and future of the European Parliament. The scientific analysis is based on a multidisciplinary approach with emphasis on the political role of the institution as it is starting to play a central role in the European integration. The future of the EU parliament is a key question for the future of the Union and is addressed by different proposals developed in this article.

The most important source of financial expenses which gives capital means for various purposes is taxes. The way of harmonyzing taxes became important after abolishment of borders control and abolishment of trade restriction and different duties. By this process we seek equal competition rights between EU partners who repeal impediments for taxes. Moreover, we seek to accelerate integration process. EU does not have general taxes politics that is why every state member formates it's own tax politics according to EU directives, regulations and other documents. Each state member must apply such tax system which will not allow to distort competition, which will guarantee the functioning of common market and equal taxes to all economy subjects. There is a necessity to unify taxes because different taxes make a huge damage to competition. People will choose such countries, where load of taxes is not so big, other counties are going to have big problems with budget's incoms. The object of this research is tax system. The big load of taxes prevent production growth, stimulate the growth of shade economics expansion and tax hiding. By joining EU Lithuania commited to harmonize VAT taxes and excise taxes. Also other administration systems of taxes were harmonyzed. The advantages for Lithuania for joining EU: coordination of tax system with practice of EU in tax system; usual and easier business conditions for small and medium bussiness companies; the growth of budget incomes because of abolishment of VAT privilege; the tax system was created and tariffs were harmonyzed. On the other hand, there are some disadvantages: higher excise taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and gas will increase the price of products, abolishment of VAT privilige.

The most important source of financial expenses which gives capital means for various purposes is taxes. The way of harmonyzing taxes became important after abolishment of borders control and abolishment of trade restriction and different duties. By this process we seek equal competition rights between EU partners who repeal impediments for taxes. Moreover, we seek to accelerate integration process. EU does not have general taxes politics that is why every state member formates it's own tax politics according to EU directives, regulations and other documents. Each state member must apply such tax system which will not allow to distort competition, which will guarantee the functioning of common market and equal taxes to all economy subjects. There is a necessity to unify taxes because different taxes make a huge damage to competition. People will choose such countries, where load of taxes is not so big, other counties are going to have big problems with budget's incoms. The object of this research is tax system. The big load of taxes prevent production growth, stimulate the growth of shade economics expansion and tax hiding. By joining EU Lithuania commited to harmonize VAT taxes and excise taxes. Also other administration systems of taxes were harmonyzed. The advantages for Lithuania for joining EU: coordination of tax system with practice of EU in tax system; usual and easier business conditions for small and medium bussiness companies; the growth of budget incomes because of abolishment of VAT privilege; the tax system was created and tariffs were harmonyzed. On the other hand, there are some disadvantages: higher excise taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and gas will increase the price of products, abolishment of VAT privilige.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.